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Mainstream scholarly literature has examined the post-1989 transformations in Eastern 
Europe without sufficient attention to gendered perspectives. Most feminist scholars 
and mainstream political scientists expected that the processes of democratization and 
Europeanization would be harbingers of positive change, and have not fully succeeded 
in explaining the current lack of gender equality in the region. This dissertation 
attempts to fill the gap by combining the insights from ‘Western’ theoretical 
contributions with empirical research of the Polish case. By drawing on multiple 
theoretical angles (post-colonialism, nationalism and gender, feminist institutionalism, 
feminist political economy, Europeanization), I aim to rethink the complex position of 
Poland in the processes of Europeanization and soft norm diffusion. The recent ‘war 
on gender’, which took the form of a virulent anti-equality and anti-minorities 
discursive campaign, has demonstrated that, despite the political and economic 
changes after 1989, gender inequality and social exclusion persist, and indeed may 
have intensified. My research explores the current discursive products and legacies 
(construction of subjects and values) of transformation and Europeanization as 
observed in mainstream political debates. 
This dissertation focuses on debates in the Polish parliament, the Sejm, because it is 
the main site of political discourse in Poland and thus influences also broader societal 
debates. My main argument is that gendered discourses in the Polish parliament 
reproduce patterns of domination and inequality, thereby creating discursive 
categories and subjects that are excluded and marginalized. Dominant discourses on 
masculinity, femininity, and sexuality prescribe a conservative set of social relations 
in the family and the nation. This implies that anyone who does not fulfil these 
discursive standards gets symbolically stigmatized and emerges from the political 
process as a discursive ‘loser’. 
Furthermore, the dissertation argues that the ways in which Europeanization and 
democratization were implemented in Poland, focusing primarily on neoliberal 
economic reforms, have left free rein to right-wing forces and the catholic church to 
define values and subjects. I specifically address the influential role of the catholic 
church in the Polish political context and argue that the anti-gender equality and anti-
diversity mobilizations are cyphers for a broader backlash led by nationalist 
conservative actors against Europeanization and globalization processes.  
My contributions lie in the theoretical and conceptual bridging of various literatures 
(i.e. on transformation and gender) and the application of critical discourse analysis to 
the study of Polish parliamentary debates. Moreover, the thesis exposes invisible and 
‘gender neutral’ norms about subjects and gender roles as constructed in Polish 
politics, with particular focus on welfare and family models and the construction of 
the nation. I highlight hegemonic masculinities and the marginalization or silencing of 
alternative discourses. The analysis provides insights into the mechanisms of gender 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
‘(…) the quality of a society should be measured by the quality of life of its weakest 
members.’ 
Zygmunt Bauman1 
Since the early 1990s and throughout the 2000s, Polish and international political elites 
considered the country as the model story of regime change, democratization, and 
economic transformation. European and international media applauded the Polish 
transformation route, the Europeanizing reforms, and the successes of democratization 
almost univocally in comparison to other countries of the region (at least until the end 
of 2015, when a right-wing Eurosceptic government came to power).2 Also the 
European Commission and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) produced vastly positive reports on Poland’s performance.3  
Within academia, while with less unequivocal praise, mainstream political science 
addressed the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe in the decades after the fall of 
state socialism.4 Without taking gender into account, mainstream political and 
comparative political science initially focused on the teleology of ‘transition’ and later, 
on the successes and failures of the process (Gal and Kligman 2000; Navickaite 2016). 
However, by not including a gendered analysis of politics, major insights concerning 
regime change, democratization, and transformation were lost. These studies were 
                                                 
1 From the ‘Living on Borrowed Time: Conversations with Citlali Rovirosa-Madrazo’ (2010:21). 
2 See for instance: the Financial Times, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/fced9a32-4ec4-11de-
8c10-00144feabdc0 (accessed September 2016); The Economist: 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/ 21605910-poland-just-had-best-25-years-half-millennium-
its-transformation-remains (accessed September 2016); and a bit more nuanced in the Guardian 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/06/poland-economic-progress-social-
inequality (accessed September 2016).  
3 For more details, see the EU and OECD websites, avaialable at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/graphs/2014-10-06_poland_success_story_en.htm (accessed 
September 2016); http://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/212/Polands_successful_ 
transition.html (accessed September 2016). 
4 Being aware of the wide and still on-going academic and political debates concerning the definition 
of the term ‘Eastern Europe’, I will use the concept according to its former understanding – referring 
to the whole of the so-called ‘former Eastern communist bloc’, including all the post-Soviet states, as 
well as the Central and Eastern European former state socialist satellite states that were not formally 
part of the Soviet Union (see a further discussion in chapter 2).   
simply not sufficient and did not explain why the political and economic reforms did 
not produce sufficient positive change in terms of equality, inclusion, and anti-
discrimination.  
 
Therefore, as the opening quote by Zygmunt Bauman suggests, there must have been 
a deeper problem with both the quality and equality of the Polish society that 
manifested itself in the recent elections. Accordingly, the starting point of this study 
and the empirical puzzle that set off this research project was the observation of the 
strongly sexist, chauvinist, and exclusionist language in speeches of politicians, media 
coverage of politics, and parliamentary debates in Poland. A particular focus point was 
the strengthening of reactionary and anti-equality rhetoric in the past five years in 
Polish politics, which came to the fore in April 2012, when the Polish Minister of 
Justice, Jarosław Gowin, refused to sign the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (the so-
called Istanbul Convention). According to Minister Gowin, the document was 
controversial because it went ‘against the family values of most Poles’. He alluded to 
the fact that the Istanbul Convention requires the signatories to fight stereotypical 
gender roles through family policies and education.5 Gowin blamed the foreign 
‘feminist ideology’ that apparently claimed that ‘men and women are the same’.6 He 
was echoing the language of Polish catholic church hierarchs who at the time waged a 
peculiar discursive war on ‘gender ideology’, which can be summarized in a quote by 
bishop Pieronek: ‘(…) the ideology of gender presents a threat worse than Nazism and 
Communism combined’.7 
 
                                                 
5 Art. 12 §1 stipulates: ‘Parties shall take the necessary measures to promote changes in the social and 
cultural patterns of behaviour of women and men with a view to eradicating prejudices, customs, 
traditions and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women or on 
stereotyped roles for women and men.’ Art. 12 §5 calls for: ‘Parties [to] ensure that culture, custom, 
religion, tradition or so-called “honour” shall not be considered as justification for any acts of violence 
covered by the scope of this Convention.’ Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/rms/090000168008482e (accessed June 2016).  
6 For the full story see: http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/gowin-krytycznie-oceniam-konwencje-re-o-
przemocy-wobec-kobiet/kb25j (accessed November 2016). 
7 Quote coming from a conference in 2013, as cited by the article by Sławomir Sierakowski, available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/opinion/sierakowski-the-polish-churchs-gender-
problem.html?_r=0  (accessed November 2016).   
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The following months between 2012 to 2014 saw a virtual avalanche of similar anti-
feminist and anti-gender equality rhetoric. This discourse employed chauvinist, sexist, 
homo- and transphobic elements in order to construct a societal and systemic enemy 
of the nation, the state, and the supposed religious (catholic) identity in the form of 
feminists, ‘genderists’, the ‘homolobby’, and ‘new leftist ideologues’. This sustained 
attack on the ‘ideology of gender’, while undoubtedly connected to more general 
societal-wide acceptance and usage of sexist language, hinted at a broader issue – a 
possible backlash against women’s rights, diversity, and gender equality on the one 
hand and an ultraconservative entrenchment of positions on the other. How can we 
understand these combined efforts in a state that so successfully democratized? What 
work was being done behind the ‘war on gender’? How did it differ from the ‘daily’ 
gender situation in Polish politics?  
 
The rhetoric on ‘gender ideology’ drew on and compounded pre-existing and recurrent 
anti-feminist and anti-equality discourses. Thus, here are discursive examples of the 
‘norm’ in Polish politics. In 2012, Joanna Mucha (then Minister of Sports and 
Tourism) was repeatedly asked whether it was difficult to be an attractive woman in 
politics. A left-wing opposition MP commented on a perceived mistake by Mucha 
saying that she should resign and ‘cheer on from the side’, in case she was pregnant 
and did not have the time to take care of herself. The MP tried to convey the message 
that the assumed (and in reality non-existent) pregnancy addled the minister’s brain. 
In 2013, Janusz Palikot (then prominent opposition MP and leader of the Your 
Movement party) speculated whether the parliament speaker Wanda Nowicka 
‘perhaps desired to be raped’ because she did not want to step down from her post. 
Remarkably, these comments came from supposedly left-leaning and liberal 
politicians from officially pro-women political parties.  
 
In March 2013, the former president and Solidarity icon, Lech Wałęsa, expressed his 
views about homosexuality:8  
Minorities cannot stomp all over the majority. They need to know they are a 
minority and adjust to [having] minor things, instead of climbing to the top 
(…) in order to spoil others (…) I resent that this minority that I don’t agree 
with (…) is protesting in the streets and leads my children and grandchildren 
astray with this minority [stuff] (…) [Homosexual MPs] should sit in the back 
of the plenary room. Or even behind a wall!9  
The rash misogyny aimed at female politicians and women in visible social positions 
generally was not new in Eastern Europe (Krizsan et al. 2014), neither was 
homophobia. In Europe, today, equality has been increasingly conceptualized and 
implemented connecting gender discrimination to different axes of inequality, such as 
race, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, etc. (Krizsan et al. 2014: 53-54). From this 
perspective, Polish politics was rife with discourses derogatory towards ‘other’ groups. 
So, gender dichotomies and binaries were not the only lines of exclusion and 
stigmatization in Polish politics.  
 
In the spring of 2015, when running his re-election campaign, president Bronisław 
Komorowski was asked how it was possible for people to live and to afford an 
apartment when earning a 2,000zł salary a month (ca. £385). Targeting socially 
disadvantaged groups (a sizeable group in Poland), his answer was: ‘Get another job. 
Take out a loan. Have a job. Do you know unemployment is dropping?’10 Komorowski 
displayed what was later considered typical elite alienation from the reality of most 
                                                 
8 Solidarity was the independent trade union movement established through a much lauded 
opposition-government agreement in 1980. It is credited with ‘toppling’ state socialism in Poland in 
1989. For more details see for example: Ost (1990, 2005), Penn (2006), Kubik (1994). 
9 Quote in the original: ‘Oni muszą wiedzieć, że są mniejszością i muszą się do mniejszych rzeczy 
przystosować. A nie wchodzić na największe szczyty, na największe godziny, największe prowokacje, 
żeby psuć tych innych, albo wybierać z tej większości (…) Ja sobie nie życzę, żeby ta mniejszość, z 
którą się nie zgadzam (...) wychodziła na ulice i moje dzieci i moje wnuki bałamuciła jakimiś tam 
mniejszościami (…) w polskim Sejmie homoseksualiści powinni siedzieć w ostatniej ławie sali 
plenarnej, a nie gdzieś na przodzie. Available at: http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/walesa-
ostro-o-homoseksualistach-oni-musza-wiedziec-ze-sa-mniejszoscia,309290.html (accessed November 
2016).  
10 Quote in the original: ‘Znaleźć inną. Wziąć kredyt. Mieć pracę. Wiesz, że w Polsce spada 
bezrobocie?’ Available at: http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1329,title,Znalezc-inna-prace-wziac-kredyt-
internet-o-radach-Komorowskiego,wid,17534509,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=118222 (accessed 
November 2016).  
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Poles’ lives. In a situation when more than half of the population earned below the 
average wage, Komorowski’s complacency and self-satisfaction arguably cost him the 
presidential re-election.  
What is more, economic exclusionism was compounded by open racism and 
xenophobia in response to the European refugee crisis in 2015. In the autumn of 2015, 
Polish politics openly turned against the potential influx of ethnic and religious 
minorities (which were not even present in the country yet), when the refugee quotas 
were discussed in Europe, the leader of the biggest Polish opposition party Law and 
Justice (PiS), Jarosław Kaczynski, talked about whether to welcome refugees or not in 
an interview for the Polish media: 
There are matters of various types of dangers in this sphere [welcoming 
refugees]. There are in fact symptoms of dangerous and long unseen diseases 
in Europe: cholera in the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna, various types of 
parasites and protozoa, which are not dangerous in the organisms of those 
people, but here can be hazardous. This does not mean necessarily 
discriminating… but we need to check.11 
In a country seemingly lacking any internal diversity (virtually homogenous 
ethnically, racially, and religiously), it could be expected that there is no internal other 
that would be blamed for all the evils of state socialism, transformation, or the 
disillusionment with the EU. As many Polish scholars have pointed out, the Polish 
case is peculiar because, in the face of the lack of an internal enemy, the distribution 
of hatred for the other is always in search of a target (Charkiewicz 2006; Graff 2008a, 
b; Leder 2014; Sowa 2011, 2015).  
 
Thus, Polish political discourse demonstrates ‘multiple inequalities’ (cf. Krizsan et al. 
2012). The marginalizing, stigmatizing, and exclusionary discourses are a common 
feature of both high and low-level politics in Poland. The presented quotes by major 
                                                 
11 Quote in the original: ‘To są kwestie związane z różnego rodzaju niebezpieczeństwami w tej sferze. 
Są już przecież objawy pojawienia się chorób bardzo niebezpiecznych i dawno niewidzianych w 
Europie: cholera na wyspach greckich, dyzenteria w Wiedniu, różnego rodzaju pasożyty, 
pierwotniaki, które nie są groźne w organizmach tych ludzi, mogą tutaj być groźne. To nie oznacza, 
żeby kogoś dyskryminować... Ale sprawdzić trzeba’. Available at: 
http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/jaroslaw-kaczynski-o-uchodzcach,artykuly,372175,1.html (accessed 
November 2016).  
political figures point to a serious exclusionary tendency in Polish political debate that 
singles out, denigrates, and castigates the undesirable others. This phenomenon is 
present both at the level of discourse and in the worsening of social relations and legal 
conditions, as the mainstreaming of anti-equality rhetoric through the workings of the 
‘war on gender’ showed. The recent wider and complex phenomenon of the anti-
gender campaign (coupled with the ‘normal’ daily sexism in politics) has added an 
arguably even more virulent element to the norm, has gained more media attention and 
has provoked mass mobilizations. The outburst against ‘gender ideology’ (ideologia 
gender) or ‘genderism’ (genderyzm/dżenderyzm) embodied and referred to multiple 
meanings and signifiers – Europe, equality, diversity, sexual expression, gender 
fluidity. It connected to historical reactions that are symptomatic of the Polish and 
often wider transformation and post-transformation processes following the regime 
changes in 1989 (see further discussion in chapters 2 and 4). 
 
As can be seen in the above examples, Polish political language varied from the 
‘benignly’ sexist, traditionally Polish chivalry to outright violent misogyny. At the 
same time, and puzzlingly so, there were instances of socially progressive legislation 
in the years 2011-2015. For instance, rape and sexual crimes became offences that 
were to be prosecuted publicly from 2013 onwards (instead of private legal suits that 
had to be filed by the survivors before). The Istanbul Convention was eventually 
signed and ratified in 2015. Childcare leave extensions came into force in 2012. 
Therefore, the dissertation examines how it is possible for Polish parliamentarians to 
express ultra-conservative and nationalist ideas while simultaneously pursuing legal 
changes that appear more egalitarian and women-friendly. The question is how and 
why the backlash against gender equality and diversity continued and renewed itself 
(or re-invented itself as with the ‘war on gender’) in Poland despite democratic 
transformation and Europeanization processes.  
To restate the puzzle in other terms, after almost three decades of ‘successful 
democratic transformation’ and thirteen years of European Union membership, Polish 
politics and society at large have not managed to achieve more equal gender relations 
or more room for societal diversity, despite several practical legislative attempts. There 
is a hegemony of particular interests that get articulated in the form of often vicious 
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discourses constructing and perpetuating social exclusion and structural and symbolic 
gender inequalities, which arguably undermine efforts at positive change. The 
dissertation explores and explains these exclusionist, sexist, and homophobic 
stereotypes that dominate discursively in Polish politics. 
 
Furthermore, from the perspective of December 2016 – January 2017, the success 
narrative of the ‘posterchild’ of post-state socialist transformation cannot account for 
the apparent radical right-wing and illiberal turn in Polish politics that occurred with 
the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015. International and liberal Polish 
elites were shocked. Within the mainstream discourse, it was unclear why such an anti-
liberal democratic mobilization of Polish voters occurred. In this dissertation, my aim 
is to show that the period of apparent liberal democratic stability and post-politics in 
the period between 2011 and 2015 can be seen as a swansong of the centrist-liberal 
‘common sense’ politics.   
 
Thus, my thesis examines critically the gendered and discursive consequences of the 
processes of democratization and post-transformation from a feminist point of view. 
The dissertation argues that the post-1989 political and economic changes have not 
transformed the underlying gender relations in the country, but instead have allowed 
for the addition of new forms of exclusion and inequality for significant groups by the 
state and its politics. By examining how gender is deployed in such discourses in the 
Polish parliament now, it shows how Polish politics continually reproduces existing 
patterns of domination and inequality, thus paving the way for the anti-gender and 
anti-diversity mobilizations that Poland has been recently witnessing. 
 
Research gap and puzzle 
The topic of gender and politics in Eastern Europe is not a dominant strand of political 
science research today. Moreover, as Georgina Waylen (2007) argued, the mainstream 
democratization literature has always been gender-blind (or seemingly gender-
neutral), saying little to nothing about the participation of women in transformation 
processes to democracy. However, there have been important feminist analyses that 
have set out to rectify this situation, Waylen’s Engendering Transitions (2007) being 
one of them.  
Specifically, gendered analyses of Eastern European politics have come in two major 
waves: first, in the years immediately following the collapse of state socialism in the 
region and, secondly, in the early 2000s, when a number of the former Eastern bloc 
countries were about to enter the European Union.12 Post-state socialist legacies in 
Eastern Europe are discussed at length among others in Suzanne LaFont’s (2001) and 
Peggy Watson’s (1997) work, Barbara Einhorn’s book Cinderella goes to market: 
citizenship, gender, and women's movements in East Central Europe (1993) and in the 
edited volumes by Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller (1993) and Sue Bridger (1999). 
The implications of applying the EU acquis for gender equality in new accession 
countries from Eastern Europe are explored in detail in, for example Bretherton (2001), 
Avdeyeva (2009, 2010, 2015), Lohmann and Seibert (2003), Sloat (2004), Watson and 
Lindenberg (2002), and Krizsan et al. (2014). This scholarship focussed on the 
implications of the adoption of EU gender equality standards by accession states and 
the supposed impact of gender mainstreaming in the region.  
 
Importantly, the first wave of literature focused on conceptualizing pre-transformation 
gender realities in Eastern Europe and then the immediate aftermath of 
democratization. Although women in the region did not experience the rise of feminist 
movements such as those that had a powerful impact on political and social science 
thinking since the 1970s in the West, many feminist commentators assumed that 
Eastern Europe would collectively develop a feminist consciousness and follow the 
Western example. Initially, Western groups of feminist scholars and activists thought 
that the social upheaval of the transformation processes would allow Eastern European 
women to mobilize themselves and fight the patriarchal gender regime (predating and 
reinforced in state socialist times) (Funk 1993; Regulska 1998; Wöhrer 2004; 
Beckwith 2007). However, to the surprise and dismay of many, this did not happen as 
predicted. In fact, on a societal level, Eastern Europe experienced (and to a large degree 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of pre-state socialist gender realities see for instance: Wolchik and Meyer (1985).  
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is still experiencing) a rejection of everything that is even vaguely connected with their 
understanding of feminism (Verdery 1994; Sperling 2014).  
 
In trying to explain the rejection of state socialism in Eastern Europe, both Polish and 
Anglophone feminists, saw a parallel resurgence of right-wing political preferences 
that brought a reconfiguration of identity. Following 1989, in the situation of floating 
identities that the regime change produced, people were left in search of notions of 
‘return to tradition’ or ‘retraditionalization’ (Funk 1993; Magyan-Vincze 2006; Gerber 
2011). This often meant a romanticization of patriarchal values and of strong 
traditional families as bases for a healthy society (Zvinkliene 1999). As Alexandra 
Gerber argued (2011: 490), feminist political scientists have been addressing the issues 
of ‘remasculinization’ and ‘retraditionalization’ in Eastern Europe since the fall of 
state socialism (Graff 2005; Moghadam 1995; Watson 1993b), particularly in view of 
EU requirements to implement gender equality directives. 
All apparent facets of state socialism had to be overthrown in the transformation. As 
scholars like Sue Bridger (1999), Ann Graham and Joanna Regulska (2006), 
Agnieszka Graff (2008a), and recently Valerie Sperling (2014) argued, feminism in 
the East became a ‘dirty word’ after the fall of state socialism, owing to a specific set 
of circumstances created (or perpetuated) in the state socialist times. The phenomenon 
was also connected with the general belief that politics was discredited. Thus, there 
was a lack of faith in the public sphere in the region (Eisenstein 1993).  
Feminist theorists have demonstrated the centrality of gender to the creation of 
markets, civil society, and democratic institutions. However, those theorizing 
European integration tended to assume that the power of conditionality and 
compliance in the pre-accession period would lead automatically to more gender 
equality and prevent ultraconservative entrenchment (Buzan and Little 2000; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The expectations in terms of improved gender 
equality through gender mainstreaming and EU accession came both from Polish 
feminist activists and from the EU itself (Grabowska 2014). The European 
Commission understood gender mainstreaming and anti-discrimination to be part of 
the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ that had to be met prior to EU accession (Presidency 
Conclusions 1993).13  
 
At the same time, gendered research focused on EU’s role in the ‘Europeanization of 
gender equality’ (Lombardo and Forest 2012; Sindbjerg Martinsen 2007) and on 
processes of social learning and socialization of EU soft norms through non-binding 
instruments (Beveridge 2012; Forest and Lombardo 2012; Krizsan and Popa 2010). A 
whole body of gender equality policy literature analysed equality institutions and 
bodies (McBride and Mazur 2010; Outshoorn and Kantola 2007; Squires 2007; Stetson 
and Mazur 1995) and anti-discrimination enforcement mechanisms (Krizsan 2006; 
Krizsan et al. 2014; Lustgarten 1980; MacEwen 1997).  
 
Arguably, according to the general opinions widespread among the Polish population, 
there is not much sexist discrimination, just a ‘natural’ division of gender roles (Graff 
2008a). According to a government survey conducted by the office of the 
Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment in 2012, only 10% of respondents claimed to have 
experienced worse treatment due to their gender.14 In contrast to these opinion polls, 
statistics point to the fact that there is widespread systemic and structural exclusion of 
women and sexual minorities in Eastern Europe. Recent data from the Global Gender 
Gap Index show a persistent gender gap between women and men at all levels of 
political, social and economic life in Poland.15 Women have worse access to education, 
wealth, positions of power in terms of professional development, more restrictive 
                                                 
13 The membership criteria took the name from the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, 
Denmark. The Presidency conclusions stated that: Membership requires that candidate country has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.  
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf (accessed October 2016).   
14 Available at: http://www.sprawnik.pl/aktualnosci,10223,11971,jaka-jest-dyskryminacja-w-polsce-
badanie (accessed September 2016). 
15 The Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) was introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006. It 
provides a framework for capturing the magnitude and scope of gender-based disparities. The GGI 
benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, political, education- and health-based criteria, and 
provides country rankings each year. At the time of writing, the newest (2014) report classifies 142 
countries and ranks them on a scale from 0 to 1 (from 0 to 100%) in terms of gender equality.   
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access to health care, and less personal safety. In 2014, Poland ranked 57th (a drop of 
four places since 2012) out of 142 countries globally. Women earn 23% less than men 
(GUS 2009). The lack of equality between women and men is also visible in terms of 
women’s political representation. Rueschemeyer and Wolchik (2009) have 
demonstrated that high-level representation of women in political positions and public 
administration in the region of Eastern Europe is below that of most post-industrial 
Western Europe. Accordingly, during the parliamentary term under analysis in this 
dissertation (2011-2015) and well over 90 years after women won both active and 
passive voting rights in Poland, women made up 18% of all Polish parliamentarians.16  
 
European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency’s report ‘Homophobia and 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU Member States’ ranked 
Poland as one of the worst countries in the EU for the LGBTQ+ community. A public 
opinion poll from February 2014 found that 70% of Poles believed same-sex sexual 
activity is morally unacceptable, with only 22% believing it morally acceptable (CBOS 
2014). While there is no official criminalization of same-sex sexual activities, there is 
also no legal recognition of same-sex couples, even though same-sex marriage is not 
constitutionally banned. Article 32 of the Polish Constitution guarantees equality in 
accordance with law and prohibits discrimination for ‘any reason’. Anti-discrimination 
provisions were added to the Labour Code in 2003, but the specific proposals to 
include a prohibition of discrimination and hate speech/ crimes on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender expression or identity were rejected numerous times 
since, following strong catholic church objections.  
Therefore, the legal and social status quo in terms of gender equality and anti-
discrimination are a combination of reluctant pre-accession updates to Polish law and 
legacies of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL). The official numbers concerning the 
formal structures of politics and economy show socio-political inequality in terms of 
gender in the region, which can be the result of a combination of pre-PRL legacies and 
                                                 
16 Women won voting rights (passive and active) in 1918 after the declaration of independence of the 
Second Republic.  
post-transformation reconfiguration of gender roles (see a further discussion in 
chapters 2 and 4).  
Current empirical work has indicated that, foremost among the post-state socialist 
Eastern European states, Poland has pursued policies reflecting an anti-feminist 
backlash and anti-gender equality backlash (Gerber 2011; Glass and Kawachi 2001; 
Pascall and Kwak 2005). The discourse of the ‘war on gender’ was a new addition to 
the previous anti-feminist discourses that have been present in Europe, especially since 
the late 1980s, and which are connected to the purging of perceived ‘communist’ 
practices in Eastern Europe and to the backlash after the transformation and 
Europeanization.  
While the recent anti-gender discourse is religious organization-driven, but is willingly 
followed and expanded on by politicians, its virulence and the commitment with which 
it is applied in politics requires further investigation. It is important to discuss how this 
discourse impacts the work in politics. It may force progressive politicians and 
activists to abandon vocalizing points that might be labelled as ‘feminist’ or 
‘gendered’, thereby discarding or pushing women’s and LGBTQ+ rights and other 
minority topics down or off political agendas. The result of this is a closing down and 
cementation of discursive space in the form of, at best, ridiculing these themes, at 
worst, treating them as dangerous, with politicians not willing to risk their political 
authority for progressive legislative bills. The creation of derogatory labels for people 
who raise feminist and minority concerns makes room for hate speech in politics and 
in society around it. This has material effects on the processes of construction of 
political problems in parliamentary debates and agenda-setting. 
 
It is therefore essential to take gendered analysis into account, if we want to understand 
the quality and equality of Polish politics. However, the available feminist and political 
science literature focused, on the one hand, on the processes of transformation and 
democratization and, on the other hand, on the adoption and expectations regarding 
the implementation of EU soft norms regarding equality and gender mainstreaming. 
While mainstream political science scholarship still misses out on gender political 
analysis, feminist research has not fully explained why the Polish gender equality 
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situation has not improved and in fact has been recently deteriorating (‘war on 
gender’). Hence, this dissertation switches the attention from equality policy adoption 
and implementation to the analysis of political discourses and their power at work in 
the creation of discursive values and subjects that provide blueprints of femininity, 
masculinity, and heteronormativity for the society.  
Because of the lack of connections between critical Polish and mainstream political 
science literature, it has not yet been fully researched why Poland fell and is falling 
back in terms of progress on (gender) equality. The available scholarly analyses tend 
to build on each other insufficiently and miss the insights that can be gained from 
bridging ‘Western’ theoretical contributions with Polish interpretative knowledge. 
Therefore, I specifically build on and apply Polish and Eastern European scholarship 
and combine it with personal, ‘local’ experience (for a further discussion of reflexivity 
see chapter 3). By engaging in the debates on democratic transformations and anti-
feminist backlash, I also contribute to the literature on the connections between post-
state socialism and post-colonialism. Specifically, I reconsider the complex position 
of Eastern Europe (as a specific set of politico-spatial locations, but also as a group of 
imagined spaces and their attendant ideologies) in the processes of Europeanization 
and soft norm diffusion. The subsequent analysis is an example of a discussion of the 
ambiguities in centre-margin power relations in the context of economic globalization 
today.  
 
Moving between global, regional, and local perspectives, the thesis focuses on Poland 
as a case and then zooms into the Polish parliamentary discourses as the crucial site of 
national politics. I demonstrate that Poland’s recent bout of ‘war on gender’ (2012-
2014), while following wider global backlash trends, shows that the post-1989 political 
and economic regime changes have not resulted in transforming the underlying gender 
relations in the state and its politics. The main research question is: What is the role of 
gender in the construction of discursive exclusion and marginalization? I specifically 
look at the parliament, as the arena, where I examine the anti-equality and anti-
diversity backlash through the lens of gendered subjects in order to find out: Why and 
how do the gendered discourses construct subjects and values? What is the 
relationship between these discourses and the processes of democratization and 
Europeanization? What are the underlying constructions of femininity, masculinity, 
and heteronormativity?  
 
Main insights 
Feminist political research has been trying to destabilize existing categories, binaries, 
and oppositions (Celis et al. 2013: 14). Gender studies scholars have argued that 
existing categories and concepts legitimate exclusion and need to be rethought, 
examining how gendered power relationships construct citizenship and the nation, the 
state, and bureaucracy (Lister 2003; Yuval-Davis 1998; Squires 1999; Kantola 2006). 
This highlights why the construction of subjects and values has consequences for the 
state, nation, and its politics. Following this call, the focus should shift from women’s 
presence in and exclusion from different institutions to understanding the gendered 
structures of those institutions – the ‘constitutive representation of gender’ – and how 
to transform them (Celis et al. 2013: 14, 18).  
 
Thus, institutions, like parliaments and their norms, discourses, and rules of behaviour 
are not just gendered, but also gendering: ‘they produce the very gendered subjects of 
politics’ (Celis et al. 2013: 14-15). Power is therefore productive and creative 
(Foucault 1980) and it ‘lures us to fulfil the standards of normative femininities and 
masculinities’ (Celis et al. 2013: 15). This implies that those, who do not live up to or 
fulfil the gendered prescriptions and proscriptions for nation and family or subjectivity 
are discursively pushed out – their prerogatives ‘lose out’ in the mainstream narrative. 
 
I argue that the way in which political discourses construct gendered subjects and 
values within the parliamentary institutional arena influences and perpetuates the anti-
gender and anti-equality backlash witnessed in Poland recently. Political discourses in 
the Polish parliament construct categories of subjects and values purposefully 
deploying gender, which outline boundaries and hierarchies that people (consumers of 
discourse) need to live up to. Hence, Polish politicians employ gendered discourses to 
delineate notions of ‘proper’ femininity, masculinity, and sexuality. As I show later in 
No country for losers? 
15 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
the dissertation, gender is central to the discursive construction of the family (chapter 
5) and to nation-building (chapter 6).  
 
Following Polish scholarly analyses, I argue that transformation and Europeanization 
were forces for economic globalization in Poland. They were implemented according 
to orthodox neoliberal principles and reinforced the peripheral position of Poland’s 
economy in the global economic system – as a provider of industrial subcomponents 
for transnational companies and cheap labour within Europe. Consequently, 
transformation, like globalization, produced actual economic (and political) losers 
(women, former public employees, former working class, etc.). As I discuss further in 
chapter 4, ‘democratic and economic transition’ was exacted through wholesale 
privatization of most state assets, liberalization of trade and business relationships, 
cutting back on education, health care, pensions and all parts of the public sector, 
which the establishment of formal liberal democracy was supposed to make up for. 
The hopes were for the dissemination of a set of traditional liberal values of civil rights, 
tolerance, equality, and respect for individualism to come naturally through a complete 
laissez-faire ideology. At the same time, neoliberal market capitalism was presented 
as a transparent, ‘natural’ ideology, the departure from which or even the questioning 
of which was an aberration (Pietrzak, 2016).  
 
Polish scholars like Monika Bobako, Ewa Charkiewicz, Agnieszka Mrozik, Andrzej 
Leder, Jarosław Pietrzak, and Jan Sowa and Anglophone academics such David Ost 
have been pointing to the fact that this has produced masses of disappointed and 
marginalized groups that mirror wider developments between the centre and the 
(semi)periphery in global capitalist relations (which I analyse further in chapters 2 and 
4). However, going beyond transformation and Europeanization, today the language 
of mainstream political debate in Poland remains stigmatizing, hierarchical, and 
exclusionary, discursively constructing more categories of subjects and values that 
‘lose out’. Throughout the transformation process and after it, certain social groups 
(discursive categories of subjects) were forced into positions of being ‘losers’ in the 
social and political system. The resulting societal anger, disappointment, and a wish 
for revindication had to ‘go somewhere’ and find an outlet. 
 
The thesis is informed by the idea that there are ‘two monstrous machines’ (cf. 
Charkiewicz 2006) of Polish transformation and Europeanization processes, which I 
discuss in chapter 4. These two hegemonic constructions in Poland – the neoliberal 
and the nationalist-catholic one – both use gendered notions of subjectivity and values 
in ways that perpetuate catholic and conservative social conventions and channel 
social discontent towards particular social groups (i.e. women, ethnic and sexual 
minorities, etc.). The focus of the dissertation in the empirical sections of the work is 
on the nationalist-catholic discourses that are essential in constructing both the family 
and the nation in the Polish case. The neoliberal reforms form an important background 
for the analysis in the dissertation, hence chapter 4 discusses this context in more 
detail. Importantly, the research focuses not only on women in politics, but on what 
roles specific notions of gender identities (like femininities, masculinities, and 
heteronormativity for instance) play in political discourse.  
Therefore, my analysis examines both women and men. I am interested in the values 
that politicians invoke and produce when they do politics, what roles they present and 
prescribe to the public, how they describe and ‘do’ gender using it to justify political 
behaviours and choices. The hegemonic discourses (by constructing categories of 
hierarchy and power) provide a ready framework of exclusion and marginalization that 
allows for scapegoating and using whole groups and categories of minorities for 
political expediency (when popular anger or discontent needs to be rerouted). The 
marginalizing and hierarchic nature of the hegemonic discourses, as well as the ready 
availability of ‘losing’ discursive subjectivities (go-to frames of meaning), has allowed 
the ‘war on gender’ to become so prominent and viral. The political discursive field, 
already ubiquitous with stigma, inequality, and exclusion, merely needed a new 
scapegoat. Gender provided this scapegoat, within a broader illiberal backlash against 
liberal democracy, globalization, economic inequality, etc. (i.e. as a cypher of this 
backlash – see chapter 7). 
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The dissertation then examines the use of gendered parliamentary discourses in 
constructing subjects and values in Polish politics, asking how MPs in parliament 
chose to wield concepts of femininity, masculinity, and heteronormativity as tools in 
political debates. Beneath this inquiry rests a premise about the creation of modern 
political subjects through the often-invisible practices of power (cf. Verdery 2012). 
Talking and debating creates and constructs individuals as subjective selves, thus, 
discourses can fabricate subjectivities (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 412-13). Hence, 
the dissertation focuses on how nationalist-catholic discourses are deployed in 
parliament by particular political forces and, in turn, how the deployment of such 
discourses reinforces the creation of ‘losing’ subjectivities.  
The thesis argues that parliamentary discourses create notions of gendered national 
subjects and values, which is later reflected in terms of policy and legislation. I do not 
claim that the discourses produce actual groups in society, but instead show the 
‘reflexive perspective on the political’ (Kulawik 2009: 263). Critical and gendered 
research of the discursive construction of subjects focuses on a broad range of actions. 
I examine the noisy and visible rhetoric of nationalists, ultraconservatives, and anti-
feminist utterances as well as what are considered ‘normal’ discursive strategies of 
MPs. These discursive strategies and constructions produce gendered dispositions and 
lay down the ‘rules of the game’.  
 
I argue that, in Poland, political actors apply discursive power to construct gendered 
political values and subjects, drawing upon the availability and general tacit 
acceptance of sexist, misogynist, and chauvinist language, which is possible because 
of particular features of the Polish historical, economic, political, and cultural 
landscape, as well as the country’s socio-economic position in Europe after 1989 (cf. 
Sperling 2014). I explore the gendered hegemonic discourses as sources for informal 
institutional frames of meaning, which produce a Polish model of gendered 
subjectivity/citizenship that is unequivocally male (masculinity discursively 
constructed as a standard and blueprint for conduct) and catholicized. In other words, 
I explore gendered discourses as means of constructing losing subjects and outsiders 
by right-wing, nationalist, but also liberal and conservative forces. 
 
Hence, the dissertation suggests three main insights. Firstly, the Polish case helps us 
to understand the use of gendered discourse employed to construct subjectivities as 
part of post-transformation Polish politics. Secondly, these subjectivities entail notions 
of femininity, masculinity, and heteronormativity, which are affected by and situated 
in entrenched discursive understandings of nation, transformation, and post-state 
socialism. Hence, the thesis highlights how these gendered notions relate to the 
concepts of nation, transformation, Europeanization, and post-state socialism, which 
are central in scholarly literature on Eastern Europe. Thirdly, the understanding of 
these gendered dynamics is important for the study of democracy and European 
politics, as they are some of their essential constituents. 
 
Contributions 
Based on these insights, the thesis makes several contributions to the scholarly debate. 
The primary theoretical contribution of the thesis concerns the elaboration and the 
application of gendered analysis to political discourse. Feminist political analysis has 
long held the position that social phenomena cannot be explained without taking 
gender into account. The focus of this dissertation moves from equality policy analysis, 
dominant in the available literature, to the exploration of the gendered power of 
discourse. Thus, this work is about what gender does in utilitarian terms – as it is used 
and deployed in certain discursive power projects. The second main theoretical 
contribution concerns the exploration of trajectories and legacies of transformation 
processes, specifically combining transnational and Polish literature. I combine the 
different bodies of literature and use them to elucidate the key mechanisms of 
discursive production, reproduction, and backlash in gendered terms.  
 
The combination of feminist, postcolonial, political economy, institutionalist 
approaches also constitutes a theoretical innovation in the study of post-transformation 
politics in Eastern Europe. The discussions in chapters 2 and 4 especially provide a 
synthetic way of engaging with (post-)transformation legacies and with critical 
junctures in terms of Europeanization and its impacts on gender equality. I discuss 
national and regional trends that are specific to post-state socialist societies, moving 
No country for losers? 
19 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
between different layers and levels in order to combine comparative and regionalist 
literature with feminist, postcolonial, institutionalist, and democratization theory.  
 
Therefore, I adapt the critical Polish political literatures to critique the prevailing, but 
flawed, theoretical assumptions according to which the implementation of a neoliberal 
economy and the formal adoption of European values and soft norms concerning anti-
discrimination and gender mainstreaming would lead to improved equality standards. 
Instead, the dominant narratives in Polish politics show that gender discrimination and 
inequality is still a pervading issue. In chapter 4 specifically, I show that the dominant 
neoliberal thinking has contributed to perpetuating the issue, by portraying the 
gendered social protection mechanisms and rights (parental leave, reproductive health 
rights, institutionalized public care, etc.) as at odds with economic efficiency.  
 
Furthermore, the dissertation adds to the literature analysing the backlash against 
gender equality and anti-discrimination, which is led by deeply entrenched 
conservative forces that see gender equality standards as the influence of much-
disliked Europeanization (as a stand-in and focus point of globalization). Thus, the 
combined effect of transformation and the re-affirmation of nationalist and 
ultraconservative values in a post-state socialist context leads, at best, to the 
perpetuation of gender discrimination. At worst, it produces a full-scale backlash 
against the piecemeal measures for gender equality introduced on paper during 
Europeanization. 
 
The main methodological contribution lies in the application and operationalization of 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) to the study of a Polish institution, as much of this 
work revolves around discourses and their critical analysis in the context of 
parliamentary politics. An important methodological contribution consists of the 
suggestion that to operationalize Fairclough’s CDA, ‘local’ interpretative knowledge 
is necessary (cf. Donna Haraway’s 1988 ‘situated knowledge’). In order to 
complement the understanding of social practice of discourses, I use the cognitive 
resources that are available to the discursive audience in Poland, who are ultimately 
the consumers of the political discourses (for details, see chapter 3). Furthermore, I 
reflect on and apply the insight that concrete notions of politics reproduce particular 
kinds of gendered subjects; the ways in which femininities and masculinities are 
produced as part of the political process in the specific discursive case of Poland 
(Saward 2010; Childs and Webb 2012; Celis et al. 2013: 18). This dissertation is thus 
an explicit answer for the call for more research that examines the role that 
parliamentary discourses about gender and sexuality play in constituting gender 
equality (Lombardo and Forest 2012; Celis et al. 2013).  
 
On the empirical level, the Polish case is important because it elucidates the impact of 
gendered discourses on processes of democratization and of ultraconservative 
backlash against gender equality and diversity and wider centrifugal forces in Europe. 
This work shows how Europeanization and democratization processes applied in 
Poland, with a specific neoliberal market spin, focused on legal and economic issues 
and left ultraconservative forces and the catholic church to define the values and 
subjects. I specifically address the problem of the role of the catholic church in the 
Polish political context and argue that the anti-gender equality and anti-diversity 
mobilizations are cyphers for broader backlash against Europeanization and 
transformation processes. The aim is to depict the prominence of these processes and 
capture the Polish parliament as a time- and space-specific institutional snapshot, 
providing it with historic and social context (chapter 4). This outlines the limits, scope, 
and basis for the construction and employment of discourses within Polish politics 
today, providing sources for the public’s interdiscursivity and common frames of 
meaning for political actors and consumers of political discourse. 
 
Research aims and justification 
The dissertation sets out to connect the theoretical literature on (post-)transformation 
with an empirical analysis of current parliamentary discourses that are crucial in 
structuring contemporary political life in Poland. It assesses the gendered political 
impact of the constructed subjects and values by combining specific theoretical 
approaches. The thesis argues that it is impossible to determine a universal and 
indivisible truth about the power structure under analysis. All the while, it is vital to 
consider the historical and contextual dynamic underlying the political debates which 
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tend to exclude or subordinate discursively certain groups or subjects vis-à-vis others. 
As Watson (2000a: 186) argues, ‘[b]ecause feminism cannot be understood except in 
its historical context, and because in post-communism that context itself stands in need 
of explicit theorization, exploring the possibilities of meaning for feminism goes hand 
in hand with a conceptualization of transition in the former Soviet Bloc.’ So, there is 
an explicit call for a contextualized and historicized gendered analysis of 
transformation and post-transformation. The intention, thus, is to add to the knowledge 
about post-state socialist gender realities by looking at the gender discourses in a 
specific political site – the Polish parliament. 
 
The goal of the dissertation is to understand how gender, but also its intersections with 
class, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and other social categories work discursively 
together and how these power relations construct subjects and values in discourse, 
thereby perpetuating and renewing the forces working against gender equality. By 
exploring the discourses that MPs use in communicative events and specific utterances 
in debates, I focus on how power operates through discourse to establish the 
dominance of certain constructions of gender relations and to marginalize or exclude 
counter-discourses (Freidenvall and Krook 2011: 49). The gendered discursive 
perspective enables the questioning of the ways in which gender is used to create social 
hierarchies and marginalize social groups along classificatory lines and social 
positions. Therefore, I use critical discourse analytical tools, which allow me to 
identify the dominant topics and themes, and set the boundaries of discourses. I 
examine the discursive construction of key subjects in debates on national identity and 
sovereignty, family and welfare, and the ‘war on gender’. 
 
Why Poland? 
The focus of this research suggests that its outcome is symptomatic of the national, 
Polish context. However, arguably it also shows wider regional and transnational 
trends of anti-equality and antidemocratic backlash that Europe has been experiencing 
in the recent years. Similar trends have been identified in other Eastern European 
countries after the fall of state socialism, such as Russia or Slovakia, but importantly 
the Polish situation differs in that the power of the catholic church vis-à-vis the state 
is stronger due to the role it played after 1989 and thanks to the deference of Polish 
politicians (as I discuss in chapter 4). Also in countries such as Croatia, Italy, France, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, and Slovenia, the post-war and post-1989 consensus on 
human rights and civil liberties is currently threatened as issues such as gender 
mainstreaming, sexual education, LGBTQ+ rights, and reproductive health rights have 
come under coordinated attacks carried out by the church, religious and lay 
conservative NGOs, right-wing politicians, and even grassroots mobilizations (Kovats 
and Põim 2015). 
However, in Poland, specifically, the rise of religious ressentiment and nationalism are 
interwoven and mutually constitutive. As I show in detail in chapters 4 and 7, Polish 
political elites have readily supported and often used narratives of religion and 
nationalism, in order to attempt to divert people’s attention from the social 
consequences of neoliberal reforms (implemented under the guise of transformation 
and Europeanization) with the help of moral panic strategies and offering scapegoats.  
Thus, the research on Poland as a focus case contributes to the wider debates on the 
resistances and blockages to equality legislation. The norms and public discourses 
observed regionally have a specific expression in the Polish parliament. It is a 
peculiarity of post-PRL politics, but most importantly it is politics in a contemporary 
parliamentary democracy, with the destructive forces of the crises induced by 
neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (the ‘shock therapy’), economic globalization and its 
societal consequences. Local political and economic elites implemented the post-1989 
regime change, the so-called ‘transition’, according to the ruling spirit of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s – neoliberal market orthodoxy and the ‘end of history’, to which ‘there 
is no alternative’. In Poland, the general population was not consulted on the 
trajectories or processes that were being put into force or on the features of the 
expected ‘end product’ regime of the transformation.  
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The parliamentary focus 
The Polish parliament is the main site of production of political discourses and thereby 
of political subjects and values. Hence, this is a study of the construction of gendered 
subjects and values as they emerge in political discourses in parliamentary debates 
during one term of the Polish parliament (Sejm). At the same time, it is a study of 
politics, of how discourses within an institutional context produce and reproduce 
ideological structures that are gendered and have power implications that regulate life 
in a contemporary European state. The Polish Sejm provides a lens to interrogate wider 
phenomena of gendered backlash against equality (gender equality as well as sexual 
and gender minorities’ rights). It highlights the discursive power of these phenomena 
and places them in the context of feminist debates.  
 
Parliamentary debates not only mirror the prevailing norms and discourses of wider 
society, but first and foremost they construct and reinforce the discourses that are 
subsequently transmitted to the public. Parliamentary politics are thus central to the 
production of discourses in parliamentary democracies. The parliament is especially 
valid and interesting as a locus for research because, besides being a formal legislature 
for the state, it is also an important forum to express opinions, values and interests 
(Kantola 2006). Furthermore, legislatures are ‘privileged discursive sites’ and 
discourses originating from such sites attain special authority and significance for 
whole societies (Prado 1995). In Eastern Europe, and in Poland specifically, 
parliaments have been serving as the central sites for the resolution of major national 
issues (Montgomery 2003: 4).  
 
Accordingly, the thesis argues that, in the Polish context, the parliament is the primary 
site for doing politics. As a parliamentary democracy (further discussion of the Polish 
political system can be found in chapter 3), Polish politics rests on the primacy of the 
Sejm. The main public concerns, debates, and policy issues are first and foremost 
tackled in parliament and shape the wider views in society. Even though the media, 
the executive, and public opinion play a role in this process, their analysis is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, the Sejm is a proxy for all Polish politics 
and a lens to analyse it. The focus is thus on the discourses of parliament and the work 
it does in generating insider and outsider groups (‘losers’). The thesis builds upon the 
discursive turn in feminist analysis in order to find out how gender subjects are 
discursively produced following political transformation processes and why this 
institutionalizes the exclusion of non-normative and nondominant groups in politics in 
Poland. It combines these insights with wider discussions of poststructuralist discourse 
theory (Bacchi 1999; 2005). 
 
The dissertation then focuses on the notion of the continuous construction of feminine, 
masculine, and heteronormative subjectivities within and across political debates. Like 
other identities, gender can be mediated through ‘dominant’ or hegemonic and 
‘subversive’ or alternative discourses of, for instance, femininity. A female subject can 
be constructed as a mother who gives up work to care for the household and children, 
adopting a dominant discourse, or she can be presented as working professionally 
outside the home or as not having children (alternative discourse). Political actors can 
employ gendered discourses and values taking advantage of cultural understandings 
and ‘frames’ that resonate with people. These include gendered constructions of 
subjects relying on femininity, masculinity, and heteronormativity. Following a 
Gramscian understanding, such hegemonic ideas (about how women and men are 
supposed to look, behave, and interact) are powerful and get reinforced by political 
authorities and citizens alike (Sperling 2014: 11).  
 
I see the parliament as having the discursive power to define the topics of political 
contestation, as well as what belongs there and what does not. The social and political 
blueprints of prestige and aspiration that are created within a discursive field are 
transposed into the choice of topics, the construction of arguments, and the choice of 
spokespeople, thereby shaping the debate, and influencing the consumption of socio-
economic and political reality. According to the pleas of Polish feminists, there is a 
need to expose the auto-referential nature of these discourses and debates and their 
alienation from the surrounding world (Bobako 2011; Charkiewicz 2006; 2010). When 
‘creating’ the world through discourse, deputies refer mostly to each other, 
constructing a closed circuit of discourse and a hermetic code legible to the insiders 
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only. They repeatedly create narratives about the same things that get constructed and 
transmitted in the same ways, and are addressed to the same recipients. Parliamentary 
debates are a closed, discursively inbred structure that uses its available tools to try to 
objectivize and naturalize the rules of its own field and as such impose them on the 
broader, societal audience.  
 
Timeframe: the 2011-2015 parliamentary term 
This dissertation focuses exclusively on the seventh parliamentary term (2011-2015), 
as a particular point in the post-transformation period. It catches an ‘ethnographic 
moment’ to show the features of discourses and subjects specific to a given time and 
place. The main political competition was then between the main government party 
and the main opposition party, both claiming to be descended politically from the 
Solidarity movement (for more details see chapters 3 and 4). In fact, arguably, the 
whole political debate in Poland has been constructed around the opposition between 
these two party blocs in the post-accession phase (see chapter 4).  
 
The timeframe of analysis was a moment of relative political and parliamentary 
stability – it was the second term of the same political coalition in government (a ‘one-
off’ situation since 1989). Following a rather fragmented and changeable political 
party system in the 1990s, the late 2000s were a period of the establishment of main 
political divisions that dominate and persist in Polish politics today. The key rivalry of 
the post-Solidarity parties was the main political line of argument in parliament (see 
chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of political parties in the seventh parliamentary 
term). 
Post-state socialism, post-communism, and post-
transformation 
The specific historical, economic, political, and cultural landscape of Poland, as well 
as the consequences of the country’s socio-economic position in Europe post-1989, 
are one of the central points of this inquiry. In this dissertation, I am mapping out the 
gendered discourses in the specific socio-historical context of the country after the fall 
of the people’s republic. I purposefully prefer the term ‘post-state socialist’ to the term 
‘post-communist’, following the recent developments in Polish scholarship (cf. Sowa 
2015: 110-121). I consciously use the term ‘state socialist’, as opposed to ‘socialist’ to 
avoid any conflations with the Nordic or Scandinavian welfare states for instance or 
the social-democratic Western European tradition. The discussion on the accuracy of 
calling the Soviet bloc ‘socialist’, ‘Marxist-Leninist’, ‘communist’, ‘actually existing 
socialism’ notwithstanding, I consider the term ‘communism’ so heavy and burdened 
in terms of Polish internal political debates that it becomes conceptually empty as a 
signifier. Positioning myself in between Western and Eastern scholarship, I cannot use 
the term post-communist (even though I realize it is the accepted term in most Western 
academia), because of its conceptual emptiness in Eastern Europe and the rejection of 
its use in the region as practically synonymous with evil, criminal, and totalitarian. 
Similarly, it is also a semantic choice to use ‘transformation’ instead of transition, 
because of the implied teleological commitment of the latter (see the relevant 
discussion in the following chapter).  
Thesis structure 
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The introductory chapter presented the 
main research questions, highlighted the significance of the topic under analysis and 
the intended theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions of the 
dissertation. The next three chapters provide a theoretical, conceptual, historical, and 
methodological background for the case study. Chapter 2 discusses the various 
literatures and theoretical approaches that inform my analysis. It provides a 
‘conceptual toolkit’ that provides the dissertation with literature insights relevant to 
identifying the excluded and scapegoated subjectivities and values in Polish politics. 
Chapter 3 provides the methodological scaffolding and the research design of the 
dissertation. I explain the main tenets of CDA, its operationalization, as well as a more 
detailed discussion of the Polish parliament and the data sources.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the transformation, democratization, and Europeanization contexts 
and the ways they produced gendered inequalities in the process. Bearing in mind the 
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theoretical categories that tend to get excluded and stigmatized from the second 
chapter, this part pinpoints post-1989 legacies and identifies critical junctures and 
historic trajectories of transformation and democratization. Importantly, this chapter 
also provides an examination of the role of the catholic church in Poland. The point is 
to provide contextual and background material in order to analyse the possible sources 
for the discourses that I examine in the following part. Next, chapters 5-7 present the 
discursive analysis of the debates on the family and welfare (chapter 5), national 
identity and the construction of the nation (chapter 6), and lastly the ‘war on gender’ 
(chapter 7).  
 
In order to narrow in on the particulars of the Polish case, the following two empirical 
chapters focus on ‘traditional’ interest areas of feminist political research – family and 
welfare (chapter 5) and the nation and nationalism (chapter 6). Family politics is 
broadly defined as including reproductive and women’s health rights, civil 
partnerships, sexual education, religious education in schools. The analysis on welfare 
includes the debates concerning ongoing pension reforms, welfare reforms, budget 
cuts, and labour law changes.  
The investigation of the construction of the nation examines the relationship between 
local and traditional commitments, on the one hand, and international/regional 
influences as posed by treaties and conventions, on the other. In particular, it focuses 
on the gendered dimension of this relationship and of constructions of the Polish 
nation. The empirical analysis exposes how the discourses that permeate parliamentary 
talk are not gender-neutral. To see what this means for legislative practice, it is vital 
to unpack and map the discursive understandings of gender in specific contexts 
(nationality, family politics and welfare) and follow them as they become political 
outcomes thereby legitimating specific gender power structures that reproduce 
discursive scapegoats and purposefully taint the image of and vilify whole social 
groups.  
 
The final empirical focus area, the ‘war on gender’, deals with a specific instance of 
discourse which is not associated with any particular thematic debate, but has been 
identified as an overarching feature while researching this project. It is a particular 
political and linguistic campaign that developed in the Polish parliament between 2012 
and 2014 (called the ‘war on gender’). In this final empirical section, I also look for 
the parliamentary implications of the discussed ‘war on gender’ in Poland. As the 
church played an essential role in creating the anti-gender mobilization, one of the 
goals is to understand and interpret the relationship between church discourses and 
their influence in parliamentary politics in Poland. The focus is on the use of the newly 
coined terms ‘gender ideology’ or ‘genderism’ in order to enforce specific 
ultraconservative and traditional religious interests in politics.  
 
The chapter includes a regional and global perspective that allows us to put into a 
broader context the gendered discourses in Polish parliament. This contextual analysis 
shows how certain trends that appear in Poland are not new and are part of a broader 
coalition of social and political actors that wants to roll back or block advances in 
terms of women’s rights and the rights of sexual minorities. The final chapter (8) 
reaches back to the issues raised in this introduction, reworks and connects the main 
themes of the dissertation and suggests potential future avenues of research in the field.
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Chapter 2: The discursive construction of 
subjects and values: the conceptual and 
theoretical framework for the Polish case 
‘The operation of transforming homo sovieticus into the Western man was conducted 
on/in the female body.’ 
Agnieszka Mrozik17 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical perspectives and conceptual understandings that 
inform my research. It aims to provide a ‘conceptual and theoretical toolkit’ that allows 
for the discursive gendering and creation of ‘losers’ by which I mean groups of 
subjects and values that can be scapegoated and vilified as a result of political and 
economic processes. I pull together the threads about exclusion, marginalization, and 
disempowerment that can later inform my analysis of the Polish processes of 
transformation and Europeanization. The chapter argues that a synthesis of literatures 
on nationalism and gender, Europeanization, post-colonialism, feminist 
institutionalism, and feminist political economy provides a suitable analytical 
framework of looking at the Polish case of backsliding on (gender) equality. Moreover, 
it helps us understand the wider questions posed by the thesis about the backlash 
against gender equality and diversity, as well as the role of discursive constructions of 
subjectivities in the Polish parliament.  
 
The main concepts are introduced in the following sections, which are dedicated to the 
various scholarly approaches. The chapter ends with a discussion combining insights 
from the perspectives under analysis. The key questions I address here are: what are 
the disadvantaged groups and values according to the outlined approaches? How can 
the chosen theoretical and conceptual approaches work together? Why are they best 
suited to exploring the research puzzle of how certain gendered subjects and values 
are excluded and marginalized through discourse? I argue that the chosen approaches 
provide different facets of conceptualizing discursive inequality in post-transformation 
                                                 
17 ‘Operacja przekształcenia homo sovieticusa w Western mana została przeprowadzona na/w 
kobiecym ciele.’ From the 2012 book: Akuszerki transformacji by Agnieszka Mrozik.  
Polish politics. Despite the differences, they are helpful in various ways to understand 
the key concepts of the thesis, hence my attempt at combining them and providing a 
comprehensive interpretation.  
 
The opening quote hints at the main assumption of this chapter – that there is a 
gendered nexus between the state, the nation, and the subject, which was transformed 
in the processes of regime change and democratization that Poland underwent since 
1989. I argue that to elucidate these developments the multiple frameworks applied in 
this dissertation point to different facets of the ‘multiple inequalities’ witnessed in 
Poland and discussed in the subsequent chapter in terms of discourse.  
 
Since I use a variety of concepts from many contexts, this chapter begins with a 
discussion of the positionality of the approaches, using the concepts of ‘translated’ and 
‘travelling’ theories. The chapter then follows with a general discussion of the notion 
of gendered subjects and goes on to add nationalism literature, feminist political 
economy, feminist institutionalist, postcolonial and dependency approaches in order 
to explore feminist, political, and socio-economic facets of potential exclusion and 
marginalization. The second part of this chapter tries to complement the discussed 
theories with the Polish context and analysis: focusing on the Polish story of 
Europeanization bearing in mind the post-state socialist/postcolonial, feminist 
institutionalist, and feminist political economic insights. As I summarize in Figure 2.1 
and Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter, the combination of these literatures elucidates 
different aspects of how and why certain subjects and values become discursively 
political ‘losers’. The conceptual toolkit established in this chapter helps us to 
understand how exclusionist and scapegoating hegemonic discourses are created and 
maintained, as they reproduce themselves through the construction of political 
subjects. 
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Translated and travelling theories and the ‘East’–‘West’ 
divide18 
I consciously used the terms ‘East’ and ‘West’ in quotation marks here. They are key 
concepts that weave in and out this dissertation. They are also often entangled in the 
literature, so I cannot neglect discussing them, especially because there remains 
ambiguity and variation in their use. Even though ‘East’ and ‘West’ come from 
geography, they do not necessarily strictly refer to geographic locations, but rather to 
the belongings of former political blocs, the ‘First’ and ‘Second’ worlds (Wöhrer 
2004). This is evident, for example, when Prague is considered to be in the ‘East’, but 
Vienna in the ‘West’, Romania and Bulgaria are called ‘East’, but Greece is ‘West’ 
(Wöhrer 2004). Moreover, ‘East’ and ‘West’ carry connotations that are far from 
neutral and therefore questioning their unreflective usage as well as bearing in mind 
their political and historical heritage are essential (Wolff 1994). It is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to try to solve this ambiguity. However, the tensions between ‘East’ 
and ‘West’ are an important narrative that plays out in the discussions on 
transformation, Europeanization, and importantly, feminism (see for instance chapter 
4).  
What comes across in these discussions are the apparently dichotomous constructions 
of ‘East’ and ‘West’ (Wöhrer 2004; Navickaite 2016). Frequently, I refer to both terms 
myself, but my goal is to deconstruct (reconstruct) and reconfigure their uses and 
understandings, not to maintain their problematic implications and especially not to 
essentialize them. As argued by Veronika Wöhrer (2004), this tension comes from the 
fact that in the early 1990s many authors spoke about ‘Western feminists’ and ‘Eastern 
women’ and described differences between them or at times focused on the things they 
had in common (Regulska 1998). The main category of comparison was the belonging 
to an either ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’ country (Wöhrer 2004: 64-76). Often, the 
differentiation between ‘East’ and ‘West’ were not only used as a binary opposition, 
                                                 
18See Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the 
Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
but also as the most obvious and important point of difference. In comparison to this 
dichotomy, other differences (i.e. class, race, age, sexual orientation), appear to have 
been neglected (Wöhrer 2004). The categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ referred to the 
former Cold War blocs, and were thus eventually replaced by ‘post-socialist’ and 
‘capitalist’.19 
Whereas most gender researchers in the ‘West’ can tend to pursue their work without 
having much knowledge about the ongoing gender debates and political developments 
in post-state socialist countries (of course with the exception of those who are 
specialized in this field and serve as ‘go-betweens’), scholars in ‘Central’ and ‘Eastern’ 
Europe (CEE) cannot do without knowing about developments in – at least some – 
‘Western’ gender discourses (Regulska 1998; Wöhrer 2004: 8-9). This is a 
consequence of the fact that ‘Western gender studies’ form the mainstream, the 
‘canon’ of all feminist knowledge. Even bearing in mind the ‘politics of location’ (cf. 
Rich 1986), feminist analysis readily maintained the hegemonic position of ‘Western 
feminist theory’, in which the post-state socialist condition is often lost, sometimes in 
favour of the ‘Third’ world (Koobak and Marling 2014).  
Therefore, Eastern Europe has been, simply put, not of much concern within this 
canon. It seems that, within feminist political science (similarly to other, more 
mainstream, fields of social science research), there are some contexts that are 
considered more important, more general, context-neutral, or relevant for every 
scholar, and others that are regarded as less important or more special, ‘peculiar’ and 
therefore not so relevant for those who do not live there, or do not specialize with this 
area (Wöhrer 2004: 9). Hence, this makes up the context of my dissertation and the 
theoretical approaches I discuss below. 
Importantly, this also raises the question of the relationship between post-state 
socialism and post-colonialism (discussed in detail below). Since the fall of the state 
socialist system and the intensified economic, political, and scientific cooperation 
across the former ‘iron curtain’, feminist researchers from Eastern Europe have 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the term ‘state socialism’ vs. ‘state socialism’, see discussions in chapters 1 and 
4. 
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pointed out similarities in the ways in which the ‘Third World’ and the (now former) 
‘Second World’ are constructed by the ‘First World’. Eastern European countries have 
been depicted as the underdeveloped and dependent opposite Western Europe, much 
like Africa or the Middle East were constructed in the classical colonial period 
(Bobako 2011).  
Similarly, Nanette Funk (1993: 319-320) has argued that power imbalances also exist 
at the level of discourse, as ‘East’ has been discursively incorporated into the ‘West’ 
following EU enlargement: ‘Western’ feminist insights are hegemonic and risk 
suppressing and distorting post-state socialist women’s concerns. Analysts have 
pointed out the lines of power differentials between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ gender 
research. 
The limited presence of post-socialist space in feminist discussions may be 
further explained by CEE’s historical immersion in Western culture, although 
it is not perceived as belonging to the ‘West’ yet/any more (an exclusion 
emphasised also in the concept of ‘New Europe’, with its stress on the recent 
arrival of the CEE countries) (Koobak and Marling 2014: 334). 
‘Western’ women, in speaking their own language, risk imposing standards of 
discourse and even provoking political and intellectual resentment (Funk 1993: 320). 
Similarly, Olga Toth (1993) argued that ‘Western’ feminists have distorted the 
situation in Eastern Europe in two ways: through envy in the claim that women in 
Eastern Europe had ‘got it all’ by a lucky strike after 1945 (free education, health care, 
reproductive rights, full employment, public childcare); and through pity, for the 
‘double’ and ‘triple’ burdens that I discuss in detail in chapter 4 (working, caring for 
family, and political community engagement). The dichotomy between ‘East’ and 
‘West’ (especially at media and mainstream political level) is also pervaded by 
negative popular stereotypes on both sides: American and ‘old Europe’ feminists as 
man-haters and, conversely post-state socialist women as simply having bought into 
sexism having subordinated themselves insipidly to the family (Funk 1993:32; cf. 
Penn 2014).  
This situation is compounded by what Magdalena Grabowska (2016) has referred to 
as ‘travelling theories’ in post-state socialist feminism, where Eastern European 
scholars have to translate (both literally and figuratively) ‘Western’ research into their 
regional and local contexts. This form of cultural borrowing has been prevalent since 
the development of gender studies during the 1990s, also in Poland; the expectations 
regarding the transformation, democratization, and Europeanization processes were a 
direct product thereof. The assumptions that the democratic transformation was 
supposed to be conducive to the rise of a feminist consciousness. Thus, 
democratization and Europeanization should have produced more gender equality and 
social inclusion and, if Europeanization and democratization were ‘deeper’ and their 
values more internalized, the situation would have resulted in more gender equality – 
all these claims were articulated while taking for granted that ‘West’ was the only 
possible point of reference.  
This form of ‘intra-European colonization’ (Grabowska 2016) of Eastern Europe as 
the ‘little other’ (Wolff 1994) is currently being rejected or reconfigured. In this vein, 
recent ‘revisionist’ feminist insight from Eastern Europe (Kulawik 2011b; Daskalova 
2007; Fidelis 2015; Funk 2014; Grabowska 2016) have turned towards subverting 
linear and teleological transformation narratives (Navickaite 2016). What is more, 
feminist scholars are trying to challenge the idea of Eastern European women as 
passive victims and are highlighting façade equality during state socialism by filling 
in the gaps in the narrative about gendered political developments since 1945 (see 
more detailed discussion in chapter 4). In Polish academia, there have been recent 
moves to revise this position and include state socialist times in the history of women’s 
movements, emancipation, and gendered research more generally in particular by the 
‘go-betweens’ (see for instance: Fidelis 2015; Grzebalska 2014; Mrozik 2012; Funk 
2014; Penn 2006, 2014). The focus is on elements of post-1945 continuity, even 
though the stress usually falls on the non-linearity of the phenomena. 
Until now there was a conspicuous absence of the ‘Second World’ in ‘Western’ theory 
other than claims that, as a result of transformation, it was falling behind in 
modernization (Funk 1993). When arguing for a more ‘decolonial’ positioning of 
Eastern Europe in gender research, Koobak and Marling (2014: 333) argued along 
similar lines: 
The most pertinent discourse that helps to naturalise the East–West difference 
is the persistent trope of post-socialist CEE feminist studies ‘lagging behind’ 
No country for losers? 
35 
Chapter 2: Conceptual and theoretical framework 
the West. Spatial and geopolitical differences are projected onto a temporal 
plane, with Eastern Europe perceived to be ‘catching up’.  
Thus, the former state socialist bloc tends to get less attention in feminist scholarship, 
with the notable exception of the ‘go-betweens’. Today, the goal is to de-homogenize 
state socialism, transformation, and their legacies, but not to break with the translation 
of ‘Western’ theory about the ‘East’. Rather, it is about seeing the process as travelling 
theories that move back and forth between contexts and are developed by the 
intermediary researchers. The goal is the conscious, deconstructive, and 
transformative use of ‘Western’ concepts in the study of Eastern Europe. This 
dissertation follows the understanding that, while we need to translate the travelling 
theories into the ‘Eastern’ scholarly debate, they also go back and provide new 
conceptual insight in the ‘West’. To an extent, what I do in this chapter is filling 
‘Western’ theories with and translating Polish scholarship to explore the Polish case. 
Gendered subjects 
Gender is arguably one of the range of overlapping and layered sociocultural contexts 
and categories within which both individuals and societies operate and mediate their 
subjectivity (Stapleton and Wilson 2004). In this dissertation, I follow an important 
aspect of what the feminist theorist Carol Cohn understands under the term gender: 
(…) a symbolic system, a central organizing discourse of culture, one that not 
only shapes how we experience and understand ourselves as men and women, 
but that also interweaves with other discourses and shapes them – and therefore 
shapes other aspects of our world (…) [A symbolic system in which] human 
characteristics are dichotomized, divided into pairs of polar opposites that are 
supposedly mutually exclusive: mind is opposed to body; culture to nature; 
thought to feeling; logic to intuition; objectivity to subjectivity; aggression to 
passivity; confrontation to accommodation; abstraction to particularity; 
political to personal, ad nauseam. In each case, the first terms of the “opposites” 
is associated with male, the second with female. And in each case our society 
values the first over the second (1993: 228-229). 
Following Cohn (1993: 228), I want to move the stress from gendered individuals to 
gendered discourses and therefore to the system of meanings, ways of thinking, and 
frames of understanding or reference that shape and identify how subjects understand, 
mediate, and represent themselves. This is a crucial underlying assumption of the 
construction of gendered political subjects in discourse. 
Gender is one of the most recognizable, accepted, and available aspects of identity. 
Arguably, gender relations are at the heart of cultural constructions of social identities 
and collectivities (such as the subjects that I am analysing) (Yuval-Davis 2001:126). 
In a society, dominant ideas about how women and men are ‘supposed to’ look, 
behave, and interact are perceived as obvious, understandable, and legitimate (Sperling 
2014: 13). Accordingly, to take Lene Hansen’s (2006) processes of linking and 
differentiation, we can observe how categories of ‘woman’, ‘man’ as well as 
‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are applied in political discourse. Hansen’s discussion 
of identity (which can be applied to gender identity) shows how this concept is always 
relational and implies that identity is constructed through reference to something alien 
or opposite. Hence, identity discourses create categories of self and other, where the 
former will be constituted as superior or more important than the latter (Hansen 2006: 
6). For instance, the category ‘woman’ can be conceptualized as different and inferior 
to the category ‘man’ by linking it to a range of language signs (Hansen 2006: 20). 
Lene Hansen’s analysis demonstrates this phenomenon by showing how the use of the 
term ‘woman’ gets defined and constructed through a process of linking with 
‘emotional’, ‘motherly’, ‘reliant’ and ‘simple’. At the same time the male series of 
links are: ‘rational’, ‘intellectual’, ‘independent’, and ‘complex’. Therefore, meaning 
is constructed through the discursive juxtaposition between a privileged sign on the 
one hand and a devalued one on the other (Hansen 2006: 19). The othering of the 
category ‘woman’ (with its linked characteristics) leads to the subordination of this 
kind of identity construct as compared with the ‘man’ category and its links. Hence, 
how discourse (texts and language) actually constructs acceptable knowledge and 
identity becomes an empirical question in need of analysis (Hansen 2006: 8).  
In the context of gendered analyses of politics, the notion of identity is often applied. 
However, it is a rather slippery and arguably over-used term, the definition of which 
varies from discipline to another (Sunderland and Litosseliti 2002: 6). While identity 
is a useful term, not least because it relates to a sense of self in everyday use for people, 
it can be treated as misleadingly singular and fixed in time by researchers (Ivanic 1998: 
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11). In the case of my research focus, it would also prove a hurdle beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to trace the impact of parliamentary discourses on people’s 
identities. By positioning myself within the interpretative tradition, I am not looking 
for causal connections or correlations how discourse creates identities.  
For these reasons, instead of interrogating identity, I focus on the construction of 
gendered subjects or subjectivities, meaning that I am exploring the discursive 
constructs in politics, not their identity manifestations in society. I explore the 
production and distribution of discursive power, without necessarily insisting on 
causal mechanisms between the political discourses and their products. The discursive 
production of gendered subjectivities, I argue, involves the categorization, attribution 
or ascription of values and qualities to individuals or groups. The relationship between 
discourse and gendered subjects consists of ‘semiotically construct[ing] 
(represent[ing]) reality without simultaneously identifying [oneself] and relating to 
other people in particular ways’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 50).  
Therefore, my gendered subjects ‘emerge from discourse’ (Bucholtz 1999: 4). In other 
words, the ways people talk and debate and the way they speak to and about others 
‘turns individuals into subjective selves (…) Various private and institutional 
discourses are constitutive of us and others as social subjects (…) These discourses 
fabricate our subjectivities’ (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 412-13). The relationship 
is however a two-way process: the result of joint creation, involving both the producers 
and the audience (or consumers) of the discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 
41). As I discussed above, the way people talk to and about others can be seen as an 
affiliation, but the way we are spoken about is frequently siginificant too (Sunderland 
and Litosseliti 2002: 23). This dialectical relationship means that the subjectivity of 
the consumers and producers of discourse is constantly shaped and reconfigured by 
the concepts and assumptions embedded in discourse and vice versa (Sunderland and 
Litosseliti 2002:23; Horsman 1990).  
So, if subjects are immersed within discourses, the result is both enabling and 
constraining. Individuals have agency to an extent in this process, forming and 
reconfiguring their own role in the discursive practice – this idea allows for both active 
application and constraints on availability of discourses (Sunderland and Litosseliti 
2002). The analysis of this mediation entails an exploration of power relations between 
discourse producers and discourse consumers, in the case of this dissertation – the 
relations associated with institutional hegemonic power. For this reason, the idea of 
discourse mediating gendered subjects is a wide-ranging and powerful one (cf. 
Sunderland and Litosseliti 2002: 23-24). 
As I discuss in more detail in chapter 3, the critical discursive approach that is 
employed in this dissertation is appropriate to the exploration of how power works in 
and influences framing processes within parliamentary debates. Power plays out in 
hegemonic discourses, which produce and limit the ‘truths’ that are available to us 
within specific contexts and times (cf. Foucault 1980). Hence, drawing on the 
Foucauldian perspective, power is also understood as productive, not just repressive 
(Foucault 1980). In the construction of gendered subjects, this kind of power is most 
effective when it forces us to fulfil the standards of normative femininities and 
masculinities available through hegemonic discourses. If power operates by both 
creating and restricting, producing and oppressing, through dominant discourses, then 
those ideas and narratives that express different options for change and transformation, 
make it difficult to challenge hegemonic groups and discourses. In this sense, the 
power of discourse, while enabling agency and producing legislative outcomes, also 
constrains the subjects’ potential for political agency (for more see a discussion of 
Fairclough’s power in discourse and power behind discourse in the following chapter). 
Thus, the power of discourse especially affects the possibility for actors to challenge 
existing hegemonic discourses.  
A focus on gendered subjects is central to theorizing gender as socially and 
discursively constructed, a process in constant flux, which continually undergoes 
modification and negation (Sunderland and Litosseliti 2002: 25). However, in a more 
poststructuralist vein, gender can also be understood as ‘performance’. This idea 
means that one ‘performs’, displays, represents, or enacts gender, as famously argued 
by Judith Butler in Gender Trouble in 1990. As Sunderland and Litosseliti point out, 
the conceptual understanding of gender is not a question of either-or, but may be a 
matter of theoretical primacy (2002: 25), so a question of which theory one chooses. 
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Performativity, understood as doing one’s gender, is a useful conceptualization, 
especially in sociological research regarding sexuality and gender expression. Gender, 
and what we perceive as feminine or masculine (or just ‘normal’ in reference to gender 
expression and sexuality), is enacted and wielded in contests over power and policy 
‘in forms we could refer to as “politicized masculinity and “politicized femininity”’ 
(Sperling 2014: 11).  
In politics and political research, even without drawing on concepts of theatricality 
and performance, much of the utterances and communications or political debates can 
be seen as a ‘ritualized process which allows the participants to construct and project 
desirable versions of their identities, in a succession of performances targeted at 
specific audiences’ (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 407). Importantly, a given 
‘performance’ does not guarantee that the consumers of discourse adopt the desired 
interpretation (for a more detailed discussion of interpretation see the following 
chapter). Constructing subjects is also a linguistic performance, so it brings up 
questions about terminology, choice, and intentionality (Sunderland and Litosseliti 
2002: 26). It can often be hard to draw a clear distinction between intentional 
(theatrical) performance and linguistic construction or categorization in political talk 
especially. Therefore, while being informed by notions of performativity, the stress in 
this dissertation is on the construction of values and subjects, and not on the MPs’ 
specific performance of gender.  
Drawing from Annica Kronsell’s insights (2006), I look at whether the national 
legislature of Poland displays what she calls traits of ‘hegemonic masculinity’. 
Masculinity is a concept that encompasses how we think a ‘real’ man should be, look, 
think and behave (Reeser 2010). As there are many cultural and social norms on how 
an ideal man should be and behave, there is not one single type of masculinity but 
rather a multitude of masculinities. According to Connell (1995), patriarchal norms on 
masculinity can also be called hegemonic. I refer to the idea that men should not only 
dominate women, some men should also dominate other men. Hegemonic forms of 
masculinity as they are understood today developed from the advent of industrial 
capitalism and imperialism (Connell and Wood 2005). Even though they are time- and 
space-specific, hegemonic masculinities share important characteristics: association 
with authority, social conservatism, compulsory heterosexuality, integration with a 
family division of labour, strongly marked, symbolic gender differences, and an 
emotional distance between men and women. The subsequent section discusses the 
connections between the gendered characteristics of femininity and masculinity and 
the nation. 
Nationalism and gender 
Agnieszka Mrozik’s opening quote of this chapter suggested a connection along the 
lines of gender-state-nation-change. The following discussion explores this 
relationship from a theoretical perspective. While ‘nationalism is a particular – and 
particularly potent – manifestation of political identification’ (Peterson 2010: 35), 
scholars have argued that gender relations are always at the heart of cultural and 
historical constructions of national identities (McClintock 1995; Verdery 1996; Walby 
1996a,b; Graff 2001, 2008b; Yuval-Davis 2001). They become even more important 
in times when the perceived national identities or values are at risk, or are under 
pressure because of particular social and political circumstances (like war, the 
persistence of an oppressive regime or the collapse of a former political and/or 
economic order). Significantly for the current study, ‘nationalism is quintessentially 
[a] homogenizing, differentiating, or classifying discourse’ (Verdery 1996: 227). 
According to feminist scholars, there are close ties between discourses about gender 
and those that define national, racial and ethnic identity (Graff 2008b). Therefore (as 
I explore empirically later in chapter 6) nations are constructs that are gendered in 
different ways (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis 2001; Walby 2005; Graff 
2008a).  
At the same time these notions are not fixed: ‘[g]ender is a dynamic system, not a fixed 
dichotomy; the categories themselves are not simple or stable (contrary to common 
sense); and many gender issues concern patterns of interaction and relationship, having 
little to do with differences in personal characteristics’ (Connell 2006: 838). This 
means that there are different ideals as to the rightful place and position of both women 
and men in society, which are engraved in the various economic, social, political and 
legal practices of the nation (Walby 1996b, 2005: 10). The ideas may entail a gendered 
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division of labour, cultural definitions of femininity and masculinity and a gendered 
approach to the articulation of women’s and men’s interests (Connell 2006). 
Moreover, organized religions are often very important carriers of such gendered 
projects (Walby 2005). Although analytically the discourses of religion and culture 
may appear as distinct from that of political relations, concretely and historically they 
are always entangled. This is especially true in countries of Eastern Europe, such as 
Poland, where the church is a key actor in national identity debates.  
The dissertation follows Tamar Mayer’s assertion (2000: 5-6) that the nation is 
intertwined with the male and female ego and is inseparable from gender and sexuality. 
A number of attempts to conceptualize the link between women and the state have 
focused on the central dimension of citizenship and how, far from being gender-
neutral, it constructs women and men differently (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989:6). 
Both ‘gender’ and ‘nation’ are cultural constructs used both in academia and in daily 
life. Both are ‘made up’ and socially constructed through their use in social life – they 
become real and seemingly natural (Verdery 1996: 62). Both provide ways to socially 
classify and imply homogeneity and difference simultaneously. ‘Nation has no 
meaning except in a world of “other”’ (Verdery 1996: 62). Hence, to research the 
nexus of nation and gender is to question how either of them involves the other in the 
way they are socially elaborated or lived. As Katherine Verdery (1996:62-63) explains:  
(g)ender as a construct mediates the relation between bodies, as anatomical or 
biological givens, and social meanings about them. Is it a symbol system by 
which bodies enter into sociality (…) To the extent that the modern nation-
state is defined in relation to a geographical territory, “nation” parallels 
“gender” in linking the “physical” body of the state to a set of meanings and 
affects, thus rendering physical space socio-political.  
Similarly, Tamar Mayer (2000) argued that because nationalism, gender, and sexuality 
are socially and culturally constructed, they often play an important role in 
constructing each other in turn. In particular, they do this by using the ‘we’ category 
and juxtaposing it to ‘they’, which makes easier their construction through the 
exclusion of that which is different. Thus, gendered and national categories produce 
lines of exclusion and categories of hierarchy. 
Gender is also central to ‘eroticizing the nation’ (Verdery 1996: 77) – for instance, 
through stereotypical constructions in which the male heroes burn with love and 
devotion for the feminized motherland. The ways in which women’s bodies relate to 
the national collectivity has been elaborated in the seminal work Woman-Nation-State 
by Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989). They distinguish five major ways in 
which women are involved in ethnic and national processes: 
1. women as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities; 
2. women as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic and national groups; 
3. women as central participants in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity 
and as the transmitters of its culture; 
4. women as signifiers of ethnic/national differences – as a focus and symbol in 
ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and the 
transformation of ethnic/national categories; 
5. women as participants in national, economic, political, and military struggles. 
Additionally, Sylvia Walby (1996b: 237-238) has argued that there are two more ways 
that we need in order to look into gender relations in collectivities: 
1. the specificity of gender divisions of labour in different ethnic/national groups; 
2. the conflict between different forms of social hierarchy. 
Walby (1996b: 238) concedes that different genders (and classes) may be differentially 
enthusiastic about ‘the’ ostensible ethnic/national project depending on the degree to 
which it (and its priorities) is ‘theirs’.  
However, these classical elaborations can lead to ambiguities. As Julie Mostov (2000: 
98) pointed out, the status of women in nationalist discourse is unequivocal. On the 
one hand, as women guarantee the continuity of a nation, they hold the highest value 
– they are ‘mothers of a nation (…) that need to be protected’ (Mostov 2000: 99). On 
the other hand, as Mostov claims, they are always suspect, as they might be disloyal 
by denying to perform the prescribed role of caring about the extension of the nation: 
they might not want children or may have them with ‘inappropriate’ partners. For this 
reason, the need to protect women unavoidably starts requiring the monitoring of 
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women’s behaviour (Mostov 2000: 91). This monitoring is most effectively performed 
through reproductive policy that regulates access to birth control methods as well as 
the public support for motherhood (or lack thereof).  
Importantly for my study, the subjectivity notions of ‘female’ and ‘male’ can be 
elaborated in such a way that they intersect unequally with citizenship, implying that 
practically women and men are not equal in their rights as citizens. I intend to examine 
this by looking at how discourses construct subjects in parliament. Attention is due to 
how nationalist politics integrates gender and what forms of national imagery are 
offered, by whom, and how political discourses, around for example abortion, produce 
distinctive values and subjects (this is discussed in chapters 5 and 6).  
Postcolonial studies and (post-)dependency theory 
A significant body of work from which the thesis draws is postcolonial studies. Rasa 
Navickaite (2016: 121) has argued that the application of postcolonial theory to the 
post-state socialist context is not unproblematic. ‘Postcolonial’ cannot be used simply 
as a parallel term with ‘post state-socialist’ (Koobak and Marling 2014). Eastern 
Europe in the second half of the 20th century specifically was not a case of direct 
imperial conquest in the same way as other geographic regions had been. Nonetheless, 
the East is always ‘only precariously included in the idea of Europe’ (Navickaite 2016: 
121). As I discuss below, Eastern Europeans’ claims of belonging to Europe, on the 
one hand, and their calls for catching up to Europe, on the other, rearticulate and 
reproduce ideas of Western superiority (Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011; Koobak and 
Marling 2014).  
Although scholars from the postcolonial tradition were initially reluctant to accept 
potential similarities between postcolonial and post-state socialist experiences, there 
is increasingly a recognition that postcolonial theory may provide fruitful insights into 
post-state socialist transformation processes (Imre 2014; Trakilovic 2016; Koobak and 
Marling 2014).  As argued by Karolina Krasuska (2013), there has been a growth in 
research discussing the problems of Eastern Europe from the postcolonial perspective 
since the 1990s. In the Polish academic context, the frames testing the postcolonial 
approach and its usefulness were discussed in the special issue of Teksty Drugie (2010) 
and in the edited volume by Gosk and Karwowska (2008). The main debate centered 
on the applicability of the term postcolonial in the post-state socialist context, with 
some authors suggesting to use the concept of post-dependency instead (Gosk 2008).  
Jan Sowa (2011) has outlined that post-state socialist Eastern Europe shares several 
common features with postcolonial terrains of the former Third World. He sees this in 
the degradation of social capital; low levels of social and civic trust in public 
institutions and in politics at large; the weakness of the civic tradition (activism, civil 
society participation); weak identification with state institutions and their 
representatives; the public sphere often being overwhelmed with primordial conflicts 
and forces; lack of control over religious institutions; and the spilling over of symbols, 
rituals and religious values from the sacrum to the secular sphere (Sowa 2011: 443). 
Arguably, a combination of postcolonial theory with insights from post-state socialism 
provides the basis for a critical approach to the East-West divide and for exposing and 
challenging the binary logic that keeps Europe’s ideological divide in place (Trakilovic 
2016).  
What makes critical dialogue with postcolonialism especially relevant for CEE 
is its complex and continuing process of self-colonisation: in rejecting the 
former coloniser (Soviet Union, Russia), the region has constituted itself as a 
periphery of the West (Koobak and Marling 2014: 336). 
This means interrogating processes like Europeanization from the perspective of the 
Eastern periphery and asking questions about the hierarchical positioning, which 
assumes ‘Eastern European backwardness’ going through a linear progressive 
trajectory towards the desirable ‘Western’ goal point that was arguably the essence of 
transformation in Eastern Europe (cf. Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011; Navickaite 2016; 
Colpani and Ponzanesi 2016; Koobak and Marling 2014).  
Cross-connecting postcolonial theory and post-state socialism, hence, gives us a 
framework to deconstruct, question, and reposition our understanding of relationships 
such as the one between discourse and social power. It gives new concepts and insights 
to the analysis of how power hierarchies are enacted, reproduced, or legitimised by the 
text and talk of dominant groups or institutions within the given context. Within the 
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framework of such an account of discursively mediated dominance and inequality, 
drawing parallels between the postcolonial and post-state socialist conditions is 
important. Below, I discuss concepts drawn from postcolonial theory that inform my 
dissertation.  
In chapter 4, I explicitly bring a gender lens to the post-state socialist discourses and 
highlight commonalities with postcolonial equivalents. Already Franz Fanon (2008: 
82-108), one of the seminal first theorists of post-colonialism, observed that 
decolonization means the ‘reclaiming of manhood’. The ‘communist man’ (much like 
the colonial man) has been constructed as effeminate in the post-state socialist 
discourse, especially by the conservative proponents of the ‘return to tradition’ 
discourse (for more details see the discussion of post-transformation gender relations 
in chapter 4). The way to emancipation and empowerment for the ‘true manly man’ is 
seen in the negation of the state socialist condition (cf. Verdery 1996; Graff 2008b). 
This logic has served to legitimize the secondary position of women in national 
collectivities. The parallel between post-state socialism and post-colonialism is 
evident here. As Nira Yuval-Davis pointed out (2001:128) the construction of 
womanhood of Third World women has a property of otherness to it, because women 
are excluded from the national ‘we’ of the body politic. This puts them in an object 
rather than subject position. This can be seen also in the East European states that were 
‘purified’ by pushing women out of the public and workplace in transformation 
(Kulawik 2005).  
Feminist political economy 
This dissertation also draws on insights from feminist political economy, since 
economic transformation in Poland is one of the most important social and historical 
contexts of my research. Feminist political economists have argued that it is essential 
to understand economies as gendered structures and economic crises as crises in social 
reproduction (Rai and Waylen 2013: 6-7). Feminist political and legal theorists have 
shown how women's subordination in the family/private sphere shapes labour markets 
in ways that disadvantage and discriminate against women in education and 
employment, and reinforce their subordination in the public, political sphere (True 
2010: 41). During economic crises, women workers are particularly vulnerable to 
being laid off work or having their wages reduced. The usually concomitant reduction 
of public services affects women adversely, as primary care workers in the domestic 
sphere, while the price shocks to food production and markets make women vulnerable 
to debt as they struggle to provide for their families (Elson 2013: 207). Hence, feminist 
political economy highlights the masculine nature of the integrated political-economic 
authority structure (True 2010: 44). 
This is an important insight in the post-transformation and market liberalization 
context of Poland, but also following the 2008 economic crisis, which is the time 
period under analysis in this work. As Rai and Waylen (2013: 1) point out: the impact 
of the crisis is never uniformly felt. There are those who suffer more from the slump 
than others. Indeed, economic crises create opportunities for restructuring and 
diminishing social protection in the name of fiscal responsibility (cf. Klein 2007). The 
most vulnerable in society are being hit hardest. The case of post-1989 Poland 
exemplifies how women were laid off and had their wages reduced at a time of 
economic crisis and ‘shock therapy’. As I discuss in more detail in chapter 4, women’s 
privation and exclusion as a result of transformation was evident in the form of their 
disproportionate unemployment in formal terms and their overrepresentation in part-
time, ad hoc, and poorly paid work (Bridger et al. 1996; Pine 2002), their responsibility 
for care work that was previously catered to by the state (Haney 1999), the 
feminization of fields of work that were not valued materially or symbolically (Bridger 
et al. 1996; Pine 1996, 1998, 2002). 
In general, political economy analyses political and economic power as part of the 
same authority structure. All forms of power are understood as having a material basis, 
and often as founded on material relations of inequality (True 2010: 44). This 
understanding directs us to investigate the interconnections between the economic, 
social and political realms. Such an investigation reveals that power operates not only 
through direct coercion but also through the structured relations of production and 
reproduction that govern the distribution and use of resources, benefits, privileges and 
authority within the home and transnational society at large (True 2010: 44). This, in 
the context of this dissertation, means that the political economic processes interact 
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with and re-configure the institutional and ideological formations of society where 
gendered subjects and relations are shaped. 
Feminist institutionalism 
While not applying the approach itself strictly, this dissertation also draws on the 
insights of feminist institutionalism. As understood by Mackay et al. (2009, 2010), 
new feminist institutionalism is a combination of feminist political science and ‘new’ 
institutionalism. Until recently gender was not very prominent in the analysis of 
institutions (Mackay et al. 2010). However, it can provide an insightful look at how 
gender relations are ‘institutionalized’, or ‘embedded in particular political institutions 
and constraining and shaping social interaction’ (Mackay et al. 2010: 581). 
Recognizing the value of the approach, there has been an important ‘institutional turn’ 
in feminist political science (Kenny 2009; Lovenduski 2011; Krook and Mackay 
2011), allowing for the analysis of ‘underlying structures which underpin 
institutionalized advantages and disadvantages according to gender’ (Krook and 
Mackay 2011: 3). 
Because feminist institutionalism is not a unified approach to studying gender and 
politics, it allows for the theorization of various phenomena within the institutions. It 
allows for a broad conceptualization of the interconnecting features of the political and 
the social, such as the interplay between political actors and institutions. It also 
highlights the interconnectedness of formal and informal rules, norms, and daily 
practices and the consequences of such dynamics (Mackay et al. 2009: 254). In my 
case, these ‘rules of the game’ and institutions are defined and co-constituted by the 
discourse within parliament and its actors. The institutional relevance of my work 
derives from its focus on discourses in parliament and the institutional agency of their 
construction. The study of how gender relations play out at different institutional levels 
(through the construction of images, symbols, and ideologies) allows for an 
understanding of how gendered patterns of hierarchy and exclusion are justified and 
legitimized in the ‘seemingly trivial’ level of interpersonal day-to-day interaction and 
the ‘doing’ or ‘performing’ of gender (Acker 1992, quoted in Mackay et al. 2009: 257).  
Significantly, feminist institutionalism allows for the combination of several 
approaches to the study of the topic. Drawing from the historical strand, it is possible 
to conduct research on the long-term ramifications of ‘largely contingent events’ 
(Krook and Mackay 2011: 9). The implications of this include the study of paths and 
legacies in Eastern Europe from state socialist times, but also the contextualized 
impact of the ‘democratic’ transitions. Furthermore, the discursive approach to 
institutionalism analyses how ‘ideas and discourses construct and shape the very 
“exercise of power”, including (subjective) perceptions of positions’ (Schmidt 2010: 
321). While I do not focus on the institutionalist workings or characteristics of the 
parliament, the study of gendered construction of subjects therein is informed by the 
notion of how discourses shape and are shaped by the ‘exercise of power’ within the 
institution.  
Connecting it all to Poland 
The following sections aim to bring the Polish context to fill the theoretical approaches 
discussed above. Arguably, Poland is a case of one-dimensional constructions of 
female and male identities with reference to the nation. While Gerber (2011: 491) 
admits that gender is but one element in a larger construction of Polish national 
identity, according to Małgorzata Radkiewicz (2005:116), the interrelation between 
gender and nation is so strong that it can be considered the most important aspect 
defining Polish national identity. While Poland is by no means unique in having gender 
and national identities strongly intertwined, the most significant feature of Polish 
nationalism is that it has always been related to specific historical connotations, which 
are masculinist in nature or reflect male-dominated hierarchies of values: the ethos of 
fighting (and losing – martyrdom), patriotism, and the catholic religion (Radkiewicz 
2005: 116). Thus, Polish nationalism is tightly bound up with not only ethnic 
identification, but also the religious identification of the majority ethnic group (Gerber 
2011: 491). 
Because of massive population relocations, ethnic cleansing, and the significant 
redrawing of state borders, the ethnic homogenization of post-Second World War 
Poland paved the way for a particular discourse of Polish national identity centred on 
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Polish catholicism, rather than civic nationalism (Porter 2000; Snyder 2004; Zubrzycki 
2010), forming a particular religious ethno-nationalism. As the great Polish cultural 
theorist, Maria Janion (1996, 2000, 2006), has extensively shown, the role of the 
romantic mythology as a source for modern discourse on gender and nation in Poland 
significantly overpowers all other sources. Romanticism, as a literary and cultural 
period, is essential and foundational to the construction of Polish national identity 
(Porter 2000). Specifically, the romantic mythology of ‘Mother Poland’ (Matka-
Polka) as the defender of both the Polish-catholic soul and the core of the nation itself 
has resulted in a strong association between women’s social and cultural roles and 
Poland’s very survival as a place and a people (Porter 2000; Graff 2008a). Professor 
Anna Titkow pictured this trope as: 
Clothed in black, Mother Poland [Matka-Polka] (…) cultivated Polish identity 
and traditions at home, maintained the religion, language and customs. Years 
spent without men taught mothers ironclad self-reliance – they had to teach 
themselves to run the family after their husbands were killed or exiled. Mother 
Poland’s heroism pressures women to be perfect. Their reward is high prestige 
in society and family, but being placed on such a pedestal narrows the spectrum 
of socially acceptable behaviours (…) The Polish Mother has had to be good, 
faithful, strong and devoted; it would not do for her to submit to desires, or 
pursue her own passions or dreams. (Podgórska and Kapecka 2003) 
This spectre of Mother Poland, a fundamentally gendered ideal-type, has left little 
cognitive space for the development or valuation of a gender-neutral citizen in Poland 
(Fuszara 1993; Gerber 2011; Graff 2005; Heinen 1997; Watson 1993b). Maria Janion 
(1996, 2004, 2006) has extensively shown that the ideal-type of Polishness 
(combination of Polonia and Matka-Polka) is steeped in romanticist mythology and 
leads to Polish nationalism being martyrologic, or even necrophile, due to an almost 
eroticized vision of suffering, sacrifice and death. The ever-present trope of Mother 
Poland is both cause and effect of ultraconservative and religious entrenchment. In a 
country with a very strong Marian worship strand of catholicism, Matka-Polka 
combines the figure of Mater Dolorosa that says goodbye to sons that are going to 
their death, with the position of a patron-saint of nationalist and independentist lost-
cause conspiracies (Mrozik 2012). The figure of Matka-Polka highlights the ongoing 
need for cultural explanations of policy outcomes, particularly those that address how 
categories of worth work to distinguish between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’, 
and how collective schemas comprise the normative foundation from which policy 
options are developed (Gerber 2011: 492). 
With real women pacified by the gendered nationalist discourse, feminist political 
economy approaches and postcolonial and dependency theory point to even more axes 
of inequality and marginalization in the Polish case. Monika Bobako (2011) has shown 
Polish transformation processes can be viewed as examples of racializing the class 
difference, namely the treatment of social classes as racialized (lesser) others. 
Following the insights of Etienne Balibar’s and Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1991) Race, 
Nation, Class, Bobako argues that the racializing of class difference functions as a 
feature of market liberalization and transformation discourses. In her discussion, she 
shows that the process of creation of class difference in Poland after 1989 can be 
interpreted as the racialization of social groups that were victims of the capitalist 
transformation (Bobako 2011:1). She claims that the categories of race, class racism, 
and racializing are a useful tool in analysing the creation of post-transformation class 
differences in Poland (Bobako 2011: 10,14). Psychological traits of laziness, 
unwillingness to reform, and inefficiency, intimately connected to the stereotypical 
racist ‘inferior race’ understandings, have been applied to categorize and stigmatize 
former public sector workers in Poland – the homo sovieticus from the opening quote.  
The discursive strategies of essentializing, reifying, and naturalizing of cultural 
characteristics as biological traits were employed consciously to legitimize 
exploitation and inequalities in concrete power relations and economic interests. 
Drawing interdiscursively on rhetorical devices of racial superiority, Polish political 
and economic elites legitimized inequalities and explained the economic 
disenfranchisement of the former working class, the unemployed, and those who 
needed welfare as the inescapable result of the neoliberal-oriented economic 
transformation. This process allows for a deeper understanding of mechanisms of 
social exclusion and segregation based on hierarchies of subjects. 
Within the Polish context, it is also useful to consider the notion of ‘colonial 
complicity’, namely the situation in which a country was neither a dominant colonial 
power, nor an ‘innocent victim’, nor a mere outsider of the colonial projects (Vuorela 
2009: 19). From this perspective, Polish politics is influenced by its paradoxical 
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historical legacy, which mainstream memory and national discourse has attempted to 
whitewash. While it was a periphery to colonial empires, Poland also proceeded with 
its own colonizing projects in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine in particular. For 
reasons of convenience, Polish adepts of postcolonial studies completely neglect this 
fact, using post-colonialism exclusively to pursue ‘typically Polish martyrology’ and 
to ‘remind ourselves and the world that Poland was a victim’ (Sowa 2015: 62; cf. 
Ruchniewicz 2007; Orla-Bukowska 2006). In Poland, the power of seduction of the 
hegemonic discourse about national colonial victimhood is so strong that there is an 
explicit need to examine what it purposefully overshadows, namely the complicity in 
the practices of imperial domination (cf. Sowa 2011).  
Along similar lines, the Bulgarian historian, Alexander Kiossev (1999), propounds the 
view that Eastern European countries are a case of ‘self-colonizing’ cultures that 
import foreign (Western European) cultural, economic, and political, modes of 
development, considering them superior, which is typical for peripheries and semi-
peripheries. He argues that there is no explicit forced colonization of these countries, 
except that purported by their own elites – ‘comprador elites’, as Pietrzak (2016) calls 
them that are beholden not to their own citizens, but to larger, transnational and 
international economic and financial structures. The crux of the problem with self-
colonization is the identification of ‘normal’ with foreign or outside cultural models 
and their implementation (Kiossev 1999; Sowa 2011). So, self-colonizing cultures of 
Eastern Europe constituted their cultural and political identity in an inferiority position 
vis-à-vis the West, especially with the economic transformations after 1989 (Sowa 
2011: 25). 
 At the same time, the Polish political elites constructed and emphasized their apparent 
belonging to the West by widespread arguments that Eastern Europe had been 
‘kidnapped’ from the West by the Soviet Union following the Second World War 
(Kundera 1984). Transformation then represented post-state socialism as a one-way 
road from the ‘communist’ economic system of backwardness to liberal democracy of 
the West (Navickaite 2016). Moreover, Polish elites relativized the distance from the 
West by orientalizing and othering their Eastern neighbours and thus constructing 
Poland as the last Western rampart in the East (Zarycki 2004; cf. Said 1978). This 
attitude echoes the notions of colonial complicity discussed above because it served to 
justify Polish claims of a civilizational mission towards its Eastern neighbours, which 
informed the Polish imperial ambitions during the First and Second Polish Republics 
(cf. Porter 2000: 158-177). This is an important observation that premises the 
discussions of the legacies of Polish transformation politics in chapter 4.  
Gendered and critical view of Europeanization 
In the years of regime transformation and especially the period following the accession 
to the EU, Europeanization was an important part of the political process and a 
reference point for the political elites in Poland and the wider region. In a very narrow 
and popular understanding, it meant the processes of legal adaptation and legislative 
implementation leading up to EU accession. Eastern European states that were to 
accede to the EU were obligated to harmonize their domestic legal framework with the 
acquis communautaire of the European community. This harmonization included their 
acceptance of policy solutions that were already ‘defined and consolidated in the EU 
policy process’ (Radaelli 2003: 30). However, the process of Europeanization was not 
limited to accepting EU laws and mechanisms. As with many instruments and 
processes in EU integration, Europeanization does not really have a set definition, but 
Radaelli’s (2003: 3) extensive description provides a good clarification of key 
processes as: 
a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.  
Magdalena Dabrowska (2009) has argued that Europeanization should go deeper and 
lead to the reform of values and lifestyles. In contrast, Mikulova (2014: 166) has shown 
that the task of pinning down the ‘why’, ‘who’, ‘what’, and ‘how’ of Europeanization 
in the many spheres of politics is next to futile. She claims that the disputed concept 
of Europeanization itself poses the first hurdle. Due to its inherent complexity, it tends 
to involve a myriad of agents, instruments and mechanisms. It can be operationalised 
as both process and outcome and this is ambiguous. Most available definitions opt for 
theoretical and empirical utility (Mikulova 2014:166). For instance, the QUING 
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research project considered Europe to be ‘a way of life’, drawing on Tony Judt’s 
(2006) thoughts.20  
In terms of research on gender equality and Europeanization, it appears that gender 
analyses of the domestic impact of ‘Europe’ have not abounded so far, especially for 
countries of Eastern Europe. Emanuela Lombardo and Maxime Forest (2012) call for 
a study of Europeanization recognizing that discourse is a particularly relevant factor 
in understanding the type of impact the EU has on domestic politics. The envisaged 
approach should be useful for researchers to focus on the gendered implications of 
Europeanization (Lombardo and Forest 2012:13).  
Scholars have argued that ‘the pursuit of equality has become an important priority for 
EU member states’ (Krizsan et al. 2014: 54). On paper, political commitment to gender 
equality has a longstanding tradition in Europe. The Rome Treaty, signed in 1957, paid 
due attention to gender equality in employment and included a statement that women 
and men should receive equal pay for the same work. This notion was further 
elaborated on in numerous EU directives regulating the rights of women and men in 
the labour market (Walby 2004).  
In the 1970s, several EU directives referred to issues of employment and direct 
discrimination of women. They again called for equal pay, equal access to training, 
promotions and equal work conditions. Further directives in the 1980s and 1990s 
included guarantors of rights for self-employed people and those employed part-time 
(Dabrowska 2009). EU directives not only supposed to address labour market from the 
perspective of gender equality, but also to center on problems with the reconciliation 
of work and family life. Both the public sphere and family life were supposed to be 
investigated through gender equality lenses. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) 
emphasized that one of the aims of the EU was to counteract discrimination and to 
                                                 
20The Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies Integrated Project (2006-2011), under the direction of 
Mieke Verloo, tackled examples of exclusion and polarisation, along gender, ethnicity, religion or 
sexuality lines, at the level of member states. The aim was to provide the knowledge for inclusive 
gender+ equality policies. For more information see: 
http://www.quing.eu/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,  
promote gender equality (Krizsan et al. 2014). EU countries were obliged to respect 
gender equality in all legal acts and actions.  
Following this logic, gender equality is one of the marks of Europeanization. For 
Poland, the acceptance of legal provisions on gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming in the labour market did not involve much discussion in the pre-
accession period (see Table 4.4 for a periodization of Polish politics). Dabrowska 
(2009) claims that the legal changes were probably treated as a kind of ‘tax’, a form of 
‘toll’ at the city gates that the country was obliged to pay to accede to the EU and 
receive funds. Within this understanding, gender equality was seen as a part of the 
European ‘package’ – a ‘forced fit’ as one analyst has called it (Weiner 2009: 307).   
Post-socialist states’ fierce yearning to return to Europe and the fortitude of a 
globally consolidated gender equality regime overrode an active dialogue 
among feminist scholars and activists, from both East and West, about the 
distinctiveness of gender identities, roles, and relations in Eastern Europe 
(Weiner 2009: 306). 
However, in practice, the recognition and implementation of standards of gender 
equality included in recommendations caused much more trouble. While the EU 
acquis was duly translated, adopted, transposed into domestic law and seemingly 
implemented, the ‘soft’ values that were expected to diffuse in society did not. Values 
surrounding gender equality, equal chances, and anti-discrimination were not 
incorporated and did not infuse Polish politics. This is clear in the discursive examples 
presented in the previous chapter. According to Grabowska (2014), the changes that 
occurred in Polish politics in the area of equal treatment have been slow and 
unsatisfactory. Similarly, research on equality within the European context has 
recognized a good transposition record in the new Eastern European EU members that 
was managed prior to the accession, combined with persistent problems of application 
and enforcement (Krizsan 2009; Krizsan and Papp 2005; Sissenich 2007; Falkner et 
al. 2008).  
Therefore, in Poland, Europeanization included a revision of laws including those 
concerning gender equality. Gender-based discrimination had to be specifically 
outlawed and there needed to be a new position at the ministerial level responsible for 
equality. This was part of the Europeanization process, understood as the adaptation 
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of the national legal system to EU norms and institutional obligations (Avdeyeva 
2015). The most important of the legislative changes effected by the EU appeared in 
the Polish Labour Code between 2002 and 2010 (Grabowska 2014). The Labour Code 
was amended several times to adapt it to the requirements of EU equality-related 
directives. The amendments introduced and clarified the definitions of discrimination 
(direct and indirect), and the definition of sexual harassment.  
The second important piece of anti-discrimination law was introduced after 2004 
during the process of adjusting Polish law to the EU (Grabowska 2014). The Act on 
the implementation of some regulations of the European Union regarding equal 
treatment entered into force on 1 January 2011. The new law specified the practices 
for counteracting discrimination on account of gender, race, ethnic origin, nationality, 
religion, denomination, worldview, disability, age and sexual orientation. It also 
became the basis for the work of the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment 
(discussed in detail in chapter 4). 
Numerous authors are critical towards the mechanisms and implementation of gender 
equality policy in the EU (Walby 2005; Ludwig and Wőhl 2013). Arguably, within the 
EU framework, gender equality is too often narrowed down to equality in the access 
to labour market, which ignores other aspects of inequality and does not provide tools 
for debating the origins of discrimination, such as sexism and patriarchy (Grabowska 
2014). According to Ulrich Sedelmeier and Frank Schimmelfennig (2005), 
Europeanization was a process of discursive appropriation of norms, values and rules 
of behaviour in EU member states. So, the process of accession was a process of 
apparent Europeanization. The discourses on gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming were presented as distinctly European solutions to regime change 
(Krizsan and Popa 2010). As observers later noted however:  
after the EU’s Eastern enlargement of 2004, it became clear that some of the 
reforms in the former candidate countries resembled a Potemkin village: 
behind the gleaming façade presented to outsiders—notably visitors from 
Brussels—often lingered a grimmer reality (Mikulova 2014: 163). 
 
The hijacking of the ‘post-s’: post-state socialism and post-
colonialism 
As I stated in the initial chapter of this dissertation, political science literature on 
gender and post-state socialism has struggled to explain the lack of gender equality 
and the resurgence of nationalism in the countries that underwent transformations. 
Significantly, Peggy Watson pointed out that this stemmed from an unconscious 
normative assumption that a feminist consciousness (in the form of more gender-equal 
relations) should have appeared and that it was prevented from doing so by some 
shared experience in state socialism (Watson 2000b: 106). This stance was seen by 
many in Eastern Europe as a paternalistic Western and ‘white’ understanding of 
transformation. As I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, ‘West’ became an 
unspoken point of reference for the representation of Eastern Europe, a Western-
centeredness analogous to whiteness-centred interpretations of change in the 
postcolonial world (Watson 2000b: 102; Grabowska 2014). The ‘import of Western 
feminism’ has therefore been criticized by disparate groups of academics, activists, 
feminists and also anti-feminists (see for example Funk 1993; Toth 1993; Gal 1996; 
Nicolaescu 1996; Siklova 1998; Regulska 1998) 
Therefore, the expectation of achieving ‘Europeanization’ and improved gender 
equality can be seen as part of othering processes that are supported by the economic 
and political domination, and the discursive power of Western countries (Regulska 
1998; Slavova 2006). Within this context, it is possible to rethink the relationship 
between centres and margins to include a diversified and shifting position of Eastern 
Europe in this order. On the one hand, many of the countries in this region are 
constructed as other, while on the other they form part of the European Union. Poland 
shows this complex position – it ‘lags behind’ Western Europe in terms of its progress 
on gender equality, while it takes part in the economic and political power that the EU 
commands, especially towards non-Europeans (which can be seen in the national 
identity debates discussed in chapter 6 of this dissertation). 
However, Polish feminists such as Ewa Charkiewicz (2006) have criticized the 
positive vision of the EU as the guarantor of gender equality, mostly due to two 
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interconnected mechanisms that make it difficult or even impossible to implement 
equality: the principle of subsidiarity, which in practice allows the member states to 
interpret and select the acquis according to local gender regimes, and the ideological 
as well as institutional domination of market neoliberalism (cf. Young 2000; Rognlien 
2011). However, a postcolonial or de-colonial critique is not the same as ‘hijacked 
postcolonialism’.  
In fact, what has happened is that some features of especially postcolonial language 
have been hijacked by nationalist and ultraconservative forces in Poland. These groups 
exactly aim to portray transformation and Europeanization as evil oppressors that 
allegedly do not allow Poland to grow past its peripheral role into, what they think it 
should be, a regional power. This highlights the specificity of Polish postcolonial 
attitudes. Postcolonial studies are widely considered a critical discipline, or even an 
emancipatory one, and some, as Jan Sowa (2015), have argued that post-colonialism 
is the effect of Marxism meeting postmodernism. However, in Poland Marx is 
conspicuously absent even in postcolonial studies, instead allowing for the triumph of 
the postmodern (Sowa 2015: 46).  
Polish sociologists and cultural theorists like Ewa Charkiewicz (2006), Jarosław 
Pietrzak (2016), and Sowa (2011, 2015) often use the terminology of world systems 
and dependency theory, seeing Poland as a (semi)peripheral country in a global 
capitalist economic system. Its (semi)peripheral position puts it necessarily in a chain 
of economic dependencies that results in the country only being a resource of cheap 
labour and raw materials or of component parts for the transnational capital 
accumulation. Within such a relationship, they see the postmodernist aspects, as 
mediated by far-right conservatives and nationalists, fighting modernizing and 
progressive Enlightenment traditions through the opposition to ideas of equality, 
emancipation, rationality, and secularism. Sowa asks whether this is a misapplication 
of postcolonial studies or some inherent conservative fault within the theory (Sowa 
2015: 46). 
The ‘hijacking’ of post-colonialism in the Polish context can point to the latter. 
Postcolonial theory engrains the positive valorisation of locality and difference as 
opposing the universalist and dominating tendencies of mainstream ‘Western’ culture. 
This gives the perfect excuse and intellectual tool to those who want to express their 
aversion to modernity as such. Postcolonial theory gives the elites of a peripheral 
country like Poland an intellectually valid way of expressing their ressentiment and 
inferiority complexes (cf. Sowa 2011). Polish conservatives and the catholic church 
reject the mainstream Western socio-cultural tradition, discursively deploying labels 
like ‘liberal’ or ‘leftist’ (‘lewacki’), while being convinced that they have an 
alternative: ‘our’ different moral national model, thus blowing up difference into 
superiority and inferiority complexes (Drozda 2015). This is now producing a backlash 
in terms of values in Eastern Europe, where ultraconservative elites claim to be the 
true defenders of ‘European-ness’ against forces allegedly corrupting it (same-sex 
marriage, homosexuality, gender equality, sexual education, etc.). 
Synthesizing the approaches 
The conceptual approaches discussed in this chapter point to multiple possible levels 
and lines of exclusion and inequality that are relevant to the Polish context. The 
approaches have been selected for the purpose of providing theoretical insights on a 
common theme of constructing subjects and values that might be marginalized. The 
link that brings together all the discussed approaches is that they all point to and 
elucidate specific constructions of subjects – they all show how certain political 
discursive ‘losers’ are constructed. These ‘losers’ in the conceptual understanding of 
subject construction are not unlike from the term subaltern used first by Gramsci 
(1971) and then by Spivak (1999), namely they point to notions of subordination and 
underclass. Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 summarize the constructions of subjects based on 
the conceptual insights used in this dissertation.  
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Figure 2.1 Aspects of the construction of subjects based on the theoretical insights 
used in this dissertation. 
 
(Source: own compilation) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that the discursively constructed subjects can be affected by 
intersectional mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization. Similarly, Table 2.1 
summarizes the specific categories of subjects in ‘losing’ power relations that each of 
the approaches elaborates on. This elucidates potential avenues of discourse 
interpretation in the following chapters. 
Table 2.1 The different political ‘losers’ as conceptualized by the approaches 
applied in this dissertation. 
Conceptual approach Its ‘losers’ 
Gender and nationalism literature Women (including those of other 
ethnicity) and non-heteronormative 
individuals  
Feminist political economy Women (performing unpaid care work; 
laid off due to market ‘efficiency’ and 
austerity reasons) 
Feminist institutionalism Gender equality norms and their 
proponents 
Postcolonial and dependency theories Non-Western ‘others’ (peripheral 
countries; racialized others) 
(Source: own compilation) 
 
Feminist analyses outline how categories of women are othered and put in lower 
positions in national construction projects, especially when they are run by right-wing 
and conservative forces. At the same time, postcolonial and dependency theory as 
applied to the post-state socialist context shows how particular groups of workers and 
employees get ‘racialized’ and marginalized basing on neoliberal market principles. 
Feminist political economy gives insights into how the private-public division and 
mostly women’s care work puts them in a losing position within globalized economic 
forces. Furthermore, feminist institutionalism explores how the ‘ways of doing’ things 
in parliament and norms and rules are not gender-neutral and also more often than not 
favour masculine values and behaviours.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that a combination of approaches is necessary to examine the 
underlying unequal presumptions of the Polish political discourses. Since the aim of 
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the dissertation is to determine the discursive construction of subjects and values, a 
single body of literature would largely ignore the importance of the multifocal 
construction of Polish discourse. Building on the insights of gendered nationalism, 
feminist political economy, feminist institutionalism, and postcolonial and 
dependency theories, the chapter developed an interpretive model to help inform the 
ensuing empirical analysis. I argued that the conceptual toolkit drawn from the 
outlined scholarly literatures provides a framework to show that the ‘losers’ of Polish 
political discourses can be marginalized or vilified on many theoretical levels. Before 
moving on to the specific discursive analysis of the anti-equality and exclusionary 
constructions of subjects in Polish parliamentary debates, I outline the steps taken to 






















Chapter 3: The critical discourse analysis 
approach, method, and research design 
‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.’ 
Ludwig Wittgenstein21 
After exploring the key literature and theoretical approaches, the thesis outlines a 
method that allows the exploring the daily work of the hegemonic discourses discussed 
above. This chapter outlines the method and research design that are used to investigate 
the research questions and apply the theoretical approaches presented in the previous 
sections. The main issues addressed are: what is critical discourse analysis and how 
can it be applied to the study of gendered discourses in the Polish parliament? How 
was the case study selected and what are its implications for the research design? What 
are the main methodological issues in operationalizing CDA? The first section 
discusses and justifies the methodological perspective of the thesis. Next, I show how 
to apply the chosen theoretical framework and elaborate on the combination of 
studying gendered discourses. I also explain the need to use process tracing in order to 
complement the CDA method and provide context and background information. The 
third section introduces the research methods and sources used in the project. I provide 
an overview of the assumptions and implications of critical discourse analysis 
following Norman Fairclough (1992, 1995), including potential limitations as well as 
issues of reflexivity, replicability, and generalizability. The final section addresses the 
selected case, the sources, and the particular discussion of the Polish parliament as the 
main site of analysis. 
A feminist methodology 
This work adopts the perspective that ‘there is no distinctive feminist methodology, 
but there is a distinctive feminist approach to methodology and methods’ (Krook and 
Squires 2006: 45; Reinharz 1992; Squires 1999; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002; 
Randall 2002). In this sense, there is no one prescriptive way to conduct feminist 
                                                 
21 From the ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (1922) by Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
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research. As Randall (2002: 109) claims there is no ‘simple and single feminist 
perspective within political science’; rather, feminism can be more accurately 
considered as ‘a kind of developing dialogue around a common but evolving agenda’, 
a specific, though not restrictive or singular, approach to social science (Randall 2002: 
109). This common agenda involves the commitment to problem-driven research 
which, as Krook and Squires believe (2006: 45), should even be applied at the expense 
of method-driven research. Furthermore, since there is no single feminist theory, or no 
one feminism, there is also no single ‘correct’ approach to methods other than the 
commitment to critical research and exposing power and exploitation structures and 
systems (Bryson 1992; Krook and Squires 2006; Tickner 2006).  
Hence, feminist research is driven by substantive political problems and is open to the 
application of a wide range of methodological frames. In other words, a feminist 
methodology is an ‘epistemology in action’ (Weldon 2006b) – in the case of this study, 
an explicitly discursive and interpretative one. Typically, a feminist conviction implies 
a critical approach, aimed at creating social change or exposing social injustice and 
inequality. ‘An important commitment of feminist methodology is that knowledge 
must be built and analysed in a way that can be used by women to change whatever 
oppressive conditions they face’ (Tickner 2006: 25).  
Similarly, the position of the researcher and the individual choices in terms of methods, 
while reflecting one’s ontological and epistemological commitments, have 
implications that are different in feminist research from those of traditional positivist 
social science. The approach moves beyond a determinist and traditionally positivist 
concept of causality, providing instead a reflexive perspective and a contextualized 
and dynamic way of interpreting meaning (Kulawik 2009: 263). Arguably, when 
combined, different forms of knowledge will produce, not a universal understanding, 
but a broader, albeit contingent understanding of the nexus of gender, institutions, 
power, and discourse in legislatures (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 155). 
Unlike empirical methods designed to generate results that can be replicated by 
different scholars, feminist methodologies can yield different outcomes in the hands 
of different theorists. This highlights the collective self-reflective and deliberative 
nature of feminist methodologies (Ackerly et al. 2006: 7). Accordingly, Ann Tickner 
(2006: 19, 27) argues for ‘seeing theory as constitutive of reality’ and claims that 
acknowledging the researcher’s subjective element (which arguably exists in all social 
science research) in fact increases the validity and value of the work. Therefore, this 
research project, while producing feminist knowledge out of research practice and 
experience, explicitly adheres to the belief that such knowledge is always constituted 
by the theorist, as the one who reflects on that experience (Kronsell 2006: 127) (see a 
discussion of reflexivity further in this chapter).  
In order to find out how gender subjectivities and values are politicized following 
democratic transformation processes and why this institutionalizes the exclusion of 
women and minority groups in politics in Poland, this research project builds upon the 
discursive turn in feminist analysis and combines its insights with wider discussions 
of poststructuralist discourse theory (Bacchi 1999; 2005). In a similar attempt to bridge 
theory with discursive methods, within the new institutionalist school, scholars have 
already employed discourse analysis in order to put greater emphasis on the role of 
ideas and discourses in influencing actors’ interests, preferences and behaviours 
(Schmidt 2008; Freidenvall and Krook 2011: 43).  
Analysing gender, power, and discourse  
As one of the main guiding concepts of the research project, discourse requires 
elaboration, especially with regards to its analytical specificity within legislatures and 
political debates. In general, discourse is defined as a specific social construct, a 
language (both spoken and written) that has a mutually constitutive relationship with 
the social structures within which it operates. Echoing the opening quote of this 
chapter, discourse can be conceptualized as ‘“speaking” which sets limits on what can 
be said’ (Bacchi 1999: 40). My work is therefore informed by the understanding that 
reality is mediated through discourse (van Dijk 2008). Discourses are socially 
constituted and they constitute the social (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 448).  
In this research context, discourse is functional to the social construction of power 
through the discursive creation of both women and femininity (as a subordinate other) 
and men and masculinity (as the self). Therefore, language or discourse cannot be 
considered a ‘transparent tool’ and require a significant degree of interpretation as to 
what is constructed as the other within, or how it is constructed (Bacchi 1999; Hansen 
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2006). Importantly, discourses are time-and site-specific, they cannot be ‘read’ without 
their linguistic, social, historical, and political contexts. ‘Language is social and 
political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a 
simultaneous construction of identity and difference’ (Hansen 2006: 17). 
Because the field of discourse analysis is heterogeneous and broad (cf. Phillips and 
Jorgensen 2002; Schmidt 2008; Kenny 2009) it is up to the researcher to create 
analytical limits between the discursive and the non-discursive elements for the 
purposes of their work (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 153-5). In this vein, Vivien 
Schmidt (2008) has been working from a discursive institutionalist perspective, 
reclaiming the concept of discourse for new institutionalism and demonstrating how it 
is an important tool for the study of relations between ideas and institutions. Her 
studies, however, have been criticized for their weakness and narrowness of the 
conceptualization of discourse (Bacchi 2005; Panizza and Miorelli 2013). Schmidt 
restricts her understanding of discourse to a communicative vessel for conveying 
substantive ideas, which is unsatisfactory in establishing the relationship between 
ideas, power (and hence power inequalities), and discourse (Panizza and Miorelli 
2013: 305-7). Carol Bacchi (2005) goes further to claim that institutionalist analysis 
and discourse are inherently incompatible because of an epistemological nonalignment 
between the two approaches. Bacchi’s argument is strong from a Foucauldian vantage 
point; however, it does not necessarily hold for other types and understandings of 
discourse analysis.  
Conversely, the poststructuralist approach in terms of critical discourse analysis 
emphasizes that there are both discursive and non-discursive elements of social reality 
(like institutions and norms guiding behaviour) (Panizza and Miorelli 2013). 
Importantly, these are mutually constitutive, which allows for a fuller understanding 
of the role of discourse in creating power (and inequality). From this point of view, the 
social orders observed in institutions (in this research) are never fully structured, but 
open to political interventions and dislocations that make it possible to ground or 
subvert them (Panizza and Miorelli 2013: 302). Critical discourse analysis does not 
ignore the existence of a reality outside ‘our heads’ or language. The argument is not 
that all societal phenomena are purely discursive or linguistic, but that for things to be 
intelligible they must exist as part of a wider framework of meaning and discourse (cf. 
Fairclough 1992, 1995; Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Panizza and Miorelli 2013). 
Therefore, discourse can be seen as a form of social practice that both constitutes the 
social world and is constituted by other social practices. ‘[T]he discursive constitution 
of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas in people’s heads, but from social 
practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented in real, material and social structures’ 
(Fairclough 1992: 66). 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is at the same time a method and a mode of social 
research. Discourse analysis in general is: 
an attempt to identify regularities in the methods used by participants as they 
construct the discourse through which they establish the character of their 
activities and beliefs in the course of interaction (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984:14). 
Furthermore, CDA is ‘primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues, 
which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis’ (van Dijk 1993: 280). 
More generally it focuses not only on social justice, inequality, power, and power 
struggles, but also on the exploration and exposing of the often subtle role of discourse 
in the production and perpetuation of injustice, inequality, and dominance (Sunderland 
and Litosseliti 2002: 19).  
Thus, CDA espouses a decidedly political and normative position. For this reason, it 
fits my explicitly gendered and feminist approach to the research topic. CDA aims to 
reveal the underlying relations of power that structure discourse, and how political 
actors consciously and unconsciously reproduce hegemonic discourses. I subsequently 
discuss the CDA approach developed by Norman Fairclough, which is arguably the 
most elaborated version of critical discourse analysis (Turunen 2015). Fairclough’s 
goal was to synthesize CDA and socio-political analysis (Fairclough 2001, 2003). 
Therefore, this method serves best my own project. 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is explicitly political, with a normative claim 
of exposing power inequalities and hierarchies (Turunen 2015). CDA rests on the 
premise that class relations, meaning the inherent and structural power differentials, 
are the most fundamental way of societal organization (Fairclough 2001: 26). While 
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from a traditionally positivist vantage point the overt combination of politics and 
research may sound suspicious, Fairclough’s CDA is firmly grounded in the 
understanding that there is no objective science (Turunen 2015). Therefore, it is better 
to be open about one’s political and normative ‘biases’ and to espouse transparency, 
rather than to pretend to be objective and as a result reproduce social inequalities (or 
ignore their existence) (Fairclough 2001:4). In line with its ‘positively’ biased position, 
CDA advocates openly political goals, namely political and social emancipation 
(Fairclough 2003: 203). Taking into account this perspective, analysts like Bucholtz 
(2001: 167) have lauded ‘the fresh air CDA brings into the academy.’ Such openly 
political attitude is vital from the point of view of feminist research.  
Initially, Fairclough’s approach to discourse analysis was very text-focused, making 
the method conceptualized in his earlier work from the 1990s, overly linguistic 
(Turunen 2015). However, his approach evolved in his later writings towards a more 
social scientific approach, in which the analysis of discourse is complemented by a 
broader social analysis (Turunen 2015). This combination of text analysis with social 
analysis is a crucial point of reference for the dissertation. In his later works, 
Fairclough does not see discourse as a mere intangible linguistic system (Fairclough 
2001:17-18). Quite the contrary, the use of language is necessarily determined by 
social and political (power) structures in this view. These social structures are often 
constructed with the use of force. Hence, linguistic conventions are outcomes of force 
(Fairclough 2001:18). Such a conceptualization leads him to the claim that discourse 
is ‘language as a form of social practice’ (Fairclough 2001:18). Next, I discuss briefly 
three aspects of language and discourse as a form of social practice: its textual, 
discursive practice, and social practice facets (for a graphic representation, see Figure 
3.2). 
In Fairclough, discourse understood as text refers to the idea that any linguistic action 
is also a social action (Turunen 2015). For instance, the act of defining and outlining 
of political terminology is part of politics itself (Fairclough 2001:19). Discursive 
practice means that discourse is a ‘product’ which can spread and be consumed in 
society. This is the aspect of discourse that most concerns me in this dissertation. 
Consumption of discourse designates the audience’s or the agents’ interpretation, and 
is ‘an active process of matching features of the utterance at various levels with 
representations you have stored in your long-term memory’ (Fairclough 2001: 8-9). 
Social power structures influence and are influenced by discourse (conceptualized as 
a social practice).  
Discourses intervene between the individual and the society and therefore individuals 
‘have them in their heads’, but they are also social insofar that they have social sources 
(Fairclough 2001:20). In this way, Fairclough points to the mutually constitutive 
relationship between language and social practice. Discourses are socially produced 
and conveyed; their very nature depends on the social relations and struggles out of 
which they come (Fairclough 2001:20). Consequently, Fairclough points to the 
understanding that the discourses we witness as individuals are contingent to the social 
and political contexts we live in. Both the production and consumption of discourse 
involve individually held ‘member’s resources’ – a term that refers to the individual’s 
or the audience’s prior knowledge including language, values, beliefs, assumptions, 
and cultural references (Turunen 2015).  
This premise is important for my research because my member’s resources as an 
addressee, a consumer of discourse, and a part of the ‘Polish audience’ are crucial to 
the interpretative work that is needed in Fairclough’s CDA. Accordingly, the power of 
the discourse stems from the fact that individuals internalize what is socially produced 
and available to them, and apply the internalized members’ cultural and linguistic 
capital to position themselves in their social practice, ‘[giving] the forces which shape 
societies a vitally important foothold in the individual psyche (Fairclough 2001: 20). 
The dominance and availability of a discourse (its inculcation to new contexts and 
spreading to new topics) is not automatic and depends on individual cases (Turunen 
2015). Fairclough specifies that ‘even powerful discourses such as the new discourses 
of management (…) may meet levels of resistance which result in them being neither 
enacted nor inculcated to any degree’ (Fairclough 2003: 209).  
The strict or creative ‘reproduction’ of discourses directly relates to the social 
distribution of power, and ‘if there is a shift in power relations through social struggle, 
No country for losers? 
69 
Chapter 3: Method and research design 
one can expect transformation of orders of discourse’ (Fairclough 2001: 33).22 So, it 
is the relations of social power that primarily account for discursive change. 
Conversely, ‘if power relations remain relatively stable, this may give a conservative 
quality to reproduction [of discourses].’ (Fairclough 2001:33). It seems that discourse 
adds to social change if coupled with change in social relations of power (Turunen 
2015). This has important implications for the analysis of durability and transformation 
of hegemonic discourses in politics. Political debates become the site for the 
manifestation of certain power relations, and therefore do not allow for power-neutral 
readings.  
Therefore, Fairclough conceptualizes power as a force enmeshed with ideology 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1992:24; Fairclough 2001:26). Fairclough argues that 
those with power have ‘two ways (…) [to] exercise it and keep it: through coercing 
others to go along with them, with the ultimate sanctions of physical violence or death; 
or through winning others’ consent to (…) their possession and exercise of power’ 
(Fairclough 2001:27-28). The understanding of power as force and domination is 
directly transferred into textual aspects. Fairclough makes the distinction between 
power in discourse and power behind discourse (Fairclough 2001:36). The former is 
characteristic of ‘unequal encounters’ where the discursive power of the superior party 
gives opportunities and means to control the linguistic exchange (Fairclough 2001:38). 
Power in discourse can take direct and clear-cut forms, for instance in the case of 
interactions between the police and the victim (or the guilty), or in subtler forms like 
cross-cultural encounters (Turunen 2015). Significantly, power in discourse may also 
manifest itself in the construction of ideal subject positions and aspirational values, 
like the conjectures on the ideal role of a woman in family. 
The power behind discourse is less overt and clear-cut. It reflects the idea that ‘the 
whole social order of discourse is put together and held together as a hidden effect of 
power’ (Fairclough 2001: 46). Power behind discourse needs ideology as a structuring 
force of language. Fairclough (2001:52) locates the power behind discourse in the 
                                                 
22 See the discussion and definition of ‘orders of discourse’ in the section below of the current chapter.  
capability of specific actors to use certain discourses. Importantly, it is a power upheld 
by, for instance, codes of conduct or government programmes that legislate policy 
priorities (Fairclough 2001: 52). As a result, individuals do not have equal access to 
and possibilities of using discourses of power. Accordingly, the availability of and 
access to discourse is closely related to one’s social (power) position.  
For Fairclough, the power operating behind discourse gives CDA the legitimacy in 
pursuing its goal of exploring and exposing of the truth that is disguised by ideology 
and power structures that tie into various discourses and social practices that maintain 
unequal relations of power. Hence, analytical work must focus on discursive practices 
that, according to semantic content and social context, ‘produce meanings that tend to 
escape the attention of lay persons and non-specialist social scientists alike’ 
(Fairclough 2002:7). This again brings in the overt political and normative engagement 
of the researcher into the practice of critical discourse analysis. The process of making 
sense of texts becomes inextricably linked with social relations of power. 
Consequently, the power- and ideology-focus of CDA fits the feminist normative 
assumptions in my research project. 
Operationalizing CDA 
As discussed above, I choose CDA as a method because it is explicitly critical in the 
sense that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the formation of the social 
world, including social constructions that involve unequal relations of power (Phillips 
and Jorgensen 2002: 63). This is critical from the point of view of feminist research. 
It can be seen in Figure 3.2 that Fairclough (1992) claims that every instance of 
language use or every utterance is a communicative event that consists of three 
dimensions. The analysis should focus on: firstly, the linguistic features of the text; 
then the processes relating to the production and consumption of the text (discursive 
practice); and thirdly, the wider societal and institutional practice to which the 
communicative event belongs (social practice) (Fairclough 1992: 73). This method is 
applied to the analysis of transcripts and videos of plenary debates in the legislature 
under study. Since the model itself is quite abstract, I proceed to discussing the 
operationalization of Fairclough’s CDA method.  
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Figure 3.2 Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for critical discourse analysis. 
(Source: Fairclough 1992:73). 
Fairclough’s model consists of pairing of the semantic and linguistic features of texts 
with their structural-societal (power) effects. All texts and utterances (see innermost 
square in Figure 3.2) can be broken down to their vocabulary, grammar, and textual 
structures. According to Fairclough (1992), the particular linguistic features of texts 
correspond to different structural-societal effects: they can be experimental, relational, 
and expressive. Firstly, experimental features of vocabulary mean, for instance, 
classification schemes, ideologically contested words, over-wording or possible 
meaning interrelations between words. The experimental value of grammar is revealed 
in the descriptions of processes and participation of agency, in nominalization and in 
the use of active and passive voice. These correspond to the knowledge and belief 
structures of a society.  
Next, the relational features of grammar can be discovered in grammatical moods 
(declarative, imperative, etc.) as well as in the use of pronouns. These, along with 
expressive features, reveal social relations and social identities. Lastly, the expressive 
features of vocabulary depict the evaluative character of words used. Grammatically, 
they can be found in expressive modality, which simply means the degree of certainty 
in someone’s claim. Accordingly, agency can be hidden or omitted through grammar: 
nominalizations and the absence of subjects can be interpreted as referring to widely 
shared understandings. The analysis of the linguistic features of a text should be 
completed with the investigation of its content so, put simply, not just the grammar 
and vocabulary, but also their meaning. The analysis of content allows us to see how 
a text is ideologically linked to various representations of the world and how it reveals 
collectively held knowledge and social beliefs (Fairclough 2001: 94).  
Following the descriptive analysis, the next step is to interpret these connections, 
namely the connection between the first dimension (text) and the second one 
(discursive practice), as highlighted in Figure 3.2. The investigation of discursive 
practice includes the analysis of the narratives and genres which are articulated in the 
production and consumption of the text (Philips and Jorgensen 2002: 69). Looking at 
the interdiscursivity (what other different discourses and genres are articulated in one 
text) and the intertextuality (what other texts the one under analysis draws on) of a text 
is part of the interpretation process. The aim in my case is to see how MPs try to 
establish legitimacy in their use of discourses. Importantly, the interpretation also 
looks at whether the text reproduces or restructures the existing orders of discourse. 
Here, I explore what network of discourses the discursive practice or utterance belongs 
to, and how the discourses are distributed and regulated across texts. 
Importantly, in my case, the interpretation of discourses is informed by the contextual 
analysis provided by tracing processes of transformation and the legacies of 
Europeanization (see chapters 2 and 4). As I discussed in chapter 1, an important aspect 
of interpreting the discourses is my own ‘local’ knowledge of the Polish situation. 
Through interpretation, the text acquires meaning and coherence and is situated in a 
broader context of social relations. Interpretation involves the interpreter’s cognitive 
capital (member’s resources) or background knowledge possessed. Interpretation in 
Fairclough’s model involves deciphering the semantic content of the text and the 
attribution of meaning to the text. This requires knowledge and familiarity with the 
language in which the text is written. Certain meanings need to be attributed to, for 
instance, the notions of ‘Polishness’ and ‘national heritage’. 
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Interpretation also requires the researcher to build connections between different parts 
of the text and to explore how texts construct the social world and how they reflect the 
relations of power prevalent in society. An important stage of interpretation involves 
the contextualization of the text. Fairclough claims that the social order of power 
dominates the institutional setting, which, in turn, ‘determines’ the situational setting 
(Fairclough 2001:122). I discuss below, how I complement this statement with 
contextual social and historical analysis. In the case of my study, the relevant contexts 
include, among others: the political situation in the country; the problems facing the 
state; the post-transformation circumstances; and immediate problems stemming from 
political struggles.  
At the level of interpretation and understanding, Fairclough’s (1992: 237) critical 
discourse analysis explores the relationship between the discursive practice and the 
order of discourse. An order of discourse is defined as a complex configuration of 
discourses and genres within the same social field or institution (Phillips and Jorgensen 
2002: 72, 141). Thus, the order of discourse can be taken to denote how different 
discourses that partly cover the same terrain compete to fill structures with meaning. 
Here, the complementing notion of Bourdieu’s social field would be seen as a system 
of social positions structured internally in terms of power relationships, where actors 
struggle over the appropriation of certain types of capital or power (cf. Bourdieu 1993). 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 114) suggest this notion can be applied in critical 
discourse analysis. The order of discourse is reconceptualised as a potentially 
conflictual configuration of discourses within a given social field (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999). For instance, in the political field the different politicians and 
political parties struggle to gain political power and they are distributed across the field 
in terms of their relative strength (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 72). 
In other words, the order of discourse is the hierarchy according to which the 
communicative events, or texts, are articulated. When two or more discourses in the 
same area present different understandings of the world, it is important to ask and 
discuss what consequences it would have if one understanding were to be accepted 
instead of the other. This has particular implications for gendered political analyses. 
According to Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 51), it is easier to show that certain 
dynamic discursive practices constitute and change the social world when analysing 
the reproduction and transformation of discourses across a range of texts.  
The final and arguably most important step of the applied method is the social and 
institutional analysis of the texts/communicative events in question. Arguably, this is 
the part to which Fairclough devotes least room in his analysis. This step involves the 
mapping of the partly non-discursive, social and cultural relations and structures that 
shape the broader context of discursive practice – the social matrix of discourse (see 
the outermost square in Figure 3.2). It is particularly important to take account of the 
material and institutional anchoring of the order of discourse, as political debates are 
embedded in wider social practice. It is in the exploration of the relationship between 
discursive practice and the broader social practice that the study arrives at its final 
conclusions by looking at the social power implications of the communicative events 
(Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 86). This nonetheless raises the issue of where to draw 
the line between discourses and how to differentiate between discursive and non-
discursive. I follow the division offered by Phillips and Jorgensen (2002: 144) and 
treat the delimitation as an analytical exercise. I understand discourses as narratives 
that I identify as a researcher (pinpoint, name, and interpret), rather than as objects that 
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Table 3.2 Outline of the steps taken in the methodological process. 
(Source: own compilation). 
According to Phillips and Jorgensen (2002: 69), discourse analysis alone is not 
sufficient for the investigation of the wider social practice because, as previously 
explained, the latter encompasses both discursive and non-discursive elements. For 
this reason, I use process tracing to complement the final stage of CDA analysis and 
provide background information on the Polish historical and societal context (see 
discussion below). The main aim of this approach is to explore the links between 
language use and social practice and the focus is on the role of discursive practices in 
the maintenance of the social order and in driving social change (cf. Phillips and 
Jorgensen 2002). To help operationalize this method, the structure of the empirical 
chapters follows questions that are central to CDA. 
 
DESCRIPTION 
1. Information on the immediate context of the text (author, target audience, 
events referred to). 
2. Identification of linguistic markers of the text/communicative event (signs, 
genres; the linguistic component of the methodology). 
INTERPRETATION 
3. Analysis of interdiscursivity and intertextuality. 
4. Interpretation of the meanings resulting from the analysis with reference to 
the theoretical model adopted in the dissertation (gender identities and 
relationships). 
UNDERSTANDING 
5. Analysis of the order of discourse (identify whether discourse is dominant or 
not). 
6. Deconstruction of gender relations in discourses and their implications in the 
parliament. 
7. Based on the contextual background provided through process tracing of 
transformation and Europeanization, an extensive interpretation of dominant 
discourses in the case studies on family policy, economic restructuring and 
nationalism, including a critique of dominant structure and power relations. 
8. Comparison and placing into a regional and global context of the debates and 
discourses in Poland. 
Table 3.3 Operationalizing critical discourse analysis.  
On the object What/who is being talked about? 
On the speakers Who is speaking? 
On the themes What kinds of subjects and values are produced? 
On the authority How is truth being created? 
On the rules What can and cannot be said? 
(Source: based on Trakilović 2016). 
Based on this operationalization, I divide my analysis in the empirical chapters into 
discursive fields. Discursive fields can be thought of as ‘embedding’ concepts in that 
they reference broader enveloping contexts in which discussions, decisions, and 
actions take place. 
Towards a Feminist CDA 
A feminist approach to critical discourse analysis cannot remain descriptive and 
neutral, since the interests guiding it aim to uncover or make transparent processes and 
mechanisms that perpetuate injustice, inequality, manipulation, sexual discrimination 
in both overt and subtle, pernicious forms (Wodak 1989; Sunderland and Litosseliti 
2002:20). On the one hand, a CDA approach to gender makes it difficult to make global 
statements about women’s and men’s language as the same discourse is usually voiced 
by different sexes. On the other hand, however, it does allow for the tracing of 
discursive construction of femininities and masculinities. In fact, current research 
validates the view that discursive approaches to the study of politics are ‘particularly 
suited to explore the way power works in framing processes’ in debates (Verloo and 
Lombardo 2007: 9).   
In her analysis of the Swedish military, Kronsell (2006) conceptualizes these 
characteristics as prevalent in institutions where masculinity is not just a trait attributed 
in gender, but an almost moral norm, and where silence on gender is a determining 
characteristic of those institutions, indicating a degree of normality and simply ‘how 
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things are’ (Kronsell 2006: 109). Kronsell (2006: 117) shows how, by turning to 
symbols and procedures in institutional practice, we can find out how gender relations 
are played out. ‘Norms of organizations, like norms of hegemonic masculinity, are 
embedded in institutions as rituals, procedures, routines, and symbols’(Kronsell 2006: 
117). What is more, by interviewing women in such contexts and ‘breaking the 
silence’, it is possible to deconstruct the notions of gender identity and the linked 
characteristics of women and men as citizens or politicians. 
Hence, by looking at how discourses about women and men, femininity and 
masculinity are present in parliament, I investigate the ideas about gender relations 
within a specific case study analysis. Such dominant or hegemonic discourses of 
femininity and masculinity are interpreted as affecting the lives of many women and 
men in Polish society. These discourses are called dominant or hegemonic so as to 
highlight the power they exert in society (Bacchi 2005).23 This is crucial, as the power 
of discourse especially affects the possibility for actors to challenge existing 
hegemonic discourses (Verloo and Lombardo 2007: 9). 
Limitations of and alternatives to CDA 
The use of CDA reveals interesting aspects of political debates that are especially 
relevant for this study. It allows us to realize how a discourse can be directed against 
a competing discourse in society. Nonetheless, there is one main shortcoming 
connected with the CDA method as put forward in Fairclough’s work (Turunen 2015). 
Arguably, there is no evidence that discourses are interpreted according to the same 
intention as they are produced. Going back to the level of consumption of discourse, 
there is a problem in Fairclough around the hermeneutic task of ‘pinning down’ 
interpretation, given that individuals have the capacity to interpret texts differently, 
based on their own cognitive capital. Yet, while the role of interpretation remains 
ambiguous, Fairclough does acknowledge its importance and attributes to it a degree 
of independence from social relations. He also treats it as a mirror image of text 
                                                 
23 At the same time, it is very important for feminist scholarship to allow room for actors and subjects 
to move within the constraints imposed by hegemonic discourses (resulting in change). 
production. He therefore asserts that the social relations of power determine the 
discourses circulating in society. This makes it easy for him to externalize the problem 
of interpretation from the available material itself and makes it dependent on social 
relations of power, the analysis of which ultimately depends, on the researcher’s 
choice. However, Fairclough gives some arguments to counter this problem. He argues 
that individual interpretations are deeply engrained in societal processes and 
necessarily take recourse in collectively held discourses. These, in turn, are 
conditioned by societal structures (Fairclough 2001: 26). Hence, societal structures 
limit the number of possible interpretations. 
What CDA makes possible is the focus on the relations of power between the 
politically hegemonic supporters and the subordinated others. To counter 
shortcomings in his writings, Fairclough explicitly calls for interdisciplinary 
approaches in order to solve the problem of having insufficient textual material to 
interpret social and political situations and their connections. His approach then moves 
beyond a determinist and traditionally positivist concept of causality, providing instead 
a reflexive perspective and a contextualized and dynamic way of interpreting meaning 
(cf. Kulawik 2009). Arguably, when combined, different forms of knowledge will 
produce not a universal understanding but a broader, albeit contingent understanding 
of the nexus of gender, institutions, and discourse in legislatures (Phillips and 
Jorgensen 2002: 155). This in a way plays into Donna Haraway’s (1988) notion of 
‘situated knowledge’ that needs to take into account the place from which one speaks 
and its cultural and political meaning that depends on the researcher’s own reflexivity 
and positioning in my case.  
Understandably, there can be no guarantee that consumers of discourse understand the 
text or communicative event in line with the intentions of the producers of this 
discourse. The problem of establishing what in fact is interpreted as distinct from what 
is produced has been a source of much criticism targeted against CDA (Widdowson 
1995, 1996; Schegloff 1997). I tackle this issue by using extensive material in the form 
of numerous debates. I am also consciously subscribing to the understanding that my 
interpretation is only one of the possible. I reconstruct the process of the discourse 
production and analyse the ‘product’ itself – the discursive constructs of subjects and 
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values in Polish political debates. What makes my interpretation plausible is that it is 
supported and enhanced by the knowledge of the context and backed by relevant 
scholarly literature, i.e. my member’s resources that are engrained in Polish social 
practice (cf. Philips and Jorgensen 2002). As argued, one of the aims of this 
dissertation is to combine Polish insights, personal knowledge with transnational 
literature. I supplement this by providing the social and historical background. Within 
the analysed debates, I point to which aspects of the discussed themes are important. 
The interpretation can thus be enhanced with the help of the social context in which 
the text occurs. 
An alternative discursive approach to the gendered study of politics was proposed in 
the use of critical frame analysis in the Policy Frames and Implementation Problems: 
the Case of Gender Mainstreaming (MAGEEQ) research project.24 Within the 
discourse analysis tradition, strategic or critical frame analysis tries to examine 
precisely how social actors manoeuvre within discursive limits to shape issues in ways 
that advance their specific political projects (cf. Verloo 2001; 2005). Mieke Verloo’s 
(2007) approach (roughly basing on Carol Bacchi’s work, 2005) calls for reflection on 
both the discourses within which actors operate and the active deployment of concepts 
and categories for political purposes. A framing methodology shows the ways in which 
the framing of a concept affects how policy-makers and legislators think about an 
issue.  
Initially, this research project attempted to use a critical framing methodology. 
However, Verloo’s (2005; 2007) focus on the nexus between diagnosis (what is 
wrong?) – attribution of causality (who/what is responsible for the problem?) – 
prognosis (what should be done about it?) – and call for action (who should do it?) has 
proved difficult to operationalize given the aim of my study – the power and operation 
of discourses in creating subjects and values in politics. Hence, the thesis switches the 
focus from policy adoption and implementation (which is the crux of critical frame 
                                                 
24 For details of the background, aims, and results of the MAGEEQ project refer to the website: 
http://www.mageeq.net/  
analysis that talks about policy frames) to the study of political debates and their 
power-creating capabilities. 
In contrast to critical frame analysis, the central thesis of CDA is concerned with the 
extra-textual relations of power that can explain the text (the debate in my case). 
Fairclough argues that, ‘the way in which society organizes its economic production, 
and the nature of the relationships established in production between social classes, 
are fundamental structural features which determine others’ (Fairclough 2001:26). For 
CDA, the ultimate source of interpretation is not really text, but the dominant social 
relations of power which the text reflects (Turunen 2015).25 This is its strength in the 
context of gendered political research. The main analytical effort of CDA lies in the 
connection between discursive practices and social practices, that is, the way in which 
social conditions determine possible interpretations. Because of this, the distinction 
between the production and the interpretation of discourse fades away. 
Consequently, discursive change in hegemonies is possible only if there exists a social 
struggle that alters the fundamental structures of society, that is, those of the relations 
of discursive production. Fairclough does not, however, treat actors as simple puppets 
of discourse; he acknowledges the possibility of resistance (Turunen 2015). This is an 
acknowledgement of social facts: resistance and non-compliance do, indeed, happen. 
However, CDA is primarily geared to the exploration and exposure of hegemonic 
discourses, as such CDA alone makes it difficult to explain change. This is not an issue 
for my dissertation because discussing discursive change over time is not within the 
scope of this work. My aim is to expose the discourses in the studied timeframe (2011-
2015), rather than highlighting their real and potential evolution (an issue I come back 
to in the conclusions). Nonetheless, I complement the understanding part of 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis by applying process tracing methods, in order 
not to omit ideas of change altogether. 
                                                 
25 CDA as a theory of society argues for the dialectical relationship between social forces and the 
discourse, but critical discourse analysis as textual analysis seeks explanation for the text from the 
social relations of power. 
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Process tracing ‘lite’ 
The view expressed by Phillips and Jorgensen (2002: 69) that CDA needs a 
complementary method or an additional level to fully understand and interpret the 
discursive and non-discursive element informs and underlies my decision to match 
CDA with another research method. Process tracing, then, can be seen as a way of 
‘boosting’ within-case analysis (Kenny 2009). Importantly for this research, it 
encompasses an element of historical narrative, but more frequently it is understood as 
a method of within-case analysis used to evaluate causal processes (cf. Hall 2003; 
Collier et al. 2004; George and Bennett 2005; Strahan 2007).  
Conversely, the dissertation makes no claims on looking for causality (as I discuss in 
the later sections) and largely rejects the positivist language, adopting a flexible – ‘lite’ 
– understanding of process tracing that is more compatible with the discursive and 
interpretive approach of the project (cf. Kenny 2009: 97). My application of process 
tracing, hence, consists of theory-informed (see chapter 2) sequential narrative. The 
aim is to trace, outline, and connect the stages of a particular process, enabling me to 
identify the critical junctures, legacies, and contingent reasons for the emergence of 
particular gendered ‘losers’ in political discourses through the dynamic of events over 
time (cf. George and McKeown 1985; Tarrow 2004; Falleti 2006).  
In applying the ‘lite’ process tracing method, the thesis provides a detailed 
reconstruction of the temporal sequence of transformation and Europeanization 
processes in Poland (see following chapter). One of the main advantages of this 
approach, apart from complementing the CDA, is that it allows for the ‘placing of 
politics in time’ (Pierson 2000, 2004). In the next chapter, I systematically situate 
particular moments (critical junctures of transformation and Europeanization) in the 
context of a longer temporal and spatial framework (cf. Kenny 2009). This allows for 
the improvement of the understanding of complex political dynamics and discursive 
interplay (cf. Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Hall 2003; Thelen 2003, 2004; George and 
Bennett 2005; Falleti 2006; Steinmo 2008; Kenny 2009). 
Sources and data collection 
The two focus areas of family/welfare politics and the nation are followed in the 
plenary debates. The timeframe encompasses a single parliamentary term from 2011 
to 2015, which was the seventh term of the so-called Third Republic. The material for 
the chapter on ‘war on gender’ includes apart from relevant utterances in parliament, 
media reports and quotes by church officials. Since discourse encompasses not only 
written and spoken language but also visual images, I look not only at debate 
transcripts available in the Polish Sejm archive, but also at video materials provided 
by that archive. The sources used in the dissertation are publicly available. Thanks to 
the abundance of publicly-available material, there was no need to include interviews 
for further data collection. As I discuss below, consultations took place, but they were 
aimed at improving the research design and discourse interpretation and did not 
directly generate data for the dissertation. 
Data collection was performed first in the Sejm archive in the fall of 2013 (accessible 
by the public after prior arrangement of passes). The bulk of data collection and source 
selection has been subsequently done through the online archive of the parliament 
available at: www.sejm.gov.pl. I selected the pertinent debates according to the 
thematic key and the focus areas I chose for analysis, guided by the theory insights 
from multiple scholarly literature presented in chapter 2. I selected parliamentary 
debates focusing on the family and the nation, as important policy and discursive 
spheres that play a crucial role in the construction of gendered subjects. I studied the 
construction of subjectivities within these debates and how these constructions are, in 
turn, deployed in parliament for particular purposes. During the 2011-2015 
parliamentary term, there were 102 plenary sessions of the Sejm. I selected 74 of them 
as relevant, based on the agenda points. Overall, over 200 individual parliamentary 
agenda points (debates) were selected and analysed from the seventh parliamentary 
term (for a full list divided by chapter, see Appendix I). To allow for transparency, all 
quotes from the parliamentary debates under analysis follow the format: name of the 
speaker, date of the speech, the number of the parliamentary meeting, the page 
numbers as they appear in the official stenographs. 
No country for losers? 
83 
Chapter 3: Method and research design 
Reflexivity, replicability, generalizability, and ethical 
considerations 
From a traditionally positivist point of view, the methodological approach of the thesis 
may raise issues of reliability and replicability. Positivist research attempts to draw 
scientifically valid conclusions about the wider population based on the samples under 
analysis (cf. Blaikie 2010: 192-194, 217). As I argued above, a positivist approach is 
not appropriate or applicable for the subject under investigation. The dissertation is 
committed to a feminist interpretative and discursive approach. My findings concern 
the power relationships between discourses and the gendered construction of political 
subjects and values in the parliamentary debates of the Polish Sejm. As argued in 
chapter 1, these contributions matter because the parliament and its deputies hold 
considerable discursive power in the national arena. Looking for a causal impact or 
correlation between the discourses and their work on the general population, the 
consumers of the discourses, is beyond the scope of this work.  
This chapter has illustrated that interpretation and my own reflexivity are central to the 
application of the CDA method. Since one of the aims of this dissertation is to infuse 
the theoretical and conceptual framework with my own experience and ‘local’ 
knowledge, I understand my own reflexivity as one of the main concepts in the 
research design of the dissertation. A compelling argument to explain this position is 
made by Joanna Regulska (1998: 42): 
As I was born and spent many of my early years in a country that is “waiting 
in the queue to be integrated”, but much of my professional life in one of the 
countries that determines that queue, I have experienced otherness in numerous 
ways, and I am aware how these encounters have shaped my own ideas and 
attitudes towards exclusion and marginalization. (…) This (…) represents my 
own resistance to forced exclusions.  
Instead of focusing on the replicability of findings, I have taken several measures to 
ensure that the research is credible and well-informed (Lincoln and Guba 1985). To 
optimize the plausibility of the arguments and interpretations made within the bounds 
of this hermeneutic approach, my observations and findings were discussed in 
consultations with analysts and scholars in Poland and in scientific conferences. These 
contextual discussions were used to guide my thinking and to confront my ideas. I 
spoke with feminist activists from Kongres Kobiet, Feminoteka and Federacja na 
Rzecz Planowania Rodziny. I also benefited from more academic discussions at the 
Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych, and at the special seminar on Critical Discourse 
Analysis of Polish Public Discourse with Dr Kinga Dunin. Moreover, I conducted six 
interviews with MPs from PO, SLD, and TR and received answers to questionnaires 
from two PiS deputies, which I used as background pointing me to different 
interpretations of the political debates. Hence, from the point of view of academic 
ethics, my research did not raise any specific concerns. The sources under analysis are 
publicly available (also online at the time of writing). There was some direct 
engagement with policy-makers and activists as well as researchers in Warsaw, but 
this did not produce primary textual materials for the dissertation.  
The Polish case  
In the dissertation, I map out the gendered discursive construction of subjectivities and 
values in the Polish parliament. By scrutinizing parliamentary debates, I want to show 
the power of dominant discourses and trace what is silenced. Accordingly, my critical 
discourse analysis within the parliament focuses on two main themes where gendered 
political discourse can be best observed, family and the nation. These cases are 
selected to avoid the production of ideal types and, first and foremost, to map out the 
contradictions and varieties (tensions and interrelationships) within and between 
discourses in Poland. So, I consider the discourses that are dominant in one context, 
but perhaps cannot be articulated in another, with the aim of revealing silences and 
looking at their informal institutional causes.  
According to Gerber’s (2011) and Gwiazda’s (2016) analyses of Polish politics, 
Poland as a case study can be viewed as an ‘extreme’ (Bryman 2008) or ‘atypical’ case 
that can help us understand the deeper causes behind a given problem and its 
consequences (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). As I discussed in chapter 1, against the European 
and regional background, the Polish case is unique in several features: the role of the 
church in politics, the lauded success of its transformation, and the good 
macroeconomic statistics since transformation and post-accession. However, it is also 
at the same time a symptomatic case for broader regional and global trends of backlash 
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against economic globalization, Europeanization, and disappointment with the 
workings of liberal democracy in practice. Therefore, the Polish case can provide 
insights into the dynamics of regime changes, as well as into the resistances, blockages 
and tensions that such transformations produce, but is not necessarily representative 
of the whole Eastern European region.  
Single case studies have been criticized mainly for their weak generalizability (Gerring 
2004; Lieberman 2005), but the premise of this criticism rests on the positivist 
assumption that large numbers of cases produce more general valid principles (Yanow 
et al. 2008). As Meryl Kenny (2009) has argued, it is important not to misinterpret 
these limitations through ‘the prism of statistical methods’ (George and Bennett 2005: 
22). By applying the methodology outlined in this chapter, the dissertation situates the 
single case study within a larger temporal and spatial framework and traces historical 
and political developments, thereby providing a deep within-case analysis.  
The aim of this research, therefore, is not inference about causality, but the in-depth 
exploration of a puzzle that allows for interpretative understanding of the processes 
and of their consequences in the case study. The goal is analytical description that can 
be useful in understanding wider phenomena. The selection of within-case focus areas, 
like family politics, nationalism, and the ‘war on gender’ is based on their relevance 
to the traditional feminist topics; their representativeness in terms of current regional 
trends (nationalism, ultra-conservatism and anti-feminism), with the ‘war on gender’ 
pulling both the old and the new together. In keeping with the discursive and 
interpretive approach of the thesis, the goal is not to arrive at some sort of original 
‘truth’ or singularly ‘right’ interpretation about the gendered processes, events, and 
meanings, but to shed light into the ways in which particular constructions and 
meanings (subjects) are discursively constructed at a specific time and site. 
A note on Polish politics 
This dissertation focuses on the political developments of the so-called ‘Third 
Republic’, which was established after the fall of state socialism in 1989. According 
to the official and popular count, the ‘First Republic’ was the ‘Republic of Nobility’ 
(Rzeczpospolita Szlachecka) that lasted until the third partition of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795.26 The ‘Second Republic’ was the post-First World 
War state (1918-1939) and the ‘Third Republic’ came after the PRL. The years of state 
socialism (1945-1989) are not counted as a republic.  
The legal basis of the Third Republic – the Republic of Poland (RP), is the Constitution 
of April 1997.27 Poland today is a parliamentary republic with a bicameral 
(asymmetric) system.28 The system of government is founded on the separation of and 
balance between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Legislative power is 
vested in the Sejm and the Senate, executive power is the President of the Republic of 
Poland and the Council of Ministers, and the courts and tribunals constitute the judicial 
power (Art. 10 §1 and §2 Constitution of RP). According to Art. 11 of the Constitution, 
Poland ensures ‘freedom for the creation and functioning of political parties’. Political 
parties are voluntary and their purpose is to impact the formulation of legislation and 
policy by democratic means (Art. 11 §1 Constitution of RP). 
In the seventh parliamentary term under analysis (2011-2015) the government drawn 
from the parliamentary majority included a (center-)right coalition (in power for the 
second term, since 2007) of Civic Platform – PO (senior partner) and the Polish 
Peasant’s Party – PSL (junior partner). PO (Platforma Obywatelska) was the largest 
party in the Sejm with 202 seats (out of 460). Ideologically, PO pools together 
Christian democratic, centrist, conservative, and liberal ideas. PSL (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe) was the junior coalition partner of PO with 39 seats. It proclaims 
centrist, agrarian, and Christian democratic ideas, in practice it represents 
conservative, traditionalist, and decidedly catholic positions.   
                                                 
26 The term ‘partitions’ refers to the final period in the history of the First Polish Republic (the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth). The three partitions took place towards the end of the 18th century 
(1772, 1793, 1795), divided the Commonwealth territory between its neighbours (Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria), and ended the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian state, resulting in the elimination of the 
sovereign Poland for 123 years. 
27 I am using the official English translation of the Polish Constitution, which is available at: 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm (accessed October 2016).  
28 It is a ‘democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice’ (Art. 2 
Constitution of RP). According to Art. 4 §1 of the Constitution, ‘supreme power in the Republic of 
Poland shall be vested in the Nation’. 
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The biggest opposition political group was the right-wing Law and Justice Party – PiS 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), with 134 seats. It espouses Christian democratic, national-
catholic, and conservative ideas.  There were also two other centre-left (SLD – 
Alliance of Democratic Left) and liberal (TR – Your Movement) opposition groups 
amounting to about 10% of the parliamentary seats between them. SLD (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej) was the second biggest opposition party and had 34 seats in the Sejm. 
It declares social democratic and social liberal ideas.  During the seventh legislative 
term, the parliamentary club ‘Your Movement’ (TR) eventually fell apart, as it lost the 
needed quorum (at least 15 MPs), due to numerous defections (in the fall of 2014 and 
March 2015). The political party continued to exist and its remaining 4 MPs formed a 
parliamentary ‘circle’ called ‘Palikot’s Movement’. 
In the latter half of the 2011-2015 parliamentary term there were two more splinter 
right-wing opposition parties, which were not elected but broke off from either PO or 
PiS and together they formed the United Right PR (Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together 
and Poland United). PR (Polska Razem – Zjednoczona Prawica) was a splinter right-
wing parliamentary grouping which had 15 deputies in the Sejm and did not run under 
this name in the 2011 elections. There was also a group of independent non-aligned 
deputies, composed of MPs that defected mostly from TR during the seventh 
parliamentary term (36 MPs as of 2015). 
Women made up 24% of the deputies in the lower chamber and 13% of the Senate, 
which gave the whole of the parliament an average of 18.5% of women among its 
MPs.29 The average age of the MPs was 50. At the end of the parliamentary term in 
question, a woman held the main position of the Speaker, or Marshall, of the Sejm.30 
The Presidium of the parliament included 3 women and 3 men; the equality in numbers 
was also a late change (June 2015). 31 There were no women at the head of any of the 
                                                 
29 Sourced from the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the basis of information provided by National 
Parliaments by 1st February 2015, available at: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm (accessed June 
2016). 
30 Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska took over the post from Radosław Sikorski in June 2015.  
31 The Presidium of the Sejm is composed of the Marshal and Deputy Marshals of the Sejm. 
Traditionally, the composition of this collective body of the Sejm reflects the political diversity of the 
House and has one representative of each of the political parties. 
political clubs, circles, or groups in the parliament (although some parliamentary clubs 
have had women in deputy chairperson positions), which means that normally the 
Convent of Seniors included only 3 women for its 11 members.32  
Out of the 27 standing legislative committees, women were in charge of 4: the 
Committee for EU Affairs, the Committee of Public Finance, the Committee for 
Culture and the Media, and the Committee of Justice and Human Rights. Out of the 
then running 4 extraordinary committees, a woman headed 1 – the Committee on 
Curbing Bureaucracy. The parliamentary composition suggests that due to the 
dominant ‘maleness’ of the Sejm, we can expect some particular type of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ (Connell 1987; 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) as well as an 
‘emphasized femininity’ (Connell 1987) to emerge as institutional norms. The 
expectation is a division of power or a hierarchy between masculinities and 
femininities in the parliament as to what women and men are expected to be dealing 
with and the ways they say things and produce discourse. 
The workings of the Sejm 
Since the Polish parliament is the main site of my research, it is important to outline 
its main modes of operation as well as its main processes. The following section details 
the legislative process (Figure 3.3) of the Sejm and the main responsibilities and 
structures of the institution (Figure 3.4). Institutionally, the legislative branch in 
Poland includes the Lower House, the Sejm (Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej), and the 
Upper House, the Senate (Senat Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej) (Art. 10 §2, Art. 95 §1 
Constitution of RP). Sometimes both houses are referred to only as the Sejm.33 
Whenever I use the word ‘Sejm’, I am referring to the Lower House only. Due to the 
                                                 
32 For a diagram of the structures of the parliament see Figure 3.4 in chapter 3.  
33 When the two chambers sit together, they are known as the National Assembly (Zgromadzenie 
Narodowe). The National Assembly is convened only during the swearing of the oath of a new 
president, taking an indictment against the president or cancelling the powers of the president due to 
her/his health reasons.  
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asymmetrical (superior) legislative power position of the lower chamber, my analysis 
focuses only on the Sejm and omits the debates in the Senate.34  
The Polish Sejm is the institution where new legislation is debated, and parliamentary 
committees in parliament are the organs for working on the details of the proposed 
legislation. Both chambers of the Polish parliament are elected for four-year terms in 
direct elections. The MPs are elected through a multi-party and open-list proportional 
representation system, with a 5% threshold for political parties (seats are allocated 
according to the D’Hondt method, favouring bigger winners).35 The Prime Minister is 
appointed by the President with the approval of the majority of the parliament. 
The highest position in parliament is the Marshall – the Speaker. The Sejm elects a 
Marshall and Vice-Marshalls (who preside over plenary debates). The parliament also 
establishes standing parliamentary committees (and if necessary ad-hoc special 
parliamentary committees). I show a schematic outline of the legislative process in the 
Sejm in Figure 3.3. Within the legislative process, the right to initiate bills belongs to 
the deputies, the Senate, the President, the Council of Ministers, or a group of citizens 
of more than 100,000 signatories. The Sejm debates the proposed bills in up to three 
readings. During the first two readings, deputies, the Council of Ministers and the 
representative of the group of citizens that has initiated a legislative proposal can 
introduce amendments; the Senate may introduce changes only after the Sejm has 
passed the bill on its third reading. The Sejm passes legislative bills on a simple 
majority basis, in the presence of at least half of all the 460 MPs.  
 
                                                 
34 The role of the Senate in legislating is secondary: it passes judgement on the proposed bills by 
either accepting them, suggesting changes, or rejecting them altogether. However, the Sejm can 
overrule the Senate’s decisions by absolute majority (231 or more votes). The procedures for laws 
amending the Constitution are somewhat different, and the powers of the Senate are then greater. 
35 Senators are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies after the electoral law was 
changed in 2011. Candidates cannot run both for the Sejm and the Senate. 
Figure 3.3 The legislative process of the Sejm. 
 
(Source: own compilation based on sejm.gov.pl). 
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The Marshall of the Sejm determines the schedule of the parliamentary sittings and the 
daily agenda. The Marshall consults the Convent of Seniors of the Sejm (see Figure 
3.4). The Convent of Seniors of the Sejm (Konwent Seniorów) normally represents the 
MPs in matters of the daily workings of the parliament.36 MPs are divided into 
parliamentary clubs and circles based on political party affiliation. A parliamentary 
club (Klub Sejmowy or Klub Poselski) is formed by MPs that share political 
sympathies.37 In practice, all political parties that have been elected to the parliament 
usually form clubs. A deputy can only belong to one club or circle.  
Figure 3.4 The organizational structure of the Sejm. 
 
(Source: own compilation based on sejm.gov.pl) 
                                                 
36 The Convent of the Seniors consists of the Marshall and all Vice-Marshalls, spokespersons of all 
parliamentary clubs and circles (if their membership is less than 15). 
37 There must be at least 15 deputies for the group to be called a ‘club’; otherwise the MPs form a 
‘circle’ (minimum 3 MPs). 
The formal institutional character of parliamentary debates is regulated through the 
Constitution of the RP, the Resolution on the Regulations of the Sejm (1992) (Uchwała 
Regulaminu Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej), and the Resolution on the Ethical 
Principles of the Members of the Parliament (1998) (Uchwała Zasady Etyki 
Poselskiej).38 One significant difference between the Polish parliament and those of 
many European countries is the fact the deputies’ presence in the parliamentary sittings 
is strictly controlled in each plenary (Turunen 2015). The rules governing the Polish 
parliamentary debate are also quite stringent and set a predictable order for the plenary 
debates (Turunen 2015). The Marshall of the Sejm determines the speaking order. The 
secretary of the Sejm takes down the speeches (Art. 179 Regulamin Sejmu). During the 
debate, MPs’ speeches are limited to 10 minutes, and speeches on behalf of 
parliamentary clubs to 20 minutes; other time limits are generally determined by the 
Marshall in consultation with the MPs. Despite these strict regulations, the practice of 
the Sejm can be rather relaxed and, for instance, time limits are regularly exceeded by 
most speakers.  
Conclusions 
This chapter stressed the importance and relevance of critical discourse analysis as an 
approach and as a method to feminist research. I argued that CDA aims to access how 
ideological and power structures are reproduced by subjects. This chapter also gave an 
overview of Norman Fairclough’s CDA and proposed a way of implementing it in the 
present research, complementing it with a simplified version of process tracing in order 
to provide the essential background and contextual framework to apply the theory and 
methodology to the empirical part of this work.  This chapter also provided an outline 
of the cases analysed in this dissertation. Based on the theoretical, conceptual, and 
methodological frameworks discussed thus far, the next chapter embarks on discussing 
                                                 
38 There are no official or established English translations of the Regulations of the Sejm or the Ethical 
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the essential historical and political background, in preparation for the application of 




















Chapter 4: Gender inequality legacies of 
transformation and trajectories of 
democratization in Poland 
‘Poland looked ugly in the red dress, but will be happy wearing the blue one with 
yellow stars’ 
Ewa Charkiewicz39 
As I have argued in the previous chapters, in order to understand the gendered and 
discursive consequences of the post-state socialist transformation, it is vital to 
understand the paths and the legacies in the region. Exploring the discursive 
constructions of gender in parliament calls for the exploration of several layers of 
unconscious gendering over time. This chapter provides the socio-historical and 
economic context to process trace the key dynamics and expectations concerning 
democratization and transformation in the region and in Poland specifically. As the 
opening quote suggests, I discuss the trends and processes that led to the rejection of 
the state socialist legacies. First, I discuss the general historical background and show 
the consequences of how the transformation was gendered, but also classist, in how it 
operated and produced discursive sources for the contemporary political debates. The 
main questions addressed in the chapter are: what were the paths and trajectories in the 
transformation and democratization processes in Poland? What are the legacies 
pertinent for the unequal discursive constructions in politics today? How are they 
gendered and how do they reproduce political exclusion and discursive 
marginalization? 
I argue that since we cannot observe the transformation itself in parliament today, we 
can see the residual discourses and the nationalist-catholic responses to them that have 
remained influential until today. Transformation, democratization, and 
Europeanization, as discussed in this chapter (and earlier in chapter 2), mostly 
consisted of neoliberal market reforms (Charkiewicz 2006; Bobako 2011; Mrozik 
2012). Polish elites implemented them in order to re-establish or reconnect the Polish 
economy to the global market. I argue that, as such, democratization and 
                                                 
39 ‘W czerwonej sukience jesteś brzydka, a w niebieskiej w żółte gwiazdki będziesz szczęśliwa.’ Ewa 
Charkiewicz, Biblioteka Think Tanku Feministycznego (2006:9). 
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Europeanization were stand-in processes of globalization in Poland. According to 
Polish critical scholars, neoliberal market values were internalized utterly and 
completely and there is no counter-hegemony to these discourses (Leder 2014; Sowa 
2015). The social norms of hyper-individualism, self-reliance, economic success, and 
rejection of social solidarity were a by-product of accepting first the ‘shock therapy’ 
after 1989, and then of the mostly market-oriented and economy-related acquis 
communautaire of the EU on paper.  
The rejection of state socialism, which nominally proclaimed itself an egalitarian 
system, and the lack of attention to social inequality issues in the post-1989 Polish 
politics produced a vehement reaction in the form of resurgent nostalgic ethnic 
nationalism, militant catholicism, and social conservatism. An important argument in 
this chapter is the interconnection and the impact of the ‘two monstrous machines’, or 
what the Polish feminist critic Ewa Charkiewicz (2006) called the neoliberal and 
nationalist-catholic camps, holding sway in Polish politics. To explore these further, 
this chapter again combines a number of literatures, Polish or Eastern European, and 
Anglophone conceptualizations of the democratization and transformation processes, 
on the one hand, and the feminist literature on gender equality, on the other. 
While the early ‘transition’ literature from the 1990s may already be outdated, its 
impetus can still provide insight into the later developments in Eastern Europe. 
Accordingly, it is pertinent to establish how this scholarly literature saw the effects of 
the transformation processes in terms of gender as well as the impact of the 
reconfiguration of gender roles during the democratization and Europeanization of the 
region. To begin with, I trace how the literature conceptualizes the period following 
the fall of state socialism in 1989. The key themes concern the losers of transformation 
and the societal anger that subsequently had to find an outlet. Next, I look at the 
feminist interrogations of these processes and trace gender inequality as a consequence 
of predating patriarchal structures, the changes in the understanding of the private and 
public spheres, and the politicization of gender difference.  
I show the gendered context in which Eastern Europe, and Poland specifically, 
operates. The final section addresses the implementation of gender equality policy 
post-accession and the backlashes against it. The themes described in this chapter 
provide a background in terms of history, politics, and economy for the analysis of 
discourses that follow in the subsequent chapters. They outline the limits, scope, and 
basis for the creation and use of discourses within Polish politics today, providing 
sources for interdiscursivity and common frames of meaning for political actors and 
users of political discourse.  
The socio-economy of transformation and its legacies 
The Polish post-state socialist transformation, especially in the 1990s, was the product 
of American orthodox neoliberal market proponents (such as Jeffrey Sachs and David 
Lipton), implemented by their Polish ideological equivalents – Leszek Balcerowicz 
and Waldemar Kuczyński, typical apparently non-political ‘economic experts’ (cf. 
Klein 2007). Polish political elites enacted and implemented regime change in the form 
of economic and political transformation according to the dominant spirit of the day 
(Dunn 2004; Klein 2007; Charkiewicz 2011). This period was dominated by 
arguments around the ‘end of history’ and the victory of liberal democracy and market 
economic orthodoxy, which were broadly seen as the ultimate end goal of human 
social, political, and economic development (cf. Fukuyama 1989, 1992). In practice, 
‘transition’ was imposed in the form of ‘shock therapy’ (Klein 2007) consisting of 
savage cuts to welfare, waves of mass privatization, and tax cuts, which exacerbated 
social inequalities, poverty, and unemployment.  
Mainstream macroeconomic analysis has highlighted the positive aggregated data of 
Poland’s post-transformation economy. The size of the Polish gross domestic product 
(GDP) makes it the sixth economy in the EU, as of 2009.40 According to the Main 
Statistical Office of Poland, in 2010, the Polish economic growth rate was 3.9%, which 
was one of the best results in Europe (GUS 2011). In fact, Polish GDP growth has 
been uninterrupted since 1992 (GUS 2011); the country did not experience recession 
after 2008, unlike other European economies. Thus, commentators report the 
                                                 
40The full story is available at: http://finanse.wp.pl/kat,9231,title,Polska-szosta-gospodarka-Unii-
Europejskiej-Holendrzy-ogladaja-nasze-plecy,wid,11805963,wiadomosc.html (Accessed November 
2016). 
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impressive accumulated economic growth of 53% between 2003 and 2014 (Tycner 
2016). According to the Main Statistical Office, unemployment rates have been 
dropping slowly but steadily since the early pre-accession years – from around 20% in 
2002 to approximately 10% in 2015 (GUS 2016).41 Average incomes have also been 
rising and reached approximately £790 per month in 2015 (GUS 2016).42  
However, all the above indices miss the reality of post-transformation costs and effects 
on the Polish society at large (Debski 2010; Sowa 2015). An aggregated analysis 
disregards societal complexities and the different impact of transformation on different 
social groups. The economic gains and the ‘successes of transformation’ were not 
evenly distributed. Starting from the early years of the transformation, women’s 
unemployment was higher than men’s (Regulska 1998). Official recorded women’s 
unemployment reached 10.5% in 2013, while men’s was 9% (GUS 2014). In 2013, the 
employment ratio for women was 43%, as compared with 58% for men (GUS 2014). 
This happened even though women on average are better educated than men in Poland 
(Regulska 1998).  
Similarly, while average income was £790 gross, the most common net wage in Poland 
(mode) was £305 per month; half of the working population was earning less than 
£405 net (median) (GUS 2016). As Tycner argues (2016), some jobs, in cleaning or 
security for instance, are paid on average less than the minimum wage (£220 net). 
These data point to enormous income discrepancies between different parts of Polish 
society. Consequently, the Gini index for Poland was 0.3 in 2013 and has risen from 
0.24 in 1985 (GINI 2013).43 The neoliberal policies implemented by all post-1989 
governments have led to a significant rise in the number of Poles living below the 
                                                 
41 In the early stage of transformation unemployment sky-rocketed from 0.3% in January 1990 to 12% 
by December 1991, reaching 16% in 1994 (GUS 2016). Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-
tematyczne/rynek-pracy/bezrobocie-rejestrowane/stopa-bezrobocia-w-latach-1990-2016,4,1.html 
(accessed November 2016).  
42 Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/sygnalne/komunikaty-i-obwieszczenia/lista-komunikatow-i-
obwieszczen/obwieszczenie-w-sprawie-przecietnego-miesiecznego-wynagrodzenia-w-sektorze-
przedsiebiorstw-w-2015-roku,60,3.html (accessed November 2016). 
43 The Gini coefficient (or the Gini index) is a measure of income distribution of a nation's residents 
and is the most commonly used measure of inequality. The closer the numerical value to 0, the more 
equality.  
‘social minimum’ (defined as a living standard of £163 per person in a one-person 
household and £405 for a three-person family per month in 2008), rising from 15% of 
the population in 1989 to 47% in 1996 and 59% in 2003 (Wielgosz 2005).44 While 
absolute poverty declined from 13% in 1993 to 4% in 2010 (GINI 2013), the number 
of Poles living on the border of relative poverty was 17% in 2008 (Dębski 2010). 
Przemysław Wielgosz, a Polish left-wing commentator and journal editor (2005: 5-6), 
has called this ‘the absolute sorrow of restoration’, meaning that the restitution of 
neoliberal capitalism in Poland has produced a ‘social wasteland’. 
Due to the abandonment of consistent state activity in the field of housing and other 
external factors, in 2002, 35% of Poles lived in poor or very poor housing conditions 
(Dębski 2010). According to the National Census of 2002, 70% of people aged 18-29 
lived with their parents (GUS 2003). Also the idea that the labour market is virtuous 
because unemployment is lower than in other parts of Europe is misleading. The labour 
market was liberalized according to 1980s neoliberal principles in order to allow for 
more ‘flexibility’ (Regulska 1998). Thus, minimum wage regulations apply only to 
permanent employment contracts. Due to the ‘elasticization’ of the job market, 
permanent contracts have been increasingly replaced by insecure fixed-term – so-
called ‘trash’ or ‘junk’ – contracts, which now concern 27% of the working population. 
Permanent contracts were also replaced by forced self-employment (19%), as 
employers prefer not to pay contributions for health care and pensions, thereby pushing 
their employees to do it themselves (Tycner 2016). Not having a permanent 
employment contract usually means not being eligible for a pension scheme, having 
no right to sick leave, holidays, to unemployment benefits, no right to join trade unions, 
and no childcare leave (Tycner 2016). Women make up an increasing number among 
the self-employed (Dębski 2010). 
As I discussed in the section on Polish peripheral postcolonial position in chapter 2, 
Poland’s position in the international division of labour also has bearing on the 
situation on the job market. In the early 1990s, according to the tenets of the ‘shock 
                                                 
44 The ‘social minimum’ is calculated by the Polish Institute of Labour and Social Studies (IPISS) and 
indicates a particular threshold needed for a household to lead a ‘decent’ life and is based on the cost 
of a basket of goods considered necessary for this (Dębski 2010: 70). 
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doctrine’ (Klein 2007), the Polish industry and finance sectors were privatized and 
sold to transnational capital investors. In Privatizing Poland, Elizabeth Dunn (2004) 
has depicted the methods of privatization, arguing that new managerial standards and 
the reorganization of work changed worker identity by creating hierarchies and 
categorizing them into either bad (‘communist’) or ‘normal’ (capitalist) groups. Dunn 
(2004) shows that the narrative of being ‘elastic’ and ‘individualistic’ created the 
image of the capitalist man and the other – the former public worker (homo sovieticus). 
Those, who did not manage to ‘keep up’ the change, were left behind. In view of the 
feminist political economy literature discussed in chapter 2, these are also general 
effects of globalization that can be seen especially in the countries of the Global South, 
but also in Western Europe. 
Furthermore, multinational corporations had usually no material interest in sustaining 
their newly purchased enterprises, with the alternative being either a profitable 
liquidation of a factory or its transformation into a subcontracting entity, hiring cheap 
workers (Tycner 2016; cf. Dunn 2004; Ost 2005). Pietrzak (2015), Bobako (2011), 
Sowa (2011, 2015) and Tycner (2016) see this as the start of what became a 
specialization within the global capital system. Given its (semi-)peripheral position in 
this system, Poland can compete internationally mainly with cheap labour. To stay 
competitive, labour has to be relatively cheaper in comparison to Western Europe, 
whose capital profits from Polish call-centres, storehouses, and factories producing 
simple subcomponents (Tycner 2016). These phenomena left behind many groups of 
people and barred them from benefiting from the economic success that the 
macroeconomic data suggest.  
Jan Sowa shows (2015:85) that it is difficult to ask what the general consequences of 
such transformation were for Poland because they were diametrically different for 
different groups of Poles. The problem with the Polish transformation after 1989 is not 
what the cost was (too high, not fair), but who paid for it (Sowa 2015: 85). Essentially 
transformation was paid for not by those who mostly benefited from it. Andrzej Leder 
(2014:195) argues that the liberal rhetoric of the 1990s divested huge groups of people 
(especially workers and farmers) of a form of ‘symbolic capital’, acquired during state 
socialism, and put them in the position of losers –  as ‘Soviet people’ or the mythical 
homo sovieticus (see also Dunn 2004; Charkiewicz 2011). Following the theoretical 
analysis of chapter 2, we see how social groups that failed to ‘modernize’ or apply the 
new neoliberal orthodoxy during transformation were stigmatized and excluded from 
participating in the successes of the regime change.  
Post-1989 politics in Poland 
In terms of political developments, much has been said of the post-PRL party divides 
that defined transformation politics as continuity of the prior conflict between ‘we’ – 
the people and ‘they’ – the regime (Grabowska 2004). Individual preferences were 
bound with pro- or anti-regime attitudes and, while there was a significant middle 
group that did not fit into or care about the ‘we’ or ‘they’, it is argued that the political 
world consisted primarily of the dichotomy between regime and society (Bielasiak 
2010: 43). Participating in politics meant having to choose a side in the dichotomy. 
This clash was infused with normative visions along a cultural axis of competition, 
rather than along the standard left–right continuum representing diverse 
socioeconomic interests (Bielasiak 2010). With the fall of PRL, the division remained 
in the form of the ‘post-communists’ and the ‘post-oppositionists’ (post-Solidarity). 
Hence, the framing of Polish politics over the two decades following 1989 was subject 
to these twin pulls of political interests. The ‘post-communists’ and the post-Solidarity 
competition reinforced a discourse rooted in normative visions rather than distributive 
interests and policies (Bielasiak 2010: 42) – politics was not so much about achieving 
practical gains for particular societal groups of interests, but about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
(or even ‘evil’). Instead of being grounded in constituencies with clear social and 
economic interests, politics became rooted in claims centred on moral judgments and 
unquestioned commitments to alternative worldviews. Bielasiak (2010) claims that in 
the post-PRL political divide, the debate centred foremost around issues of 
responsibility for past misdeeds and the nature of the free state (for instance on the 
responsibility for ‘communist regime crimes’ or ‘de-communization’ of the state 
apparatus).  
Initially, the Polish political scene in the 1990s was characterized by volatility and 
instability in terms of party composition, membership, and electoral results (Gwiazda 
No country for losers? 
101 
Chapter 4: Legacies and trajectories 
2016). However, in spite of the party name and affiliation changes, as Polish analysts 
point out, politics has always been played out in Poland between two camps, called in 
different ways depending on the scholar: on the one hand, republican/ conservative/ 
nationalist-catholic/ jagiellonian45/ ‘return to Europe’ and on the other liberal/ 
modernist/ ‘return to normal’/ pro-Western.46 Literature described and conceptualized 
these blocs in the recent years, but named them variously, depending on whether the 
parties drew their origins from the Solidarity movement or from the former PZPR 
(United Polish Workers’ Party): in other words, depending on whether they were part 
of the state socialist regime or opposition prior to 1989. Arguably, from a postcolonial 
perspective, these two camps can be seen as an example of Kiossev’s (1999) and 
Sowa’s (2011) dichotomy between the essentialists and those that oppose the self-
colonizing elites that I discussed in chapter 2.  
The first camp nostalgically looks back to (invented or mythical) history and tries to 
restore some imagined ‘traditional’ (in their own understanding), national, and catholic 
community. Its main claim is to defend a supposed national community, maintaining 
that the Polish nation is homogenous and at the same time defining those who have or 
do not have the moral right to participate in the national group (Bielasiak 2010). The 
combination of all these factors facilitated a discourse infused with normative values 
as the primary currency of politics and the dominance of identity conflicts (in Polish 
politics) (Bielasiak 2010: 43). The dominant conservative paradigm of the ‘return to 
Europe’ acquired highly legitimizing value because it was a break with the state 
socialist past and an entry into the Western world as an independent and self-asserting 
actor (Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003: 64-68). It stood as an affirmation of Poland’s 
long-term struggle to emerge from the shadow of the Soviet Union, which had derailed 
                                                 
45 Referring to the Jagiellons – a dynastic monarchy of Lithuanian noble descent that ruled the Polish 
Lithuanian Commonwealth (the First Polish Republic) in 1386-1596, encompassing what is often 
commonly known as ‘the Golden Age’.  
46 The difference between the ‘return to Europe’ and what is called the pro-Western and groups lies in 
the different visions they have of Polish integration with the ‘liberal West’. The former wants a 
Europe of sovereign nation states cooperating on what is in their individual national interests (‘concert 
of nations’). The latter are the ‘modernizers’ who want Poland to ‘catch up’ with the West and adopt 
practices from the West. For more detail see the discussions in chapter 2.  
the country’s European identity (I discussed the notions of ‘return to Europe’ and 
‘kidnapped West’ in chapter 2).  
Moreover, the Polish nation was viewed as a major contributor to the historical and 
cultural formation of the continent, especially in how it sacrificed throughout history 
for Europe’s survival (Bielasiak 2010: 47). This does not necessarily entail a pro-
European stance (understood as pro-European community), rather it invokes a 
particular self-reasserted ‘equal footing’ within a concert of European states (very 
much along 19th century ideas of national sovereignty). Significantly, it also means 
that, if Europe is seen as trampling on the expected ‘equal footing’, it may start to be 
seen as another totalizing, imposing and demanding ‘evil empire’, leading to slogans 
such as ‘EU=Soviet Union’ (Leder 2014; Sowa 2011).  
The second, liberal and ‘modernist’, camp legitimizes its actions based on the calls for 
the ‘return to normality’ (discussed conceptually in chapter 2), which is simply 
identified with the wealth of Western societies, without a deeper insight into the 
divergences and sources of wealth there. In the drive to build market economy and 
establish ‘normal’ politics, the post-1989 program evolved into appeals based on 
common purpose and the good of the state, thereby reinforcing political tendencies 
based on consensual understandings of politics (Bielasiak 2010:47). ‘Normality’ here 
meant ‘modern’ or simply ‘as it is in the West’, which highlights the prominence and 
importance of postcolonial mentality (see chapter 2 for more details).  
The result was the so-called ‘cargo modernization’ (Leder 2014), which meant the 
reproduction of costly institutional, but mainly infrastructural and material solutions 
from Western Europe, while telling people that there was no other way to reform 
(Gdula 2008:7; Sowa 2015: 21). The effects of ‘normality’ politics, apart from GDP 
growth, was the unquestioned rejection of the social welfare and public ownership of 
the 1990s. These self-colonizing elites proceeded to reject criticisms of their 
unreflective modernization, calling it an irrational facet of ‘communist mentality’ 
(Gdula 2008:8).  
As I show in Table 4.4, following the accession to the EU, however, the post-PRL 
divide became less relevant and was displaced by a more visible post-Solidarity rivalry 
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(Bielasiak 2010:48). Both dominant parties in Polish politics after 2004, the Civic 
Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS), claim direct descendance from the Solidarity 
movement. PiS’ and PO’s roots contributed to a reinvigorated ‘war at the top’47 that 
accentuated the diverging political understandings of what post-state socialist Poland 
should be. In the post-accession period, the emerging PO-PiS dichotomy altered the 
political cleavage that had defined the periods of late state socialism and most of the 
transformation, and drove the political contest away from the post-PRL divide 
(Grabowska, 2006: 179-180). As I summarize in Table 4.4, this happened 
simultaneously with the demise of the post-state socialist left (Alliance of Democratic 
Left or SLD). PiS defined its program as the embodiment of ‘solidaristic Poland’, 
dedicated to traditional norms affirming Solidarity’s commitments to reclaim the 
nationalist values of Poland, in contrast to its depiction of ‘liberal Poland’ represented 
by PO’s emphasis on individualism and competition (Słodkowska, and Dołbakowska 
2006: 111-36, 155-200). To establish political ascendancy, both PO and PiS sought to 
define their heritage as representative of Solidarity’s legacy to restore a free and just 
state (and also to legitimize themselves vis-à-vis the public).  
For advocates of the PiS side, Poland’s emergence from state socialist rule signified 
the restoration of the historical nation defined by national and Christian traditions. 
Therefore, they can be considered part of the ‘return to Europe’ tradition from an 
ultraconservative and ‘Europe of nations’ perspective. The narrative of moral 
resurrection was infused by historical traditions, Christian morality, and the stress on 
state sovereignty that draws extensively on the political mythology of nationalism and 
religion, Solidarity’s struggle for the liberation of the country, and the commitment to 
social solidarity (Markowski 2007). In its depiction of a reclaimed Poland, the 
solidaristic PiS programme employed a normative terminology relying on confessional 
culture, economic populism favouring state intervention to remedy inequalities, and a 
                                                 
47 ‘War at the top’ was originally the popular name given in the media to the conflict between the then 
president Lech Walesa and the other leaders of the Solidarity movement in the 1990s (especially the 
government of prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki).  
revived Euroscepticism to safeguard economic and cultural independence (Bielasiak 
2010: 50). 
For proponents of the neoliberal ideology and liberal values, who coalesced in the PO 
camp, the struggle for freedom was about market principles, open competition, 
individual rights, and European integration, understood as pooled or diffused 
sovereignty (Bielasiak 2010: 49). These respective visions of a renewed Poland based 
their claims on distinct interpretations of Solidarity’s legacy and national recovery, 
each using discursive appeals to particular interests of socioeconomic groups in post-
1989 Poland (Jasiewicz 2008: 12-15). While the PO side of the post-Solidarity divide 
appealed largely to Polish urban, middle-class, educated people; PiS posited the 
concerns of religious, lower-income, rural, and small town Poles. Hence, politics in 
the new millennium continued to be defined by a dichotomy, by contrasting visions of 
the country, and the persistence of a maximalist discourse advocated by ‘Polska 
Solidarna’ (solidaristic Poland) and reluctantly forced upon ‘Polska Liberalna’ 
(liberal Poland) (Bielasiak 2010:55).  
Table 4.4 presents a summary of the main political events and trends in Poland after 
1989 in order to contextualize the discussions below. The aim is to show the 









Table 4.4 An approximate periodization of Polish politics. 
Period Selected political features 
Political elites’ 
attitudes towards the 
EU 
EARLY 1990s - ‘shock therapy’  
- early ‘de-communization’ 
- application for EU 
candidacy (1990) 
No country for losers? 
105 
Chapter 4: Legacies and trajectories 
- ‘war at the top’ 
- restrictive abortion law (1993) 
- wholesale privatization 
- volatile political party system 
- Wałęsa presidency 






- post-PRL party divide: between ‘post-
communists’ (SLD and affiliates under 
different names) and post-Solidarity 
camp (AWS and other short-lived 
Solidarity offshoots) 
- ‘three big reforms’ (health care, 
education, pensions system liberalized) 
- Kwaśniewski presidency 
- official EU accession 
negotiations (from 1999) 




UNTIL CA. 2005) 
- EU accession referendum (2003) 
- EU accession (2004) 
- last time ‘post-communists’ in 
government (SLD) 
- first knee-jerk nationalist and 
conservative reactions to accession  
- end of post-PRL party divide (SLD in 
power for the last time) 
- establishment of PO and PiS 
-PiS wins parliamentary and 
presidential elections (Fall 2005) 
- end of transformation(?) 
- government-led Euro-
enthusiasm 
- SLD-led government 
officially urging people 
to vote ‘yes’ in the 
accession referendum 






- post-Solidarity party divide: between 
PO and PiS 
- irrelevance of left-wing political 
forces 
- strong conservative resurgence 
- short period of centrist-liberal heyday 
(2008-2011) during the (centre-) right 
PO governments (2007-2015) 
 - Smolensk plane crash and the 
beginning of the ‘Smolensk religion’ 
- presidencies of Kaczyński (2005-
2010) and Komorowski (2010-2015) 
- seeming divide 
between Eurosceptic PiS 
and pro-European PO 
- Eurosceptics in power 
2005-2007 
- pro-European PO in 
government 2007-2015 
- Polish rotating 
Presidency in the 
Council of Ministers of 
the EU (July-December 
2011) 
(Source: own compilation). 
What comes across from the timeline presented in Table 4.4 are the non-linear and 
contingent trends in Polish politics. In fact, the transformation and Europeanization 
processes did not follow linear sequences. The changes were a contingent ebb and flow 
determined by the electoral majorities in parliament. Moreover, I identify the brief 
period between 2008 and 2011, as the ‘liberal heyday’ in Poland, due to the dominant 
mood of the time. It seemed that the liberal, ‘modernist’ camp triumphed in politics 
(at least that is what the perspective was from Warsaw). PO had won over PiS in the 
early elections of 2007; macroeconomic data were looking good despite the crisis in 
Europe; Poland held the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EU in 
2011 (which was presented as very prestigious domestically); and the country 
embarked on a bout of major infrastructure investments mainly in roads and stadiums, 
in preparation to host the European football championship of 2012 (which had 
significant bearing on the social and political outlook in Poland).  
After the period of stalemate and rolling back in terms of equality and anti-
discrimination policy in the fifth parliamentary term (2005-2007), due to a strongly 
right-dominated parliament, after 2007, there was some progress in the area. A new 
round of implementation of EU equality and anti-discrimination laws (legislated in 
2010, entered into force 2011), established formally the office of the Government 
Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment and defined its objectives and institutional scope 
(discussion in the following sections). Similarly, the electoral quota bill was 
successfully passed in parliament in 2011.48 However, these were one-sided successes 
that did not ‘trickle down’ to the majority of the population or address the inherent 
inequality legacies of transformation; they concerned mainly political and economic 
elites and in reality, by October 2015, the electoral pendulum shifted strongly to the 
right again.  
The explanation for this can be found in earlier research. David Ost (2005) has shown 
in his research of trade union members that the anger resulting from the socio-
economic and political marginalization of the transformation ‘losers’ was mobilized 
along non-economic lines, which ultimately impeded the development of the emerging 
democratic system. Those who could politically capture the emotional baggage of 
                                                 
48 The amendment to the electoral code stipulated candidate quotas on party lists, requiring every 
district-level list prepared by a party to include at least 35 per cent of candidates of each gender. The 
advocates of the quota law did not manage to lobby for a ‘zipper’ arrangement that would require lists 
to be topped by women and men in turns. The quota also applied only to the lower chamber and not 
the Senate. 
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transformation and organize it along ethnic, religious, rational, national, or religious 
ones (instead of class lines), scored great successes politically (Ost 2005: 8-10).  
During the period under investigation in the thesis (2011-2015), politicians from the 
so-called neoliberal camp, like the prime minister, Donald Tusk, and the president, 
Bronisław Komorowski, repeatedly stated that today’s Poles lived in the ‘best Poland 
ever’ (see the quotes by Komorowski in chapter 1 as an example). This did not coincide 
with the lived experience of social and political inequality of many Poles (as seen in 
the discussion above). Arguably, the church and the ultraconservative and reactionary 
right gave people a different interpretation of contemporary society, providing the 
losers with a narrative of restoring dignity through nationalism and religious 
ressentiment. 
The role of the catholic church in Poland 
One of the main actors in Polish politics since the 1980s has been the catholic church. 
Its role in the transformation was significant. For this reason, the next section focuses 
on the role of the church in Poland. The basis for the catholic church’s claim on Polish 
politics and society is rooted in the assumption that ‘everyone is catholic’. Due to 
historic circumstances, Poland is an unusually homogenous European country in terms 
of ethnic and religious composition.49 Officially, according to the data provided by the 
Main Statistical Office (GUS 2016) for the year 2011, 87% of Poles are roman 
catholic, 0.4% are Eastern orthodox and 0.3% protestant. At the same time, there are 
over 150 other official religious groups or faiths as registered with the state (GUS 
2016). 2.4% of Poles declare themselves as non-denominational (GUS 2016). 
However, when measuring the participation in religious rites within the catholic group, 
39% come to mass on Sundays (so-called dominicantes) and only 16% receive 
communion regularly, which is one of the tenets of catholic faith (communicantes) 
                                                 
49 The Main Statistical Office published the data for the last official Polish census of 2011 (GUS 
2012). Over 93% of Polish citizens declared themselves ethnically Polish (GUS 2012). The single 
largest ethnic minority was German – counting just over 100,000, in a country of 38 million (GUS 
2012). Most ethnic minority groups did not exceed 50,000 members (Ukrainian, Belorussian) or 
20,000 members (Roma, Russian) (GUS 2012). 
(ISKK 2014).50 Interestingly, according to opinions polls, 28% of Polish catholics 
believe in reincarnation (Graff 2010). At the same time, 71% of Poles are married and 
74% of children are baptized in catholic church (Graff 2010). There seems to exist a 
certain discrepancy between declarations and self-identification as being religious and 
actual religious practice in Poland. 
Polish catholic church is very influential in politics. As Michał Matlak (2016) argues, 
the respect for the Polish catholic church is linked to the role it played during state 
socialism, when organized religion provided a necessary alternative to the 
authoritarian state and gave many Poles a sense of freedom and dignity. Coming out 
of the state socialist years, the church had accumulated unparalleled social capital 
because it was widely seen as the focus of democratic opposition and the protector of 
the true (non-state socialist or ‘anti-communist’) national identity. Some degree of 
social secularization began spreading during the state socialist period, but the trend 
was halted and partially reversed with the papal election of John Paul II (Matlak 2016). 
In the 1980s (especially after Karol Wojtyła became pope in 1978), the church 
managed to posit itself as the locus of anti-regime opposition. By providing space both 
physically (literally allowing oppositionists to meet on church premises) and 
ideationally (giving legitimation to the ‘fight for freedom’ through catholicism), it 
became indispensable to the Solidarity movement – both its ‘left’ and conservative 
wings.  
Arguably, the Polish catholic church leads the way in creating discursive conflicts by 
generating or even inventing enemy groups (Sowa 2015: 12). The church is now 
spending the accumulated social and political capital from state socialist times, when 
it was the bulwark of opposition, in pursuit of a string of threats: in the 1990s it was 
sects, leftist secularism, and Western decadence, today it is ‘genderism’ (as I further 
discuss in chapter 7). Overall, throughout the last decades the church has managed to 
                                                 
50 The data is provided according to the Institute of Catholic Church Statistics (ISKK), available at: 
http://www.iskk.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=38&Itemid=67 (accessed 
November 2016). 
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position itself as a besieged fortress, which is allegedly always running the risk of 
being destroyed.  
Generally, Alice Kang (2015: 9-10) points out that church-state relations may be 
separate and antagonistic (characterized by assertive or extreme secularism) or fused. 
In political contexts where church and state are assertively separated, religious 
authorities have less say over policymaking. At the other end of the spectrum, church-
state relations may be fused, where church and state are closely intertwined and 
religious authorities have greater powers over policymaking. While she gives Iran as 
an example of the latter, I argue that Poland also provides an instance of tending 
towards such fusion. While officially there is a separation of church and state, and 
religious authorities do not have explicitly complete control over policymaking, they 
are seen as legitimate players on the political field and their input on policy proposals 
is sought and respected. Due to the politicians’ partial reliance on the church, religious 
authorities (including conservative religious activists) become informal veto players 
(Kang 2015: 11). Furthermore, once formalized, partial power-sharing arrangements 
between state and church become institutions in and of themselves, having long-lasting 
effects on how citizens and the state conceive what is thinkable and unthinkable (Kang 
2015: 11). 
Following this logic, in the 1990s the Polish catholic church proceeded to translating 
its informal capital into real political and financial power. In 1997, religious groups 
and their conservative deputies rallied around the cause of including an ‘invocatio Dei’ 
clause in the newly drafted post-1989 constitution. Their efforts failed, but the 
precedent of forcing through and demanding legislation according to the ‘right values’ 
was established (for more, see chapter 5). As a result, the Polish constitution does not 
state explicitly that Poland is a secular state. Following long negotiations, the parties 
drafting the constitution agreed on a half-way formula in the preamble stating:  
We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic, Both those who believe in 
God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not 
sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other 
sources, (…) Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for 
independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian 
heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, (…) Recognizing our 
responsibility before God or our own consciences. 
This devising tries to give some place for non-believers or secular actors, but it also 
unequivocally gives precedence and stresses the role of religion in Polish political and 
social life. Furthermore, Article 53 §1 reads: ‘Freedom of conscience and religion shall 
be ensured to everyone.’ Similarly, Article 53 §6 states that: ‘No one shall be 
compelled to participate or not participate in religious practices.’ These were the only 
articles that non-religious negotiators managed to push through in the draft of the 
constitution. 
Kinga Dunin (2002) and Agnieszka Graff (2008a) argue that the catholic church in 
Poland has monopoly in the axiology sphere to define the collective consciousness of 
Poles. The borders between church and state have been actively blurred in Poland for 
years (Graff 2008a). Therefore, the statement that ‘Poland is a catholic country’ is 
heard everywhere (Graff 2010). Judging from the official statistics I presented above, 
it is more a self-fulfilling prophecy, a speech-act legitimizing the already existing 
power relation (Graff 2010). For instance, Graff argued (2001) that the church dictates 
the conditions and defines the language in the area of reproductive and sexual health.  
The readiness of society and politicians to apply and adopt this language reproduces 
and reinforces the supremacy of the church. Having established their power in the basic 
law of the country, the catholic clergy consistently and persistently protested against 
any progressive proposals concerning assisted reproductive techniques (in vitro 
fertilization in particular), abortion and contraception, civil unions (especially same-
sex, but not only), and sexual/reproductive health education at schools by claiming 
they are at odds with nature. The legislation implemented in Poland since 1989 has 
followed the recommendations of the catholic church. Because politicians in Poland 
largely are subservient to the church and fear its societal influence, all of the above 
activities are either banned or heavily restricted by the law or, as in the case of 
compulsory sex education, ignored by the authorities. 
Through the work of the so-called Church Committee with the approval of the state 
apparatus, the church managed to conduct a large-scale reprivatisation campaign with 
the approval of subsequent governments. The name Church Committee is used 
commonly to refer to one of the five ‘Estate Committees’ (the catholic one), which 
were established in 1989, in order to consider cases of return and/or compensation of 
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requisitioned or nationalized properties of religious organizations and institutional 
churches, which were taken over by the state under the PRL.51  
Furthermore, the church lobbied for and established religious education as a required 
subject in all schools.52 The other power gains of the church during the transformation 
came in the form of state budget funding (from multiple ministries: health, education, 
defence, etc.) and indirectly through the access of catholic religious actors to hospitals, 
schools, and public events and institutions. Numerous legal solutions and provisions 
have been presented to the Polish public either as compromise or as the ‘will of the 
conservative majority’. In practice, they have been a direct result of powerful lobbying 
by the Polish catholic church in politics. For instance, in 1993, the right-wing 
government of Hanna Suchocka signed the Concordat agreement with the Vatican, 
which put the burden of funding of religious education in schools on the Ministry of 
Education, without having any oversight into the curriculum (which remains with the 
dioceses).  
Similarly, the ‘left’ SLD government of Leszek Miller signed the EU accession treaty 
in 2003, only with the added proviso about the legal supremacy of the Polish 
legislation over EU law in matters of ‘protection of life and moral issues’ (even though 
the EU has no competence in this field). Graff (2008a) and Środa (2009) argued that 
this was the capstone of a tacit agreement between subsequent governments and the 
Polish episcopate, making sure that the interests of the church were maintained in 
exchange for the hierarchs’ support. In response, Polish feminists and activists wrote 
the Letter of 100 women addressed to the European Parliament stating:  
There has been a peculiar agreement between the catholic church and the 
government regarding Polish accession to the EU (…) The church will support 
European integration in exchange for the government giving up the debate on 
                                                 
51 The Estate Committee for the catholic church was terminated in 2011 amid accusations of rampant 
fraud and mismanagement in favour of the church and at a huge cost to the state.  
52 Legally schools are bound to provide an alternative subject of ‘Ethics’. The Council of Europe has 
recently issued warnings that Poland does not respect religious freedom in education and that 
everyone is presumed catholic by default, therefore students who wish to ‘opt out’ from religious 
education classes are singled out at school and left without occupation in the periods when their 
classmates have religious education classes.   
the liberalization of the abortion law (…) In the backrooms of to Polish EU 
integration process, women’s rights are being traded off (List 100 kobiet).53 
Feminists and transformation  
Pre-accession gendered analyses of the democratic transformations that followed the 
fall of state socialism agree that the democratization processes led to a re-assertion of 
patriarchy and a return to essentialist notions of gender differences.54 Consequently, 
scholars have argued that women are the biggest ‘losers’ of the transformation 
processes (Eisenstein 1993; Funk 1993; Bridger 1999; Bystydzienski 1999; Heinan 
1999; Zvinkliene 1999; Duffy 2000; LaFont 2001; Regulska et al. 2006). Some of the 
reasons for this could be the negligible role of women in power positions, their 
marginal economic and financial capabilities as well as the prevailing older patriarchal 
gender regime (pre-dating state socialism in the region) that the workers’ party rule 
did nothing to dispel (Duffy 2000).  
Ironically, also the protective legislation, inherited from the state socialist period, 
which gave women benefits because of their reproductive roles, proved to be a 
disadvantage for women in the market economy (LaFont 2001: 210). For instance, 
maternity leave and public childcare were deemed too expensive for the market 
economy and women turned out to be the most expendable workers during 
transformation. The data presented in the beginning of the chapter point to the fact that 
women were pushed out of the workforce, but it was also the perception of many 
women (Penn 2014). Hence, in order to accommodate the massive unemployment of 
the male workforce that came as a result of privatization and ‘optimization’ of state 
enterprises, for women the ‘return to tradition’ meant primarily staying at home and in 
the private sphere. This perspective did not change much until, already in the post-
accession period, politicians started noticing the plummeting birth rates (more 
discussion in chapter 5). As I show in chapter 5, this spurred them on to fight the 
‘demographic crisis’ with renewed attentions to certain aspects of welfare. 
                                                 
53 Available at: http://www.zgapa.pl/zgapedia/List_Stu_Kobiet.html (accessed November 2016). 
54 According to gender essentialism, women and men are biologically different, consequently their 
inherent and inadvertent (gender) roles in society have to be different too. 
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According to the conservative and nationalist understandings that dominated the 
transformation period and gained increased prominence across the political spectrum 
since then, under state socialism men were ‘effeminate’ and emasculated due to their 
lack of political participation and their perceived political debilitation (Verdery 1994). 
Meanwhile, women were relatively ‘better off’ (than before state socialism at the 
least), because of their perceived gains in terms of employment, protective legislation, 
and the right to abortion (Graff 2008a). What is more, state socialism was seen as 
having an almost parental (even motherly) role that usurped the authority, which under 
patriarchy proper, and traditionally, should have been men’s (Verdery 1996). 
Following this logic, male emancipation and empowerment could only come through 
the negation of the previous state socialist order. Therefore, the transformation to 
democracy ‘established itself in collective consciousness as the re-masculinization of 
national culture, allegedly feminized by state socialism.’ (Graff 2008b: 201) So, if 
women were seen to have benefited in any way from state socialism, feminism was 
automatically associated with state socialism and therefore was attacked as anti-
national.  
Women’s perceived better position is essential for understanding why feminism was 
rejected wholesale in transformation. Post-1989 politics were constantly legitimated 
through their supposed break with and contrast to state socialism (Verdery 1994; Duffy 
2000). Moreover, this gendered analysis asserts that the ‘reassertion of control over 
women’s bodies and returning women to the home signifies men’s regaining control 
over what is theirs, a re-appropriation of (male) collective identity and a symbol of 
having wrestled control away from a dead state socialism’ (Funk 1993: 2). The 
reinstated power of the church further added to the reinstatement and reinforcement of 
patriarchy in post-state socialist transformations. For instance, the issue of restricting 
abortion, a theme particularly important for the church, came into legislative debates 
very early in the 1990s in almost all Eastern European countries. 
Once freedom was ‘regained’ after 1989, men could go back to the ‘rightful’ place and 
govern in the public sphere. As I mentioned above, this was even more pronounced as 
it proved a convenient strategy to alleviate some of the unemployment produced by 
the market reforms by pushing women out of the labour force, leaving their jobs to 
men (Eisenstein 1993; Funk 1993; LaFont 2001). With the ever-increasing prominence 
of essentialist notions of gender roles in post-socialist times, Eastern European women 
have largely displayed a ‘non-gendered’ identity outside of the private sphere (Duffy 
2000; Beckwith 2007). For instance, according to the research by Shana Penn (1994, 
2006, 2014) on women in the Solidarity movement, women did not self-identify as 
female politicians or activists fighting for women’s freedom, but as people fighting for 
everyone’s freedom. What is more, women did not feel discriminated against, because 
they believed in the inherent biological differences between the sexes and the ‘natural’ 
consequences thereof in social life (Penn 2014). Due to the economic hardships of the 
‘democratic’ transformation period, spurred by neoliberal and market reforms, 
pressure mounted on women to give up individual aspirations and personal goals and 
to follow the norms and goals delineated by the dominant political group (the new 
ruling elite) (Graff 2008a).  
This took the form of a renewed demand for family stability as a basis for a healthy 
society and appeals for a return to traditional roles for women. People were pressured 
into conforming to rules that were geared toward a particular (nationalistic) and 
masculinist collective identity, at the expense of the individual (Papanek 1994). 
Women’s identities had to conform to the alleged ‘greater needs’ of society, nation 
and state at the time of transformation. Marginalized groups such as women did not 
necessarily feel discriminated against, because they believed in the inherent biological 
differences and the natural consequences thereof in social life (LaFont 2001; Regulska 
et al. 2006).  
As I have observed earlier, the first wave of transnational literature on gender and state 
socialism focused on the need to account for the ‘lack’ of feminism in the countries 
that underwent transformations. This teleological understanding of transformation 
mirrored the dominant thinking in political science at the time, which generally viewed 
that the countries of Eastern Europe as transitioning from a specific starting point 
which was bad (state socialism) to some version of a market democracy as its desirable 
final goal. Significantly, Peggy Watson points out that this teleology stemmed from an 
unconscious normative assumption that feminism should have appeared and that it was 
prevented from doing so by some shared experience in state socialism (Watson 2000b: 
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106). Following Watson, democracy after state socialism should not be conceptualized 
as a removal, but as a reconfiguration of asymmetries of power, underlining the way 
in which identities are differently constructed after transformation (Watson 2000b: 
103). According to her, ‘the novelty of masculinism after communism is that it is part 
of a broader process of sweeping political differentiation, the result of unparalleled 
opportunity for relative political empowerment which democratization after 
communism brings’ (Watson 2000b: 111-2).  
Theorists focusing on gender analyses of Eastern Europe reiterate that citizens (both 
women and men) under state socialism were equally excluded from political power 
and participation (Watson 1997).55 The state had exclusive monopoly on the shaping 
of the public sphere. Arguably, everyone had the same rights in abstract terms, which 
in reality were curtailed in equal measure also for everyone. However, as Watson 
argues, with the democratization process, gender began to matter more as a societal 
(and status) difference that could be mobilized for political purposes. Theoretically, 
with the democratic transformation everyone gained the right of expression and the 
right to private property (among others). However, because democratization was 
introduced as tied inextricably with neoliberal market reforms, not everyone was able 
to exercise these rights to the same extent. The realization of the rights depended on 
people’s ability to exercise them relative to others. Citizens who were more 
economically or politically disadvantaged at the start of the transformation process 
(like women), ended up as its losers as well.  
What is more, in the ‘maelstrom of change’ all post-state socialist Eastern European 
states went through extensive national debates on ‘who should be included’ in terms 
of belonging to the new nation (Duffy 2000: 227). Therefore, how and on what basis 
individuals were differentially included into society as full citizens mattered. 
Differences became politically mobilized, women were turned into a ‘political 
minority’ and the new collective was defined by ‘democracies compromised of male 
interests’ (Graham and Regulska 2006: 123). Given the insights of the more recent 
                                                 
55 Here I am referring to the entirety of the population and not the top workers’ party leaders who 
wielded the power. 
gendered research into the opposition prior and after 1989, it can be argued that the 
exclusion of women after the fall of PRL reflected the forgotten and ignored role of 
women in the Solidarity movement (cf. Penn 2014). Hence, as Duffy argues (2000: 
225), women underwent a ‘reverse transition’ – instead of gaining more equality under 
democracy, many of their actual rights were curtailed (like reproductive health or 
institutionalized care) along with the substantive opportunities to exercise rights 
because of the low representation of women in positions of power. The needs and 
desires of individual people and especially women were subordinated to the good of 
motherland (Gal and Kligman 2000).  
This logic was applied through the work of a religious discourse which intertwined 
with nationalistic sentiments and produced a powerful tool for disciplining the public. 
Such ‘displaced nationalism’ (Graff 2009) provides a narrative of the imaginary 
collective, which envisions the possibility of re-establishing the ‘natural’ order of 
things not only in terms of gender roles, but also reproductive arrangements, and 
family configurations. Since the collective is imagined as a homogenous nation rather 
than a pluralist society, the citizens are easily denied their rights, not only in the field 
of reproduction, but also in terms of democratic deliberation over moral choices 
(Korolczuk 2013b) – and also in terms of how they view the very process of 
transformation and how they justify the choices made about female and male roles. 
This process also had a reflexive dimension in that it streamlined views of 
transformation itself, thereby presenting the political choices that were made as the 
only option. 
Post-transformation gender relations 
The post-1989 Polish state has become a state of and for the masculine universal 
subject. As mentioned earlier, Shana Penn (1994: 63) has demonstrated that women 
who organized the underground Solidarity movement after the imposition of martial 
law in December 1981 (when most male members were imprisoned or interned) have 
never been publicly recognized as contributing to the resistance against state socialism. 
Similarly, Peggy Watson has argued that, parallel to the increasing power of the 
parliament, the number of women deputies decreased (Watson 1993b; Fuszara 2009; 
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2010). Einhorn (1993) has shown how the institutional agreement reached by the 
Round Table negotiations in the spring of 1989 excluded women and ignored their 
interests. Alexandra Gerber (2010) outlined how the nationalist discourses effectively 
impeded the realization of legislation that guarantees equality between women and 
men in Poland. Accordingly, one of the most prominent Polish feminist scholars in the 
field of politics, Małgorzata Fuszara (2009) depicts the absence of women from high-
ranking public positions both in politics and the financial sector and administration. 
This picture is further elaborated and problematized by the analysis of the media 
situation (Graff 2008a) and the studies of national identity and culture (Matynia 1994; 
Janion 1996). 
Most feminist theorists analyse the gender relations in Eastern Europe from a ‘macro’ 
perspective. They trace the gender structures under state socialism by analysing how 
and why gender was not the central point of analysis of the dominance and struggle in 
state socialism (and Marxism) (Meyer 1985; Eisenstein 1993). They also stress the 
significance of the basic assumption that equality in terms of full employment was 
supposed to have meant gender equality in society. However, in truth, full employment 
meant state-enforced duty, not a privilege or a responsibility. For women, this added 
to the so-called ‘double’ or ‘triple burden’ (Meyer 1985; Duffy 2000; LaFont 2001) 
consisting of a professional job and household work combined with the task of raising 
children and expected political and social involvement. What is more, while state 
socialism allowed women to enter into traditionally male occupations (though to a 
certain level only), it did not ensure the dynamic in the opposite direction – men were 
not encouraged to perform traditionally female household chores or childcare (Duffy 
2000; LaFont 2001). Despite near full participation of women in the workforce, their 
roles remained largely clerical and secretarial in the domains where men were in 
managerial positions. Moreover, a significant wage gap persisted. For many Eastern 
European women such ‘false equality’ and ‘forced emancipation’ were reasons for 
resentment, not appreciation (Funk 1993; LaFont 2001; Fuszara and Zielińska 2006). 
Women’s full participation in the workforce became so associated with state socialism 
that its negation was framed as an ‘anti-communist’ and oppositionist stance.  
The fall of state socialism led to a redrawing of the lines between the public and private 
spheres. In the traditionally patriarchal dichotomy, the private sphere, as symbolized 
by home, family and friends is considered the female domain, whereas the public 
sphere of paid work, public office, politics and economic activity is seen as male. The 
public sphere has always been considered as having more importance and value than 
the private sphere (productive-reproductive divide); it was where men did the politics 
and the business. While the public-private division in society held in state socialist 
times, the value and appreciation of the two spheres was somewhat different. Under 
state socialism both women and men ‘retreated to the private sphere’ (Duffy 2000: 
221; Graff 2008b) to escape the overpowering state interference in all aspects of public 
life, because the ‘state […] had either lost its credibility (Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary) and/or was eroding in moral authority (USSR).’ (Duffy 2000: 221)  
Therefore, the public sphere was seen as the source of moral decay of the society. Both 
women and men were powerless there. This meant that the private sphere (always 
dominated by women) was the place where core national and moral values were 
preserved and culture was transmitted, frequently in purposeful opposition to the state. 
In fact, homes often became the centres of anti-regime activities (like printing of 
underground newspapers, pamphlets, political meetings, etc.) (cf. Penn (2006). ‘Thus, 
the conceptualization of the locus of society control was ‘turned on its head,’ at least 
from the western women’s perspective.’ (Duffy 2000: 221; Graff 2008b). Surprisingly, 
this did not lead to a re-valuation of the private in favour of appreciating ‘women’s 
work’, as can be seen in the scathing sign on the walls of the Gdańsk shipyard during 
the famous August 1980 strike: ‘Women, do not disturb us, we are fighting for 
Poland!’ Men did the ‘hard’ work; women were supposed to make sandwiches. This 
clearly delineates the private sphere as designed for women around the Kinder, Küche, 
Kirche trope, leaving the public – political – sphere for men to reign in. In Poland, this 
particular vision of gender roles permeated the post-1989 political scene through 
Solidarity and the catholic church, which emerged as the major political players in the 
transformation. Once established in the 1990s, this understanding dominated the 
following stages of transformation and was never really challenged in the post-
accession period.  
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Anti-feminist discourses 
In the early 1990s, the word ‘feminist’ became an epithet and an insult used in Eastern 
Europe, referring to women who either did not fit into the heteronormative traditional 
family gender roles, or who were assertive about their rights, both in the public and 
private spheres. The negative perception of feminism, as a direct associate of 
‘communism’, was perpetuated and spread through ultra-religious and right-wing 
political forces. Examples of this discourse range from the Polish bishop Tadeusz 
Pieronek, who called the then minister Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka ‘feminist concrete that 
even hydrochloric acid will not help’, to daily television use of the term ‘feminist’ as 
interchangeable with ‘witch’ or ‘monster’. Such discourses are not peculiar, endemic 
or even restricted to Poland, or Eastern Europe.  
As I argue in Chapter 7, these discursive constructions of feminists connect with a 
wider global anti-feminist backlash, which follows certain historical trends, generally 
recurring when it seems that women have made substantial gains in their efforts to 
obtain equal rights. However, the anti-feminist discourses in Eastern Europe display 
significant interdiscursivity with homophobic, racist, xenophobic and often anti-
Semitic discourses, which are more dominant in societies of the region. They all 
construct the ‘other’ (whether feminist, gay, foreigner or Jewish) as a pervasive and 
infectious threat to the healthy traditional – national – family. The proponents of such 
hegemonic discourses see the problem in the apparent fact that a lobby of 
‘leftist/liberal/feminist forces’ is trying to dismantle or undermine the institution of the 
family by advocating for equality and tolerance. Such anti-feminist discourses have 
been increasingly constructing the ‘West’ and/or ‘Europe’ as a source of the decadent 
threat to what is national and natural, and therefore good, especially in the post-
accession period.  
Anti-feminist discourses were not merely a short-term feature of the transformation 
processes in Eastern Europe, but they laid the foundations for the current political 
situation. In many countries of the region, any legislation or proposal that is perceived 
as progressive in terms of women’s (and sexual minority) rights is easily ridiculed or 
dismissed as dangerous, thereby discarding or pushing women’s rights topics down 
and off national parliamentary agendas. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 7, the 
Polish ‘war on gender’ over the last years is a direct descendant of the early 1990s 
anti-feminism. The current anti-gender discourses are church-driven, but are willingly 
followed by Polish politicians. The virulence of this discourse as well as the 
commitment with which it is being applied in politics require further investigation. 
The dominant, even hegemonic, position of anti-feminism during the transformations 
in Eastern Europe has left us with a narrative that is seemingly gender-neutral and 
claims that, even if there were losers to the ‘democratic’ transformation processes, it 
was irrespective of their sex. As a consequence of the construction of women and their 
specific gender roles, the fact that neoliberal market reforms hit them most is often 
glossed over or missed in public debates, but also mainstream political analysis (see 
for instance: Eisenstein 1993; Fuszara 1993; LaFont 2001; Fuszara and Zielinska 
2006). Women have not had the opportunity to write their story of the transformation 
in the mainstream and the feminists that have tried to give insights were ridiculed and 
discredited through the self-perpetuating anti-feminist discourse stemming from the 
post-1989 transformation (Graff 2008a). 
The thesis intervenes in scholarly debates on the expectations, progression, features, 
and consequences of the political change that Poland underwent after the fall of state 
socialism in 1989. Over the years, Polish feminist scholars have stressed the need for 
a feminist critique of transformation that takes into account a gendered social and 
political analysis and shows the historical sources and subsequent modernizations of 
patriarchy (Fuszara 1993; Graff 2008a). They also called for an analysis of how gender 
power relations get inscribed in institutions. Elites in Poland and the EU seem to be 
largely blind to the problems of social exclusion and growing socio-economic 
inequalities (Charkiewicz 2006, 2010; Bobako 2011). This points to a multi-focal 
social crisis with very concrete gendered dimensions (Maciejewska and Marszalek 
2013: 11).  
Gender equality getting a ‘double beating’ 
In the years leading up to the EU accession (1997-2004, see Table 4.4), Poland 
implemented several family- and gender-related policies that attempted to 
No country for losers? 
121 
Chapter 4: Legacies and trajectories 
‘retraditionalize’ gender relations in the country (Gerber 2011; Glass and Fodor 2007; 
Pascall and Kwak 2005). These came mostly in the form of welfare and social 
protection cuts (access to free childcare, social benefits) and notably in the restriction 
of abortion. The Polish resistance to implementing the EU gender equality agenda and 
the actual non-enforcement of gender mainstreaming have often been attributed to the 
importance of the catholic church in social and political life (Anderson 2006; Heinen 
and Wator 2006). As I have shown in this chapter, the determinant role of religiosity 
and of the church in political and social life has been particularly pinpointed as the 
root cause of Polish social conservatism. However, as shown above, others have 
ascribed it to a backlash against PRL-era gender policy (Funk and Mueller 1993; 
Fuszara 2000).  
The negative reactions to gender equality in Poland, in the form of ultraconservative 
backlash and ‘return to tradition’ in family life, not only sought to destroy the gender 
equality legacy as a facet of the state socialist regime, but were also a response to the 
EU promoting its own policy agenda through accession conditionality and normative 
power (Buzan and Little 2000; Manners 2002). As a scholar of European integration 
observed, the conditionality requirements of the Eastern enlargement were 
qualitatively different, and nominally more demanding, than the ones put forward in 
the previous EU expansions (Leiber 2007). It is important to note that gender equality 
provisions and gender mainstreaming policies were developed and formulated before 
states in Eastern Europe joined the EU. Poland did not participate in the creation of 
gender equality policies that it had to adopt. Furthermore, the Eastern European 
candidate countries were required to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire 
as a the definitive be-all and end-all condition of accession, without being able to 
negotiate the substance of these requirements (Gerber 2011). This again allowed for 
an interpretation and perception of another imposition of ‘foreign ideology’, as I 
discussed earlier.  
Although some claim that the ‘anti-feminist ideological legacy’ of the post-PRL period 
is becoming less important, we need to look at institutional legacies to explain 
tendencies towards retraditionalization (Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007; Gerber 2011). 
The claim of institutional path dependency is a valid one and it does not automatically 
rule out the importance of other more recent factors. The historical legacy itself has a 
complex relationship to state socialist ideology, having been both shaped by, and in 
reaction to, it. Furthermore, as Gerber argues (2011), this ideological backlash has not 
disappeared, but rather has been transformed or merged into opposition to the EU 
gender equality agenda. To a certain extent, several of the central tenets of PRL gender 
policy are identical to those of the EU gender equality agenda.  
What had once been state socialist has arguably been re-signified or even restyled as 
European, so that this agenda became vulnerable to labelling by Polish policy elites as 
reminiscent of—if not identical to—the social engineering of the previous regime 
(Gerber 2011: 493). These apparent similarities between EU gender equality policy 
and state socialist policy are crucial: not only in that their shared designation of the 
privileged category of the ‘employed’ structures access to state support and protection, 
but also in their shared inability to alter either the valuation of care work in relation to 
paid labour, or the gendered division of labour within the household (Gerber 2011: 
493-4). This provides another reason for the often-prominent discursive link 
EU=Soviet Union that nationalist-catholic and conservative political groups in Poland 
use.  
So, as Elżbieta Korolczuk (2013b; Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2013) argued, women-
specific and gender equality legislation always faces a double challenge in Poland. 
First, the issues must successfully gain a place on the political agenda at all, and then 
legislative proposals must win majority support in the parliament. While this is a 
normal process in other countries, in Poland the task is particularly difficult due to the 
pre-eminence of ultraconservative values in politics (more details in chapter 5,6, and 
7). Thus, we can see a mechanism that produces and maintains gender-based 
exclusion. One essential feature of this construction is that women are denied the 
possibility of acquiring a political subject position. As Graff (2011: 52) states: 
“Woman” is not one of the two categories that to an equal degree can be located 
under the concept of “person” or “citizen” – it is a distinct category which has 
connotations of private sphere, family, motherhood physiology and sexuality.  
In view of the insights provided by the literature discussed in chapter 2, the assertion 
highlights that there are losers to national, economic, and political constructions and 
that they are gendered. Processes of transformation and Europeanization, as 
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implemented in Poland, entailed the societal and political redefinition of groups of 
people, women arguably being the most substantial one. While they were not devoid 
of citizenship, through the gendered construction of nationalism and economy, they 
became losers – distinct, separate, and inferior as a social group. 
As I outlined in the initial part of this chapter, there is a wide agreement that Polish 
politics is divided into two deeply antagonistic blocs, the cooperation between which 
is difficult, if not impossible. Agnieszka Graff describes the blocks as liberal and 
religious (2007: 151); others characterize them as pragmatic-cynical and patriotic-
conservative, or simply left-liberals and right-traditionalists (Krasnodębski 2003:40). 
Whatever the labels, commentators conclude that they stand too far apart to allow for 
any dialogue: ‘[t]here can be no real dialogue between a liberal discourse, which 
emphasizes freedom and human rights, and a religious discourse, the bottom line of 
which is the “will of God”, “absolute truth”, and “natural law” (Graff 2007: 151). The 
field of gender equality is where these two camps come to a head. Neither camp 
commits to issues or values of gender equality, with the distinction that one pays it lip 
service and the other overtly rejects it. Surveys of politicians’ opinions (both women 
and men) reveal that gender equality does not enjoy much support, even though 
discrimination against women is acknowledged (Fuszara 2010: 377). Indeed, there 
appears to be more support for gender parity among the electorate than among the 
politicians (Fuszara 2010: 378). 
Hence, the denunciation of gender equality was double; first, with the rejection of state 
socialism in Eastern Europe; and second, in parallel with the resurgence of right-wing 
political preferences in an anti-EU function. On the one hand, discourses of gender 
equality and anti-discrimination legal provisions have been perceived negatively as a 
part of state socialist legacy. On the other, because of the visibility of gender equality 
as part of the package and standards to be adopted in order to achieve EU accession, it 
has subsequently gained negative connotations as anti-EU sentiments have grown.  
An anti-equality example 
The history of the post of the anti-discrimination ombudsperson in Poland is an 
illustrative example of the superficiality of implementation of the gender equality 
provisions. Prior to the EU accession process, the governments in the 1990s and early 
2000s had various secretarial positions within ministries (either labour or social 
affairs) that were residual to the Plenipotentiary for Women that operated in the last 
years of the PRL (1986-89) (Krizsan 2012). Nominally, the post went through not only 
several ministries, but also titular changes – from Plenipotentiary for Women and 
Family (1991-2) to Plenipotentiary for Family only (1997-2001), disappearing on 
several occasions depending on the political commitments of the elected parliaments 
(1989-91, 1992-95).  
The institutional government-level position was created in December 2001, by the then 
prime minister Leszek Miller (SLD).56 At that time it was called the Government 
Plenipotentiary for the Equal Status of Women and Men and, in 2002, its competencies 
were extended to include fighting all types of discrimination (not only sex/gender-
based). The existence of a government-level position for gender equality that was to 
combat discrimination based on sex/gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual 
orientation, and beliefs was one of the conditions that candidate countries had to fulfil 
before joining the EU. Even though technically the plenipotentiary for equality was 
only supposed to initiate and organize an ombudsperson office and institution, the EU 
Commission’s Directorate General for Enlargement accepted the efforts and 
considered the Copenhagen criteria fulfilled before the accession. The Polish 
government never created an ombudsperson office working against all forms of 
discrimination due to alleged lack of funds, so the work continued within the frame of 
the plenipotentiary institution.  
The post is a government position at the level of secretary of state in the chancellery 
of the prime minister. The first two plenipotentiaries were part of the ‘left-wing’ SLD 
government. From the beginning, the position was controversial in the Polish 
parliament and there were several attempts to restrict its workings. There were two 
                                                 
56 Leszek Miller was the prime minister for the SLD - Democratic Left Alliance, a social-democratic 
political party in Poland, formed in 1991 as an electoral alliance of centre-left parties, which has 
always been considered a ‘post-communist’ party.   
No country for losers? 
125 
Chapter 4: Legacies and trajectories 
petitions calling for the dismissal of Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka57 and Magdalena Środa58 
in 2002-2004. In 2003, the right-wing opposition party LPR (the League of Polish 
Families) proposed to rename and re-establish the position as the Plenipotentiary for 
Family Matters, but the legislative proposal fell through in the parliament. In 2005, a 
proposed law on the equal treatment of women and men and outlawing all forms of 
discrimination based on sex/gender, race, ethnicity, religion, beliefs, age, and sexual 
orientation, which would have expanded the plenipotentiary position and its scope, 
was voted down in parliament (cf. Sarata 2010). 
After this, the office of the plenipotentiary focused on researching and producing 
reports pertaining to anti-discrimination policy. The first two plenipotentiaries also 
actively participated in civil society activities and supported NGO-run campaigns 
promoting feminist and LGBTQ+ causes. Magdalena Środa famously criticized the 
role of the catholic church in Poland for ‘promoting the culture of violence’ and 
accused the church hierarchy of covering up the scale of the problem of domestic 
violence in the country and the resistance to divorce.59 In general, the right-wing and 
religious groups did not look favourably on the plenipotentiary position. Hence, after 
the 2005 elections, a much more right-wing dominated parliament and government 
came into place, the position was scrapped altogether. Despite protests from civil 
society and in spite of the existence of the legal requirement for the position, the two 
subsequent PiS governments (Law and Justice) did not nominate anyone and the office 
disappeared. The position was recreated in 2008 by the newly-elected (Fall 2007) 
center-right PO (Civic Platform) government, as the Government Plenipotentiary for 
Equal Treatment. Since then it has been held by two PO female MPs and one feminist 
                                                 
57 Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka was a Polish politician who was a MP from 1993 (with a hiatus in 1997–
2001) until her death in the Smolensk plane crash in 2010. 2004-2005, she was the Deputy Prime 
Minister in the SLD government, while concurrently, filling the post of Minister for Social Policy. 
Jaruga-Nowacka was the government Plenipotentiary for Equality in the SLD government between 
December 2001 and August 2004. She was one of the few Polish politicians who openly said they 
were feminist. 
58 Magdalena Środa is a philosopher, professor of ethics at the University of Warsaw, and a feminist 
author. She was the government's Plenipotentiary for the Equal Status of Women and Men in the SLD 
cabinet between August 2004 and November 2005. 
59 Available at: http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,53600,2436973.html (accessed November 
2016).  
academic (Małgorzata Fuszara). Following the parliamentary elections in 2015, there 
was much controversy whether the position would be discarded again.60  
The weak institutional grounding of gender equality policies in Poland, the lack of 
dedicated financial resources, and the narrow understanding of gender equality limited 
to the labour market and economy produced a superficial impact of the EU on gender 
equality within Polish politics (Grabowska 2014). Arguably, the legal changes and 
their implementation have not had a radical and systemic impact on women’s issues.  
Political and institutional changes seem to be driven by a ‘combination of EU pressure, 
anti-equality agendas and incidental moments of progress linked to special policy 
moments, rather than positive commitment to any specific equality process’ (Krizsan 
et al. 2014: 63). Following Poland’s accession to the EU, debates on abortion, gender 
equality, and rights of same-sex couples often brought up notions of Europeanization 
and European values in both positive and negative senses (as can be seen in the 
empirical part of this dissertation). Debates on those issues were more seriously 
polarized than the transposition of EU legal provisions. The same applies to the debates 
on the meaning of national culture, and the inevitable changes the latter would have to 
undergo after joining the EU.  
Conclusions 
As I argued in this chapter, 1989 led to repeated reconfigurations of identity. All 
perceived facets of ‘communism’ had to be overthrown in the transformation. Both the 
transformation and Europeanization were implemented most comprehensively in the 
economic sphere through the adoption of neoliberal market reforms such as structural 
adjustment measures, privatization, and the scaling down of social benefits, etc. 
(Bobako 2006). These economic transformations produced huge social and economic 
inequalities (Sowa 2015) and created large groups of disenchanted and disgruntled 
people, thereby raising the levels of discontent (Ost 2005). According to Andrzej Leder 
(2014), the deployment of nationalist-catholic discourses provided an answer to 
                                                 
60 In early 2016, prime minister Szydlo nominated the first man to the position that is now called the 
Government Plenipotentiary for Civil Society and Equal Treatment. 
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societal discontent and pointed to a ‘culprit’ in the form of Europe and its decadent 
social values. Within these discourses, the family played a central role as the 
embodiment of the nation and tradition (see further discussion in the next chapter). 
This has meant an almost automatic opposition to norms and policies promoting 
gender equality as they are seen to threaten the family.  
Throughout the 1990s, subsequent governments and parliaments in Poland have shown 
an ambivalent position in terms of their commitment to implement formal gender 
equality policies. As Rutkowska (2008) suggests, one of the reasons for the insufficient 
application of the gender mainstreaming in Poland was that it was not taken seriously. 
While aspiring to EU accession and in the early membership period, the parliament 
wanted to appear progressive and adopted EU gender equality directives. Despite pro 
forma and ‘on paper’ democratization and diffusion of gender mainstreaming EU 
policies, not much has been done to entrench equality values institutionally or 
practically in society. Gender equality commitments were a token addition to politics 
that ostensibly showed how progressive the Sejm was (Rutkowaska 2008; Zbyszewska 
2014). At the same time, nothing was done to counter the Eurosceptic groups in Polish 
politics that successfully mobilized and organized the anger of the losing groups of 
transformation (cf. Ost 2005). This has paved the way for the current dismantling of 
the already weak pre-existing institutional guarantors of anti-discrimination and 
equality, using an ‘anti-gender campaign’ that later became the name of the game when 
it came to family and welfare politics. 
As the opening quote of the chapter suggested, during the transformation Poland was 
supposed to or expected to change from the ugly, ‘red’ system and return to ‘nice’ and 
‘proper’ Europe. Significantly, Poland is presented as a woman choosing dresses – the 
motif of anthropomorphising the nation into the female form will come up more 
specifically in the discussions in the ensuing analysis (especially chapter 6). This 
chapter has surveyed the academic debate concerning the processes of democratization 
in Eastern Europe and in Poland specifically. As I have shown, this was not a straight-
line progression and positive development in terms of inclusion, political and civil 
rights and in particular not in terms of economic rights. The chapter has sketched the 
main trends of the transformation and post-transformation politics and depicted the 
already exclusionary tendencies and trajectories of the 1990s and early 2000s. I have 
also shown the feminist critiques of transformation and added a layer of intra-feminist 
debates concerning the judgments and expectations regarding Europeanization. I have 
argued that transformation and Europeanization, as implemented in the neoliberal form 
in Poland, were in essence globalization processes, which produce backlash. 
The first section of the thesis has outlined the research puzzle, the theoretical and 
methodological framework and, in this chapter, it has established the exclusionary and 
anti-equality legacies of transformation. The following chapter opens up the empirical 
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Chapter 5: Constructing the family 
‘guy + girl = normal family’ 
Right-wing slogan61 
 
The first empirical chapter presents the case study analysis on family and welfare 
parliamentary debates, with a view to explore the construction of subjectivity and 
values in this discursive field. The focus area of family politics is broadly defined and 
includes among others debates on reproductive and women’s health rights, civil 
unions, pension reform, sexual education and issues of maternity leave and foster care. 
The key argument is that MPs construct discursively a particular family model in 
Poland, which shapes people’s mentalities and practices concerning ‘natural’ 
differences between women and men. I analyse the deeply rooted cultural and religious 
background that prescribes models of both femininity and masculinity in the Polish 
Sejm. The chapter begins with an overview of the political and legislative situation in 
the Polish parliament that is relevant to the subsequent case study, including the 
political distribution of forces, the legal status quo, and a short description of the 
particular legislative proposals that were under discussion. The main questions guiding 
the discussion around which the chapter is organized are the ones introduced in the 
previous methods section: Who is speaking? What/who is being talked about? What 
subjects and values are produced? How is truth created? What can and cannot be said? 
Political and legal status quo 
The Polish Family and Care Code (Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy) and the Civic Code 
(Kodeks cywilny) regulate the matters connected to family law in general in Poland. 
The codes specifically deal with marriage, adoption, the termination of relationships, 
including divorce, annulment, property settlements, alimony, child custody and 
visitation, child support and alimony awards, and juvenile adjudication. The codes do 
not provide a legal definition of ‘family’. The only actual legal document that provides 
                                                 
61 In the original: ‘Normalna Rodzina - Chłopak i Dziewczyna’ is a right-wing chant and slogan at 
nationalist and pro-family demonstrations in Poland.  
the definition of ‘family’ in Poland is the 2004 law regarding social care, where in 
Article 6 §14 family is defined as: ‘people related or unrelated to each other, remaining 
in an actual relationship, living, and running a household together’.62 This is a broad 
and comprehensive definition that is rarely remembered or used in Polish political 
debates.  
Instead, many deputies refer to Article 18 of the Polish constitution, when talking 
about the ‘family’. This article states that ‘motherhood and parenthood shall be placed 
under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland’ (sic!) Significantly, there is 
no distinction made about fatherhood on par with motherhood in the Polish 
constitution and, as I show later, this has discursive and practical implications in the 
Polish parliament. Article 18 of the constitution is controversial for another reason. Its 
first section reads that ‘marriage as a union between man and woman (…) is under the 
protection and care of the Republic of Poland’.63 Following a reductionist legal 
understanding, it allows the opponents of civil unions to claim that civil partnerships 
are illegal and unconstitutional, because only marriages exist in the founding 
document. 
Both the Family and the Civic Code date back to 1964 and have been amended and 
supplemented by various individual laws as well as codified EU laws and treaties in 
the subsequent years. Thus, Polish family law consists of a somewhat curious mix of 
PRL-era stipulations that have been partly complemented or overridden and (post-) 
transformation legislative developments, which often were called for because of 
changing societal needs over time (in vitro fertilization, civil unions) and changing 
ideologies about the family (restrictions on abortion). As I discussed in chapter 4, 
widespread social restructuring along neoliberal and market-oriented lines was part of 
the transformation and regime changes after 1989. Social service delivery was 
supposed to be transferred from the state to the market and the private service sector.  
                                                 
62 My own translation. The full text of the law is available at: 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20040640593 (accessed November 2016).  
63 The full text of the Polish Constitution in English is available at: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/ 
prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm (accessed April 2016). 
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In Poland, even though many social and welfare benefits (such as sick leave, leave to 
take care of sick children, or childcare leave) were maintained nominally, many 
employees and workers were pushed out of fulltime work contracts into the equivalent 
of zero-hours contracts and self-employment; this determined that they were not 
eligible for any of the said benefits. The financial compensation of welfare benefits 
was severely reduced and maintained at a low level in the post-transformation years.  
The specific debates and legal proposals I discuss in this chapter are concrete additions 
or amendments to the legal status quo at the beginning of the seventh parliamentary 
term (2011-2015). In 2015, for instance, the benefit for taking care of a handicapped 
minor was the equivalent of around £97 monthly (under the condition that the carer 
was not working, otherwise the benefit did not apply). One of the major debates in the 
discussed parliamentary term was whether to raise this allowance. In 2013, the ruling 
coalition voted through a change in maternity leave (which was supposed to be called 
‘parental leave’, but eventually was not; officially it is ‘childcare leave’). Paid 
childcare leave has been extended to 12 months, with a provision of 2 weeks reserved 
for fathers only (allowed, but not obligatory). According to 2014 data, only around 7% 
of fathers took up the possibility of taking parental leave (GUS 2014). 
Following general austerity trends in Europe at the time, the ruling coalition PO-PSL 
promised and legislated a change in the pensions system in 2012. The debates on this 
bill are part of the analysis in this chapter. Higher retirement age was supposed to be 
phased in over time (until 2020), going up to 67 years for both women and men (from 
60 and 65 years, respectively). This was one of the flagship projects of PO and was 
presented as a ‘must’ given the economic and demographic situation in the country. It 
was also in line with wider European trends – retirement age was raised in many EU 
member states as part of austerity packages supported by the EU Commission.  
Another policy area that is included in the analysis in this chapter is reproductive and 
sexual health care. Poland has a restrictive abortion law (one of the most restrictive in 
Europe next to the Republic of Ireland and Malta). The 1993 law on ‘Family-Planning, 
Human Embryo Protection and Conditions of Legal Pregnancy Termination’ allows 
the termination of pregnancy in three instances only: when the pregnancy is the result 
of a crime (illegal act), when the health and/or life of the mother is in danger, and when 
there is a ‘credible risk’ of severe and irreversible damages to the foetus. This law has 
been widely debated among the public and is often referred to as an ‘abortion 
compromise’ or a ‘historic compromise’. The concept of a ‘compromise’ has been 
criticized as a gross linguistic and semantic manipulation, which perpetuates the 
impression that the law was a result of negotiations or national consultations 
(Czerwinska and Piotrowska 2009). When using the term no one ever clarifies whom 
that compromise was between. In fact, it was a compromise between catholic church 
hierarchs and ultra-religious politicians, who demanded complete banning of abortion 
and ‘compromised’ on three exceptions instead.   
In November 1992, when the restrictive abortion law was debated in parliament, the 
Parliamentary Women’s Group called for a national referendum in favour of a liberal 
abortion law. More than 1,2 million signatures were collected (the legally required 
number was 100,000), but the Sejm ignored the citizens’ legislative initiative and went 
on to pass the restrictive abortion law that is in operation until now. Opinion polls 
show how the legal status quo has changed public perceptions on abortion. In 1997, 
65% of Poles believed that a woman should have the right to terminate pregnancy 
whenever she decides to do it. By 2011, however, the number fell to 48% (CBOS 
2011). According to official state statistics, there were just over 700 legal abortions in 
2012 (in a country of around 38 million people). NGOs estimate the number of illegal 
abortions at between 80,000 – 200,000 annually.64 Therefore, the restricted access to 
abortion has had no impact on fertility rates in Poland, which are one of the lowest in 
Europe.65  
The Polish constitution is ambiguous and can be used by the anti-choice advocates. 
For instance, Article 38 stipulates that ‘everyone’s life is protected’. At the same time, 
                                                 
64 The Polish Federation for Women and Family Planning (Federacja na  rzecz Kobiet i Planowania 
Rodziny – Federa) is a pro-choice NGO that provides legal help, advice and support to women about 
reproductive health and sexual rights. They also compile reports and data on the topic. For more 
information, see their website: http://www.federa.org.pl/dokumenty_pdf/aborcja/Raportpopr.pdf 
(accessed December 2014). 
65 According to the Main Statistical Office, Polish fertility rate was 1.29 child/woman in 2013 (with 
2.1 children/woman usually considered as the ‘replacement rate’ needed to maintain the size of a 
country’s population at a stable level).  
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it does not explicitly state the right of life ‘since conception’ and attempts at such 
constitutional change failed in the previous parliamentary terms. The restrictive 
abortion law was liberalized shortly in 1996 by the SLD government (it entered into 
force in 1997) to allow abortion until the 12th week of pregnancy if ‘a woman is in a 
difficult personal situation’. The provision allowing for abortion based on social 
grounds was withdrawn by the parliament after the 1997 elections and following a 
ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal. In 1997, the Constitutional Tribunal judged that 
the constitution protects life ‘at all phases of development’ and used the term 
‘conceived child’66, which is now often understood as interpreting the constitutional 
protection of life since the moment of conception.  
To date there is no legislation (or even legislative initiatives in preparation) on civil 
unions or partnerships. Two attempts in the seventh parliamentary term were voted 
down (and off the parliamentary agenda in general). The TR legal proposal was based 
on similar legislation from other European Union member states and allowed for the 
partners’ joint tax declarations, some tax benefits, medical information rights as well 
as the right to decide and inherit in the case of one of the partners’ death. The PO 
proposal was more conservative and did not allow for joint tax declarations or tax 
benefits. Neither of the legislative proposals allowed for adoption by same-sex 
couples. During a vigorous parliamentary debate, the then prime minister Donald 
Tusk, who was in favour of sending the proposals on for further work in the 
committees, clashed with the then Minister of Justice Jarosław Gowin, who claimed 
that all civil partnerships are unconstitutional. In the end, both projects were voted 
down thanks to the dissenting votes of the ruling coalition MPs (they also voted against 
the project proposed by their own party).  
As argued in the previous chapters, the catholic church is a primary political actor in 
Poland, and reproductive policies are not the only field where this is clear. The current 
Polish education system provides for two hours per week of religious education from 
                                                 
66 The problem with the Constitutional Tribunal ruling is that it based its explanation on the new draft 
of the constitution, which at the time of the ruling was not in force yet. For more discussion see: 
http://www.hli.org.pl/pl/orzecz/k_26_96.html (accessed April 2016). 
kindergarten or pre-school until the end of high school (so roughly from the age of 3 
to 19).  All Polish schools (public and private) are bound by law to provide an 
alternative subject of ‘ethics’. The European Court of Human Rights has judged in 
2010 that Poland does not respect religious freedom in education and that everyone is 
presumed catholic by default (Chełstowska et al. 2013). Therefore, students who wish 
to opt out from religious education classes are singled out at school and left without 
occupation in the periods when their classmates have religious education classes. 
 Moreover, the Polish education system does not include a ‘sexual education’ subject 
per se. All schools are supposed to provide a regular subject called ‘education 
preparing for family life’, but the implementation of this is cursory at best and depends 
on the schools. Parents can excuse students from attending ‘education preparing for 
family life’ classes due to personal beliefs. For this reason, in the parliamentary term 
under analysis, TR and SLD have been trying to introduce sex education classes at all 
levels of compulsory education. The proposals were voted down (due to PO, PiS, and 
PSL votes).  
Until 2014, rape and other sexual offences were prosecuted only if the prosecution was 
initiated by the victim privately through the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code. 
This meant very low numbers of sexual crimes being reported and tried in court. 
Following the passing of the new amendment to the Criminal Code in 2013, rape is a 
matter of public prosecution. This change is keeping in line with the legal 
recommendations of the Council of Europe and in various EU documents.  
Until the parliamentary term under discussion, Poland had no legislation regulating or 
officially providing for the public funding of in vitro fertilization, even though 
procedures of assisted reproductive technology have been performed in the country 
since the late 1980s. In response to a European Court of Justice sentence against 
Poland, in June 2015, the Sejm legislated for public financing of up to three IVF 
attempts per couple (none for single parents) and without the possibility of holding 
frozen embryos.  
Similarly, the legal situation of transgender people in Poland is not legally streamlined. 
Trans people have been legally recognized in Poland since the 1960s, and the medical 
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and psycho-sexual procedures for transitioning are established. However, the 
bureaucratic and legal-administrative side are not properly codified. In order to have 
their gender identity recognized through the official confirmation of sexual 
designation in personal documents (ID, passport birth certificate), trans people needed 
to take their closest family to court (usually parents) through the Civic Code. 
Furthermore, Poland did not issue new birth certificates for trans citizens and did not 
have a legal mechanism to ensure that all employment and education history was 
properly adjusted to a person’s new personal data.67  
The new legislative proposal, the Gender Accordance Act, presented to the Sejm in 
2013 by the first Polish openly trans MP, Anna Grodzka, stipulated that only the 
applicant was involved in the gender recognition process. After a court proceeding, 
applications would be provided with legal recognition within three months of 
submission, without them having to undergo any medical interventions, including 
hormone therapy. Trans people would also receive new birth certificates and new 
documentation proving their education and employment history. Following the first 
reading in parliament, the bill was stalled in committees and returned to the plenary 
conspicuously before the 2015 elections. It has been passed with amendments but, 
following the 2015 presidential elections, the new president Andrzej Duda vetoed the 
bill and the old rules remained in operation. 
Based on this background, the following debates, presented in Table 5.5, have been 




Table 5.5 Family and welfare politics parliamentary debates 2011-2015. 
 Legislative area Bill proposals68 
1. Changes in the foster care system 1 legislative proposal 
                                                 
67 Information based on the NGO-advocacy group Trans-Fuzja, which supports trans people in 
Poland. Available at: http://transfuzja.org/en/artykuly/press_releases.htm (accessed November 2016).  
68 A detailed list of the analysed legislative proposals with their identification numbers, dates of the 
proceedings and debates is provided in Appendix I at the end of the dissertation.  
2.  Family planning laws and abortion 
legislation 
5 separate legislative proposals 
(3 of restriction, 2 of 
liberalization) 
3.  Legal establishment of civil partnerships 2 separate legislative proposals 
4. National programme combatting domestic 
violence 
1 legislative proposal 
5. Changes to child care leave  1 legislative proposal 
6.  Changes in the criminal code allowing for 
the public prosecution of rape and sexual 
assault 
1 legislative proposal 
7. Bill on gender recognition 1 legislative proposal 
8. Change of retirement age 1 legislative proposal 
9. Introduction sexual education in schools and 
kindergartens 
1 legislative proposal 
10. Codification of funding and procedural rules 
of in vitro fertilization 
3 separate legislative proposals 
(Source: own compilation). 
 
Who is speaking? 
The agents using the discourses under analysis are on the same power levels and 
equally influential in terms of their institutional position and the inherent discursive 
power. They are all directly elected MPs, who hold certain privileged discursive 
powers through their membership in the institution of the parliament. At first glance, 
there is a clear-cut division between the right and ‘left’ sides of the parliament in terms 
of the discourses they employ. The ‘left’ side of the plenary seems to be promulgating 
more liberal and progressive stances on family and welfare, while the right side uses 
traditionally ultra-conservative and faith-based arguments. However, on closer 
consideration it often happens that deputies do not follow their party lines. The 
supposedly liberal and centrist PO use the same discourse as PiS and SP when it comes 
to abortion, women’s rights and sexual minority rights. Similarly, the ‘left’ SLD 
deputies refer to catholic figures as their authority figures, just as the right-wing MPs 
do.  
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Each of the parties seems to have ‘go-to’ people – de facto spokespersons for family 
and welfare topics. For PiS, these are Krystyna Pawłowicz, Marzena Wróbel, Anna 
Sobecka, Elżbieta Rafalska, Robert Telus, Bolesław Piecha, Jan Warzecha or Andrzej 
Duda. PO has liberal target MPs (Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska, Artur Dunin) and 
conservative ones (Abraham Godson, Piotr van der Coghen). PSL shows a more 
coherent conservative stance through Franciszek Stefaniuk and Dariusz Dziadzio. 
Similarly, Patryk Jaki, Tadeusz Woźniak, and Eugeniusz Grzeszczak, SP (the small 
PiS splinter party) provides strictly right-wing and ultraconservative arguments. 
SLD’s Marek Balt and Ryszard Kalisz are supposed to be the liberal-left 
counterbalance, but in practice follow the dominant narratives. TR deputies Wincenty 
Elsner, Robert Biedroń, Armand Ryfiński, Wanda Nowicka (later non-aligned), and 
Zofia Popiołek are the main proponents of discourses on Europeanization, 
modernization and liberal civic rights.  
What is being talked about in the family and welfare debates? 
Marriage  
The first theme that I have singled out is marriage. I purposefully call it ‘marriage’ 
instead of ‘family’ because, as I show here, the dominant discourses in this field in the 
Sejm use the two terms interchangeably and make no difference between them. A 
marriage is a family; a family cannot exist without marriage. This hegemonic discourse 
emerges clearly in the parliamentary debates on the institutionalization of civil 
partnerships, foster care, and the legislation against domestic violence. It is particularly 
visible in the conservative resistance to any entrenchment or formalization of currently 
informal partnerships: ‘Should we be creating an alternative to the family, a choice of 
a significant section of society?’ (Patryk Jaki, 25.01.2013, 32, 242).69 Here ‘family’ 
has a specific cultural significance and means heterosexual (and usually religiously 
sanctioned) ‘marriage’, because it does not allow for the possible contradictory idea 
that there are other forms of ‘family’ – like patchwork, informal, or same-sex 
                                                 
69 All references to parliamentary debates follow the format: name of the speaker, date of the speech, 
the number of the parliamentary meeting, the page numbers as they appear in the official stenographs.  
relationships. There is an immense pressure to refer to only nuclear families and to 
undermine any other forms of personal bonds.  
Within this discursive field the key word ‘marriage’ is treated as one with a stable and 
permanent meaning that has been true since time immemorial. ‘Marriage is a 
relationship sanctioned by culture, religion, law, and social custom. Marriages and 
families are the bases of the nation, society and state’ (Marzena Wróbel, 24.01.2013, 
32, 174). The understanding of marriage within this discourse draws on Christian and 
catholic tradition: ‘Marriage is procreation’ (Artur Dunin, 24.01.2013, 32, 198). This 
mode of family life is constructed as an ethos guiding the beliefs and behaviours of 
not just the parliament but of the whole society. Any real or perceived attempt to 
change the institution of marriage is seen as a coup against the entire society as well 
as the moral order. ‘[The authors of the proposed legislation, proponents of civil 
partnerships] are trying to depreciate the traditionally understood family and create 
mayhem in ethical issues, particularly to erase the difference between good and evil’ 
(Tadeusz Woźniak, 24.01.2013, 32, 197). For this reason, Patryk Jaki (SP) warns: 
‘Please think twice before you raise a hand against the traditional family institution’ 
(25.01.2013, 32, 242). 
Defining marriage as a relation aimed at procreation (practically echoing the biblical 
idea of marriage as a means ‘to prevent sin’), naturally leads the proponents of this 
discourse to the argument that any relationship that does not produce or potentially 
cannot produce offspring is vapid, empty, and socially harmful. ‘The proposed 
partnerships have only hedonistic and auto-destructive aims for the person, their 
partner and the members of their families’ (Krystyna Pawłowicz, 24.01.2013, 32, 163). 
Similarly: ‘Marriage and family are the future of the state (…) Homoerotic 
relationships in all their unnaturalness do not serve the state’ (Tadeusz Woźniak, 
24.01.2013, 32, 170). This discourse displays elements of interdiscursivity with other 
nationalist and demographic discourses, which are also present within the family 
politics topic (see below). It rests on the assumption that, in order to be good, a 
relationship needs to be useful and fruitful to society. ‘Two gentlemen satisfying their 
sexual lust, just as two ladies in a similar situation, cannot demand privileges based on 
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this, because they are not a marriage, they are not a family’ (Tadeusz Woźniak, 
24.01.2013, 32, 170).70 
The proponents of the hegemonic discourse that family is marriage see the problem in 
the alleged fact that a ‘homosexual lobby’ and ‘leftist and liberal forces’ are trying to 
dismantle or undermine the institution of marriage by advocating the 
institutionalization of competing forms of relationships. Repeatedly, all sides in the 
parliament discuss ‘the legalization of civil partnerships’ which is technically and 
legally incorrect because civil partnerships are not illegal in Poland. This wording and 
semantic choice however implies a notion of lack of authorization and propriety in 
relation to informal (non-marriage) relationships.  
This was strongly reiterated in the civil partnerships debates in January 2013. In 
response to legal proposals put forward by TR and SLD, PO, PSL, PiS, and SP MPs 
repeatedly asked why there was a need to legislate for civil partnerships if there is 
already the option to opt for either civil or denominational marriage. They present this 
as a coup d’état. ‘Today we are witnessing a proposal to liberalize concepts, giving 
relationships new parameters. (…) The family as a basic social cell is being 
overshadowed. Its clarity is becoming blotted. (…) It comes to the point that that the 
constitutional format of the family is becoming unfashionable, unmodern’ (Franciszek 
Stefaniuk, 24.01.2013, 32, 167). MPs like Mr Stefaniuk (PSL) claimed that there 
needed to be a reinforcement of the institution of marriage and the re-confirmation of 
what they saw as the constitutional model of social life. ‘If moral disintegration and 
decline are happening (…) let us try to respect every person and present the basic, 
constitutional model of the family (Franciszek Stefaniuk, 24.01.2013, 32, 167-8).71 
This argument is based on the conflation of ‘family’ with ‘marriage’, following the 
discussed above interpretation of Article 18 of the Constitution, according to which 
marriage is under the special protection of the Republic of Poland (see above).  
                                                 
70 My own emphasis. 
71 In fact, the Polish constitution does not stipulate for any specific ‘family models’. 
There is a competing discourse to the hegemonic narrative discussed above. Its 
proponents are largely TR MPs, together with some individuals from SLD and PO. 
The main argument of this discourse is rather matter-of-fact and goes along the lines 
that ‘people live in informal relationships and you cannot do anything about it, so let 
us make their lives more dignified and easier.’ It shows interdiscursive elements with 
the modernity and Europe discourses discussed later in the chapter. Nonetheless it has 
not risen to such prominence as the hegemonic discourse. This might be due to the fact 
that its proponents in the parliament are fewer, no matter how prominent they are: for 
instance, the former PM Donald Tusk and former Plenipotentiary for the Equal 
Treatment Agnieszka Kozłowska-Rajewicz were two of its most vocal advocates.  
Motherhood 
The discursive field of motherhood is closely related to the one about family and 
marriage. ‘Fatherhood’ or ‘parenting’ do not exist in any of the discourses and debates 
within the Polish parliament. Fathers rarely make an appearance and ‘fatherhood’ is 
mentioned in very few contexts, for instance when talking about lesbian couples: 
‘Laws legalizing homosexual relationships give the false pretence that such 
relationships are good for society and for its development. (…) Children lack the 
experience of fatherhood or motherhood.’ (Anna Sobecka, 24.01.2013, 32, 176). 
Outside this context, where fatherhood becomes relevant or mentioned only because 
of its absence, the conspicuously missing fathers stand in contrast with the almost 
mythical mother figures constructed discursively in the parliament.  
Discourses on motherhood are most strongly present in abortion and family planning 
debates. In these debates the words ‘mother’ and ‘woman’ are used interchangeably. 
Accordingly, all women are (or will be) mothers. Women who chose not to be mothers 
are murderers. ‘What is the difference between a mother that kills her own child in a 
barrel from [a mother] that kills it in her womb?’72 (Andrzej Dera, 26.09.2012, 22, 63). 
Not carrying a pregnancy to term is considered evil and amoral: ‘the proposed law 
[abortion liberalization proposal] is soulless, written without respect for humans, has 
                                                 
72 Reference to a media-hyped story of a woman who killed her new born infants and hid their bodies 
in barrels on her farm.  
No country for losers? 
141 
Chapter 5: Constructing the family 
a technical, thoughtless, and inhuman character that reinforces the brutalization of 
people and pushes women into the abyss’ (Krystyna Pawłowicz, 26.09.2012, 22, 64).  
Pregnancy is especially romanticized using euphemistic nouns instead of factual or 
medical terms: ‘womb’ instead of uterus, ‘carrying a child under her heart’ instead of 
being pregnant. Abortion is discursively constructed as murder allowed under the 
current provisions of the constitution – regardless of the fact that the constitution is 
very restrictive. Often this narrative aids itself with claims that the majority of the 
society is against abortion. The agents of this discourse argue (mainly PiS and United 
Poland deputies, but also some PO MPs) that this is due to ‘aborters’, ‘exterminators 
for pregnancy termination’ and the ‘contraceptive lobby’ that have infiltrated the 
‘leftist and liberal’ side of the parliament. They see the solution in the restriction of 
the existing law and have attempted to implement this several times each parliamentary 
term since 1993.  
Since abortion is unequivocally considered as an evil, it is part of the ‘civilization of 
death’, a term coined by the former pope John Paul II that has become a widely used 
phrase among conservative politicians and activists worldwide. Even MPs advocating 
the liberalization of the current law argue that ‘(…) personally I would not terminate 
a pregnancy’ (Zofia Popiołek, 26.09.2012, 22, 66). This reflects how much it is 
permissible to say in the parliament. Mentioning abortion as a possible option or 
solution is inconceivable in the institution. It is argued that women (=mothers) must 
always welcome pregnancies and rejoice about them. In keeping with the characteristic 
anti-choice style that has been observed by feminists worldwide, male deputies are 
experts on pregnancy: ‘The biggest joy will be for every child to be born’ (Franciszek 
Stefaniuk, 26.09.2012, 22, 61). By default, in this context, fathers are constructed as 
traditional protectors and breadwinners of the family.  
This is explained through the construction of the ‘natural’ difference between the 
sexes. ‘God, or nature if someone prefers it that way, created humans in such a way 
that man is usually big and strong, so as to defend the family and woman is warm and 
caring in order to care for their children’ (Piotr van der Coghen, 26.09.2012, 22, 67). 
Hence the characteristics are naturalized-normalized and explained in biological 
terms, leading to the social legitimation of inequalities, which are purported to be the 
‘natural order of things’ that needs to be perpetuated and protected. This is reinforced 
in the debates on family planning and abortion: ‘A mother should be surrounded with 
care, cordiality, warmth, financial support, instead of pushing her to kill her child’ 
(Anna Sobecka, 26.09.2012, 22, 64). Deputies repeatedly ask to protect motherhood 
and parenting, but never fatherhood. ‘We need a reinforcement of activities that protect 
motherhood’ (Elżbieta Rafalska, 26.09.2012, 22, 75). 
Here, one of the most dominant discourses claims that life begins with conception; 
hence, by extension, abortion is murder and women who terminate pregnancies are 
killers: 
  New life is a human being (Bolesław Piecha, 26.09. 2012, 22, 59). 
This is an issue of humanity, no matter the worldview, no matter if they are 
believers or non-believers. Conceived life, life that has begun should be 
defended by any other conscious human being (Franciszek Stefaniuk, 
26.09.2012, 22, 61). 
Based on these debates, there is a very clear hegemonic discourse about motherhood 
in Poland – motherhood, not ‘fatherhood’ or ‘parenting’. ‘Fathers’ rarely make an 
appearance and ‘fatherhood’ is mentioned in very few cases, such as the debate on 
extending maternity leave. In this instance ‘motherhood’ and ‘parenting’ are often used 
interchangeably, with occasional reference to fathers who might want to ‘take 
maternity’. There is no realization on either side of the political spectrum of the logical 
and grammatical incoherence and ambiguity of sentences like: ‘We propose the right 
to maternity leave for both parents’ (Beata Szydło, 14.05.2013, 40, 4) or ‘(…) when a 
parent returns to work after maternity’ (Ryszard Zbrzyzny, 14.05.2013, 40, 9). As 
argued, there is pronounced worry about fatherhood only in the context of same-sex 
relationships. 
The debates on care work are also gendered, but give the impression of being much 
more inconspicuous and neutral. When referring to the people who perform care work, 
MPs use the masculine noun ‘opiekun’ (carer), never the female variant ‘opiekunka’.73 
                                                 
73 The Polish language is explicitly gendered. There are 5 grammatical genders (3 singular form 
genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter, and 2 plural form genders: masculine and non-masculine). 
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Most of the people performing care work (both paid and unpaid) are in fact women. 
However, when talking about carers of disabled children the word ‘opiekun’ is 
supplanted by the word ‘mother’. This is in line with what feminist scholars have been 
ardent in stressing, namely that reproductive and care work has always been a 
‘woman’s issue’ and an invisible part of the state and family economies.74 
The Polish model of masculinity presented in the debates suggests no responsibility 
for dependants. In fact, this is reflected by statistical data in Poland; for instance, the 
rates of alimony payments in Poland are among the lowest in Europe. According to 
the Women’s Rights Center in Poland, only between 16-17% of fathers pay the court-
assigned alimony for their children and dependants.75 This again points to an unwitting 
and unconscious family model, in which care is privatized and seen as a responsibility 
put solely on women. Arguably, this understanding is stronger in the neoliberal market 
economy model, as feminist political economists argue (cf. Rai and Waylen 2014).  
MPs never mention fathers in reference to care work; similarly, as in the case of 
childcare leave, there is only occasional mention of ‘parents’.  At the same time, 
women do not exist on their own, but only by the virtue of their connection to men: 
‘(…) every Polish woman, our daughters, sisters, wives’ (Marek Balt, 26.09. 2012, 22, 
86). 
Children 
MPs argue that ‘children are our highest national good’ (Andrzej Duda, 26.09.2012, 
22, 70), but anti-violence debates convey the idea that children are practically a 
possession of parents in Poland. In the views of especially conservative MPs, raising 
                                                 
All nouns have a grammatical gender. Adjectives, numbers, pronouns, and verbs are changed 
according to the gender of the noun they refer to. The rule of thumb is that if a feminine gender-form 
of the noun does not exist, it should be formed out of the male noun using specific suffixes and 
endings (and vice versa).  
74 There is a vast literature on the gendered nature of the political economy of care work. I have been 
basing on Acker (2004); Bakker and Silvey (2008); Bedford and Rai (2010); as well as the whole 
volume 36 of Signs – the Special Issue on ‘Feminists Theorize International Political Economy’; 
Kelly et al. (2001); Peterson (2005); Rai and Waylen (2008); and Whitworth (2000) among others. 
75Available at: http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1019407,title,Nowe-przepisy-batem-na-uchylajacych-sie-
od-placenia-alimentow-Tak-ale-tylko-
niektorych,wid,17679790,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=117d6f&_ticrsn=3 (accessed September 2016).  
children according to parents’ opinions is an unquestioned and incontrovertible right 
in the Polish legislation. For them, this right extends even further:  
(…) a child in a shop [gets a temper tantrum] (…) and the mother attempts to 
pick the child up. Finally, she spanks the child and the child calms down. I 
would not like to promote beating children and the use of violence, but I am 
talking about normality (Tadeusz Woźniak 05.04.2013, 37, 239). 
In fact, in the previous parliamentary term Poland witnessed an exuberant debate on 
the signing and ratification of the European Convention on the Rights of the Child, in 
which a large part of the MPs defended vocally parents’ rights to spank children when 
they want to.  
In general, any provisions pertaining to family life are seen as the state encroaching on 
the autonomy of the family: ‘the Polish legal system has many laws that allow for the 
interference in family life’ (Józefa Hrynkiewicz, 05.04.2013, 37, 232). PiS, SP, and 
PSL MPs especially (but also many from PO’s more conservative wing) see 
themselves as the legislative protectors of the Polish families vis-à-vis the ‘(…) abuses 
by public authorities against the rights of families against their subjectivity and 
autonomy’ (Józefa Hrynkiewicz, 05.04.2013, 37, 232). In this discourse the biggest 
evil is to ‘take away children from their families’ (Krystyna Ozga, 05.04.2013, 37, 
244). ‘Children are taken away from parents for whatever reason’ (Marek 
Matuszewski, 05.04.2013, 37, 245). ‘This law along with the foster care legislation 
interferes in the life of the family’ (Waldemar Andzel, 05.04.2013, 37, 246).  
Furthermore, debates on gender confirmation and sexual education center around the 
trope of the ‘child in danger’. The conservative concern with minors reflects their 
patriarchal understanding of family, adding to the neoliberal rhetoric of individual 
choices and parents’ right to raise their child as they want. Children do not have 
autonomy in either of the discourses. Conservative MPs are especially vocally worried 
about the appropriateness of making gender- and sexuality-related decisions by 
underage people. MPs are also concerned with keeping children safe from ‘sexual 
demoralization’ in the form of information on reproductive health, sexualities, gender 
identity and expression, informed consent or birth control methods. The parents’ rights 
to decide for their offspring is superior to the rights of minors to education and 
knowledge.  
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This shows that the patriarchal model of family does not only put women and men in 
particular power positions, but also creates a vertical axis of power between the elder 
and the younger – parents and children. Under the guise of autonomy and respect, we 
see a perpetuation of children as an extension of their parents in terms of values and 
worldviews. Whatever autonomy children might have, it is subservient to parents’ 
autonomy, which restricts the rights of the former. This point of view is prevalent both 
in the Sejm and in the society at large. Recent opinion polls show that over 63% of 
people in Poland agree that physical punishment of children is permissible.76 SP 
deputies have attempted to institutionalize this patriarchal definition of power in the 
family by establishing a new position in the government – the Ombudsman for the 
Rights of the Family, instead of an Ombudsman for the Rights of Children, which is 
the current post.  
Domestic violence 
The parliamentary debates concerning national programs and laws aiming at 
eliminating violence in the family shed light on the ideal vision of family that is 
projected by the Sejm. The majority of MPs regularly point to poverty and alcohol as 
the only causes of violence and use of force in the family (e.g. Andrzej Szlachta, 
05.04.2013, 37, 243). In this manner, they paint a picture where violence occurs only 
in pathological and deprived families, thereby obscuring the reality that can be 
observed through statistics.  This also vilifies poorer citizens and is instrumental in 
their social exclusion. Conspicuously, the debates on violence only mention ‘victims’ 
and ‘perpetrators’ and while they often express sympathy and pity with the former (cf. 
Cynthia Enloe’s 2000 ‘womenandchildren’) and severe contempt for the latter, they 
almost never talk about men as the ones who statistically commit violence most often. 
This instance of silence on gender is functional to bolstering and keeping up the image 
of the traditional family. 
Only individual (former) TR deputies dare to present stereotypical gender roles and 
traditional power hierarchies in the family as plausible underlying causes of violence. 
                                                 
76 According to the Main Statistical Office data for 2013, available at: http://stat.gov.pl/publikacje/ 
(accessed December 2014). 
The right side of the parliament (including members of the ruling coalition, especially 
of the Peasant’s Party) vocally point to the fact that both tradition and religion in 
Poland demand respect for women. However, their conception of respect focuses on 
old-fashioned courtesy rituals and disregards substantial issues, such as domestic 
violence and violence against women. MPs evidence this by saying that women are 
always treated with respect, allowed through the door before men and are kissed on 
the hand. More conservative MPs go further to claim that discussing violence in the 
family is in itself an attempt to destroy the traditional model of this institution. This is 
reiterated by SP MP Tadeusz Woźniak: (05.04.2013, 37, 239): 
(…) violence in the family…We have no documents talking about violence in 
the workplace, on the street, in the stadiums, wherever, in any other place, we 
only have a law about violence in the family as the worst institution that is 
doomed to this negative phenomenon. Surely this is acting against the family, 
surely this is not the promotion of family. We do not speak of the grand tasks, 
aims, achievements, sacrifice in the family. What do we speak of? We speak 
of violence. (…) Please tell me, is it violence (…) when a parent says, even 
though maybe he shouldn’t ‘you shithead stop romping’77. Beg your pardon, 
he infringes once on the child’s dignity. ‘Blue card’78, police. This is what the 
law says. This law is harmful.79  
Economy and welfare 
Economic arguments are prominent in debates that concern welfare and are employed 
in right-wing narratives that are most often directed against the ruling coalition and the 
government. The accusation within this discourse is that socially more permissive or 
liberal legislative proposals take away the attention from real problems, such as the 
balancing of the budget, unemployment, or poverty. This is a clear by-product and 
residue from the post-transformation primacy of neoliberal rhetoric which I discussed 
in the previous chapters. Above all, the conservative opposition MPs often ask how 
much certain changes in the legislation cost (such as the introduction of sexual 
education). The socially progressive legislative proposals are framed as taking 
attention and funds away from ‘real problems’. For instance, the civil partnerships 
                                                 
77 ‘Romping’ sounds like a mild offense – the Polish word used was ‘dokazywać’, which means to 
romp or to frolic. This shows what the MP considers children should be punished for.  
78 The so-called ‘blue card’ is a new procedural solution (introduced by the national program to fight 
violence), which is supposed to be a streamlined case file that the police have to create in any case of 
domestic violence or abuse that is reported.  
79 Emphasis in the quotes is my own. 
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legislation was called a ‘substitute topic’ by multiple opposition MPs during the 
plenary session of 24-25 January 2013. In general, the impression is that all 
‘worldview matters’ (kwestie światopoglądowe) must be taking attention away from 
‘real’ problems (such as unemployment).  
On the other hand, proposals to curb more generous or permissive social welfare and 
family politics legislation are presented as responsibility and foresight in terms of the 
state budget. The reform of the pensions system and the raising of the retirement age 
is constructed as ‘the most difficult and most responsible legislative tasks of this 
parliamentary term’, which is indispensable (Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz 
26.04.2012, 13, 128, 130) and momentous (Dariusz Rosati 26.04.2012, 13, 133). In 
keeping in line with the wider EU discourses justifying the cuts to welfare and social 
benefits through austerity programs, the pension reform is the ‘bitter pill’ that will save 
the country in the long run. Proponents of the reform present it from a market 
perspective: ‘from the point of view of market development the most important effect 
of raising the retirement age will be the stopping of falls in employment and 
consequently the strengthening of GDP growth factors’ (Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz 
26.04.2012, 13, 132). 
Coming from the side of PO and TR, there are arguments firmly based in competitive 
and market arguments, but also stressing the traditionally liberal need for citizens to 
have a freedom of choice and not to be forced to any social or economic solutions. 
This was the logic according to which parental leave was not assigned specifically to 
mothers and fathers, but gave options in who takes how much time with the child. 
Technically, fathers can take more time off for childcare, but without any obligation 
to do so not many do not (as opposed to the Swedish model, in which the missed 
‘paternity leave’ is subtracted from the overall available childcare time). The debates 
on the proposed changes in foster care in 2012-2013 (see Table 5.5) show the absolute 
discursive unwillingness by MPs to ‘interfere into families’ and ‘parents’ right to raise 
their children as they want’. There is interesting interdiscursivity with ‘anti-
communist’ discourses here. Namely, the MPs vocally proclaim fear of forceful family 
politics solutions, which are unequivocally labelled as ‘communist’ or ‘leftist’.  
Demographic moral panic 
Deputies are only interested in a particular type of family which reflects the supposed 
demographic interests of the nation. ‘Demography is unrelenting’, as the Minister of 
Labour and Social Policy claims (Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz 26.04.2012, 13, 129). 
Therefore, a strong family is seen as the basis for a strong society and nation. 
Demography is understood as destiny. Despite the previously shown monetary 
concerns to welfare, there is a strong realization that costs aimed at increasing birth 
rates in Poland are justified because they will be good for the economy in the future. 
Thus, the cost of spending in the field of family and welfare politics has to be an 
‘investment in the future’. All that is considered as beneficial to positive demographic 
trends should be promoted, although this also depends on the ideological background 
of the speaker.  
Some deputies see as beneficial expenditures bolstering traditional marriage-family: 
‘The fact that the state protects marriage, woman and man, is in its interest, because it 
simply guarantees the biological reproduction of the nation’ (Kazimierz Ziobro, 
24.01.2013, 32, 181). Others argue for or against liberal health and reproductive 
services: ‘Is it not absurd in the situation of a high drop in birth rates to promote 
contraceptives at all cost, even emergency contraception, by refunding it? (Jan 
Warzecha, 26.09. 2012, 22, 67); similarly: ‘Today we have decreased demographic 
growth. This [abortion] is regular murder, let us call it what it is.’ (Andrzej Duda, 
26.09.2012, 22, 70). More liberal voices claim: ‘This is the high-water mark of 
hypocrisy and of duplicity. (…) you have all spoken of the need to change the 
demographics in Poland. Then why did you not vote in favour of in vitro?’ (Tomasz 
Kamiński, 26.09.2012, 22, 75).  
Nonetheless, the dominant tone is alarmist about the state of Polish demography and 
the dominant discourse to address this state of affairs stresses the need to support the 
traditional family/marriage (as opposed to civil unions or same-sex relationships). 
Despite the general preference for non-interference of the state in the family, there are 
exhortations for state control over sexual behaviour and reproduction. 
(…) demography is key and essential. (…) We are all aware that the birth rate 
in Poland is really very low. This is a catastrophe. The birth rate in Poland is 
1.31. At the same time Polish women in the UK give birth, the rate there is 2.3-
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2.5 child per woman. Is it possible that Polish women living in the UK are more 
attractive than Polish women in Poland? (Andrzej Romanek, 14.05.2013, 40, 
6). 
The concern over low birth rates and the discursive construction of the demographic 
crisis invoke moral and political anxieties about women’s reproductive health rights, 
but also about how sexualities are deployed. This argument bases on the assumption 
that: ‘It is in the interest of the state to support heterosexual marriages, which produce 
children and with that directly add to economic growth, because they are raising future 
tax payers and employees’ (Beata Mazurek, 24.01.2013, 32, 176). Hence the neo-
liberal market logic of strict budget spending (often implicit in the arguments used by 
MPs) is applied to maintain traditional gender relations within the family and society. 
This highlights the interdiscursivity between the narrative on economy and those of 
demography. 
While it is no longer acceptable to advocate the male-breadwinner and female-
homemaking model openly,80 the underlying broader gendered division between the 
public and the private is still present in discursive constructions. When discussing 
maternity leave, MPs talk about ‘employees’, again only using the masculine noun 
(‘pracownik’). The implied welfare model seems to be that of the dual breadwinner, 
which completely overlooks the reality that most women are secondary wage-earners, 
who end up quitting their jobs when their children are born, as well as the fact that 
Poland’s pre-school and kindergarten situation is dire. There are not enough places for 
all children and parents are forced to pay to get a place, so the majority is discriminated 
against because of their lower economic status. 
What subjects and values are being produced? 
Values and anti-values 
Within the social matrix of discourses in the area of family politics, the parliamentary 
discursive field displays intertextual and interdiscursive elements, which can be found 
                                                 
80 This was still common in the 1990s with the restructuring policies and massive unemployment due 
to economic shock therapy policies.  
in the construction of prescribed or denigrated values for the family. These are 
dominated by conservative hegemonic discourses, according to which any legislative 
change within the area of family politics comes down to an overturn of the healthy 
moral order and natural law allegedly codified in the constitution (the infamous Art.18, 
which I discussed in the beginning of this chapter). ‘The project [on proposed civil 
partnerships] entirely demolishes the hierarchy of values’ (Jacek Osuch, 26.09. 2012, 
22, 65). As Krystyna Pawłowicz (PiS) argued: ‘The proposed law on conscious 
parenting and reproductive rights is a persistent attack on life and on family’ 
(26.09.2012, 22, 64). However, this narrative sees a stronger counter-discourse that 
proposes values traditionally associated with political and civic liberalism. Even so, 
the hegemonic conservative discourse depicts these as anti-values. While it sometimes 
admits that these anti-values may have noble intentions, the hegemonic discourse 
ultimately argues that they will bring about the collapse and decay of the ‘real’ values. 
Table 5.6 below shows the constructed ‘real’ and ‘anti-’ values in the parliamentary 













Table 5.6 Summary of the values constructed in the parliamentary discourses. 
REAL VALUES ‘ANTI-VALUES’ 
(national) tradition modernity (progress, Europeanization) 
family (family-marriage) diversity 
conscience/morality freedom of choice 
responsibility happiness (pleasure) 
human life (since conception) equality 
freedom of speech political correctness 
respect for authority tolerance 
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natural (God’s) law codified law 
(Source: own compilation).  
The presented values and anti-values do not necessarily pose dichotomous or binary 
oppositions, but are usually evoked in bigger and often messier discursive groupings. 
The logic of Hansen’s (2006) linking and differentiation does not work literally here – 
one side is not male and the other female. However, there is a significant derogatory 
implication of certain effeminacy in the column of ‘anti-values’, especially connected 
to ideas of tolerance and political correctness. The aim is to produce ideological 
ambivalence and perhaps some confusion, which in turn serves the purpose of 
hindering new progressive legislation. The tension between values/anti-values 
discourses emerges in all the debates under analysis. MPs on both sides of the divide 
argue that it is a war (Tadeusz Woźniak, 26.09.2012, 22, 69): ‘Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations as contrasted to the clash of the civilization of life and death are nothing, 
at least in this room’ (Piotr Pyzik, 26.09.2012, 22, 80). While both sides demand 
respect for their own values, neither allows room for the negotiation between the two 
positions: 
This is an attempt to dazzle us with the ideology of equality, which is in essence 
a dictatorship of relativism, a dictatorship of a minority over a majority 
(Marzena Machałek, 24.01.2013, 32, 178). 
More respect for the human and for human life! (Andrzej Duda, 26.09.2012, 
22, 70) 
I have a conscience in contrast to the authors of this law (Bolesław Piecha, 
26.09.2012, 22, 59). 
The role of a civilized country built on Christian and humanist values is to 
defend the weak (Andrzej Dąbrowski, 26.09.2012, 22, 87). 
Natural law is independent of us (Kazimierz Ziobro, 26.09.2012, 22, 95).  
They [the citizens] will have the freedom of choice, a normal civilized choice 
(Dariusz Dziadzio, 26.09.2012, 22, 73). 
Why do you [MPs in favour of the legislative proposal] want to decide for the 
citizens? (Marek Poznański, 26.09.2012, 22, 72). 
No one, especially not the state should tell you [the citizens] what happiness 
looks like (Robert Biedroń, 24.01.2013, 32, 158). 
Conversely, the proponents of the two discourses accuse each other of ‘politicizing’ or 
‘ideologizing’ the debate:  
We are debating using ideology and not the language of law (Robert Biedroń, 
26.09.2012, 22, 72). 
(…) in the matters of values, matters of conscience we believe that things must 
never be politicized, because this is a matter of everyone’s conscience and 
everyone has the individual rights (Franciszek Stefaniuk, 26.09.2012, 22, 61). 
(…) the dispute is between nature and culture. Religion is not nature and does 
not constitute law (Piotr Bauć, 25.01.2013, 32, 243). 
One of the main values constructed in the parliamentary debates is the ‘value of life’. 
The debates on family planning, termination of pregnancy, and assisted reproductive 
techniques especially display the main political cleavages in Poland. While most of 
PO, SLD, and TR deputies follow the ‘modernizing’, liberal, ‘European’ rhetoric, PiS, 
PSL (and some PO MPs) are proponents of the ultraconservative catholic discourse 
that is supposed to be a corrective to the increased pluralization and fragmentation of 
family arrangements, and reproductive choices (cf. Korolczuk 2013a). The Polish 
debates on IVF and abortion demonstrate that the religiously grounded opposition 
against reproductive rights relies heavily on the idea of ‘biovalue’, understood as the 
body, health and vitality of people that translates into the well-being of the collective 
nation (Rose and Novas 2005: 29-30). ‘Life’ or the ‘civilization of life’ refer to 
zygotes, embryos, and foetuses, but is rarely used with regards to children and never 
to adults.  
Now everyone knows, science has proved it that the human, that life begins 
with the moment of conception. We are not interested in women’s bellies, we 
just defend life and we fight for life (Robert Telus, 26.09.2012, 22, 66). 
This allows for the emotive construction of the rights of an embryo to ‘life’ as 
effectively overshadowing the desires and needs of women who may want to carry 
them or not, and men who want to become fathers through IVF for instance (cf. 
Korolczuk 2013a). 
The constitution 
Interestingly, the constitution is often brought up in the family and welfare field as an 
important value-bearer. Significantly, the supposed constitutionality of the proposed 
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legislation is used as an argument most frequently by the right-wing side of the 
parliament (for reasons I explained in the beginning of the chapter). Therefore, the 
constitutional theme is pervasively dominated by one conservative discourse claiming 
that any changes to the marriage-family field are persistent attacks or coups against 
the constitution, the whole codified legal order and thereby against the state as it 
currently exists. This discourse is present in particular in debates concerning family 
planning and abortion, sexual education and civil partnerships. As Waldemar Andzel 
(PiS) and Krystyna Pawłowicz (PiS) reiterate: ‘Why do you want to destroy the state 
by undermining the constitution namely article 18?’ (24.01.2013, 32, 242); ‘(…) by 
undermining article 18 of the constitution [the civil partnerships legislation] is an 
attempt at a constitutional coup’ (25.01.2013, 32, 183).  
In this light, all legislation that is perceived as dangerous or subversive to the existing 
legal order is argued to be unconstitutional. This can be extended to most of the debates 
under analysis: ‘[sexual education classes are an] interference into parents’ rights, 
especially into the constitutionally guaranteed right to raise the child according to their 
own beliefs’ (Henryk Siedlaczek, 26.09.2012, 22, 70). Similarly, on abortion: ‘(…) the 
destruction of a life of a child in the embryonic phase infringes the constitution as well 
as other articles of criminal law.’ (Elżbieta Rafalska, 26.09.2012, 22, 75); and civil 
partnerships: ‘The proposed law [on civil partnerships] is radically contradictory both 
to nature and to the constitution’ (Krystyna Pawłowicz, 25.01.2013, 32, 163). The 
proponents of this discourse believe that all their intrinsic rights and values are 
entrenched in the constitution, which is under constant attack: ‘[The authors of the 
proposed legislation] are attempting a particular coup on the constitutional legal 
system and take a shot at the system of norms and values with regards to human 
sexuality that has been solidified through the ages’ (Tadeusz Woźniak, 24.01.2013, 
32, 170). 
The attempts of the left side of the parliament to construct a counter-discourse are 
based on the accusation of misinterpreting the constitution. Essentially, the 
constitution of the country becomes a matter of opinion of the MP: whatever does not 
suit their stance is deemed unconstitutional. ‘For you [addressing PiS and Solidarna 
Polska MPs] the constitution are only implementation mechanisms for the Bible, the 
Vatican and the bishops’ (Wincenty Elsner, 24.01.2013, 32, 165). They have not 
managed to destabilize the prominence of the ‘constitutional defence’ discourse. PiS, 
SP, PSL and often PO MPs repeatedly make claims about protecting the constitution 
and are able to add and reinterpret it unchallenged: ‘The legalization of homosexual 
relationships is contrary to the current law, its promotion is forbidden’ (Krystyna 
Pawłowicz PiS, 24.01.2013, 32, 163).81 PiS, SP, and the other opposition parties talk 
about constitutional defence when it suits them; at other times they talk about God’s 
law (natural law) even as opposed to the constitutional legislative order (as I 
highlighted in table 5.6). 
Europe 
One of the most prominent non-conservative discourses that has managed to obtain a 
degree of importance and even dominance concerns Europe, as an ideal or metaphor 
for modernity, progress, and development. Within this discourse SLD, TR and PO 
accuse the right-wing and conservative forces in Poland of being ‘hordes of catholic 
Taliban’ (Armand Ryfiński, 26. 09. 2012, 22, 56) and that they ‘remain the 
representatives of the church [slang word ‘purpurat’ – the purple ones], of ignorance, 
and of backwardness [and] have forgotten that [they] are supposed to express the will 
of a modern, democratic society.’ (Dariusz Dziadzio, 24.10.2012, 24, 244). The users 
of this discourse claim that PiS, SP, but also parts of PO and PSL are dragging the 
country backward, away from Europe, which is built up to mean modernity, 
civilization and progress. As seen in the previous chapters, this perceived 
backwardness and ‘lagging behind’ Europe in terms of modernization might be 
interpreted as a specific post-state socialist form of a postcolonial condition. This 
thinking takes for granted ‘Europe’ (or wider ‘West’) as the only known term of 
reference for the peripheral position of Poland. 
This discourse emerges clearly in debates on legislative proposals that are considered 
progressive in terms of women’s, sexual, and minority rights. Examples of this 
                                                 
81 Poland has no laws criminalizing or outlawing homosexuality.  
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discourse show that the proponents weave in expectations and values into key words 
like ‘21st century’, ‘Europe’, and ‘civilization’: 
We are in the Middle Ages. When will we have the 21st century in this 
[plenary] room? (Maciej Banaszak, 26.09.2012, 22, 72).  
We live in the 21st century. I have no doubt that the state should be comfortable 
for its citizens (Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska, 24.01.2013, 32, 162). 
A modern state should simply support [civil partnerships] (Robert Biedroń, 
24.01.2013, 32, 158). 
You [addressing PO] look at Europe you count the euros, but you have not 
learned tolerance and equality. (…) There, in Europe, they have civil 
partnerships despite the threatening murmurs of bishops in Ireland, in Spain 
(Wincenty Elsner, 24.01.2013, 32, 165). 
This is Europe (…) this is the 21st century and a free country (Wincenty Elsner, 
24.01.2013, 32, 165). 
The ‘modernizing Europe’ discourse calls on the parliament to catch up to the ‘West’ 
and to adjust to what is or is perceived as a European norm: ‘What is also very 
important about this law is that we want Poland to draw nearer to highly developed 
countries. The possibility of terminating pregnancy is a European standard’ (Armand 
Ryfiński, 26.09.2012, 22, 56). At times, Poland’s backwardness is presented as a 
source of shame and depreciation in the regional and global context: ‘Europe is 
laughing at you’ (Armand Ryfiński, 26. 09. 2012, 22, 56). More progressive legislation 
is presented as a gauge for modernity and democracy: ‘(…) modern law worthy of a 
democratic country’ (Marek Balt, 26.09.2012, 22, 62). 
The flip side of this discourse is the narrative that, exactly because this is the civilized 
21st century and we have modernity and civilization, this calls for more conservative 
values:  
We live in the 21st century (…) and yet we murder children in the 30th week 
of pregnancy because they are ill (Bartosz Kownacki, 26.09.2012, 22, 83). 
The 20th century, which was characterized by the lack of respect for the human 
being and for the whole of creation, is over (Andrzej Dąbrowski, 26.09.2012, 
22, 87). 
Eugenics was the shame of the 20th century. It is time to end it in the 21st (Anna 
Paluch, 26.09.2012, 22, 90). 
The conservative response is emotively formulated as the concern about influence 
from outside, especially European moral decay. There is a perception that Europe (by 
the doings of the EU and other international institutions) can force certain legislative 
solutions that are not appreciated or do not conform to constructed national traditions. 
Again, here we can see a hint of the postcolonial discourse being used for a nationalist 
and conservative cause: ‘[c]an the European Union or some other international 
organization force Poland to register homosexual couples and to allow them 
privileges?’ (Tadeusz Woźniak, 25.01.2013, 32, 170). 
National, catholic, nuclear family 
Overall, all social and family topics in the parliament are constructed as difficult, often 
with the explicit intention of arguing for the status quo. ‘This is a very difficult subject, 
which we should really take up deeply and substantially. This will remain a topic that 
will be divisive in our society.’ (Anna Bańkowska, 26.09.2012, 22, 76). There is an 
inherent fear of infringing on anything considered as belonging to the private sphere 
and seen as in the least bit controversial: ‘(…) the debate concerns a very delicate 
sensitive topic’ (Vice-speaker Jerzy Wenderlich SLD on abortion 24.10.2012, 24, 
241); ‘(…) what you have been saying about a difficult, delicate topic’ (Donald Tusk 
on civil partnerships 25.01.2013, 32, 241). Judging from the above discussion of 
discursive fields within family politics, it seems that the most dominant feature of the 
Polish family is that it is permanently threatened. ‘The family is currently under threat 
in Poland’ (Robert Telus, 24.01.2013, 32, 186). It is endangered by abortion, by civil 
partnerships, by the interference into the family through attempts to enforce paternity 
leave, and anti-violence legislation. As we have seen, the Polish family as constructed 
by the parliamentary debates is a married, opposite-sex couple with children: ‘I would 
like to remind (…) that the closest family consists of dad, mom and kids, not Mr and 
Mr or Ms and Ms’ (Marek Matuszewski, 24.01.2013, 32, 183).  
Any other forms of family life are not only not accepted but not even considered 
‘families’. The usefulness and acceptability of families is judged by its ability to bring 
children – new citizens, new members of the nation, new tax payers. If a family is 
No country for losers? 
157 
Chapter 5: Constructing the family 
valued by the number of children it brings to the nation, then abortion is considered a 
highest evil: ‘A nation that allows the killing of unborn children is condemning itself 
to die off’ (Abraham Godson, 26.09.2012, 22, 64). Conversely, couples or families 
that do not fulfil the family-marriage requirement (as discussed above) are unwanted 
and harmful to society. ‘Society cannot sponsor the sweet life of non-durable empty 
relationships of people, who bring no benefits to it’ (Krystyna Pawłowicz, 24.01.2013, 
32, 163). This completely overlooks the reality that as much as one third of all children 
in Poland are currently born outside of formal marriage (either civil or religious). 82  
How is truth being created? 
Deputies draw on specific authority figures to support their statements. There are 
several sources that the MPs drawn on to legitimize their arguments. However, there 
is only one authority that is seen by all as unquestioned and impossible to undermine 
– the former pope John Paul II. He is quoted by all political groups in the parliament 
and his name appears in all the debates under analysis in the topic of family politics. 
He is referred to as: ‘none other than the blessed John Paul II’ (Arkadiusz Mularczyk, 
26.09.2012, 22, 81); ‘our great compatriot [no name given]’ (Bartosz Kownacki, 
26.09.2012, 22, 83); ‘(…) our great compatriot, the blessed John Paul II’ (Marek Balt, 
26.09.2012, 22, 86), ‘(…) the Holy Father’ (Adam Rogacki, 26.09.2012, 22, 96); 
‘distinguished Pole, pope John Paul II’ (Bartosz Kownacki, 24.10.2012, 24, 242); ‘the 
unquestioned authority Karol Wojtyła, later pope John Paul II’ (Franciszek Stefaniuk, 
24.01.2013, 32, 167). There is no other authority outside politics that is quoted more 
often and more profusely than John Paul II. It appears that in order to be legitimate as 
an MP there is a need to reference or base oneself in catholic sources. Unsurprisingly, 
this is done most often by right-wing deputies: they even refer to the Vatican 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the ‘Holy Father pope Benedict XVI’ 
(Krystyna Pawłowicz, 24.01.2013, 32, 165). However, also former ‘communist’ MPs 
                                                 
82 According to the Main Statistical Office yearbooks for 2013 and 2014, accessed at: 
http://stat.gov.pl/ publikacje/ (accessed April 2016).  
find it necessary to quote St. Augustine and the Council of Trident (Ryszard Kalisz, 
24.01.2013, 32, 168).  
On the other hand, there are several personalities constructed as evil-doers and 
negative examples. They usually include left-associated intellectuals, writers or artists: 
‘the guru of left-wing and leftist philosophers, Mr Jürgen Habermas’ (Bolesław 
Piecha, 26.09.2012, 22, 60). 
For you, Prof Peter Singer would probably be a guru, surely you know Deanne 
Wells, who believes that abortion is allowed at any moment until it is admitted 
that the child is useful’ (Bolesław  Piecha, 26.09.2012, 22, 59). 
Conservative MPs sometimes cite non-religious figures who have very conservative 
positions on selected topics in order to show that their arguments find resonance also 
in secular circles: 
If we are to pelt each other with quotations, then I send you to the quotes of 
people who criticized abortion from atheist or humanist positions such as Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, Oriana Fallaci and Giuliano Ferrara. If it is about a concrete 
quote, I can reference the American feminist Rebecca Walker who said that 
feminists are wrong to say that abortion causes no harm (Maciej Orzechowski, 
26.09.2012, 22, 74). 
The discursive political culture of the Sejm is extremely catholicized and a lot of the 
symbolism used draws on religion: for instance, the use of the word ‘amen’ instead of 
‘yea’ or ‘yes’ on multiple occasions by right-wing MPs, but also phrases like ‘God 
forbid’ (Ryszard Kalisz multiple times, 24.01.2013, 32, 174, 193) by apparently left-
wing deputies. There is also constant mention and reference to catholicism or the 
church: ‘I would like to point out that the way we are working here is being monitored 
by the public opinion and by the Polish episcopate, who not long ago has issued an 
appeal not to break the consciences of MPs’ (Arkadiusz Mularczyk, 24.10.2012, 24, 
227); ‘While we are sitting here our parliamentary chapel is holding Eucharistic 
adoration’ (Andrzej Dąbrowski 10.10.2012, 23, 18). Also, there is an understanding 
that something like ‘natural law’ or ‘God’s law’ underlies all social and family issues: 
‘The Decalogue is the basis for all lawyers.’ (Kazimierz Ziobro 24.01.2013, 32, 181). 
The anticlerical counter-discourse or even secularism are not prominent and are again 
put forward only by the liberal deputies (former TR): ‘I would like to remind you that 
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this is the plenary session of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and not a rosary prayer 
meeting or a meeting of the episcopate.’ (Sławomir Kopyciński, 24.10.2012, 24, 242). 
Paradoxically, apart from the apparent catholicism, sexist comments, jokes and taunts 
are also ever present: ‘Ms Pawłowicz, you give birth and then we talk.’ (Jacek 
Kwiatkowski, 26.09.2012, 22, 77); ‘Give birth! (..) Give birth! (…) Give birth instead 
of yelling.’ (Jacek Kwiatkowski to Krystyna Pawłowicz, 26.09.2012, 22, 78); ‘I have 
a weak spot for you…’ (Vice-speaker Cezary Grabarczyk to Marzena Wróbel 
24.01.2013, 32, 177). Similarly, deputy Piotr Bauć repeatedly refered to his female 
peers, with whom he disagreed as ‘my beloved madam professor’ (kochana pani 
profesor) (22.06.2013, 44, 266) or ‘beloved ladies’ (Kochane Panie Profesor, Poseł 
Pawłowicz i Pani Poseł Wróbel!) (22.06.2013, 44, 265).83 By singling out female MPs, 
he shortened the linguistic distance between them, increasing familiarity and thereby 
infantilizing them; this is particularly explicit in the very formal setting of the Polish 
parliament and the formal nature of the Polish language.  
Moreover, Robert Kropiwnicki (24.09.2014, 75, 103), while propounding his 
progressive views said: ‘social and cultural roles change because 200 or 300 years ago, 
it was unimaginable that so many beautiful and smart ladies would sit in parliament’.  
Thus, hegemonic gender constructions are perpetuated through a certain use of 
language and grammar. 
What can and cannot be said? 
The Polish Sejm displays traits of hegemonic masculinity, that is, anything masculine 
or male is hegemonic. This is so pervasive that it is rendered an invisible norm. There 
is a tacit dominance and acceptance of male-dominated structures that presents itself 
as silence on gender. Masculinity is institutionally constructed as a standard and 
blueprint for conduct in the Polish parliament. The domination of the masculine gender 
in the ‘universal function’, referring to general meanings in both sexes, is prevalent. 
                                                 
83 Kochany/kochana is a term of endearment in Polish that is much more informal and personal than 
‘dear’ (drogi/droga), which would still be too familiar in a parliamentary setting.  
Hence, masculinity is not just a trait attributed in gender, but an almost moral norm, 
indicating a degree of normality and simply ‘how things are’ (cf. Kronsell 2006: 109). 
While pretending to be ‘gender-neutral’ the informal institutional workings and 
discourses of the Sejm define the specific and conservative roles of women and men 
towards the fulfilment of what is considered the common good of the society. 
Importantly, there is no significant difference in male or female discourses within 
parliament; as many feminist scholars have shown, there is no proof of women acting 
for or speaking for other women.   
Conclusions 
This case study explored the political discourses on the topics of family and welfare, 
a highly relevant and gendered policy field. The debates on family politics are a sphere 
where contradictory discourses concerning family, economy, the body, and 
subjectivity or citizenship intersect and interact. Perhaps, it is even more evident in the 
post-transformation context of Poland, where already in the beginning of the 1990s 
heated debates especially on issues such as abortion, domestic violence, and in vitro 
fertilization have become an important part of the process of contestation and 
legitimization of political authority (cf. Korolczuk 2013a). The effects of the political 
and economic transformation (as discussed in chapter 4) are clear in the contemporary 
Polish political discourses. The social and cultural changes of the 1990s influenced the 
ideologies and practice of care and family sphere. There is a clear stress on pro-natalist 
(or nativist) thinking, which ties the future of the Polish nation (not state, not society, 
not people, but nation) to population growth, thereby justifying the interest and control 
of reproductive and sexual health.  
The dominant, even hegemonic, discourses in the field of family and welfare politics 
are heteronormative, come from catholic church teachings, and stress marriage as 
means for procreation, thereby guaranteeing the continuity of the Polish nation. As the 
opening quote suggested, all other types of relationships are not seen as worthy of 
being called family and hence vilified (in opposition to Polish law). Motherhood is the 
determinant marker of female identity and the main formula for women’s participation 
in the national collective (cf. Janion 1996; Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2013).  
No country for losers? 
161 
Chapter 5: Constructing the family 
Motherhood, and especially pregnancy, are romanticized (while fatherhood is hardly 
remembered). The absolute command to sacrifice for ‘life’ (meaning embryo or foetus) 
is a permanent component of debates on family planning. Therefore, abortion is seen 
as absolute evil (hence showing an interdiscursivity with religious rhetoric) and 
constructed as criminal. Furthermore, women are assumed to be the caregivers in the 
family; this fits well both within neoliberal and conservative-catholic perspectives.  
Debates on domestic violence construct a patriarchal hierarchy in the family, where 
men are at the top (but their role as chief perpetrators of violence is ignored), women 
must sacrifice themselves for the family members (both older and younger) and 
children are at the bottom. In this context, the dominant discourses raise economic 
issues for two main purposes: either to claim that passing more socially liberal bills 
(e.g. civil partnerships) takes time and resources from ‘real problems’; or to justify 
funding cuts to welfare or legislating austerity measures.  
The discursive subjects produced are tropes of ‘emphasized femininity’ (Connell 
1987) and hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987, 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 
2005). They pertain to gender-conforming, able-bodied, cisgender, heterosexual 
individuals of reproductive age, who are useful for the nation on one hand, and to the 
economy on the other. Except for specific dedicated debates (like the pension reform), 
issues of people with disabilities, older people, or other non-binary people are invisible 
and non-existent. As the opening quote suggests, there is only one proscribed family 
model in Poland. It is exclusivist and does not make room for diversity (even though 
the Polish law does). It also completely ignores the reality of Polish family life: 
children born outside of marriage, single parenting (motherhood mostly), divorce 
rates, and the existence of patchwork families, which are very often same-sex because 
they include mothers, grandmothers, and aunts, as primary caregivers to dependants 
(children and the elderly).  
These discursive constructions lead to the creation of ultraconservative values and 
liberal ‘anti-values’, with the being presented as virtues (national tradition, 
heteronormativity, natural law, etc.) keeping in line with the national-catholic camp 
outlined in chapter 4; and the latter with the ‘modernist’ one. Legislative proposals 
perceived as opposing the ‘real values’ are sweepingly branded as anti-constitutional 
reducing the debate to yes-no level. The main liberal discourse centres around the 
concepts of ‘European standards’ and ‘modernity’ or ‘progress’ and follows the self-
colonizing logic outlined in the conceptual part of the dissertation. The proponents of 
this discourse (mainly TR, SLD, and some PO deputies) see inferiority in the Polish 
situation, focusing on the need to ‘catch up to Europe at all costs’. This is met by an 
equally strong counter-narrative arguing that traditional ‘our Polish’ values must be 
defended from foreign unnatural and immoral influences. These discourses are 
strongly co-constitutive and play off each other cyclically.  
The above dominant ‘truths’ are constructed and legitimized through references to 
catholic authority figures, most notably the late Polish pope John Paul II. The choice 
of a gendered language also plays an important role in the construction of hegemonic 
masculinity in the Sejm. Hence, the case study has shown that the aim of family and 
welfare politics in Poland is the unpaid reproduction of the catholic nation through 
heteronormative family units. The parliamentary hegemonic masculinity has very 
specific characteristics. It is a discursive and institutional construct that it is both a 
product and a producer of catholic and ultraconservative worldviews. Any divergence 
from the ‘natural norm’ is perceived as subversive and threatening. The next chapter 
broadens the analysis to debates concerning the construction of the nation.  
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‘Just don’t order me to die, (…) 
don’t order me to fight, don’t order me to perish,  
Poland, don’t ask my blood! 
(…) Sorry, Poland 
(…) Better a living citizen, than a dead hero.’ 
Maria Peszek84 
This chapter presents the second case study of the thesis. It discusses the gendered 
construction of parliamentary debates in the topic I defined as ‘building the nation’. 
This area has been conceptualized as the area of politics that pertains to questions of 
national subjectivity, citizenship, and national celebration. In practice, the chapter 
looks at parliamentary debates that discussed national commemorations, national 
symbols and important symbols of nationality and citizenship (coat of arms and 
passports). It also analyses how the Sejm defines the Polish national collective with 
reference to the ‘others’ (particularly the legislative proposals on national minorities 
and foreigners working and living in Poland, and the European refugee crisis) and 
thereby creates discursively the Polish nation. As a result of this broad understanding 
of the focus area, I also include parliamentary debates on defence and the army, as 
well as education (specifically history and Polish language classes in schools).  
This chapter is an attempt at unpacking and showing the gendered constructions of the 
Polish national discourse that Maria Peszek is rebelling against in the opening quote. 
The purpose is to expose how deputies construct discursively a particular model of 
subjectivity, which shapes people’s mentalities and practices concerning what it means 
to be Polish, by discussing citizenship and identity in Poland. The main questions 
addressed are: what constitutes national subjectivity according to the MPs? How is 
subjectivity constructed discursively in the parliament? How are the debates under 
analysis gendered? What do the official commemorations say about the model of 
memory and citizenship and thereby subjectivity for Poland? What do they reveal 
                                                 
84 Excerpt from the 2012 song ‘Sorry Polsko’ by Maria Peszek. The translation is my own; text in the 
original: ‘Tylko nie każ mi umierać/ tylko nie każ, nie każ mi/ Nie każ walczyć, nie każ ginąć,/ nie 
chciej Polsko mojej krwi/ (…)Sorry Polsko,/ (…)Lepszy żywy obywatel, niż martwy bohater’. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtDFT34JGN8 (accessed November 2016). 
about the model of masculinity and femininity? I argue that MPs discursively build the 
Polish nation by prescribing a subjectivity model that entails specific masculinity, 
catholicism, and nationalism. This construction excludes not only foreigners, but also 
Polish citizens that do not fulfil the above criteria – non-conforming women, non-
patriotic dissenters, and ‘malcontents’, atheists, and left-wing people, for instance, fall 
out of this hegemonic narrative. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of ‘nationalism’ and ‘nation’ in the Polish 
context. It then provides an overview of the agenda points and agents of discourse in 
the Polish parliament that are relevant to the case study. Subsequently, I divide the 
analysis into specific discursive fields guided by CDA questions from chapter 3 and 
go on by conducting the analysis within these fields: Who is speaking? What/who is 
being talked about? What subjects and values are produced? How is truth created? 
What can and cannot be said? Finally, I look at the citizenship and subjectivity model 
that the Sejm is constructing for the society.  
The analysis in the previous chapter has demonstrated that one of the founding tenets 
of the discursive construction of Polish family policy was the role of the loving, 
nuclear, patriarchal family unit in the production of a healthy nation. The images of 
masculinity, femininity and sexuality were constructed in the parliamentary debates 
with reference to the ‘nation’. While the word ‘nationalism’ (nacjonalizm) itself in 
Polish has unequivocally negative connotations, the concepts of ‘nation’ (naród), 
‘national’ (narodowy) do not. According to the Polish historical and intellectual 
tradition, ‘nationalism’ refers to the National Democratic movement (Endecja) of the 
interwar period, which postulated a catholic Greater Poland, based on ethno-national 
chauvinism, national megalomania, aggressive anti-Semitism, a fascination with 
Italian Fascism and advocated a Poland with polonized, or ethnically cleansed 
minorities (between 1918 and 1939 non-Polish ethnic minorities made up around 30% 
of the population) (Graff 2013). For this reason, the Polish mainstream makes a 
distinction between ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’, with the former being desirable and 
the latter an aberration. Arguably, in the mid-2010s the distinction started to blur and 
‘nationalism’ began to lose its pejorative meaning. As the opening quote suggests, 
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there are specific expectations that come with belonging to the Polish national 
collective.  
Who is speaking? 
Similarly to the family and welfare area, the discourses are divided along party lines, 
with PO, TR, and SLD standing for the neoliberal camp, and PiS, SP, and PSL 
representing the national-catholic camp. There is however much more coherence and 
interdiscursivity among the deputies than it appears at first glance. There are no ‘go-
to’ people in this topic and all parties seem to be equally vocal in the issues discussed. 
Moreover, the differences between the parties only vary in terms of the intensity of 
national and patriotic feelings proclaimed – with more pronounced nationalist 
discourses on the right side of the parliament and somewhat less nationalist on the left 
and in the centre. There is again a different understanding of ‘Europe’ and international 
obligations within the neoliberal camp. However, with regards to patriotism and 
nation, there is not much diversity between the government and the opposition. 
Therefore, the substance of the arguments is similar on all sides. The MPs see the 
composition and duties of the Polish subject-citizens along almost identical lines. Both 
female and male MPs are involved in the debates on the nation.  
What is talked about? 
The tables below provide an overview of the specific debates relevant to the area of 
the construction of the nation. The analysed debates (parliamentary agenda points – 
see Table 6.7) include parliamentary resolutions, different stage readings of legislative 
proposals, reports from committee proceedings, and voting sessions. Overall, I 
investigated 170 individual parliamentary agenda points (plenary debates) for the 
seventh parliamentary term (2011-2015) and singled out for in-depth analysis the 




Table 6.7 Summary of the number of agenda points under analysis divided by 
topic (2011-2015). 
Topic Number of agenda 
points 
Commemoration of individuals 45 
Commemoration of historic events 40 
Foreigners, refugees, and ethnic minorities 19 
Veterans, oppositionists, ‘victims of communist 
repression’ and the ‘Committee for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Against the Polish Nation’ 
16 
Defence, army, and military service 13 
Establishment of days in honour of groups/ideas  10 
National symbols and citizenship 8 
Expressions of international solidarity or concern 8 
Acknowledgement for important institutions 5 
Education: Polish language and history 4 
Legislative acts naming institutions/buildings 2 
Smolensk plane crash of 201085 2 
(Source: own compilation). 
I clustered the above debates around the themes of national symbols, national 
obligations, and domestic and international commitments. 
National symbols 
Symbols are typically associated with national identity and national tradition. The 
debates within this field focused on the change of the use of the national coat of arms 
(white eagle with a crown on red background) on the t-shirts of the national 
representations in sports and on new passports, as well as the general law concerning 
the use of national symbols. The largest debate was the result of a heated public 
discussion following an international football match in 2011, in which the Polish male 
                                                 
85 This is the plane crash that killed president Lech Kaczyński along with over 90 other high-ranking 
state officials. 
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football representation played without the eagle on their t-shirts. This caused so much 
concern that the parliament decided to change the law and make wearing the eagle 
mandatory. MPs focused on how they were answering ‘outraged cries’ from the 
general public and society at large that apparently wanted this issue resolved. Overall, 
there was not much variety when it came to the meaning and importance of national 
symbols for Polish identity among MPs. From all sides of the parliament, they 
expressed pride of and loyalty to the symbol explaining its meaning by providing 
interpretations of its significance: 
(…) the eagle [in the diminutive form – orzełek] on the breasts of many 
sportspeople has been on the one hand an award, an honour, and on the other 
hand – the expression of integration with the nation, it was at the same time a 
type of motivating factor for sports rivalry (Krzysztof Łaszkiewicz, Secretary 
of State in the President’s Chancellery, 21.12.2011, 4, 39). 
The symbols of the Polish nation and state moulded and solidified through 
generations, especially the White Eagle, unite all Poles in the country and 
abroad. They are surrounded with reverence and respect, just as we should 
respect and revere any national representation. Everything that historically 
happened outside of the country, occurred under the coat of arms and the 
standard of the White Eagle (Franciszek Stefaniuk, 21.12.2011, 4, 43).86  
The missing eagle was a perceived dishonour or even an attempt at dismantling Polish 
identity: 
[The team played] without the symbol, which has been associated with our 
pride, our national identity that led us to victory and gathered us around itself 
and mobilized in defeat since forever (Andrzej Biernat, 21.12.2011, 4, 47). 
[The authorities that removed the eagle coat of arms from t-shirts] saw nothing 
wrong (…) nothing that would breach our national interest and the need to 
identify with people who speak the same language, breathe the same air, gather 
underneath the white-red standard, who in defence of the White Eagle 
sacrificed the highest value – their lives (Andrzej Biernat, 21.12.2011, 4, 47). 
These utterances give the impression that the issue was a matter of life and death and 
not a football game. The MPs seem to be giving similar value to representing Poland 
in sports as to conducting war under the Polish banner. Interestingly, a lot can be made 
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of the fact that the Sejm-wide debate focused on the male national team (hardly anyone 
even knows that there is a female football team). It also points to the importance of 
football as a mass sport used to mobilize masses on the one hand and, on the other 
hand, to depoliticize the youth (young men especially) by turning their attention from 
issues such as economic inequality to tribal competition (Perelman 2012). As Marc 
Perelman (2012) argued, international competitive sport (and football in particular) 
has been used as a national fetish that helps governments in the pursuit of racist and 
ethno-nationalist agendas. (Male) international competitive football has arguably 
taken the place of wars in mobilizing nationalist support. The way Polish MPs compare 
sport with war seems to support this claim – both are constructed as a ‘men’s thing’.87 
MPs from virtually all parties in the Sejm spoke in a similar emotional and passionate 
tone about the missing eagle as an assault on ‘Polishness’: ‘(…) for some bizarre whim 
will deprive us [obedrzeć – literally: ‘skin someone’] of what is most valuable’ 
(Andrzej Biernat, 21.12.2011, 4, 41). They also used a metaphoric language to convey 
the importance of the coat of arms: ‘we believe the White Eagle will give wings to our 
representatives in the stadiums’ (Tomasz Garbowski, 21.12.2011, 4, 43). ‘Every child 
wants to play [sports] with the eagle on its chest’ (Grzegorz Raniewicz, 21.12.2011, 
4, 46). 
National obligations: debt and responsibility  
The hegemonic discourse constructing national subjectivity suggests that Poles (elites 
and masses alike) owe a debt to the dead and in general to those who sacrificed 
themselves ‘for Poland’ (or who were sacrificed, to be more accurate). This comes 
across clearly in the debates commemorating Second World War events, ‘communist 
repressions’, as well as when honouring particular individuals. The debt is paid in the 
form of memory, but also appreciation, gratitude and a call to follow the example. 
However, this debt is owed only to specific dead, who are constructed as martyrs and 
victims. 
                                                 
87 According to Perelman (2012) countries that host Olympic games and international football 
championships pursue nationalist agendas and try to boost the athletic results through cheating and 
doping, in order to strengthen their national collectives through victories.  
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We, Poles, who live today in a free country, in a free Poland, owe an enormous 
debt to them [Poles living abroad due to Second World War resettlements and 
ethnic cleansing campaigns] and we have a duty to act in any possible way, so 
that the dream of thousands of our compatriots to see the fatherland, to return 
to Poland could finally come true (Robert Tyszkiewicz, 11.01.2012, 5, 43). 
Today we pay tribute to them [Home Army soldiers] and their fealty to the 
Fatherland is an inspiration for us and a source of national pride. It is our duty 
to pass on the memory of the Home Army to the next generations of Poles 
(Resolution commemorating the establishment of the Home Army, 
17.02.2012, 8, 239).88 
The values lauded by the dominant discourse consist of bravery and martyrdom (to the 
point of reality-defying daring that meant taking political and military risks that had 
no hope of success), sacrifice, honour, (national) dignity, devotion to church and 
catholic religion. All of them are unequivocally connected to the masculine ideal and 
to the male hero and role model. By commemorating and celebrating almost 
exclusively male figures, MPs use the strategies of linking the values that they cherish 
to the masculine gender (cf. Hansen 2006). 
Paradoxically, it is never explicitly verbalized what the constructed historical debt 
should make Poles do and what it consists of. For the most part, it involves a sense of 
guilt, which is meant to mobilize emotionally Poles and strengthen their bond to the 
state. Certainly, there is no call to arms in a specific contemporary context. 
Nonetheless, this debt and the proclaimed need to follow the example of the dead 
heroes and martyrs implies that there is a need to die or sacrifice oneself for something. 
This idea also implies that there would or will be a need for such loss, which fosters a 
siege mentality. Ultimately, it places the value of Polish lives quite low. The 
widespread use of the axiom ‘Bóg, honor, Ojczyzna’, gives a clue about the values for 
which Poles should sacrifice themselves. This is one of the most famous Polish mottos 
of all times – it means ‘God, honour, fatherland’, and has been a rallying cry and a 
justification for actions of politicians and statesmen for decades. Currently, it is also 
the motto of the Polish armed forces, it is supposed to point to what the army is fighting 
                                                 
88 In short, the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) was the underground Polish army during the Second 
World War that answered to the Polish government in exile in London.  
for. Again, this is seen as a set of values that Polish fighters, male fighters, soldiers, 
oppositionists and insurrectionists fight for. It is exclusionary and hierarchical.  
Furthermore, the analysed debates also expose clearly and explicitly what the MPs 
consider as Poland’s mission: ‘What is Poland’s mission in history? Zygmunt 
Krasiński was not afraid of this question. The grand duty of our nation was to imbue 
collective life with Christian values’89 (Barbara Bubula, 17.02.2012, 8, 259). This 
argument goes back to the 19th century notion of Poland as the ‘Christ of Nations’ that 
would die to save the rest of Europe either from ‘pagans’ (during Turkish invasions) 
or the ‘Asian horde’ (Russians) (Porter 2000; Prizel 1998). The level of racism and 
chauvinism implicit in this belief is never explicitly articulated, but cannot be 
underestimated.  
The debt of the Poles is not only owed to the masses that died ‘for freedom’. A similar 
logic is also applied to individuals who are venerated (both lay and religious) by MPs.  
The proposed legislation is a special ideological testament of Mr Maciej 
Płażyński, the former Speaker of the Sejm, a statesman, a noble human, 
tragically deceased on the way to the Katyn graves – the holy place on that 
“inhuman soil”.90 How many human beings were claimed by that soil! How 
much sweat and Polish blood soaked into it throughout decades and centuries 
until now. It would be a dishonour to oppose the oeuvre, which, if only in part, 
may assuage the Polish bad conscience and allow our ill-used compatriots [the 
repatriants] to live in Poland as our neighbours and awaited friends’ (Tadeusz 
Woźniak, 11.01.2012, 5, 50).91 
According to this understanding, the blood of the dead weighs on Poles and obliges 
them to act according to what the deceased would have wanted. In this particular 
debate, the repayment of the debt involves the continuation of the ideas and legacy of 
the deceased: ‘enabling their [Poles living abroad due to Second World War 
resettlements] return to the fatherland is our moral duty’ (Robert Tyszkiewicz, 
11.01.2012, 5, 43). Nonetheless, this is a somewhat precarious logical and 
                                                 
89 Zygmunt Krasiński (1812-1859) was one of the poets and writers who were commemorated by the 
Sejm in the 2011-2015 term. He is considered to be one of the Polish ‘great’ national poets. He was a 
Romanticist and thus associated to the 19th century ethos of national revival.  
90 ‘Inhuman soil’ refers to Russia (or the Soviet Union), even though it is not named. 
91 Maciej Płażyński was one of the 90 members of the Polish elite who died in April 2010 in a plane 
crash in Smolensk, Russia on the way to the commemoration site of the Katyn massacre of 1940. 
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psychological construction that resonates with the right-wing segment of the 
parliament. Due to the fact that these MPs invoke the memory of the dead according 
to their own needs, they ‘use’ them quite freely: ‘in the name of the memory of the 
valued and the name of those who rest in nameless graves [archaic and poetic: mogiła] 
as well as – before all – those who were denied graves’ (Tadeusz Woźniak, 11.01.2012, 
5, 51). 
Again, as in the previous discursive fields there is interdiscursive overlap when it 
comes to the figure of the former pope. Poles have a debt to him too: 
We, Poles, have a huge debt to pay off to John Paul II (…) every day. 
Independently of our faith, our creed, independently of our worldview, each 
and every one of us owes a piece of our current freedom in this room and 
outside it, to John Paul II (Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska, 24.04.2014, 66, 
159). 
Therefore, ‘(…) everyone has the duty to express gratitude and respect to John Paul 
II’ (Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska, 24.04.2014, 66, 159). MPs construct the former 
pope as part of national identity and many lieux de memoire (cf. Nora 1989) 
commemorate him all over the country – just as for the Katyn massacre. Thus, judging 
from the parliamentary debates, Poles need to constantly revere and live under the 
shadow of their dead, whose actions are selectively reinterpreted for current political 
goals and shape national citizenship.   
 
  
Table 6.8 Historic events commemorated by the parliament by type (2011-2015). 
Uprisings/insurgencies 7 
Constitution of governments and other political events 6 
WWII episodes of ethnic cleansing 6 
WWII massacres 4 
WWII resistance and military groups 4 
Battles 3 
Establishment of institutions 3 
Establishment of diplomatic relations 2 
Anniversary of major industrial/development projects 2 
Territorial acquisitions 2 
Abolition of a commemorative event 2 
Membership in international organizations  1 
Voting rights  1 
Christianising missions 1 
(Source: own compilation). 
Domestic fears and international commitments  
In the parliamentary debates on international obligations concerning the provision of 
legal guarantees for migrants and asylum for refugees, both the PO and opposition 
MPs agreed on the need to transpose EU and international laws into Polish legislation 
(Anna Nemś, Bogdan Rzońca, Artur Ostrowski 11.06.2015, 94, 221-224). In general, 
the stress was less on moral or ethical considerations and more on international legal 
commitments and pragmatic reasons. ‘Turning our backs on our partners, on countries 
that are today the goal of migration (…), goes against the values of solidarity and can 
cost us the loss of their solidarity in matters we care about’ (Grzegorz Schetyna 
16.09.2015, 100, 6). Humanitarian calls for help were mainly presented by the Prime 
Minister Ewa Kopacz (16.09.2015, 100, 3-5), when she reported to the Sejm on the 
refugee crisis in September 2015. Some PO, SLD, and TR MPs followed this line, 
basing their arguments in christian and ‘evangelical rhetoric’ (Rafał Grupiński, 
Abraham Godson, Tadeusz Iwiński).  
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Nonetheless, the majority of deputies advised caution: ‘The geopolitical situation of 
our region is becoming recently increasingly complicated and characterized by 
uncertainty (…) we are not a desert island. And we – as deputies and as a nation, must 
not forget’ (Mirosław Pawlak 11.06.2015, 94, 223). A perception of risk and threat 
was thus created. The danger lay in inviting someone to stay permanently: ‘It is evident 
that this is not just about inviting a guest to your home, but a long and arduous 
procedure’ (Mirosław Pawlak 11.06.2015, 94, 223). Deputies presented fear as a 
natural reaction to the presence of refugees. 
Notions of the primacy of security issues were brought into the debates: ‘I would like 
to highlight that in all the undertaken actions, security is the highest priority for us [the 
government]’ (Teresa Piotrowska 16.09.2015, 100, 7). The ‘yes, but…’ attitude was 
reinforced by questioning the identity of the migrants and especially of the refugees. 
‘Who can guarantee that refugees are really mistreated and oppressed? (…) who will 
verify the real reasons of abandoning their homeland?’ (Mirosław Pawlak 11.06.2015, 
94, 223). Despite the initial acceptance and lip service paid to the need of welcoming 
refugees based on EU agreements, refugees were quickly dehumanized in the debates 
and presented as ‘a wave that will flood us from countries of a different faith, where 
there are huge conflicts’ (Marek Matuszewski 11.06.2015, 94, 226).92  
Similarly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grzegorz Schetyna (16.09.2015, 100, 5), talked 
of a problem with ‘illegal migration’. By stressing the different faith and their 
‘illegality’ (which implied criminality) refugees were also othered, as foreign-alien 
and not compatible with the Polish nation. Instead, right-wing MPs in particular 
favoured certain groups of migrants over others, first and foremost being ‘Polish 
repatriants’ (who are not really refugees and would not fall under the legal categories 
within the proposed legislation in this debate, as discussed above) and then ‘Syrian 
Christians’ (Piotr Polak and Marek Matuszewski 11.06.2015, 94, 226). 
The debates on refugees demonstrate a certain degree of mistrust towards other EU 
member states with regards to their motivations and capabilities: ‘We will have so 
                                                 
92 My own stress in the quotations. 
many refugees here and Italy, France, and other rich countries of the EU will sigh with 
relief’ (Marek Matuszewski 11.06.2015, 94, 226). The most notorious articulation of 
this position was provided by the opposition leader and the president of the PiS 
political club, Jarosław Kaczyński (16.09.2015, 100, 13-14). I give his main argument 
here almost in full due to its controversial nature: 
The following question is crucial: (…) does the government, under foreign, 
outside pressure [obcy – alien] and without the acquiescence of the nation have 
the right to take decisions, which with a high degree of probability, will have a 
negative impact on our lives, on our public space, on our sphere of freedom, 
(…) on our safety (…) This is about the serious danger of commencing a 
process (…) that in short looks like this (…) the number of foreigners rapidly 
grows, then they do not abide (and they declare that don’t want to abide) by 
our law, our customs (…) and then in parallel they impose their sensibility and 
their requirements (…) in a manner that is very aggressive and violent(…) If 
someone thinks this is not true, let them look around in Europe. Look at 
Sweden for instance. There are 54 zones were sharia law is enforced and where 
the state has no control. (…) There are fears of hanging out the Swedish flag 
at schools, as the custom requires, because there is a cross on the flag. It turns 
out that Swedish girls, students can hardly wear short dresses, because it is not 
liked. (…) What is going on in Italy? Churches taken over, used as toilets. What 
is happening in France? Constant row, implementation of sharia too, patrols 
that make sure sharia is enforced. The same thing in London, and also the same 
thing is taking place in the strongest, firmest place – Germany. Do you want 
this to happen in Poland too? That we are no longer masters in our own country 
[gospodarz – master, host, landlord]? Is that what you want? (…) Orban was 
right here. It is their problem, not ours.93 
While at the beginning of the statement it was still not clear who, specifically, 
Kaczyński was talking about, he quickly moved on from the general to the specific 
and pinpointed Muslims as unwanted, foreign and alien others that are threatening to 
the Polish national substance, to the very existence and continuity of the Polish nation. 
Specifically, he hardly used the active voice, making the agents perpetrating the 
actions obscure – a nebulous and threatening ‘they’. The heavy-handed manipulation 
of data and the presentation of false information was also part of the contemporary 
electoral campaign (parliamentary elections were held a month later, in October 2015) 
                                                 
93 The following statement garnered a lot of media attention outside of Poland and provoked an 
official diplomatic reaction from the Swedish embassy in Warsaw. Polish centrist and liberal media 
presented it as scandalous, while right-wing commentators viewed them as the unwelcome truth that is 
silenced by political correctness. 
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and aimed to stir domestic fears against Muslim others.94 Rejection of refugees is 
constructed as responsibility for the fate of the Polish nation (Stanisław Wziątek 
16.09.2015, 100, 18).  
What kinds of subjects and values are constructed? 
The citizen-subject and the state 
One of the most important discourses used to construct the nation is the one that I 
delineate as the ‘citizen-subject and the state’. This field emerged first and foremost 
from the analysis of the debates concerning education (teaching history and Polish in 
schools). However, it has to be pointed out that the word ‘citizen’ seldom appears in 
the 170 debates that I examined, except in specific plenary debates about rules for legal 
citizenship, for passports, and for foreigners. Hence, the following discursive field is 
a misnomer on purpose. In essence, Polish deputies almost never talk of ‘Polish 
citizens’ and never address them as such. Instead, words like ‘compatriots’ and 
‘members of a nation’ or simply and most frequently ‘Poles’ are used. This is the result 
of a perceived over-use and thereby discrediting of the word obywatel (citizen) by the 
state socialist authorities prior to 1989. Obywatel is not a neutral term, but carries 
‘ideological baggage’ and is used only in its most technical and legal understanding, 
when there is no substitute. 
Similarly, the word ‘state’ is often replaced with the word ‘nation’ in Polish. In fact, 
the latter is far more frequent in all the debates under analysis. This exposes a 19th 
century vision of the state as the realization of the territorial claims of a certain ethno-
national group. This is very clear especially on the right side of the parliament: ‘(…) 
the state is an emanation of the nation, this is the basis of the philosophy of politics’ 
(Jan Dziedziczak, 11.01.2012, 5, 44). There is an implicit understanding about the 
feelings shared within the Polish community. This ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
1983) is held together by feelings of love, pride and memory. ‘May God keep safe all 
those who feel they are Poles, who cherish [in the archaic and religious form: miłować] 
                                                 
94 People of migrant origin make up less than 1% of the Polish population (around 0.3%) (GUS 2015).  
Poland and each other.’ (Tadeusz Woźniak, 11.01.2012, 5, 51).  On the other hand, the 
biggest threats come from forgetting about the nation’s heroes and the duty owed to 
them (see the discussion of Polish ‘historical obligations’ within this chapter): 
This situation [reducing the number of history classes in school] is dangerous 
for the Polish state and for our sense of national identity. A young person who 
does not know their own history is not capable of identifying with their own 
nation. Sooner or later [that person] will lose perforce their own sense of value. 
You [the government] want to prepare such a fate to young Poles. Poles have 
suffered very much over the course of their history and do not deserve such 
educational experiments (Marzena Wróbel, 28.03.2012, 11…). 
Often ‘cosmopolitanism’ is blamed as the villain that endangers the Polish nation. This 
shows curious interdiscursivity with state socialist rhetoric, in which ‘cosmopolitan’ 
was used interchangeably with ‘anti-state’ and ‘Jewish’, especially around the time of 
the 1968 anti-Semitic purges in Poland. Most probably involuntarily, but strikingly so, 
this rings of 1930s and 1940s anti-Semitism and shares a lot of interdiscursive 
elements with old xenophobic discourses, which are still recognizable and readable to 
the consumers of the current discourse:  
Stupidity, cosmopolitanism, egoism and the lack of identification with our own 
nation have cost us too much in the course of our history. It was such sins that 
brought us to the situation of loss of an independent state and then whole 
generations of Poles had to fight for this state (Marzena Wróbel, 28.03.2012, 
11, 120). 
The defining feature of a Pole is his, not her (sic!), heritage, in particular with regard 
to historic memory: ‘the building of the future has to be based on everything that was 
magnificent in history, which ennobled us and was the source of pride and respect for 
the achievements of the fathers’95 (Jan Ardanowski, 28.03.2012, 11, 123). The Polish 
state paradoxically has no mothers, even though researchers have shown that one of 
the most defining role models for Polish women has been the trope of Matka-Polka96 
(Janion 1996; Gerber 2011; Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2012; Hryciuk and Korolczuk 
2015). By extension, the duties to the state comprise of remembering and 
commemorating, in order to persevere as the nation. Jan Dziedziczak (11.01.2012, 5, 
                                                 
95 Stress is my own in all the translated quotes.  
96 For a discussion of the Matka-Polka trope see chapter 2.  
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44) sees it along similar lines: ‘it is about showing on the one hand that we are Polish 
together, and on the other hand the honour of the Polish state.’  
Role models: hero, martyr, saint  
The individuals commemorated by the Sejm in the current parliamentary term shed 
light on the type of role models that are set for society in terms of work, identity, and 
worthy ‘Polishness’. The majority of the ‘Polish national pantheon’ were statesmen or 
politicians and, most importantly, they were all men (see Table 6.9). The role models 
were all masculine and the national identity construct is therefore centred on the 
masculine ideals and values. According to the dominant narrative, the constructed 
Polish subjectivity is all-male and all-Polish ethnically, since all of the commemorated 
people, but one (Vaclav Havel), were Polish. The commemorated artists were 
honoured for their achievements in ‘spreading Polish culture in Europe’ or lauding the 
‘Polish national values’. Most of the writers, musicians and painters were either 
Romanticist or Positivist, representatives of two cultural and literary periods/trends in 
Polish history that stressed national identity and ‘Polishness’ above all in their work.   
A significant group of commemorated individuals were oppositionists, freedom 
fighters, and politicians/statesmen that are seen as either victims or heroes of their 
times. There is a stress on the sacrifices and hardships experienced by them in order to 
fight for and maintain Poland as a country. They are on the one hand heroes, on the 
other martyrs for the cause – black and white figures for the most part. Any 
inconsistencies in their biographies or grey areas in terms of personal choices or 
particular life events are glossed over and completely silenced. Their main 
characteristics are bravery and loyalty to Poland. Out of the 39 Polish individuals that 
were commemorated, not one showed any ambiguity in his/her (in the two female 
cases) relationship with the particular brand of ‘Polishness’ that is valued (see Figure 
6.5). Within this group there are none of those who contested the model of Polish 
identity based on death and sacrifice, no postmodernists, malcontents, or critics of 
stereotypical Polish national identity. 








WWII resistance fighters 4 








(Source: own compilation). 
 
An important feature of this discursive field is the special significance given to the 
position of the pope John Paul II in Polish history. ‘For us, Poles, the figure of John 
Paul II is an exceptional figure’ (Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska, 24.04.2014, 66, 
159). There is no hint of opposition to this from any side of the Sejm: 
(…) no one in this room and outside it has any doubts as to the enormous role 
of John Paul II during his 25-year long pontificate in the process of peaceful 
transformation, process of democratization and his support for Poland’s actions 
to accede to the European Union (…) This is beyond dispute (Tadeusz Iwiński, 
24.04.2014, 66, 160). 
While the quoted left-wing MP (SLD) was trying to argue that the Sejm should not 
commemorate the canonization of the former pope (because state and religion need to 
be separated), he could not have articulated his request in any other way than in the 
form of high indebtedness and gratitude towards Wojtyła. In the end, the parliament 
passed the resolution in honour of this event with less than 30 votes against and called 
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the former pope: ‘Father and Teacher’ (Resolution commemorating the canonization 
of John Paul II, 24.04.2014, 66, 159).  
It seems that current Polish MPs do not venerate other role models than those that have 
allegedly performed some special acts of sacrifice ‘for the country’. Creators, thinkers 
and people who contributed to material progress and development do not reach the 
pedestal constructed for the heroes-martyrs-saints. In keeping in line with the 
necrophile martyrology (cf. Janion 1996) discussed in chapter 2, religion, destruction 
and death are bases for respect and gratitude much more than development or 
constructive critique.  
The nation vs. Europe 
In the discursive constructions of the nation there is significantly less contestation as 
to the meaning of ‘Europe’ than in the family and welfare policy area. While in the 
latter case there are important counter-discourses which painted Europe as the ideal 
end goal of development and progress, in discourses about the nation, ‘Europe’ is an 
unequivocal threat. PO and TR ‘modernizing’ discourses are hardly articulated. Hence, 
Polish nationalism defines itself in opposition to Europe – as something separate and 
often morally better (if not more advanced).97 As seen in the debates concerning 
education in the subjects of history and the Polish language, and especially in those 
concerning national symbols, the discursive construction of Europe is thoroughly 
negative. Europe (often used interchangeably with European Union) is seen as a force 
of globalization and uniformity that aims to obliterate the particular Polish nationality.  
So, a false perspective is being created, a false temptation of considering the symbols 
of Polishness, of the Polish state, symbols expressing patriotism, Polish patriotism, as 
something outdated. And these symbols are to be replaced with the symbolic of the 
European Union (Jarosław Zieliński, 21.12.2011, 4, 46). 
                                                 
97 Polish nationalism has a long-standing and ugly ethno-nationalist tradition based on chauvinism, 
racism and xenophobia (going back to the times of the so-called Second Republic, 1918-1939). Its 
leaders like Roman Dmowski are still commemorated today (cf. Porter When nationalism began to 
hate). 
Do you [addressing the ruling parties and the government] want to destroy the 
knowledge of history of your own nation? Is it about some European political 
correctness? Is this the preparation to rewriting the history of Europe and of 
our fatherland anew, according to our current relations with the mighty of the 
modern world? (Jan Ardanowski, 28.03.2012, 11, 123). 
‘Europe’ is often conceptualized as ‘rich countries’ that make demands or want to be 
comfortable at the expense of Poland. In general, it is suggested that the ruling 
coalition and the government display a servile attitude towards these destructive 
forces:  
We are dealing with a government, which in order to deserve European praise, 
will bring about the situation where the Polish youth will not be competitive in 
the European job market (…) and without a murmur of discontent will perform 
jobs for little money that rich Europeans do not want to do (Ryszard Terlecki, 
28.03.2012, 11, 114). 
The solution therefore is to never give in and lose the memory and the national 
‘specialness’ of Poland. This was voiced clearly in the previously mentioned 
controversy about the national football team: ‘(…) we must not surrender to the 
ubiquitous globalization and to liken ourselves to the given federation [football 
association]’ (Jan Ziobro, 21.12.2011, 4, 44). 
The national others: outsiders and foreigners 
The analysis of this discursive field is based on legislative proposals concerning the 
rules for foreigners to live and work in Poland, legislation on ethnic minorities as well 
as the issue of how descendants of people who were resettled as a result of the Second 
World War by Soviet forces could return – ‘repatriate’ to Poland. The legislative 
projects on national minorities and foreigners were cases of transposition of 
international obligations (in the form of EU legislation) into Polish law. The law on 
repatriation was a citizens’ initiative. Importantly, the discursive field about foreigners 
and local ‘others’ such as minorities is not saturated with xenophobia or chauvinism. 
There is however clear preference as to what should be rewarded with state care: 
This matter [repatriation of Poles living beyond Polish borders] has also a (…) 
symbolic dimension. It seems to me that this is a certain answer to a 
civilizational challenge of the 21st century. Namely: whether we should first 
help, bring in to Poland our compatriots from Kazakhstan, who despite 
persecution maintain their bond with the Polish nation, or should we invest the 
money the Polish state is putting forward into, for example, people who do not 
identify with our collective, who come here solely for a better life. I mean some 
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representatives of ethnic minorities. It appears to me that we should extend a 
hand to everyone, but as the first steps we should prefer and help the members 
of our collective, just as many other countries in Europe do. Some countries 
did not do this and now have gigantic social problems due to people, who do 
not want to assimilate in the new collective. Poles who come from Kazakhstan 
– and this is proved scientifically – assimilate very quickly. Even if they still 
have some linguistic problems, they are happy to be in Poland, they consider 
Poland their fatherland. And this is a very important signal what we prefer, 
what is the most important to us (Jan Dziedziczak, 11.01.2012, 5, 44). 
Even though there is no overt racism, there is a clear preference for the ethnically ‘our 
own’ over the other (preference for ethno-nationalist homogeneity), no matter how 
that ‘own’ is idealized.98  
Interestingly, what also comes across in these debates are the economic calculations 
concerning the ‘others’. These are most clear when it comes to non-Polish outsiders, 
but can also be seen in the quote on the repatriates as well as in the considerations of 
the costs and benefits, both material and not, of bringing foreigners to Poland. ‘We 
need to consider how to treat the repatriation of our compatriots, whether it is a cost 
or maybe an investment in our society’ (Jakub Płażyński 11.01.2012, 5, 42). 
The values and subjects produced by discourses within the theme of national 
construction show a distinct division between what is ‘ours’ (Polish) and what is 
‘foreign’ (outside influence). Figure 6.5 below presents a compilation of the discursive 
values and subjects as drawn from the parliamentary debates analysed above. 
 
                                                 
98 In practice the people who the MPs are referring to are several thousand in numbers; most do not 
speak Polish but tarsanka (a peculiar mix of Polish, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian) and are 
descendants of people who were actually resettled from territories which are no longer in Poland 
today. 
Figure 6.5 Components of Polishness. 
 
(Source: own compilation). 
Polak-katolik99  
The Polish model of subjectivity that emerges most clearly in the debates on national 
identity and citizenship, as proscribed by the Sejm, is that they are unequivocally male. 
From the basic linguistic level to the more ideational stage, Polish women do not exist 
in the parliamentary discourse in this area. MPs never use the feminine grammar 
gender to denote concepts like ‘compatriots’, ‘Poles’, ‘heroes’, ‘insurgents’, etc. 
Unlike countries such as Germany, where all proper nouns must be used in both 
grammatical genders, the Polish ruling elite has not managed to add rodaczki (female 
compatriots), Polki (Polish women) or bohaterki (female heroes) anywhere. Following 
the intuitions of Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989), women in the national(ist) discourse 
rarely play the role of full-fledged and rightful actors of historical events and narratives 
of the collective.  
In a language like Polish, almost every act of speech, every utterance forces the 
specification of a grammatical gender, meaning the sex of the speaker, the subject of 
                                                 
99 ‘Polak-katolik’ – a Pole-Catholic (both nouns in masculine grammatical form, as opposed to the 
feminine ‘Polka-katoliczka’, which is never mentioned).  
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the clause, the addressee and/or the object that is being referred to (through pronouns, 
nouns, grammatical tense forms of verbs, adjectives, even ordinal numbers). For this 
reason, using consistently feminine forms (when referring to women) is a political 
statement. The majority of Polish language users however prefers or is just more 
accustomed to using masculine gender when referring to ‘neutral’ or standard 
positions/jobs/titles. Hence, almost all speakers use masculine nouns. Only one 
political group consistently uses both feminine and masculine grammatical genders of 
nouns (TR). This is often not welcome by right-wing MPs: ‘Poseł [male MP] Krystyna 
Pawłowicz. Please do not call me Posłanka [female MP]’ (Krystyna Pawłowicz, 
24.01.2013, 32, 175). The asymmetrical image of women and men is therefore 
encoded in the language (the vocabulary, phraseology, and in the syntax and 
morphology of the language) and produces linguistic sexism or androcentric language 
(Karwatowska and Szpyra-Kozłowska 2014). Despite having the grammatical option 
of creating female nouns corresponding to language needs, there is a lexical gap that 
blocks language users from doing so because of the lower social prestige of female 
names.  
 In all the discussed discursive fields and throughout the 170 debates, I did not find 
one reference to Polish women alongside Polish men. The intellectual ‘default’ 
member of the Polish nation and citizen is male. In this way, ‘he’ becomes the neutral 
form and creates an opaqueness in terms of how citizenship is actually gendered. What 
could this mean for Polish women? It might mean that they stop existing as a group 
with interests, especially in this area of politics. It also means that they have no other 
voice than that of a male-national. This is reflected, for instance, in how deputy 
Marzena Wróbel deploys the male hegemonic identity discourse. There is no plurality 
in this discourse, not only in terms of the hero-martyr-saint model of masculinity, but 
also in terms of any other forms of gender identity. Interestingly, some internationally 
known and widely respected Polish women are absent from Polish national 
subjectivity symbolics.  
Similarly, looking at the people and events that the parliament commemorated in the 
period 2011-2015, it is clear that the male-neutral model has an effect on what and 
who is valued in history. Only a single woman was commemorated individually for 
her own deeds or accomplishments – Halina Szwarz for the establishment of the 
University of the Third Age. One more woman was honoured together with her 
husband (as Second World War resistance members). Furthermore, the only historical 
event that pertained to women directly was the 2013 commemoration of the 95th 
anniversary of women’s right to vote. The parliamentary resolution spoke of ‘women 
receiving’ their voting rights, thereby denying any agency to the late 19th-early 20th 
century women’s movements that lobbied for women’s voting rights in the newly 
established independent Republic of Poland in 1918 and 1919.  
How is truth created? 
The discursive fields constructing the nation use strongly emotive and gendered 
language and appeal to affect. I show this on the specific example of the uses of the 
words concerning Poland as homeland. 
Fatherland-motherland 
In general, in the debates under analysis, Poland is referred to as ‘fatherland’ (ojczyzna, 
often capitalized), which arguably could also be translated as ‘homeland’. The official 
name of the country is practically always substituted with ojczyzna. The word itself is 
a term that has a certain pathos to it, but is very common and used regularly in the 
popular register. Conversely, it seems that most MPs have eschewed the older and 
archaic word macierz (motherland).100 It does pop up in especially emotional 
addresses, particularly by right wing MPs, like that of PiS’ Marek Polak (11.01.2012, 
5, 52) in the debate on the ‘repatriation’ of Poles from abroad.101 Macierz also features 
in the debate surrounding the Sejm resolution on the ‘90th Anniversary of the return of 
part of Upper Silesia to the Polish State being reborn’ (13.07.2012, 18, 188). Deputy 
Maciej Łopiński, a PiS deputy (13.07.2012, 18, 188), speaks about ‘reuniting Upper 
Silesia with the motherland’.  
                                                 
100 In fact, macierz is the archaic word for ‘mother’, but does not function linguistically as such 
anymore.  
101 Repatriation refers to the ancestors of those who were resettled by Soviet authorities as a result of 
the frontline and then border changes of the Second World War (for the most part the originally 
resettled people have already passed away). 
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Judging from these contexts, ‘motherland’ carries a more emotional and sentimental 
baggage than ‘fatherland’. It goes back to Medieval and especially later Romanticist 
notions of Polonia, the anthropomorphic Poland-as-a-woman image of the country. 
Polonia has some similarity to the French Marianne, but more to the Russian Rossiya-
Matushka. The difference is in the suffering and destitution of Polonia, which does 
not stand for victory or call to arms. Arguably, identifying the phantasm102 body of the 
national collective with a female figure (a female body) results in the uplifting (putting 
on a pedestal) of the imagined woman, on the one hand, and the instrumentalization 
and marginalization of the real woman and her body, on the other (cf. Janion 1996; 
Graff 2013). Hence, real women are seen as important for the nation in terms of 
reproduction and sexuality, as I observed in the family and welfare debates in the 
previous chapter. In this discourse, while the figure of the mother is more emotional, 
the ‘father’ is definitely more important. As I have shown in the sections above, what 
matters is what fathers have left as heritage for Poland, as well as what fathers have 
taught the nation. 
Another curious name for Poland that is derived from history, and used in 
parliamentary debates, is the ‘Most Serene Republic’ (Najjaśniejsza 
Rzeczpospolita).103 Here, the title is a reference to the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth (Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita Polska), an elective monarchy in 
Eastern Europe that lasted from 1569 (Union of Lublin) until 1795 (Third Partition of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and encompassed some of the territories of 
today’s Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, parts of Russia, and Ukraine. 
Unexpectedly, it is not used by right-wing MPs, but by a centre-right ruling party MP 
and a liberal opposition member (Marek Rząsa, 21.12.2011, 4, 46 and Piotr Paweł 
Bauć, 21.12.2011, 4, 47). As a cultural note, it refers to the time of the so-called First 
Polish Republic, which was in fact an oligarchic and feudal state run by the nobility, 
catholic church hierarchs, and aristocracy. However, within the Polish memory and 
                                                 
102 A term coming from elaborations of psychoanalysis that is often used by Polish cultural theorists to 
signify the realm of imagined people, objects, and realities. 
103 ‘Most Serene Republic’ (Serenissima Respublica in Latin) was a title of several of European states 
throughout history (most of them in modern day Italy).  
cultural politics, it is called the ‘Republic of Two Nations’ (Poland and Lithuania) and 
is presented as the golden age of tolerance, multiculturalism, and grandeur (in terms 
of territorial expanse especially). Despite there being no direct historical or even 
cultural links between the current ‘Third Republic’ and the ‘First Republic’,104 Polish 
politicians are keen to use the reference to signal imagined continuity and inheritance, 
but also perceived legitimacy.  
What can and cannot be said? 
Overall, there is significantly less discursive contestation and opposition in this area 
of politics than in the one of family and welfare politics. In practice, all sides of the 
parliament use the hegemonic discourse of nationalism (or patriotism, as they call it). 
Possibly, there is a case of self-silencing on the part of deputies who do not share this 
perspective. There is a strong representation of right-wing voices in this area, but not 
only; if the voice comes from the ‘left’ or centre, it uses the same discourse. Either this 
is a case of unspoken and uncontested institutional rules, or the ideological hegemony 
in terms of subjectivity, memory, and national identity is so prevalent that there are no 
competing discursive frames which can be used and allow for the maintenance of 
respect and prestige. There is a certain ‘banality’ in the genderedness of this patriarchal 
nationalism. However, it is significant that the related discourse is widely accepted and 
never questioned. It means that no political force calls into question the dominant, 
masculinist constructions of national subjectivity and commemoration. The 
impression is conveyed that women have little or no place in Polish subjectivity and 
historical celebrations.  
The dominant narrative on national identity shows interdiscursivity with Polish 
catholic church narratives, which historically have been used as vessels for preserving 
national identity. Deputies consider catholic prayer as a potential determinant for 
Polish citizenship for the repatriants (11.01.2012, 5, 41-60). The parliamentary 
commemorative celebrations also include priests, saints, and Christianising missions. 
                                                 
104 See discussion in chapter 1. 
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Conclusions 
The opening quote suggested expectations of ‘Polishness’ based on the belonging to 
the national collective. The analysis of the parliamentary debates has shown very 
specific constructions of subjectivity and values that compromise Polishness. 
Therefore, there are several components that glue the Polish nation together: founding 
myths and mythologized history, the particular vision of a collective, the common 
‘national character’, and threats to the nation (outside and inside) (cf. Graff 2013). 
Based on the parliamentary debates under analysis, these components include the 
history of suffering and sacrifice in the Second World War and under ‘communist 
totalitarian dictatorship’. Poles are self-sacrificing, honourable, brave, proud, and 
special. The threats to the constructed Polishness come both from inside the country 
(from those who do not want to assimilate or those who do not accept the Polish values) 
and from outside (in the form of foreigners, international imposed obligations, but also 
importantly from ethnic diversity).  
As I discussed in chapter 2, gender is one of the most important components that 
naturalizes the idea of the nation. The nation is constructed through masculine, 
catholic, and nationalist subjects. Significantly, the stress on war and military 
endeavour as that, which is considered worthy of commemoration and celebration, 
points to the militarization of Polish nationhood. This emerges from debates on the 
key historical figures to which the Polish nation is allegedly indebted. They are almost 
exclusively male, fighters, religious figures, and conservative statesmen from the time 
of the Second Republic. Therefore, Polish citizens are seen as national(ist) subjects 
who must humbly commemorate the masculine nation and its male conservative and 
religious symbolic figures. Even the language practice is androcentric, which 
strengthens hegemonic masculine hierarchies. The nation is usually referred to as 
‘fatherland’, whereas the term ‘motherland’ is only used in more emotive (and thus 
less masculine, more feminized, from the perspective of the speaker) contexts. 
Strongly masculine and militarized overtones are also present in debates on national 
symbols in sport, which can be juxtaposed to war, and this essentialized as another 
masculine national enterprise. The catholicism of Polishness comes clearly across in 
the debates in immigration and refugees, who were constructed as a threat to the 
national collective and its values for their difference religious faith. In the nationalist 
discourses, Europe and non-ethnic Polish citizens and foreigners are othered and 
portrayed as alien to the values of Polishness. While as the opening song suggests, art 
and culture allow for open contestation and a ‘struggle with Polishness, the hegemonic 
parliamentary discourses on the nation do not permit discursive dissidence or 
subversion. ‘Patriotism’ and catholicism are treated as given constituent components 
of the construction of Polish subjectivity. Thus, the last empirical chapter of the 
dissertation discusses the Polish nexus of politics and religion in more detail on the 
example of the ‘war on gender’ campaign.  
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‘Equality of opportunity – yes, but gender equality is a heresy.  
There is no gender equality. 
(…) Biology says ‘no’, nature says ‘no’, God’s law says ‘no’ (…) 
You can be outraged with (…) the Lord.’ 
Beata Kempa105 
 
Since mid-2012 Poland witnessed a heated debate over so-called ‘gender ideology’. 
The discussion has taken the form of attacks and virulent critiques disseminated by 
high-level politicians, catholic establishment and neoconservative media throughout 
the local and national levels of administration and government. The term gender (used 
in English) was even chosen as the word of the year 2013 in Poland.106 Why was an 
obscure academic concept and foreign word the most-discussed topic in Poland? The 
Polish language has not got two words for ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. What is more, there is 
no direct or linguistically convenient translation for the word ‘gender’, as it is used by 
social sciences (in Anglophone countries especially). The Polish equivalent of 
‘gender’ stemming from the field of linguistics (rodzaj), which exists in Polish, has 
never stuck in social sciences. For this reason, most scholars use the English term 
(keeping its original spelling). A minority have resorted to using the awkward wording 
construction: ‘social and cultural sex’.107  
The political and discursive context in which ‘gender’ emerged as a hot topic was 
crucial. This chapter shows that Poland saw the waging of a peculiar ‘war on gender’ 
in political debates that originated in the catholic church and faith-based organizations 
and spilled over into mainstream politics. It also analyses a central puzzle, which exists 
in the discursive construction of gender as an archenemy and threat in Polish political 
debates of 2012-2014. Given that feminism as a movement and a way of thinking was 
discredited already in the early transformation years, the question is: what was the 
                                                 
105 The SP (Solidarity of Poland) deputy, Beata Kempa, during the parliamentary debate on the 
Istanbul Convention (24.09.2014, 75, 111). 
106 The selection was done by the academics from the University of Warsaw and the Polish Language 
Foundation. ‘Gender’ won ahead of words like ‘wiretapping’ and ‘Euromaidan’. 
107 Paradoxically, the lack of linguistic differentiation between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ in Polish can be 
arguably in line with the developments in gender studies, according to which scholars no longer make 
stringent exclusive divisions between the two concepts, no longer seeing a case of ‘either-or’. 
significance of the anti-gender discourse now? In whose interest did this happen and 
what work was done by the deployment of this discourse today? The main issue is to 
investigate how much the discourse in politics was a reaction and how much it was an 
active and purposive policy by political parties. As the opening quote suggests, there 
is a connection between opposition to gender equality in the discourse of ‘war on 
gender’ and the role of constructions of natural law and religion in politics. I argue the 
anti-gender mobilization emerged as a response of party politics to catholic church 
needs; this happened in parallel with a political mobilization against the burdensome 
post-transformation inequalities that produced many political ‘losers’ disenchanted 
with the mainstream political arena. Specifically, I explore how right-wing politicians 
followed what the church provided them with in this discourse. The church 
conveniently pushed a scapegoat onto the scene, which the politicians took on 
willingly.  
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the broader transnational debates about 
the backlash against feminism and regional anti-gender trends in recent years. The 
subsequent analysis is divided according to the questions outlined in chapter 3: Who 
is speaking? What/who is being talked about? What subjects and values are produced? 
How is truth created? What can and cannot be said? Next, I unpack the content of the 
anti-feminist and anti-gender discourses in Polish politics using the example of the on-
going problems with the Polish signing and ratification of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic 
Violence. I also trace the evolution of specific formal political institutions that take on 
gender as one of their main topics: the new parliamentary group ‘Stop Gender 
Ideology!’, the parliamentary group ‘Counteracting the Atheization of Poland’, and 
the office of the Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment in the Polish government. 
Specifically, I look at the parliamentary debates in which such discursive framing was 
used in the discussion of parliamentary bills, policies, and specific legislation dealing 
with women’s or sexual minority issues in Poland. The chapter concludes with the 
possible interpretations of the reasons to deploy this discourse and points to the 
possible answers. 
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International context, change and continuity 
This chapter aims to shed light on the ways the debate on ‘gender ideology’ is 
interconnected with earlier anti-feminist discourses and practices from the post-
transformation context of Poland, as well as the Eastern European region more 
broadly. This is of particular significance because post-transformation Eastern Europe 
has been arguably the locus of the rise of religion in the form of ‘revenge of God’ 
(Kepel 1993) and nationalism. Both have been threatening to equality and diversity 
and have rolled back the achievements of feminist and LGBTQ+ movements. The 
French political scientist Gilles Kepel (1993) sees the ‘revenge of God’ in political use 
of religious ressentiment (he avoids the term ‘fundamentalism’ itself because he claims 
its protestant origins are inadequate to understand revivalist movements throughout 
the world) ranging from America to Europe and the Middle East. He traces it in 
protestantism, judaism, and islam. Kepel argues that these revivalist and often 
revanchist movements resist the spirit of modernity and secularism. They seek to 
recreate society according to a set of symbols and values in accordance with their holy 
scriptures (Kepel 1993). They pursue both a strategy from above, attempting to seize 
state power and using domestic legislation to promote their ends; and a strategy from 
below, ‘evangelizing’ the masses and seeking to take control of their daily lives 
through mobilized focused protests, for instance. The same phenomena can be traced 
in Eastern Europe with the resurgence of ressentiment in catholic and Eastern orthodox 
religions especially, but also in other faiths. 
The recent ultraconservative anti-gender mobilization is not unique to Poland, where 
progress in the field of gender equality has not only been rather stagnant and uneven, 
but also much shakier and easier to reverse than activists and academics had imagined 
(Grzebalska 2016). Also in countries such as Croatia, Germany, Italy, France, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia, the post-war consensus on human 
rights seems to be threatened as issues such as gender mainstreaming, sexual 
education, LGBTQ+ rights and reproductive rights have come under coordinated 
attacks by the church, religious and lay conservative NGOs, right-wing politicians, and 
even grassroots mobilizations (Kovats and Põim 2015). Since the transnational anti-
gender campaign began unfolding around the period of 2012-2014, these actors have 
arguably achieved a lot in material terms: they managed to mobilize hundreds of 
thousands of people for demonstrations and civil initiatives across Europe, hindered 
the passing of progressive laws or the ratification of international treaties advancing 
human rights, cut state funds for gender quality programs and, in countries like 
Hungary, even had input in the change of the constitution (Kovats and Põim 2015). 
Hence, the period around the years 2012-2013 marks a critical juncture for the 
previously relatively well-established human rights consensus in Europe. In several 
countries, gender equality, sexual education, and LGBTQ+ rights became the target of 
interrelated attacks and have been brought to unprecedented public attention lumped 
together under the term ‘gender ideology’ (Kovats and Põim 2015). As researchers 
from France, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia have pointed out, the term ‘gender 
ideology’ had sporadically appeared before, but it became influential in European 
public discourse only recently (Kovats and Põim 2015).  
The anti-gender mobilizations show significant intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
across European countries. For instance, in 2008, the German ‘marches for life’ or so-
called ‘thousand crosses-marches’ roused public attention to a renewed fight against 
abortion and in favour of the protection of ‘unborn life’ (using the same concept as in 
Poland). Similarly, in Hungary in 2012, the new constitution has laid down the law 
protecting ‘the fundamental human right to life from the moment of conception’ and 
declared that marriage should only be between a man and a woman. The following 
year, in France, over one million people demonstrated against ‘gay marriage’ (muslims 
and christians together, showing ecumenical cooperation). As in Poland, the term 
‘gender’ only reached the French public attention around 2013 (Brustier 2015). In 
Slovakia (as in Poland), the main trigger of the debate on ‘gender ideology’ and a focus 
point for the anti-gender discourse was arguably the Pastoral letter addressed to 
catholics by the Slovak Bishop Conference in December 2013 (Ďurinová 2015). In 
Italy, the so-called Standing Sentinels (Sentinelle in Piedi) have launched silent public 
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protests to protect the ‘traditional family model’ in response to a legislative proposal 
that outlawed homophobia and LGBT+ discrimination in 2013.108 
Thus, common focal points or triggers of the anti-gender campaigns all over Europe 
involve existing legislative proposals in the field of women’s and sexual minority 
rights, as well as the perceived gains by the LGBTQ+ community or by feminists. 
Specifically, these include civil partnerships or same-sex marriages, sexual education 
for children, anti-discrimination laws that criminalize homophobia, gender equality 
policies (and gender mainstreaming), and reproductive and sexual health rights. The 
catholic church especially, but also the Eastern orthodox church, provide narratives 
that catalyse the ‘war on gender’. Arguably, the organized religions have managed to 
channel different types of societal discontent with globalization and produce an 
alternative ‘anti-globalist’ account related to the economic crisis responses; one in 
which ‘gender’ plays the role of the personified imposition of alien and oppressive 
values. For historic reasons, this kind of rhetoric has very strong resonance in the 
postcolonial and (semi)peripheral area of Eastern Europe. Therefore, the ‘war on 
gender’ can be seen as an instance of hijacking of post-colonialism that I discussed in 
chapters 2 and 4.  
In Eastern Europe, the rise of religious ressentiment and nationalism are interwoven 
and mutually constitutive (cf. Kepel 1993). As I discussed in more detail in chapter 4, 
religion is often the dominant component of the revived and mythologized national 
identities. Using the rhetoric of ‘return to tradition’ (Funk 1993; Grabowska 2012; 
Magyan-Vincze 2006), it gives religious practices a more unchangeable and 
permanent image. In the light of economic crises, Eastern European states have readily 
supported and often used narratives of religion and nationalism in order to divert 
people’s attention through hate campaigns of moral panic and by offering a scapegoat. 
Hence, the newly coined terms ‘gender ideology’ or ‘genderism’ enforce (reinforce) 
and entrench specific ultraconservative religious interests in politics. Considering that 
there are few parliamentarians promoting women’s and sexual minority issues and that 
                                                 
108 For a description of the activities, motivations, and methods, see the Sentinelle website: 
http://sentinelleinpiedi.it/chi-siamo/ (accessed Novemeber 2016).  
‘politics is a man’s world’ in Eastern Europe, the question is how the anti-gender 
discourse has been impacting the institutional and discursive context of the Polish 
parliament (Pabijanek 2013).  
As I discussed in the previous chapters of this dissertation, Polish post-transformation 
politics rejected feminism and lauded the protection of ‘our’ (=Polish traditional) 
values. Thus, anti-feminist discourses are not new and neither are they specific or 
endemic to this particular region only (as can be seen in the examples above). 
Therefore, it is all the more important to question the extent to which and how the anti-
gender discourse ties into more global discourses that castigate feminism and gender 
studies. Already in 1991, Susan Faludi showed the workings of an anti-feminist 
backlash in the United States, following what was seen as the ‘women’s decade’ 
involving significant feminist advances of the 1970s. Faludi (1991) argued that the 
anti-feminist backlash then took the form of media claims that feminism created 
problems such as (one of the favourite myths) the ‘epidemic of infertility’ and the ‘men 
shortage’. These were illusory and constructed without any reliable evidence. 
According to Faludi (1991), the backlash was also a historical trend, generally 
recurring when ultraconservatives perceived that women have made substantial gains 
in their efforts to obtain equal rights. 
In her article Lost between the Waves? The Paradoxes of Feminist Chronology and 
Activism in Contemporary Poland, Agnieszka Graff (2003) offered one of the first 
interpretations of the Polish backlash against women’s and sexual rights in Poland. 
Talking about the pre-accession period in Poland, she argued that ‘if we were to apply 
American chronology to this particular moment, we would probably have to call it a 
third wave form with a second wave content in a backlash context’ (Graff 2003: 102). 
She was referring to the strongly misogynist and mythicized anti-feminism of the 
1980s in the West, combined with modern social media articulations and popular 
culture references to third wave feminism. 
 However, Graff also observed that such a paradoxical moment for Polish feminism is 
‘precisely what calls for a new analytical framework, one tuned into local specificity 
and political context, as well as the dynamics of cultural borrowing’ (Graff 2003: 103).  
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As I have shown in chapter 2, it has been a longstanding tradition to assess the social 
processes that take place in Eastern Europe and post-state socialist states from the 
perspective of Western historical narratives. Arguably, the account suggested by Graff 
can be seen as an example of this. Social transformations and the development of civic 
movements in the region were often seen as reflections of global and transnational 
processes and trends. However, what was often missing or understated in such 
assessments was the local context, one that shapes the modes and the intensity of both 
conservative and feminist rhetoric and practices (Grabowska 2014). Therefore, the 
anti-gender processes certainly have to be considered as a part of the transnational 
process of backlash against women and sexual minority rights, but they also need to 
be traced back to the historical moments that secured the unique position of the catholic 
church in Poland – one that allowed the representatives of this institution to express 
their opinions and views from a position of power and to claim their indispensability 
to Polish culture, society, and politics (see chapter 4). 
The recent anti-gender campaign and the solidified role of the catholic church in the 
public sphere are certainly not the first signs of a backlash against women’s and sexual 
rights in Poland. These processes are not particular to the Polish political scene either, 
as we have seen so far. Elżbieta Korolczuk (2014) proposes to see the recent ‘war on 
gender’ as a transnational rather than local phenomenon. Authors like Louise Chappell 
(2006: 491) have shown that during the 1990s, at the international level, an ‘unholy 
alliance’ of the Vatican, Muslim fundamentalists, the US right-wing, and occasionally 
other states have united to fight against women’s reproductive and sexual rights at the 
United Nations and in other international organizations.  
This was done mainly around and in response to the 1995 Fourth World Conference 
on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace (shortly known as the Beijing 
Conference). The Beijing Conference resulted in a Platform for Action that is 
considered by many activistst and researchers as a cornerstone in terms of progress on 
women’s rights globally. The heated discussion on how to define the term ‘gender’ 
dominated the negotiations and extended later into the debates establishing the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ‘unholy alliances’ apparently ‘[could 
not] accept ambiguous terminology concerning unqualified control over sexuality and 
fertility, particularly as it could be interpreted as a societal endorsement of (…) 
homosexuality’ (UN Document No. A/CONF.177/20).109 During the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, Russia, and other Eastern European countries have joined the bandwagon 
of the ‘unholy alliance’.  
As outlined in chapter 4, when several Eastern European countries aspired to join the 
EU, they subscribed to the gender equality and gender mainstreaming policies of the 
EU. At that time, there was no open rejection of the principles of gender equality in 
the countries that a decade later experienced the ‘war on gender’ in the region. As 
David Paternotte observed (2014), these recent mobilizations and anti-gender 
campaigns in Europe display partly new discourses and forms of organization, 
attempts by established conservative actors to reach beyond their traditional circles 
and connect with a wider audience. Hence, while such discourses are not entirely new, 
there is something particularly strong about them currently in Europe. There are 
intertwining global and domestic features.  
Leading up to the ‘war on gender’ in Poland 
While not permeating into the greater public (not until the late 2000s at least), feminist, 
gender and queer studies modestly, but progressively established themselves as 
academic disciplines in most Polish universities, academic centres and think tanks 
throughout the late 1990s and 2000s. What is more, as I showed before, there were 
little qualms about accepting the EU acquis communautaire concerning equality and 
gender mainstreaming in the accession process before 2004 (albeit scholars have 
argued most of this legislation was transposed in Eastern Europe without even the 
basic understanding of what it meant in practice). Hence, gender as an analytical and 
academic concept has been present in Polish (academic and feminist) debates in the 
last two decades. Therefore, it is all the more important to ask why there was such a 
public onslaught on a widely unknown scholarly concept. 
                                                 
109 In fact, the term ‘gender ideology’ itself was coined by the catholic church in relation to the United 
Nations conferences in Cairo and Beijing. For a discussion see: D.E. Buss (1998), Relics and Rights: 
the Vatican and the Beijing Conference on Women, Social & Legal Studies 7(3), 339-363. 
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As I discussed in chapter 4, the starting point to understand this is the powerful role of 
the catholic church in Polish politics. Coming out of the state socialist years, the church 
had accumulated an unparalleled social capital, being the focus place of democratic 
opposition and the protector of the true (‘anti-communist’) national identity. As argued 
earlier, in chapters 4 and 5, the social legislation implemented in Poland since 1989 
has followed the catholic church recommendations (Chełstowska et al. 2013). Poland 
has a restrictive abortion law and there are controversies about the interpretation of the 
definition of marriage within the Polish constitution; there are no civil partnerships 
within Polish law.  
All these legal provisions have been presented to the Polish public either as a 
compromise or as the ‘will of the conservative majority’.110 In practice, they were a 
direct result of lobbying by the Polish catholic church in politics (Środa 2009; 
Chełstowska et al. 2013). The ‘compromise’ was presented as common sense of the 
public, specifying that this was the ‘religious’ or ‘conservative’ majority. Because 
politicians in Poland accommodate the church, provisions with regards to ‘worldview 
matters’ (kwestie swiatopogladowe), as all questions regarding sexuality and 
relationships are commonly called in Poland, are either banned, heavily restricted by 
law (for instance, abortion), or ignored by the authorities (as in the case of sexual 
education). Nonetheless, as I showed in chapter 5, all these practices exist and are not 
rare. As one political commentator has pointed out, in this way ‘freedom has been 
privatized in Poland and access to it depends on social class, and therefore on the 
contents of one’s wallet, level of education and place of residence’ (Sierakowski 
2014). Sierakowski (2014) rightly pinpointed the socio-economical conditionings that 
determine whether someone in Poland can enjoy liberal rights and freedoms, or even 
access to health care and institutionalized care. 
As I discussed in more detail in chapter 4, Polish feminist activists and scholars stated 
that women’s reproductive rights (e.g. the liberalization of the abortion law) and a 
freeze on civil partnerships legislation were ‘sold off’ by the SLD government in 2001-
                                                 
110 The 1993 anti-abortion law in Poland is almost unanimously referred to as a ‘historic compromise’. 
For a discussion of the law and its background, see chapter 5.  
2005 in exchange for the support of the church in the EU accession referendum (held 
in June 2003) (Graff 2008a; Środa 2009). Polish feminist activists protested these 
developments in a letter to the EU Commission in 2003 (List Kobiet 2003). However, 
the SLD government considered church support for EU integration as vital for the 
referendum. For that reason, despite having a parliamentary majority and against their 
electoral promises, the SLD government never again broached the question of 
liberalizing abortion in parliament. Thus, as can be seen from the discussion in chapter 
4, pre-2004 politics set the stage for the full-fledged conservative backlash that began 
once the transformation and accession periods was considered as completed. 
The anti-equality backlash arguably began with the debate on the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (Istanbul Convention). Poland has been debating the signing and the 
ratification of the treaty since the spring of 2012. As I have briefly discussed in chapter 
1, the Minister of Justice, Jarosław Gowin, refused to sign the document because, in 
his view, it went ‘against the family values of most Poles’. After Gowin’s dismissal 
from the PO-PSL government and strong lobbying by women’s rights organizations, 
the new Minister of Justice signed the Istanbul Convention in December 2012. 
Following that the document was stalled in ‘inter- and intra-ministerial consultations’ 
and, later, in parliamentary committee proceedings.  
Finally, the issue of ratification was set to be discussed in the first plenary session of 
September 2014, but was postponed to the next session due to the government 
change.111 At that parliamentary session (24-26 September 2014), the proposal to ratify 
the convention was rejected and sent back to the legislative committees for more work. 
In the end, under the pressure of the new Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, the parliament 
ratified the Istanbul Convention in February 2015 (Kopacz apparently controlled the 
dissenting PO MPs), and in April of that year President Komorowski signed it 
(arguably as part of the electoral campaign prior to the October 2015 elections). 
                                                 
111 PM Donald Tusk became the President of European Council and the government was reshuffled, 
with the speaker of the Sejm, Ewa Kopacz, becoming the PM in September 2014.  
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Who is speaking? 
The church authorities and catholic hierarchs 
While most political and media observers pinpointed the origins of the discursive war 
on gender to the summer of 2013 (when Polish bishops first spoke vocally against 
‘gender’ in public), some scholars have traced the ‘gender ideology’ discourse to 
specialist and obscure catholic church publications of 2010 (Duda 2016). As argued, 
the political beginnings of the ‘war on gender’ lie in the refusal to sign the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence in the spring of 2012 by the Minister of Justice. The following 
months saw a virtual avalanche of anti-feminist and anti-gender rhetoric.  
The intensified church assault began with bishop Tadeusz Pieronek (initially 
considered part of the liberal wing of the church) adding a side comment at a 
conference: ‘I would like to add that the ideology of gender presents a threat worse 
than Nazism and Communism combined’ (Sierakowski 2014). This meant that the 
construct of ‘gender ideology’ was worse than the two main historical enemies against 
which post-1989 Polish national subjectivity was built. At that stage, Pieronek did not 
have more to say about his statement, nor could he name any victims or give the 
number of people killed or affected by the threat of gender (Sierakowski 2014). He 
did, however, repeat his statement, while adding that ‘gender ideology’ is at odds with 
nature and natural law.  
Bishop Pieronek’s statement sparked a series of ever more controversial actions by the 
church hierarchy. Posters appeared in schools and in regional parliament sessions 
calling to ‘Protect Your Child Against Gender’. Towards the end of 2013, the major 
Polish daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza reported that young children had begun 
asking their parents how they can be vaccinated against gender.112 Since the summer 
of 2013, almost every day has seen new pronouncements warning against gender 
                                                 
112 The full article is available at: 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,15112785,Mamo__czy_jestem_zaszczepiona _na_gender_.html (accessed 
November 2016). 
ideology. For example, in a public talk in Poznań, a priest said that ‘gender leads to 
the devastation of families’ and ‘is associated with radical feminism, which advocates 
abortion, the employment of women and the detention of children in preschools’.113  
Polish feminist scholars, such as Agnieszka Graff (2014) and Weronika Grzebalska 
(2015), have pointed out that the apogee of ‘anti-genderism’ coincided with the 
outbreak of a paedophilia scandal in the Polish catholic church. Unsurprisingly then, 
the main agents of the anti-gender discourse were high officials of the Polish 
conference of bishops. For instance, archbishop Józef Michalik claimed that ‘gender 
ideology’ was one of the causes (along with pornography and divorce) that lead to 
child sexual abuse. He infamously blamed children from broken homes or patchwork 
families for causing paedophilia in the catholic church, by claiming that such children 
‘cling to priests’ because they supposedly lack love.114 To turn away attention from 
the paedophilia scandals among catholic church authorities, the bishops constructed a 
worse evil and true enemy: ‘genderism is an anthropological heresy, it is beyond 
salvation’.115  
The catholic clergy played on racist and chauvinist fears and presented them during 
church meetings and sermons: 
[G]ender ideology is aimed against me and my identity, which originates in 
who I am as a human being, is determined by my biology, that is the genetic 
code (…) Gender ideology leads to the death of a given civilization (…) I can 
even easily imagine how in some time (I hope I shall not live to see this myself) 
in the year 2050, the several white people left will be shown to other human 
races here in Europe, just like Indians were shown in the United States in 
reservations. There were once these people who lived here, but they stopped 
existing at their own behest, because they could not accept who they were 
biologically’ (Archbishop Jędraszewski, Meeting with the youth, Pabianice 
17.11.2013).116 
                                                 
113 For a full description of the event, see: 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,15095636,Ks__prof__Bortkiewicz 
_o_przerwanym_wykladzie_w_Poznaniu_.html (accessed November 2016). 
114 For more details on the story, see: http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/abp-michalik-o-
pedofilii-dziecko-lgnie-drugiego-czlowieka-wciaga,361169.html (accessed November 2016).  
115 For more see: http://natemat.pl/84629,arcybiskup-hoser-gender-jest-herezja-neguje-plan-bozy-w-
stosunku-do-czlowieka (accessed November 2016). 
116 The full story is available at: http://www.dzienniklodzki.pl/artykul/1044485,abp-jedraszewski-
bialych-beda-pokazywac-jak-indian-w-rezerwatach,id,t.html (accessed November 2016).  
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The quote is characterized by using and conflating medical-scientific, rationalizing, 
and faith-based stylistics. This does not mean that the logic of argumentation is 
medical, logical, or religious. It just uses rhetoric techniques based in those traditions 
– the references are at style level, not at the level of sense and facts. According to this 
line of thinking, individual DNA coding seems to fulfil the function that was until now 
performed (according to religious argumentation) by the individual and unique human 
soul. What is more, according to the bishops, the dangers of gender ideology came not 
only from the rejection of the godly ‘natural’ gender role order, but also from its 
potential consequences in the form of annihilation of the white race. 
The bishops voiced their official opinion in a pastoral letter entitled Threats to the 
Family Stemming from the Ideology of Gender. The letter was read in most Polish 
churches instead of sermon on Christmas Day 2013, when even the usual church non-
goers traditionally attend mass as part of a wider cultural habit. The letter proclaimed 
that the ‘sexualization’ of children and youth was the main goal of gender equality 
education (in pre-schools and schools). The word ‘sexualization’ is a neologism in 
Polish, which initially gained prominence in the context of the this discourse. Similarly 
to Minister Gowin’s original claim (see chapter 1), the church saw the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence as promoting ‘non-stereotypical sexual roles’ and causing the 
breakdown of the educational system by requiring education on homosexuality and 
transsexuality (List Pasterski 2013).117  
In the pastoral letter, the bishops also attacked the World Health Organization by 
claiming that it ‘promotes, among other things, masturbation by preschool-aged 
children, encouraging them to seek joy and pleasure in touching their own bodies and 
those of their peers’ (List Pasterski 2013). The bishops warned that ‘as a consequence 
of the education implemented by youth sexual educators, young people become regular 
customers of pharmaceutical, erotic, pornographic, paedophile and abortion 
                                                 
117 The full text of the letter is available at: http://www.polskokatolicki.pl/RODZINA/2013_12/ 
List_Pasterski_AD2013.htm (accessed November 2016). 
enterprises’ (List Pasterski 2013). Eventually the original text of the letter was replaced 
with a toned-down version less than two hours after it was published.118 Even so, the 
bishops announced that both versions were legitimate, but that the original was for 
pastoral use and the second version for the laity. 
‘Gender’ or ‘genderism’ has been demonised as a wicked and well-prepared plan to 
destroy the innocence of Polish children. Following this logic, children would be 
confused about gender roles at an early age, only to become later the slaves of the 
homo /feminist /anti-church lobby. As one journalist put it in the Catholic journal 
Niedziela, ‘gender ideology’ has disastrous consequences for: 
Polish families, the church and eventually the Polish nation, through the 
propagation of a new type of person who is endowed with the freedom to 
choose his /her sexual identity, regardless of biological sex. Since such 
freedom is against ‘natural law’ and God's will, this trend will inevitably result 
in emotional and moral confusion, eventually destroying the very foundations 
of our civilization.119 
Thus, ‘gender ideology’ was essentialized as supreme ontological evil, threatening the 
very existence of Polish catholicism and the continuity of the Polish nation, since the 
two are inextricably linked within ultraconservative discourses, as I demonstrated in 
the previous chapter. 
Anti-gender mobilization in Polish politics 
Echoing the campaign driven by the catholic church, right-wing and ultraconservative 
politicians (mainly from the opposition parties, such as PiS and SP, but not only) 
pointed to the concept of ‘gender ideology’ as the new threat to traditional family 
values in the country. Lining up behind the catholic church, conservative politicians 
convened a new parliamentary group and called it ‘Stop Gender Ideology!’, consisting 
of one woman and fifteen men in January 2014 (within a couple of weeks after the 
pastoral letter). Members of regional parliaments (for instance in Lublin and Szczecin) 
                                                 
118 Such information came from Gazeta Wyborcza, see: http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,15198710,Gender 
_na_niedziele__Jak_sie_zmienial_list_Episkopatu_.html (accessed November 2016). 
119 Full article available at: http://sunday.niedziela.pl/artykul.php?dz=spoleczenstwo&id_art=00969 
(accessed April 2016). 
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held sessions to monitor the use of funds on school and pre-school curricula that 
implemented gender equality norms.120  
The role of regional self-governments in this context is important because, despite 
being centralized, education in Poland falls under the funding and monitoring 
competencies of regional parliaments and governments. Significantly, in March 2014, 
the Wołomin county (outside of Warsaw) launched the program ‘Family-Friendly 
School’ and started granting certificates to schools that do not teach gender equality or 
sexual education, under the guise of ‘protecting children from harmful information, 
sexual initiation, and the questioning of biological and cultural stability of sexual 
roles’.121 By mid-2016, around 700 educational institutions from all over Poland 
(public and private, from pre-schools to high schools and professional schools) have 
applied and received the certificate.122 
While the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk remained silent on the topic, the 
Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment, Agnieszka Kozłowska-Rajewicz, 
had to defend teachers who implemented gender equality programs, as well as the 
spending on gender mainstreaming. She also issued official statements explaining 
what the concept of gender meant. She wrote a detailed letter to the Polish anti-
genderists and the catholic church aiming to explain the term ‘gender’ and ‘gender 
studies’ (Kozłowska-Rajewicz 2014). She received answers from bishops that were 
marked by polemical arrogance; for instance, archbishop Jędraszewski responded by 
saying that: ‘it’s “the old thing” again. From outside the wise tell us what the church 
should teach. This is really chastising a student and telling us we do not know what 
we are talking about’.123 
                                                 
120 For the full story view Kurier Lubelski at: http://wyborcza.pl/1,91446,15286657,Lublin__Dyskusja 
_w_radzie_miasta_o_gender__PiS_wycofalo.html (accessed November 2014).  
121 http://szkola-przyjaznarodzinie.pl/strona-glowna/certyfikat/ (accessed April 2016) 
122 The list of the institutions that have received the certificate is available at: http://szkola-
przyjaznarodzinie.pl/lista-placowek/ (accessed April 2016) 
123 Information about the bishops’ answers can be found on the catholic news portal:  
http://www.pch24.pl/biskupi-odpowiadaja-kozlowskiej-rajewicz-,20501,i.html (accessed April 2016). 
All other institutional and administrative reactions by the government side were 
ambiguous. They allowed the anti-gender campaigners to gain discursive ground and 
achieve prominence in the mainstream. While the Istanbul Convention got signed, its 
ratification was stalled in ‘inter-ministerial negotiations’ until early 2015. Finally, the 
parliament ratified it in February 2015 and President Komorowski signed in April, just 
before the May presidential elections. The creation of anti-gender parliamentary 
groups had explicitly normalized the ‘war on gender’ in politics. While the ‘Stop 
Gender Ideology!’ group had no direct bearing on legislation (it is not a parliamentary 
legislative committee), the mass public saw no difference in terms of the details of the 
legislative process: ‘war on gender’ entered parliament officially. This gave it status 
and importance (according to the logic that if something is under debate in parliament, 
then it must be significant). 
The parliamentary group ‘Stop Gender Ideology!’ held eight meetings from its 
foundation in January 2014 until the end of the seventh parliamentary term. The last 
activity of the group was in February 2015, which points to a loss of interest in the 
topic (2015 parliamentary elections were held in October). In fact, the ‘war on gender’ 
campaign seemed to wind down in the second half of 2015, with the electoral 
campaigns for two major national elections, the refugee crisis, and the final ratification 
of the Istanbul Convention by the Sejm and by the President in the spring of 2015 (cf. 
Duda 2016). This also suggests that the church was indeed looking for a story to divert 
attention from its internal scandals. When other narratives became available and when 
the novelty of the discourse wore off, the ‘war on gender’ lost some of its function as 
the primary scaremonger and became less useful to its advocates as a method of 
mobilizing fear and discontent.  
The parliamentary group on ‘Counteracting the Atheization of Poland’ was another 
institutional proponent of the anti-gender discourses in parliament. In January 2014, 
its MPs invited the most famous church expert specializing in exposing the workings 
of ‘gender ideology’ to hold a lecture at the Sejm. Dariusz Oko held a two-hour 
presentation on the ‘dangers of gender ideology and gender mainstreaming’. Oko told 
the deputies that ‘gender is the main anti-christian ideology’ and hates the church. He 
argued that ‘gender ideology’ comes from the same source as the ideology of Pol Pot; 
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both draw from the ‘atheist philosophy of Sartre’. Oko focused also on sexuality; he 
claimed that ‘sex can become important for some people, especially atheists’, who 
become ‘sexual maniacs’, which, according to him, explains ‘gender’. He painted a 
picture of a ‘genderist offensive’ that imposes gender everywhere through gender 
mainstreaming.124  
As one Polish scholar summarized: ‘The narrative of priest Oko provides an unrealistic 
image of the pervert-gay, the hysterical feminist, and the hyper-sexualized 
masturbating child, within an infertile crowd (…) [These figures] are supposed to 
inspire fear [and guard the condition of the true family]’ (Duda 2016: 208). Arguably, 
the showcasing of such rhetoric at the main discursive site of the country, co-
constituted the political reality, in which the vision of gender imposed from the top 
(and through it equality and diversity) was alien and undesirable.  
In parliament 
Unlike in the previous chapters, the ‘war on gender’ discourse was advocated by only 
one side of the political spectrum in the Polish parliament. Only right-wing MPs were 
agents of this discourse in the seventh parliamentary term. The proponents came from 
Law and Justice, Solidarity of Poland, and Poland Together, which were all opposition 
parties. There was also clear support for and application of this discourse by PO’s 
junior coalition partner, the Peasant’s Party. This means that this was a narrative of a 
sizeable and vocal minority, which nonetheless managed to transform the social matrix 
of discourses in the parliament and gained significant prominence. PO, TR, and SLD 
deputies did not subscribe to the anti-gender mobilization and in fact actively tried to 
ridicule it. For instance, when a right-wing MP was making criticisms that were 
perceived as too broad and far-reaching, the TR deputy responded by saying ‘all you’re 
missing is gender ideology’ (Michał Kabaciński 20.02.2014, 61, 222). It was also used 
as an offhand comment when disparaging PiS-made amendments: ‘you spy gender in 
the work of the EU’ (Witold Klepacz 21.02.2014, 61, 263). 
                                                 
124 The full lecture can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDMMuS32ysE (accessed 
November 2016).  
However, despite the ridicule aimed at ‘anti-genderism’ from the centrist and liberal 
side of the parliament at the level of discourse, the parliamentary votes were not as 
clear. While officially they did not use the ‘gender ideology’ discourse, some PO 
deputies did vote against the Istanbul Convention or against new anti-discrimination 
bills (enough to stall or stop the legislation). Therefore, even though they did not 
produce the discourse, PO MPs were active in implementing it through their legislative 
choices. This again points to the artificially constructed division that outlines PO as 
belonging to the neoliberal camp, and only PiS being the nationalist-catholic side. The 
reality was that both parties included agents of both discourses and their stand-off 
difference was a discursive construction produced for domestic political purposes. 
Who and what is being talked about? 
In parliamentary plenary debates, the ‘war on gender’ discourse surged especially in 
late 2013 and throughout 2014. Table 7.10 shows the topics of the debates in which 
this discourse was prominent during the parliamentary term under analysis. The list 
does not include every single use of the term ‘gender’, but focuses on the parliamentary 
agenda points that featured the ‘war on gender’ discourse as part of the main argument. 
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Table 7.10 ‘War on gender’ in the plenary debates of the Polish parliament  
1. Ratification of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence 
2014, 
2015 
2. Honouring John Paul II 2014 
3. Education system reforms 2014 
4. Legislative proposal amending the Labour Code strengthening 
employees and preventing discrimination 
2014 
5. National program combatting domestic violence 2014 
6. Parliamentary interpellations on ‘gender ideology’, questions to the 
government, and MP statements (4 separate motions) 
2014 
7. Changes to the Criminal Code protecting minors from sexual 
harassment  
2014 
8. Bill amending the anti-discrimination law 2013 
9. Sexual and equality education in schools 2013 
10. Report on the functioning of TV and radio 2013 
11. Children’s rights 2013 
12. Regulations concerning nurses and midwives 2013 
(Source: own compilation). 
The selected debates show that the rhetoric of ‘gender ideology’ was clearly associated 
with topics of children, education, women’s reproductive health, anti-discrimination, 
and anti-violence. Below, I analyse the specific discursive constructions used in the 
‘war on gender’ narrative from the perspective of the above parliamentary debates.  
What values and subjects are constructed? 
Anti-violence 
Since the ‘war on gender’ rose in conjunction with the political discussion of the 
Istanbul Convention, which aims to prevent and combat violence against women and 
domestic violence, this area is the first focus of my analysis. Issues of domestic 
violence are discursively constructed in a peculiar way in the Sejm because they 
directly affect the most central and crucial social unit of the Polish nation, namely the 
family. As I have shown earlier, the discursive construction of family in Poland is 
essential to the reproduction of Polishness, but also to the enforcement of ‘traditional 
values’ in society. As such, policies perceived to directly affect the family are always 
treated suspiciously in parliament by MPs. This is highlighted in the debates on bills 
combatting and preventing domestic violence. 
While all deputies unequivocally denounced violence (24.09.2014, 75, 102-134), they 
showed concern with new legislative proposals that were perceived to infringe on 
‘tradition’. The problematic article in the Istanbul Convention, as perceived by the 
speakers, was Article 12, which stipulates in §1: ‘Parties shall take the necessary 
measures to promote changes in the social and cultural patterns of behaviour of women 
and men with a view to eradicating prejudices, customs, traditions and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women or on stereotyped 
roles for women and men.’ Similarly, Article 12 §5 calls for: ‘Parties [to] ensure that 
culture, custom, religion, tradition or so-called “honour” shall not be considered as 
justification for any acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention.’125 
Within the debate on the anti-violence convention, MPs rallied against a perceived 
attack on the ‘traditional Polish family’ by particular forces that allegedly distorted 
reasons for domestic violence. ‘The convention takes up the fight against violence only 
in one, (…) invented aspect, the fight against [our] understanding of masculinity and 
femininity (…) which it calls gender stereotypes’ (Małgorzata Sadurska 24.09.2014, 
75, 105). According to this narrative, anti-violence legislation was constructed as a 
trap aimed to exert foreign pressure on Poland to accept ‘blindly and unreflexively’ 
the ‘ideological solutions that go against our values’ (Małgorzata Sadurska 
24.09.2014, 75, 106). The treaty was thus ‘imposing a civilizational change’ (Jarosław 
Górczyński 24.09.2014, 75, 107). Promotion of non-stereotypical gender roles was 
understood as the ‘promotion of a gender definition of sex [płeć]’ (Jarosław 
Górczyński 24.09.2014, 75, 107). The Istanbul Convention was described as 
dangerous and scandalous because it was directly attacking the christian faith and the 
definition of family (Dorota Wróbel 24.09.2014, 75, 111).  
                                                 
125 The full text of the Istanbul Convention is available at: 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168008482e (accessed June 
2016). 
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Deputies rather pointed to alcohol and ‘social pathology’ as causes of domestic 
violence: ‘Why do the creators and lobbyists in favour of this convention point to 
traditional family as the basis for violence? Why do they not look for causes of 
violence and aggression in substance abuse, of alcohol for instance? Or drugs, 
medicines, work even, or in hypersexualization?’ (Małgorzata Sadurska 24.09.2014, 
75, 105). MPs cited data that Poland has quite low rates of domestic violence. By 
manipulating statistics, they claimed that traditional Polish family is essentially good 
and violence-free. They argued that violence rates were highest in the countries that 
commited to fighting ‘stereotypical gender roles’ (Małgorzata Sadurska 24.09.2014, 
75, 124). 
Furthermore, right-wing MPs saw the Istanbul Convention as ‘smuggling’ foreign 
nefarious concepts that Polish family law does not include, such as that of ‘partners’ 
(Małgorzata Sadurska 24.09.2014, 75, 105). This was said to create ‘conceptual chaos’ 
and the ‘humiliation of marriage and family’ (Jarosław Górczyński 24.09.2014, 75, 
107). Thus, the convention was seen as a tool ‘to pursue their [LGBTQ+] goals of 
marriage equality (understood as the destruction of ‘traditional family’) under the 
guise of combatting domestic violence. Therefore, the proponents of the convention 
were ‘genderists’ and the ‘homolobby’ that ‘stuff people’s heads with various issues 
[that are] depraving since school and kindergarten’ (Beata Kempa 24.09.2014, 75, 
110). In the plenary debate, MPs constructed a parallel between Marxism-Leninism 
and the perceived ‘genderism’. The latter was said to replace class struggle with a 
struggle of the sexes (Tadeusz Woźniak 24.09.2014, 75, 123). 
Significantly, there were clear racist connotations in the debates on the Istanbul 
Convention. In line with the observations of the previous chapters, ‘Polish’ is 
implicitly seen as good, therefore ‘traditionally Polish’ or even stereotypical Polish 
gender constructions are good, too. The MPs implied that the convention may be 
needed ‘elsewhere’, where people do not have such good ‘traditional values’. ‘Maybe 
in Istanbul, maybe in Arab countries, there are different traditions that need to be 
referred to, but from the Polish point of view, from the point of view of our culture 
and tradition’ domestic violence cannot happen within ‘our’ tradition (Franciszek 
Stefaniuk 24.09.2014, 75, 117). As Robert Telus (24.09.2014, 75, 121) put it: ‘not all 
stereotypes are bad’, implying that ‘our’ stereotypes are alright, while ‘theirs’ are bad. 
Here, ‘theirs’ refers to muslims and again reflects the attempt at othering them.  
Gender equality and (anti-)discrimination 
It is clear from the opening quote of this chapter that the proponents of the ‘war on 
gender’ discourse understand the notion of gender equality differently from gender 
scholars and feminist political scientists. As I discussed in chapter 5, MPs using the 
anti-gender discourses, conceptualize ‘gender’ as a permanent and god-given natural 
identity. Any attempt at subverting power relations exerted by this construction are 
considered a deadly threat. The understanding of ‘gender’ as the overwhelming 
tendency to force people to uniformize and homogenize according to an ‘ideology’ is 
tied to the misunderstanding of the tenets of gender equality policies, which postulate 
the abolition of hierarchal dependencies and advocate equality in diversity, not 
identicality or forced assimilation. MPs resort to common sense arguments to prove 
their narrative: ‘The use of words that are commonly understood differently is 
incomprehensible’ (Andrzej Sztorc 20.06.2013, 44, 260). 
From this perspective, equality discourses and anti-discrimination provisions were 
seen as means of censoring ‘healthy’ rejection of gender non-conformity or non-
heteronormativity (Marzena Wróbel 20.06.2013, 44, 261). Superimposing categories 
of gender identity and expression on notions of sexuality is a technique employed in 
the ‘war on gender’ discourse. ‘Gender ideology’ constructs equality and diversity 
policies as aiming to subvert the members of the nation. It is presented as a temptation, 
an attack on the peaceful and harmonious collective (family and/or nation).   
Children 
The above features come into sharp focus around what Maciej Duda (2016: 23) calls 
the ‘phantasm of a horrific threat’ – the trope of the child in danger. This emotive 
construction is brought forward in all debates in which anti-gender discourses play a 
role. Through sexual and equality education, children are allegedly in danger of 
becoming transgender or homosexual. ‘Gender’ is equated with the notion of 
‘promotion of homosexuality’ which threatens boys with becoming gay and girls with 
turning into boys. ‘There will be those who will come up with the idea of being a girl 
in the morning, so they will be a girl from morning till evening, and if they come up 
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with the idea of being a boy in the evening, they will be a boy since the evening’ (Beata 
Kempa 24.09.2014, 75, 110).  
These conflations and meshing of terms built links between gender equality education 
and transsexuality or transgenderism (according to the logic that if gender roles are 
socially constructed then you can change them, if you can change gender, you can 
change sex). The rhetoric itself is not completely coherent: if homosexuality and 
transsexuality can spread or be chosen, then how does that fit with the permanent and 
unchanging sexual identities and natural gender roles that anti-genderists want to 
maintain and protect? It is difficult to say whether, according to this reasoning, it is 
nature or culture that has a bigger impact on gender and behaviour. Either god and 
nature give people one stable gender, or we assume that people freely decide and 
change. Nonetheless, the essence of the narrative was scaremongering against 
transsexual and transgender people, by implying that the masculinity given by nature 
can be lost and diluted under the influence of ‘gender ideology’ (Duda 2016: 29).  
How is truth created? 
In comparison to the anti-feminist and ‘anti-communist’ discourses of the 1990s, the 
war on gender has several new features, even though the techniques of their 
deployment are similar. As in the 1990s, it is mostly used by right-wing and 
conservative forces strongly aligned with the catholic church. The agents of the anti-
gender discourses repeat the same word formulations and linguistic structures without 
defining or explaining them. It is more a technique of ‘hammering the message home’ 
rather than convincing through examples and argumentation. The logic came from and 
was exactly imposed as catholic dogma, in which the truths presented by church 
officials and doctrine are supposed to go uncontested and unquestioned. As seen 
above, there is a strong reference to ‘natural law’, which is conflated with ‘god’s law’; 
anything that is perceived to threaten the traditional way advocated by the users of this 
discourse is ‘against nature’. 
As we have seen in the previous section, ‘gender’ and ‘gender ideology’ are blamed 
for: divorce (‘destruction of traditional Polish family’), child abuse (children seek love 
outside of broken family), and the low fertility rates (‘civilization of death’: abortion, 
contraception, patchwork families). Accordingly, the associated ‘homopropaganda’ or 
‘gay lobby’ (‘homolobby’) is contagious; it spreads and teaches homosexuality (by 
advocating civil unions aiming to destroy families). The strong affective component 
of this discourse ensures the maintenance of stereotypical judgements that lead to 
labelling, discrimination, fear, and negative associations.  
Polish scholars have pointed to parallels between the homophobic/anti-gender 
discourses today and the old anti-Semitic discourses that have been present in the 
country for much longer (‘gay is the new Jew’) (Graff 2013). According to this logic, 
LGBTQ+ people are the new other and are discursively constructed according to the 
same linguistic and power structures as the Jewish other, who had always been placed 
in opposition to the ‘catholic Pole’ (Graff 2013; Mrozik 2014). These strong racist and 
nationalistic overtones (as we see for example in the cited statement by archbishop 
Jędraszewski) create moral panic over people switching their ‘natural’ gender roles, 
and thus allegedly making the nation and the white race disappear. 
The fact that ‘gender’ itself was used by these discourses in its original English spelling 
and pronunciation allowed for misuse and misinterpretation. The crafting of 
neologisms such as the ‘sexualization of children’; ‘genderism’ (made to sound like 
Marxism-Leninism); ‘gender ideology’ (the concept ‘ideology’ has negative and 
decisively derogatory connotations in Polish and is unequivocally associated with 
Nazism, totalitarianism, and communism, or Stalinism); ‘homo-relations’ 
(homorelacje, meant in a derogatory way) led to an incomprehensible concoction of 
nefariously sounding terms for average listeners. In addition to the creation and 
playing on the tropes discussed here, the anti-gender discourse relies on labelling, 
instrumentalizing, and offending. It is paired with the already well-established 
vilification of feminism (constructed as a feature of Bolshevism or Marxism).  
Significantly, pornography and paedophilia are equated to gender, which in the context 
of the problems of the Polish catholic church with paedophilia shifts the blame away 
from the church hierarchy. The fascination and preoccupation with sexuality and 
sexual behaviour throughout the ages by celibate catholic priests has already been a 
topic of many analyses (cf. Federici 2004). Here again, we witness clergy talking about 
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sexual behaviours and claiming the sole moral authority on the issue. Sexual education 
and reproductive health matters are presented as perverseness (leading to the said 
sexualisation). Constant references to masturbation (in children) and genitals 
(presented as something obscene and depraving) are prevalent.  
The result of these discursive concoction was confusion among the Polish public. A 
street survey conducted by a private TV channel in December 2013, showed how 
effective and widespread the reception (consumption) of this discourse was. People 
were asked what gender was, and most respondents answered: ‘something 
unspeakable’, ‘something foreign’, ‘something hurting children’, ‘something bad for 
society’. While many respondents were visibly over fifty or sixty years old, the same 
answers came from several younger ones too.126  
What can and cannot be said? 
The ‘war on gender’ discourse rapidly extended in the virtual sphere and the media. 
Numerous political experts and commentators who influence the Polish internet sphere 
and social media are religious and ultraconservative. In the years of subsequent PO-
PSL governments (2007-2015), these media specialists created and established their 
own reputation as ‘unsubdued’ and ‘rebellious’ that tell the ‘real truth’ (as opposed to 
the public television at the time and the liberal private channels). These right-wing 
commentators and their huge prominence in mainstream discourse have added to the 
dissemination of the anti-gender positions. For instance, Tomasz Terlikowski has 
propagated the church position by frequently writing and speaking on television about 
the issue:   
There is and there cannot be any doubt that genderism is another form of the 
old, well-known Marxism. Both want to create a new man that will be free of 
‘religious slavery’ and marriage. (…) Slowly the right of parents to raise their 
children according to their own (and not state) norms is taken away. The 
‘fastening’ of the family is destroyed step-by-step and is replaced with the 
sanctioning of shacking up [used a derogatory idiom in Polish] or homo-
relations [sic!] which are even given the right to adopt children. (…) Gender 
                                                 
126 The full video ‘What is gender?’ can be viewed on YouTube at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GVAiYIUwHg (accessed November 2016).  
ideology is in complete opposition to Christian anthropology. So a woman 
cannot be a priest, just as a man cannot be a mother. And gender analyses 
cannot change that. No one can take a woman’s role in giving birth as well as 
giving the children that special kind of maternal tenderness and creating the 
‘home nest’ for the husband and the children. Likewise, no one can replace the 
man in the building of safety and providing. The tales that social roles are inter-
changeable and that every family has the right to change them won’t do 
anything. Because a man is this way and a woman is different and hysterics or 
ideology won’t change it.127 
At the same time television debates often pitted such speakers against feminists to set 
up on-screen brawls. Such debates were futile and showed people that staying safe in 
the middle ground and not becoming involved is the best solution not to get into 
irresolvable discussions on morality. 
The Polish academic and feminist scene tried to respond to this discourse and rebuke 
it. There were several comprehensive publications on the topic of ‘gender’.128 
However, these arguments have not managed to gain much traction among the wider 
society. Polish feminists have also been trying to contextualize the current war on 
gender and explain why it has been waged now. As I mentioned before, the discourse 
is seen as a part of a scapegoating campaign. The church was looking for an enemy, 
because arguably it is at its strongest when it has an outside enemy to rally against 
(like in state socialist times).  
Thus, the church created a siege mentality because their perceived ‘power over souls’ 
is in crisis (Graff 2014). During the same parliamentary term, there have been 
accusations of rampant fraud in the earlier reprivatisation processes, so people are 
growingly unhappy with the fact that the church meddles in politics and has a say in 
social and family policy (as well as even giving opinions on local government 
appointments). Moreover, the church is trying to cover up paedophilia scandals by 
shifting attention away from themselves, especially in the light of the apparent 
                                                 
127 Source available at: http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,15205958,Tomasz_Terlikowski_porownuje_gende 
r_do_komunizmu_.html (accessed November 2016). 
128 Important contributions included the edited volume by Krytyka Polityczna Gender. Przewodnik 
Krytyki Politycznej (2014) and the collected encyclopedic anthology of entries on the central topics 
and themes of gender studies: Encyklopedia gender. Płeć w kulturze (2014) and Maciej Duda’s 
comprehensive analysis of anti-gender publications, Dogmat płci (2016). 
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teachings of pope Francis, which most of the Polish Episcopate is not happy about – 
considering him oddly liberal and not deferent enough to ‘The Pope’ (Karol Wojtyła).  
Historically, feminist scholars argue, the church wants to keep the power over women 
and their bodies as well as police sexuality (which people are realizing is more fluid 
and contested than the religious teachings allow) (Środa 2009; Duda 2016). At the 
height of the ‘war on gender’ campaign, the Polish church also aimed to show 
politicians its power before upcoming elections (regional and European in 2014, 
parliamentary and presidential in 2015), a power display technique that had worked in 
previous elections. Politicians also needed a scapegoat to divert people’s attention 
from economic hardship, hence they followed the church’s finger pointing.  
In the edited volume on the topic (Kováts and Põim 2015), Weronika Grzebalska has 
argued that anti-genderism is rather a ‘symbolic glue’ which lumps together various 
progressive issues under one umbrella term, and consolidates different conservative 
actors in a much bigger quest to change the values underlying the European liberal 
democracy. As such, the anti-gender mobilization is not ‘just’ a feminist issue, but 
rather one threatening liberal democracy and making much broader and deeper 
changes to our political system (Grzebalska 2015; Kováts and Põim 2015). 
Conclusions 
The narrative of the ‘war on gender’ is a new addition to the previous anti-feminist 
discourses that have been present in Eastern Europe since 1989 and were connected to 
the purging of perceived state socialist practices. The recent anti-gender discourse was 
church-driven, but was willingly followed by Polish politicians. This chapter 
highlighted the virulence of this discourse and the commitment with which it has been 
applied in politics. In parliament, the discourse was most clearly visible in topics 
relating to children, education, women’s reproductive health, anti-discrimination, and 
anti-violence. The anti-gender discourse was successful in overpowering and 
repressing the advocacy of arguments that might be labelled as ‘feminist’ or 
‘gendered’, thereby discarding or pushing women’s and LGBTQ+ rights topics down 
on national parliamentary agenda. The result of this is at best ridiculing these themes, 
at worst treating them as dangerous, with MPs not willing to risk their political 
authority for progressive legislative projects.  
As a result, the ‘war on gender’ narrative produced and reinforced an exclusionary 
discursive situation, in which the minorities have to see themselves with reference to 
the majority and explain their difference. This objectified the ‘odd’ ones that did not 
fit the discursive norm. They are orientalised and othered, which cements the majority 
in their norm hierarchy (cf. Duda 2016). The creation of derogatory labels for people 
who raise feminist and sexual minority concerns has produced more room for hate 
speech in the parliament and outside it. The war on gender also saw the centrist parties 
shifting towards the right on relevant topics. In fact, during the seventh parliamentary 
term no progressive legislation on women’s and LGBTQ+ issues was passed until the 
immediate pre-electoral period, when PO feared losing votes of the liberal-centre. 
However, by mid-2015 it was too late for such moves: the normalization and 
legitimization of the anti-gender discourse was in full swing and, as we have seen, has 
become mainstream political practice since the October 2015 parliamentary elections.  
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‘I’m terribly Polish and yet so terribly mutinous against Poland’ 
Witold Gombrowicz129 
 
The dissertation explored the discursive construction of subjects and values in the 
Polish parliament in three focus areas. One of the key aims was to trace the trajectories 
of Europeanization in Poland and identify the post-transformation legacies that 
influence the mechanisms of discursively producing subjects and values in Polish 
politics today. Through a synthetic analysis of the various fields of domestic political 
discourses, the thesis also examined why and how gendered discourses construct 
exclusion and social marginalization in the Polish case. I argued that transformation 
and Europeanization processes were implemented as forces of neoliberal economic 
globalization in Poland. While creating actual economic and political losers (women, 
former public employees, former working class, public sector workers), these 
phenomena also provided discursive bases and the scope and limitations of political 
language in Poland. Hence, post-transformation language of mainstream political 
debate in Poland remains stigmatizing, hierarchical, and exclusionary, discursively 
constructing categories of subjects and values that ‘lose’ in parliamentary politics. The 
analysis showed that the gendered discursive constructions employed and deployed in 
the Polish parliament continually reproduce subjects and values in the form of patterns 
of domination and inequality.  
The power of the hegemonic discourses on masculinity, femininity, and 
heteronormativity prescribes a set of social relations in the family and the nation. The 
hegemonic discourses in Poland deploy gendered notions of subjectivity and values in 
ways that perpetuate catholic and conservative social conventions and channel social 
discontent towards particular social groups (i.e. women, ethnic and sexual minorities, 
etc.). These hegemonic narratives provide a ready framework of exclusion and 
marginalization that allows for scapegoating and using whole groups and categories of 
minorities for political expediency when popular anger or discontent needs to be 
                                                 
129 ‘Mnie, który jestem okropnie polski i okropnie przeciw Polsce zbuntowany’, quote from Dzienniki 
1953-1956 (1986) by Witold Gombrowicz. 
rerouted.  Therefore, the exclusionary and categorizing nature of the hegemonic 
discourses, as well as the ready availability of inferior discursive subjectivities (go-to 
frames of meaning), has enabled the outbreak and viral spreading of the ‘war on 
gender’. The Polish political discursive field is rife with stigma and inequality; the 
dominant framework of debate entrenched in the post-transformation politics was 
based on exclusion and inequality.  
Discursive inequality and marginalization in Poland: revisiting 
the research puzzle 
The initial empirical motivation for this research was the observation of the daily 
sexism, chauvinism, xenophobia, and often dehumanizing language of Polish politics 
with regards to numerous minority groups in society, as well as the disjuncture of this 
language from the legislative attempts at progressive change, especially for women. 
The questions I asked were: what is the role of gender in the construction of discursive 
exclusion and marginalization? Why and how do the gendered discourses construct 
subjects and values? What is the relationship between these discourses and the 
processes of democratization and Europeanization? The dissertation argued that the 
post-1989 political and economic changes have not transformed the underlying gender 
relations in the country, but allowed for the addition of new forms of exclusion and 
disenfranchisement of significant groups in the state and its politics. I argued that this 
discursive impunity frame comes as a continuity and a legacy of the way 
transformation and Europeanization were enacted in Poland.  
Gender has been deployed and discursively inscribed in the solidification of 
nationalist-catholic thinking structures. The discursive message of equality was 
pushed out and displaced by unattainable ultraconservative social requirements, 
portraying those who do not fulfil these stringent models of subjectivity as political 
‘losers’. Throughout the transformation process and later, during Europeanization, 
certain discursive categories of subjects were placed in the position of being ‘losers’ 
in the Polish social and political system. The scapegoating was enacted in part through 
a nationalist and ultra-catholic rhetoric which provided sources and go-to frames of 
meaning for Polish politics. The discussion in chapter 4 has also provided evidence 
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that neoliberal transformation processes have exacerbated inequalities after the fall of 
state socialism and pointed to an important connection between the portrayal of socio-
economic problems as ‘cultural wars’. In the post-state socialist period, societal anger 
with economic disenfranchisement was taken over and exploited by nationalist and 
catholic political forces in Poland (cf. Ost 2005), which comes across clearly in the 
empirical analysis of debates in the fields of family and nation of this dissertation.  
The specific notions of gendered subjectivities such as femininities, masculinities, and 
heteronormativity were put to work by the two main post-Solidarity camps of Polish 
politics (the neoliberal one, represented by some PO MPs in the parliamentary term 
under analysis, and the national conservative, headed by PiS). In this context, the 
changes to the labour and criminal codes favourable to women between 2011 and 2015 
can be seen as paying token ‘lip service’ to ‘liberal European values’ by the neoliberal 
camp. However, and most significantly, the dominant discourse surrounding the 
themes of family- and nation-building, which are crucial for the construction of 
subjectivities that I explore here, was the nationalist-catholic one. 
By examining the deployment of gender in the exclusionary discourses in the Polish 
parliament, I argued that Polish politicians continually reproduce existing patterns of 
domination and inequality, thus paving the way for the anti-gender and anti-equality 
mobilizations that Poland witnessed for example in the form of the ‘war on gender’ 
(2012-2014). The thesis approached the issue first from a more global and Eastern 
European perspective, before focusing in on Poland as a case, and on Polish 
parliamentary discourses as the crucial site of national politics. I argued that Poland’s 
recent campaign of ‘war on gender’, while following wider global backlash trends, 
proved that the post-1989 political and economic regime did not transform the 
underlying gender relations in the state and its politics.  
Debates in the seventh parliamentary term reveal that the ruling elites are split in how 
they consider the transformation processes. The first group, in government in the term 
under discussion, sees it as a major success. According to this faction, the 
transformation was an act of ‘creative destruction’ or a war of good against evil, which 
required sacrifice and ruin – in other words, a move from hell through purgatory to 
heaven, so that improvement and civilizing progress could take place (cf. Charkiewicz 
2006; Sowa 2011, 2015). On the other hand, the second group views transformation 
and Europeanization as a betrayal of the ‘anti-communist’ struggle. The nationalist 
discourse and its promises of more justice and dignity mobilizes well-known reference 
points, gives hope to the disadvantaged along with a sense of identity and community 
constructed along ethno-nationalist and religious lines. They entice the ones 
disenchanted and abandoned by neoliberal reforms, even though practically they do 
not reject the neoliberal market logic and allow for its further implementation under 
different, more nationalistic forms of control.  
The theories of marginalization and their manifestations in 
post-transformation Poland 
The dissertation has set out to connect conceptual constructions of social and political 
scapegoats, as seen in different scholarly literatures (chapter 2), with the politically 
and historically outlined ‘losers’ of the post-1989 transformation mechanisms (chapter 
4) in order to explore how they play out in current discourses in Poland (chapters 5, 6, 
and 7). According to feminist analyses, categories of women are othered and 
marginalized in national construction projects, especially when these are conducted by 
right-wing and ultraconservative forces (McClintock 1991; Verdery 1996; Walby 
1996; Graff 2001, 2008a, b; Yuval-Davis 2001). Similarly, postcolonial and 
dependency theories applied to the post-state socialist context demonstrate that 
particular groups of employees are ‘racialized’ and marginalized based on the 
neoliberal market-efficiency principles; this was visible also in the process of 
transformation in Poland and in the region more broadly (Balibar and Wallerstein 
1991; Ost 2005; Charkiewicz 2006; Klein 2007; Bobako 2011; Leder 2014; Sowa 
2011, 2015). Feminist political economy exposes the role of the capitalist private-
public division in devaluing women’s care work, thereby placing them at the losing 
end of the globalized economy (True 2010; Rai and Waylen 2014). Meanwhile, in 
keeping with the feminist institutionalist insights, the ‘rules of the game’ in parliament 
are not benignly gender-neutral and play in favour of a specific type of masculinity 
(Mackay et al. 2010; Krook and Mackay 2011). As I showed through the example of 
the Polish Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment, the enactment of formal 
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gender equality institutions does not explicitly mean breaking the political habits of 
inequality (see chapter 4 discussion).  
The application of these conceptual facets of ‘losers’ to the Polish case of 
transformation allows us to see how the changes after 1989 led to repeated and 
negative reconfigurations of inclusion and equality. Because transformation and 
Europeanization were implemented most comprehensively in the economic sphere 
through the adoption of neoliberal market reforms such as structural adjustment 
measures, privatization, and the scaling down of social benefits (Bobako 2006), they 
created considerable social and economic inequalities (Sowa 2015). They also 
delineated lines of exclusion by producing large groups of disenchanted and 
disgruntled people and by raising the levels of political discontent (Ost 2005). The 
deployment of nationalist-catholic discourses provided an answer to this discontent 
and pointed to a culprit in the form of Europe and its allegedly decadent social values 
(Leder 2014). Notions of gender equality and diversity fell victim by association, as 
this attitude has brought on a virtually automatic opposition to norms and policies 
promoting gender equality.  
Both in the 1990s (the pre-accession years) and following EU membership, 
governments and parliaments in Poland have shown an ambivalent position in terms 
of their commitment to implement gender equality and anti-discrimination policies. 
Because the adoption of EU gender equality directives and gender mainstreaming was 
considered a ‘package deal’ with EU accession, Polish politicians formally adopted 
them (Rutkowska 2008; Zbyszewska 2014). However, despite the formal transposition 
into domestic law and pro forma implementation, not much was actually done to 
entrench equality and anti-discrimination values institutionally or practically in 
society. Such a formal and, most importantly, foreign imposition left gender equality 
open for attack from the nationalist-religious camp in Polish politics.  
Moreover, as I have argued, the processes of transformation and Europeanization were 
not a straight-line teleological progression. Some improvements and positive 
developments in terms of inclusion, political and civil rights, and gender equality 
happened at the same time as the backlash did. In this context, nothing was done by 
the neoliberal camp to counter the Eurosceptic groups in Polish politics that 
successfully mobilized and organized the anger of the losing groups of transformation. 
The thesis argued that this indifference has paved the way for the current dismantling 
of the already weak pre-existing institutional guarantors of anti-discrimination and 
equality, using an ‘anti-gender campaign’ that later became central in Polish political 
discourse. 
Contributions 
Based on the outcome of this research, the dissertation makes the following 
contributions to feminist political science and area studies research. Firstly, by 
applying and elaborating the gendered analysis to politics and discourse, the thesis 
reinforces an argument that feminist political scholars have long held, namely that 
social phenomena cannot be fully explained without taking gender into account. Thus, 
the work that gender does in politics in utilitarian terms is twofold. While it follows 
path-dependent developments and is subject to local, temporal, and spatial conditions, 
gender is also used and deployed in discursive power projects by politicians very 
purposefully. The thesis has demonstrated that gender is a constitutive part of a set of 
processes that collectively create a highly hierarchical social and political reality. This 
gendered discursive reality constrains political and social outcomes, and discursively 
restricts people’s control of their lives on biological, social, and psychological levels 
(cf. Foucault 1980).  
The second main theoretical contribution of my dissertation lies in the exploration of 
trajectories and legacies of transformation and Europeanization. I elucidated the 
impact of gendered discourses on processes of democratization and the broader 
regional trends of ultraconservative backlash against gender equality and diversity, as 
seen within the context of wider centrifugal forces in Europe (including Eurosceptic, 
nationalist movements, anti-democratic mobilizations, and the general spread of anti-
elite feelings). The thesis has argued that there are lacunae in the existing literature 
that prevent the full explanation of why a state that is considered to be successful in 
terms of regime change, economic performance, and overall democratic 
transformation has not improved significantly in terms of gender equality, social 
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inclusion, and tolerance for diversity. To address the gap in the scholarly literature, I 
argued that a combination of transnational and Polish literature, together with personal 
‘local’ experience, was necessary.  
By complementing the different bodies of literature and using them to analyse the key 
mechanisms of discursive production, reproduction, and backlash in gendered terms, 
I argued for the need of a multi-faceted conceptual approach to the study of post-
transformation politics in Eastern Europe. The combination of feminist, postcolonial, 
political economy, institutionalist, and nationalism literatures constitutes the main 
theoretical contribution. The aim was to ‘fill’ these theories with Polish context and 
research. I explored the national and regional trends that are specific to post-state 
socialist societies, moving between different layers and levels in order to combine 
comparative and regionalist literature with feminist, postcolonial, institutionalist, and 
democratization theory. From the perspective of feminist academic debates, the 
research confirms the need to look at ‘multiple inequalities’. The thesis, therefore, 
provided a synthetic way of engaging with (post-)transformation legacies and with 
critical junctures in terms of Europeanization and its impacts on gender equality. In so 
doing, it reinforced the need to look at the discursive level of inequalities, shifting the 
attention somewhat from policy adoption and implementation.  
The third main contribution of the dissertation lies in the methodological application 
and operationalization of critical discourse analysis to the study of Polish institutions. 
Specifically, I reflected on and applied the understanding that specific notions of 
politics reproduce particular kinds of gendered subjects; for instance, the ways in 
which femininities, masculinities, and heteronormativity are produced as part of the 
political process in the case of Poland (cf. Saward 2010; Childs and Webb 2012; Celis 
et al. 2013). The dissertation showed that dominant discourses about gender and 
sexuality and path-dependent historic and economic legacies shaped, and most notably 
constrained Polish gender equality policies (cf. Lombardo and Forest 2012; Celis et al. 
2013). While trying to avoid the Western ‘orientalizing’ gaze on the Polish discourses, 
the highly controversial nature of Polish gendered discourses was highlighted, in line 
with the strongly feminist normative assumptions and the interpretative epistemology 
of the dissertation. 
On the empirical level, the thesis highlighted the prominence of gendered discursive 
processes, by capturing the Polish parliament as a time- and space-specific institutional 
snapshot and providing it with historic and social context. The dissertation has shown 
that the processes of Europeanization and democratization, as applied in Poland with 
a specific neoliberal market focus, stressed the implementation of formal legal and 
economic issues and left ultraconservative forces, particularly the catholic church, to 
define the values and subjects. I argued that the central role of the catholic church in 
the Polish political context is what makes the case singular in the European scenario. 
The social influence and deeply conservative discourse emanating from the Polish 
catholic church help explain why the backlash against gender equality was particularly 
strong in Poland.  
At the same time, the fact that the ‘war on gender’ appeared almost simultaneously in 
several countries points to the purposeful deployment of anti-gender equality and anti-
diversity mobilizations as cyphers for a broader backlash against globalization 
processes. While it is an empirically valid case on its own, Poland is also part of wider 
regional and global backlash trends. The dissatisfaction with domestic politics, 
disappointment with EU membership and austerity neoliberal politics are significant 
forces at work in more than one European country. The Polish case is distinct, but it 
should also be seen as part of the bigger anti-liberal democracy and anti-globalization 
backlash in Russia, Hungary, Great Britain, France, and the US (cf. Isaac 2017). As I 
discuss below, future literature could explore in-depth the actual interconnections 
between these national cases.  
Subjects and values encoded and reproduced in the family 
and in the nation 
The discursive codes of social value assigned to certain subjectivities (and by 
association to gendered bodies) are embedded within constituent discourses of family 
and nation. The subjectivity model that is discursively propounded by the 2011-2015 
Sejm is that of a useful, enterprising man, a patriot-catholic, that is an obedient and 
eager entrepreneur multiplying wealth. By his side is his church-sanctioned, nuclear, 
and heteronormative family. As I showed in chapter 5, in parliamentary discourses 
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family means marriage and marriage can only be heterosexual. At the centre of the 
‘family values’ debate lies the imagined traditional family ideal. Created by blood and 
marital ties, ideal families consist of heterosexual couples that produce their own 
biological children. Such families have a specific authority structure: a father-head 
figure earning an adequate family wage, a stay-at-home wife, and children (cf. Collins 
1998). Hence, in post-transformation Poland the idea of family appears to imply an 
essential call for marriage and childbearing. 
While in the Polish parliament of 2011-2015 it is no longer perceived as acceptable to 
advocate openly and directly the male-breadwinner and female-homemaking model 
only, the underlying broader gendered division between the public and the private is 
present in discursive constructions. There is, however, an implied welfare model, 
which seems to assume two-earners in the family. Given the pro-natal stress that is 
clear in Polish family debates, the assumption is that women both work and have 
children. In the context of welfare and especially care work, this completely overlooks 
the reality that most women in Poland are secondary wage-earners, who most often 
quit their jobs when their children are born, or other dependants need care. It also 
ignores the reality of the seriously lacking public and free care infrastructure in Poland, 
which is another post-transformation legacy. There are not enough places for children 
in kindergartens and pre-schools, while central budget funding and access to public 
care for the elderly and the handicapped is extremely limited. This leads to a situation 
of discrimination against people with lower economic status. More than implying a 
modified male breadwinner model, the Polish case seems to point to a complete 
unwillingness to address the actual implications of the dual-earner model when it is 
combined with a strict division between the private and the public spheres. This marks 
a continuity and perhaps a legacy from state socialist times, when women’s practically 
full employment did not entail a reconfiguration of reproductive and care work roles.  
The right-wing and centrist deputies who idealize the traditional family as a private 
haven from a public world see family as held together by primary emotional bonds of 
love and caring. This falls well in place with the division into the private reproductive 
sphere and the public productive sphere. Assuming a relatively fixed sexual division 
of labour, wherein women's roles are defined as primarily at home and men's in the 
public world of work, the traditional family ideal also assumes the separation of work 
and family (Collins 1998). Defined as a natural or biological arrangement based on 
heterosexual attraction, this heteronormative monolithic family type is articulated 
through governmental structures and corresponds to the state-approved institutional 
norms, e.g. in the legislation on childcare, reproductive health, and the unwillingness 
to institutionalize same-sex relationships. It is organized not around a biological core, 
but a state-and church-sanctioned, heterosexual marriage that confers legitimacy not 
only on the heteronormative nuclear family structure itself, but on children born into 
it (Andersen 1991).  
The analysis of the family and welfare debates in the thesis has shown that the 
patriarchal model of family does not only put women and men in particular subordinate 
power positions, but also creates a vertical axis of power between generations, 
especially between parents and children. Under the guise of freedom of views and 
respect for parental values, we see a perpetuation of the model wherein children are an 
extension of their parents in terms of opinions and worldviews. Whatever autonomy 
children might have, it is subservient to parents’ autonomy, which restricts the rights 
of the former.  
On a discursive level, Polish MPs are only interested in a particular type of family 
which reflects the supposed demographic interests of the nation. A ‘strong’ family is 
seen as the basis for a strong and ‘healthy’ nation. Formed through a combination of 
(preferably religious) marital and blood ties, the nation-state is conceptualized as a 
national family, with the traditional nuclear family ideal providing the standards used 
to assess the contributions of family members in heterosexual, married, opposite-sex 
couple households. Most notably, children and their safety and health become 
foundational for assessing group contributions to overall national well-being (Collins 
1998). Polish MPs place themselves in the position to defend and speak for ‘normal’ 
families and the health and sanity of children. This strongly nativist narrative 
determines preferred societal structures and defines norm versus ‘deviance’.  
Naturalized hierarchies of the traditional family ideal influence constructions of first- 
and second-class citizenship (Collins 1998). First-class or primary subjectivity is 
discursively allocated to those who conform to the standard heteronormative, nuclear, 
No country for losers? 
227 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
and child-producing family model. The aim of this family model in Poland is the 
biological growth of the catholic ethno-nation. A marriage is a family; a family cannot 
exist without a marriage. Any divergence from the ‘natural norm’ is underscored by 
revulsion and seen as subversive and threatening for society. At the same time, within 
this narrative, the most dominant feature of the Polish family is that it is permanently 
threatened. It is endangered by decadence, difference, and ‘deviance’ in the forms of 
abortion, civil partnerships, interference of foster care, anti-violence legislation and so 
on.  
The hegemonic discourses describe clearly the Polish model of gendered subjectivity 
as unequivocally male. Masculinity is discursively constructed as a standard and 
blueprint for conduct by the Polish parliament. Furthermore, the political culture of the 
Sejm is catholicized and a lot of the symbolism used discursively draws on religious 
stylistics. The parliament displays traits of a particular hegemonic masculinity. This is 
so pervasive that it is practically invisible, making it seem neutral. As I showed in 
chapters 5 and 6, there is a tacit dominance and acceptance of male-dominated 
structures that presents itself as silence on gender.  
Masculinity is discursively constructed as a blueprint for conduct and modus operandi 
in the Polish parliament. The hegemonic masculinity of the Sejm has specific traits. It 
is a discursive and institutional construct that it is both a product and a producer of 
catholic and ultraconservative worldviews. Any divergence from the ‘natural norm’ 
(which MPs often portray as ‘godly’) is seen as subversive and threatening for the 
Polish nation. While pretending to be ‘gender-neutral’, the informal institutional 
workings and discourses of the Sejm define the specific and conservative roles of 
women and men towards the fulfilment of what is constructed as the common good of 
the society. Thus, the main goal of family politics in Poland is the unpaid reproduction 
of the catholic nation through heteronormative family units.  
Interestingly, there is no significant difference in male or female discourses within 
parliament; as many feminist scholars have shown, there is no proof of women acting 
for or speaking for other women. All political parties in the parliament use the 
hegemonic discourse of nationalism (or patriotism, as they refer to it). Moreover, there 
is a certain ‘banality’ in terms of the genderedness of this patriarchal nationalism. 
Arguably, the impression is conveyed that women have little or no place in Polish 
subjectivity and historical celebrations. This is reflected in dominant masculinist 
constructions of the Polish state and its citizens. Polish deputies rarely refer to ‘Polish 
citizens’. Instead, words like ‘compatriots’ and ‘members of a nation’ or simply and 
most frequently ‘Poles’ are used.  
Similarly, the word ‘state’ is often replaced with the word ‘nation’. In fact, the latter 
is far more frequent in all the debates under analysis. This exposes a 19th century vision 
of the state as the realization of territorial claims of a certain ethno-national group. The 
defining feature of a Pole is his heritage, in particular with regard to historic memory: 
the ‘debt of blood’ owed to the martyrs that gave their lives for the national cause, the 
renewed obligation to defend the catholic faith and national independence. Despite 
being inherently gendered in the anthropomorphic figures of Polonia and Matka-
Polka, the Polish state paradoxically has no female political founding figures or 
commemorated seminal state-builders (Janion 1996, 2000, 2006; Gerber 2011; 
Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2012, 2015). In keeping with the insights of the literature on 
nationalism and gender, women either play a utilitarian role in the reproduction of the 
nation, or are allegories and national stand-in mythical figures, but have no place in 
active ‘patriotism’ of national commemorations and celebrations of events and 
achievements.  
Hegemonic discourses in Polish parliament 
It is significant that these discourses are widely accepted and never questioned. It 
means that no political force calls into question the dominant, masculinist 
constructions of national subjectivity and commemoration. Therefore, the Polish Sejm 
exhibits a particular type of institutional nationalism (cf. Larsen 2009). The idea of the 
Polish nation as an ‘imagined community’ (cf. Anderson 1993), unified in experiences, 
values and historical myths, dominates institutionally and can be traced in positions 
and discourses on national identity and welfare and family politics.  
The discourses that were analysed show how the institutional nationalism of the Polish 
parliament creates and upholds mythical territories incarnating a specific Polishness to 
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be protected or promoted against the European other. When such beliefs are 
institutionalised and seen as national-cultural accomplishments, ensuing structural 
problems such as discrimination and segregation of particular social groups tend to be 
projected on the whole ‘nation’, rather than being attributed to specific socio-economic 
conditions. From the perspective of hegemonic discourses, the agents have no need of 
defining and differentiating the ‘self’ – thinking is through shortcuts and ‘picklocks’ – 
‘this is the way it is’. Gendered divisions of labour and social and family roles are 
defined along nationalist lines. 
While the transformation, democratization, and Europeanization processes form a 
backdrop for the exploration of the discourses in parliament, gendered hegemonic 
discourses can become the bases or sources from which actors draw informal 
institutional behaviour. These discourses become so entrenched in parliamentary life 
and talk that they become ready, ‘go-to’ frames of meaning available to discuss any 
topic, without detailing the argumentations or understanding behind them. The 
hegemonic discourses are legitimized from two sides: from the catholic church and by 
neoliberal market ideology, which together dominate Polish politics. The imposition 
of a concrete language forces the audience and the consumers of the discourse 
unequivocal understandings. 
Because political actors deploy such ready-made ‘frames of meaning’, they 
discursively enact, promote, and disseminate conservative gendered values and 
subjectivities through parliamentary discourse. The axiology of the message is clear. 
Being discursively orthodox and conservative with regards to gender equality and 
gender roles is an institutional norm in parliament. Despite there being a wide 
discrepancy between the declarations and practice of Poles, deputies largely depart 
from the more socially liberal and less stringent public; their behaviour and discourse 
appears to be more coherently conservative than Polish society at large. It seems that 
this is largely done to please the catholic clergy and receive its social and political 
endorsement (Graff 2008a; Środa 2009; Duda 2016). The analysis performed in the 
empirical part of this dissertation has shown the dominance of ultra-conservative, 
nationalist-catholic discourses in the fields of family and nation and their work in the 
reinforcement of inequalities politically. This is consistent with the closer inspection 
of the progressive legislation passed during the seventh parliamentary term: the 
Istanbul Convention was only ratified in a last-ditch pre-election effort, while the 
childcare leave legislation offered a very conservative division of care work between 
the mother and the father (1 year for the mother versus 2 weeks for the father). 
Counter-hegemony, re-hijacking, and subversion 
It seems that subverting the dominant discourses is next to impossible for two mutually 
reinforcing reasons. Firstly, ‘leftist’ and liberal language does not raise positive 
emotions on a par with right-wing discourse. In Poland, the left symbolic has been 
overtaken, appropriated and rendered unappealing by state socialism. Moreover, 
political actors during and after the transformation have vilified and put people off 
anything labelled as ‘left’ or, even worse, ‘communist’. Hence, the counter-hegemonic 
discourses have no symbolic power and do not raise or garner the same level of 
enthusiasm and ardour. For them to become more influential, there is a need to 
reimagine and redraw the lines that define terms like society, equality, tolerance, and 
inclusion. Secondly, as a consequence of both the transformation and Europeanization 
processes, the neoliberal market values have been so deeply internalized that they are 
dogma, part of seemingly neutral, common-sense politics in Poland. No one dares to 
subvert the ‘infallible market logic’. The empirical analysis of the dissertation 
demonstrated that the hegemonic position of nationalist-catholic discourses is in many 
ways a response to the market forces and their consequences unleashed after 1989. 
In Poland, the expectations regarding transformation and Europeanization were largely 
not fulfilled. Under the guise of democratization and ‘European values’, the notions of 
‘civilizing competences’ (as opposed to ‘communist’ backwardness) of labour 
elasticity, mobility, rational cost-effectiveness, hyper-individualist success, and 
competitiveness have been deeply engrained into Polish politics and society. Language 
and discourse constantly try to build up binary oppositions between terms, where one 
term has the tendency to establish itself as the signifier that defines the pair, while the 
other becomes profiled as a mere negation of the first. As a result, whole social groups 
that could not adapt or attain the transformation criteria became the contempt-worthy 
‘losers’ of the new system. 
No country for losers? 
231 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
The constructed hierarchy meant that gender equality could never flourish in these 
conditions – when Europeanization and transformation were conducted under the 
auspices of leaving behind ‘bad’, ‘unnatural’, ‘communist’ ways (expressed as: 
passive, backward, collectivist, rigid, ‘restitutionary’, and state socialist). 
Transformation and ‘European’ values provided a supposedly ‘meritocratic’ way to 
explain away injustice and diminish the risk of social unrest through sexism (and 
classism) because people were told it was their own fault if they were unsuccessful 
(thus turning social anger inwards). Power defined the discursive fields of family and 
nation and what fitted in them, thereby reinforcing social segregation. In this context, 
the masses of losers in the game of inequality have either turned to nationalist-religious 
forces, which offer them tribal unity and dignity through Polish ethno-nationalist 
subjectivity, or have remained in inertia at the margins of society. Importantly, the 
ethno-nationalist discourse of dignity and strength produced its own ‘losers’ – women, 
gays, lesbians, feminists, non-binary people, queer groups, ‘leftists’, and atheists along 
with ethnic, religious, and racial others.  
The ‘war on gender’ and beyond 
The last empirical chapter of the dissertation went wider than the Polish context and 
brought in all the themes discussed in the earlier chapters in order to show the regional 
and global context of conservative-nationalist discourses in politics. Between 2012 and 
2014 especially, Poland experienced an unprecedented discursive and institutional 
campaign of ‘war on gender’. The dissertation argued that the opposition to feminist 
and LGBTQ+-inclusive policies has been nothing new in the Eastern European region, 
nor globally. However, it stressed that we are experiencing a new quality of backlash 
in the recent years.  
The period around the years 2012-2013 marked a significant turning point for the 
previously relatively stable human rights consensus in Europe. In several countries, 
gender equality, sexual education, and LGBTQ+ rights became the target of 
interrelated attacks conducted by religious officials, faith-based grassroots 
organizations, conservative civil movements, and right-wing politicians, and have 
been brought to unprecedented public attention lumped under the term ‘gender 
ideology’ (or théorie du genre in France and Genderismus in Germany). As 
researchers from France, Germany, Poland and Slovakia have pointed out, while the 
term ‘gender ideology’ had sporadically appeared on the internet before, it only just 
recently entered public discourse in Europe (for more details see the edited volume by 
Kovats and Põim 2015). I have contributed to the analysis of this phenomenon by 
analysing the local context and trajectories that shape the ultraconservative and anti-
feminist rhetoric and practices for the specific case of Poland (cf. Grabowska 2014).  
As I argued in chapters 4 and 7, the recent anti-gender campaigns and the expanding 
role of the organized churches in the public sphere are certainly not the first signs of a 
backlash against women’s and sexual rights. Furthermore, these processes are not 
particular to any one domestic political arena. I followed Elżbieta Korolczuk (2015) 
in seeing the recent Polish ‘war on gender’ as part of the transnational process of 
backlash against women and sexual rights. However, I also argued that these 
discourses could be traced back to the historical moments that secured the unique 
position of catholic religion in Poland – one that allows its representatives to express 
their opinions and views from a position of power and to claim their indispensability 
to culture, society, and politics. Hence, such discourses are not new, but there is 
something particularly strong about them currently in Europe. Intertwining global and 
domestic features are at play.  
In Eastern Europe progress in the field of gender equality has not only been rather 
stagnant and uneven (see chapter 4), but also much shakier and easier to reverse than 
activists and academics had imagined (Grzebalska 2016). Arguably, politicians needed 
a scapegoat in times of crisis to divert people’s attention from economic hardship, 
hence they followed the ultraconservatives’ finger pointing. As Weronika Grzebalska 
(2015) also claimed, anti-genderism can rather be conceptualized as a ‘symbolic glue’ 
which connects the rejection of various progressive issues under one umbrella term, 
and unites different conservative actors in a much bigger quest to change the values 
underlying the European liberal democracy. As such, the ‘war on gender’ is not a mere 
feminist issue, but rather one threatening the system of liberal democracy, a booby trap 
for making much bigger and deeper upheavals in the political system (Grzebalska 
2015). 
No country for losers? 
233 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
What comes clearly across in my analysis is the central and catalysing role of the 
catholic church in Polish politics. From substantial influence over legislation (which I 
discussed in chapters 4, 5, and 6) to the ‘war on gender’, catholic clergy have had a lot 
of input into the operation of formal Polish politics. The recent anti-gender 
mobilization in the country was church-driven; Polish parliamentarians followed 
willingly, perhaps in order to legitimize their own position in politics by endorsing the 
influential discourse of the church. The ‘war on gender’ in Poland impacted centrist 
parties in parliament, so that they shifted towards the right on relevant topics. In the 
seventh parliamentary term, there was no progressive legislation on women’s 
reproductive health and LGBTQ+ issues until the immediate pre-electoral period, 
when the ruling coalition was afraid of losing the votes of the liberal-centrist electorate. 
However, by mid-2015 it was too late for such moves: the normalization and 
legitimization of the anti-gender discourse was in full swing and it has become 
mainstream political practice since the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections.  
Future research agenda 
The findings of this study could be a departure point for the analysis of wider forces 
that are pulling at the ‘European project’ based on the rejection of European values 
and integration. They point to a need to research the anti-equality backlash, and 
specifically the anti-gender mobilizations in Eastern and Southern Europe and cross-
regionally. Despite both academic and activist commitment to respond to and analyse 
these developments, the phenomenon of anti-gender mobilizations is so recent that 
there is a real dearth of theoretical and comparative work that would elucidate the 
situation. Since Europe (and definitely Eastern Europe) has seen anti-feminist and anti-
equality discourses and trends before, questions that can be explored further include: 
what is the European significance of the ‘war on gender’ today? Who is driving it 
politically?  
The main issue is to investigate how much the anti-gender mobilizations in politics are 
a reaction to unrelated issues (for example, to cover up scandals within religious 
institutions, or distract the masses from economic problems) and how much it is an 
active and wilful policy by political actors? How does it compare across regions in 
Europe? How can the backlash be conceptualized theoretically? What methods should 
be used to analyse it? And, most importantly, does it have to do more widely with the 
backlash against liberal democracy and its institutions in many European countries 
today? It is urgent to fill this gap by performing cross-regional comparative analysis 
of the ‘wars on gender’ as deployed in countries of Southern, Central, and Eastern 
Europe especially. There is a need to start building both theoretical and empirical 
connections that could allow progress in the exploration of resistance and backlash 
against equality policies in particular, but also more broadly against liberal democracy.  
As far as the Polish case is concerned, my analysis can be seen as a departure point for 
the exploration of the current political situation. Following the October 2015 elections 
(won by PiS with a first-ever absolute majority in the post-1989 Polish parliament), it 
can be argued that the parliamentary term I studied can be seen as a fin de siècle 
moment. Arguably, it has paved the way for the now on-going dismantling of the 
legislative, institutional, and systemic guarantors of the division of powers, 
independence of the judiciary and the media as well as various human and 
environmental rights standards. In terms of anti-discrimination and equality, the anti-
gender campaign showed how easy it is to use transformation legacies of anti-
feminism and economic and social inequality to construct enemies of the nation. Since 
the fall of 2015, with the new right-wing-dominated parliament, the ‘war on gender’ 
has become the name of the game in the fields of family and welfare politics.  
In the current parliamentary term (2015-2019), despite the highest number of female 
MPs in history (27% in the lower house and 13% in the Senate), the discourse and 
practice of ‘anti-genderism’ have become entrenched. There is even more focus than 
before on ‘catholic family values’ and ‘mothers’, which in practice has meant a 
significant rolling back of women’s and LGBTQ+ rights. For instance, the newly 
passed 2015 law allowing for easier administrative procedures for transsexuals was 
vetoed by the new PiS president Andrzej Duda.  
Moreover, there was a new legislative proposal that would have completely banned 
and criminalized abortion, if passed in parliament. While the bill was rejected in the 
Sejm following mass women’s protests in October of 2016, within several weeks the 
PiS government legislated a new social bonus instead. The state is to make one-time 
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payments of 4,000zł (£770) if a woman decides to give birth to a disabled infant or 
one with a life-threatening disease, giving up the option of terminating the pregnancy 
(which in this case would be legal). If the child is stillborn, the state does not 
‘compensate’ for carrying the pregnancy to term. The bonus does not apply to children 
who become handicapped or seriously ill after birth or whose defects were not 
diagnosed during pregnancy. This new state social policy is called ‘For Life’ (Za 
życiem). 
Since the Fall of 2015, the public media, courts, administration, and all social and 
cultural programs are supposed to be ‘national’ (narodowy). The nationalist and 
ultraconservative response to neoliberal inequalities of post-transformation and 
globalization thus produced exclusion in the form of welfare chauvinism that again 
leaves out sections of society. IVF state budget funding has been withdrawn by the 
parliament at the state level. Budget funding for shelters and organizations helping 
women and children affected by domestic violence has also been withdrawn. The 
flagship welfare project of the Law and Justice government, called ‘Family 500+’, is 
very restrictive for single parents (mostly single mothers).130 At the time of writing 
(December 2016), the media are speculating whether the PiS government will 
withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.131 
Thus, future research avenues with regards to the Polish case would entail more 
‘struggling with Polishness’ that the Polish writer Witold Gombrowicz alluded to in 
the opening quote of this chapter. However, an analysis of the post-2015 political, 
legal, and institutional changes in Poland would be called for, especially considering 
its relevance to the wider debates on the backlash against ‘political correctness’ and 
illiberal right-wing populism that are highly topical today.  
 
 
                                                 
130 The program (in operation since spring 2016) gives Polish families a monthly allowance of 500 zł 
(PLN) – equivalent of around £96 – for every second and subsequent child up to the age of 18. 
However, it introduces income limits for single parents to receive the money also for the first child.  
131 For the full story see: https://oko.press/pis-wypowiada-konwencje-antyprzemocowa-oficjalne-
pismo-potwierdzily-sie-ostrzezenia-oko-press/ (accessed December 2016). 
 
Appendix I: List of parliamentary debates 
included in the analysis 
Family and welfare debates analysed in chapter 5: 
 










1. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wspieraniu rodziny i systemie pieczy 





Druki nr 38 i 
67 
2.  Informacja ministra właściwego do 
spraw oświaty i wychowania o stanie 
przygotowań organów prowadzących 
do objęcia obowiązkiem szkolnym 
dzieci sześcioletnich wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Edukacji, 





Druki nr 57 i 
155 
3.  Sprawozdanie Rady Ministrów z 
realizacji "Krajowego programu 
przeciwdziałania przemocy w 
rodzinie" od 1 stycznia 2010 r. do 31 
grudnia 2010 r. wraz ze stanowiskiem 
Komisji Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 






Druki nr 48 i 
158 
4. Informacja ministra pracy i polityki 
społecznej o skutkach obowiązywania 
ustawy z dnia 10 czerwca 2010 r. o 




Druki nr 79 i 
159 
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przemocy w rodzinie oraz niektórych 
innych ustaw wraz ze stanowiskiem 
Komisji Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 
(agenda point #25). 
1-2 Mar 
2012 
5. Informacja rzecznika praw dziecka o 
skutkach obowiązywania ustawy z 
dnia 10 czerwca 2010 r. o zmianie 
ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu przemocy 
w rodzinie oraz niektórych innych 
ustaw wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 







Druki nr 47 i 
157 
6. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej o poselskim projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o wspieraniu 
rodziny i systemie pieczy zastępczej 





Druki nr 177, 
217 i 217-A 
7. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie sprawozdania Rady 
Ministrów z realizacji "Krajowego 
programu przeciwdziałania przemocy 
w rodzinie" od 1 stycznia 2010 r. do 





Druki nr 48 i 
158 
8. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie informacji ministra pracy i 
polityki społecznej o skutkach 
obowiązywania ustawy z dnia 10 
czerwca 2010 r. o zmianie ustawy o 





Druki nr 79 i 
159 
rodzinie oraz niektórych innych ustaw 
(agenda point #15). 
9. Informacja Rady Ministrów o 
realizacji działań wynikających z 
"Krajowego programu 
przeciwdziałania narkomanii" w 2010 
roku wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 





Druki nr 36 i 
231 
10.  Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej o uchwale Senatu w 
sprawie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wspieraniu rodziny i systemie pieczy 
zastępczej oraz niektórych innych 





Druki nr 313 i 
334 
11. Informacja rzecznika praw dziecka o 
działalności za rok 2011 oraz uwagi o 
stanie przestrzegania praw dziecka 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Edukacji, Nauki i Młodzieży oraz 
Komisji Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 





Druki nr 290 i 
503 
12. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 






Druki nr 319 i 
625 
13. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 





Druki nr 319, 
625 i 625-A 
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świadczeniach rodzinnych (agenda 
point #25). 
14. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu 
ludzkiego i warunkach 
dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży 





Druk nr 670 
15. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 
rządowym projekcie ustawy o zmianie 
zakresu obowiązywania Konwencji o 
prawach dziecka, przyjętej dnia 20 
listopada 1989 r. w Nowym Jorku 





Druki nr 490 i 
700 
16. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 
rządowym projekcie ustawy o zmianie 
zakresu obowiązywania Konwencji o 
prawach dziecka, przyjętej dnia 20 
listopada 1989 r. w Nowym Jorku 





Druki nr 490 i 
700 
17. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie w pierwszym czytaniu 
poselskiego projektu ustawy o 






Druk nr 562 
18. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie w pierwszym czytaniu 
poselskiego projektu ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o planowaniu rodziny, 
ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach 
dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży 





Druk nr 670 
19. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 






Druki nr 212 i 
574 
20. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o świadczeniach rodzinnych 





Druki nr 771 i 
775 
21.  Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Zdrowia o poselskim projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu 
ludzkiego i warunkach 






Druki nr 670 i 
829 
22.  Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
świadczeniach rodzinnych oraz 





Druki nr 724 i 
830 
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23.  Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
świadczeniach rodzinnych oraz 






Druki nr 724, 
830 i 830-A 
24. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o senackim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wspieraniu rodziny i systemie pieczy 




Druki nr 893 i 
930 
25. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o świadczeniach rodzinnych 





Druki nr 926 i 
952 
26. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej 
finansowanych ze środków 
publicznych oraz ustawy o wspieraniu 
rodziny i systemie pieczy zastępczej 





Druki nr 856 i 
929 
27. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej 
finansowanych ze środków 





Druki nr 856 i 
929 
rodziny i systemie pieczy zastępczej 
(agenda point #13). 
28. Sprawozdanie Komisji Samorządu 
Terytorialnego i Polityki Regionalnej 
oraz Komisji Zdrowia o senackim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wychowaniu w trzeźwości i 
przeciwdziałaniu alkoholizmowi 




Druki nr 978, 
1006 i 1006-A 
29. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o związkach 





Druk nr 552 
30. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy Przepisy 
wprowadzające ustawę o związkach 





Druk nr 553 
31. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o związkach 





Druk nr 554 
32. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy Przepisy 
wprowadzające ustawę o związkach 





Druk nr 555 
33. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o umowie związku 





Druk nr 825 
34. Informacja ministra właściwego do 
spraw oświaty i wychowania o stanie 
przygotowań organów prowadzących 
do objęcia obowiązkiem szkolnym 
dzieci sześcioletnich wraz ze 





Druki nr 1019 i 
1084 
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Nauki i Młodzieży oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej (agenda point #16).  
35. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie informacji ministra 
właściwego do spraw oświaty i 
wychowania o stanie przygotowań 
organów prowadzących do objęcia 
obowiązkiem szkolnym dzieci 




Druki nr 1019 i 
1084 
36. Sprawozdanie Rady Ministrów z 
realizacji "Krajowego programu 
przeciwdziałania przemocy w 
rodzinie" za okres od 1 stycznia 2011 
r. do 31 grudnia 2011 r. wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 





Druki nr 971 i 
1095 
37. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie sprawozdania Rady 
Ministrów z realizacji "Krajowego 
programu przeciwdziałania przemocy 
w rodzinie" za okres od 1 stycznia 
2011 r. do 31 grudnia 2011 r. (agenda 





Druki nr 971 i 
1095 
38. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
opiece nad dziećmi w wieku do lat 3 
oraz ustawy o świadczeniach 





Druki nr 1075 i 
1284 
społecznego w razie choroby i 
macierzyństwa (agenda point #3). 
39. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy 
Kodeks pracy oraz ustawy o 
świadczeniach pieniężnych z 
ubezpieczenia społecznego w razie 





Druk nr 1172 
40. Informacja Rady Ministrów o 
realizacji rządowego programu 
preferencyjnych kredytów 
mieszkaniowych "Rodzina na swoim" 
oraz zamierzenia w sprawie 
wprowadzenia po dniu 31 grudnia 
2013 r. systemów wspierania rodzin w 
zaspokajaniu potrzeb mieszkaniowych 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Finansów Publicznych, Komisji 
Infrastruktury oraz Komisji Polityki 






Druki nr 1257 i 
1259 
41. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej o poselskim projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o wspieraniu 
rodziny i systemie pieczy zastępczej 





Druki nr 1274 i 
1376 
42.  Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o senackim 





Druki nr 1186 i 
1460 
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świadczeniach pieniężnych z 
ubezpieczenia społecznego w razie 
choroby i macierzyństwa (agenda 
point #5).  
43.  Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wdrożeniu niektórych przepisów Unii 
Europejskiej w zakresie równego 
traktowania oraz niektórych innych 





Druk nr 1051 
44.  Informacja rzecznika praw dziecka o 
działalności za rok 2012 oraz uwagi o 
stanie przestrzegania praw dziecka 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Edukacji, Nauki i Młodzieży oraz 
Komisji Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 





Druki nr 1244 i 
1425 
45. Sprawozdanie Komisji Finansów 
Publicznych oraz Komisji 
Infrastruktury o rządowym projekcie 
ustawy o pomocy państwa w nabyciu 
pierwszego mieszkania przez ludzi 





Druki nr 1421, 
1721 i 1721-A 
46. Pierwsze czytanie obywatelskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu 
ludzkiego i warunkach 
dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży 





Druk nr 1654 
47. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie informacji prezesa Rady 
Ministrów na temat sytuacji ludzi 






48. Rozpatrzenie obywatelskiego wniosku 
o poddanie pod referendum 
ogólnokrajowe sprawy o szczególnym 
znaczeniu dla państwa i obywateli 
dotyczącej systemu edukacji - "Ratuj 
maluchy i starsze dzieci też" (agenda 





Druk nr 1635 
49. Rozpatrzenie obywatelskiego wniosku 
o poddanie pod referendum 
ogólnokrajowe sprawy o szczególnym 
znaczeniu dla państwa i obywateli 
dotyczącej systemu edukacji - "Ratuj 
maluchy i starsze dzieci też" (agenda 




Druk nr 1635 
50. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o uzgodnieniu płci 




Druk nr 1469 
51. Przedstawiony przez prezesa Rady 
Ministrów dokument: Informacja 
Rady Ministrów o realizacji w roku 
2012 ustawy z dnia 9 czerwca 2011 r. 
o wspieraniu rodziny i systemie 
pieczy zastępczej wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 





Druki nr 1669 i 
1801 
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52.  Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie przedstawionego przez 
prezesa Rady Ministrów dokumentu: 
Informacja Rady Ministrów o 
realizacji w roku 2012 ustawy z dnia 9 
czerwca 2011 r. o wspieraniu rodziny 
i systemie pieczy zastępczej (agenda 




Druki nr 1669 i 
1801 
53.  Informacja ministra właściwego do 
spraw oświaty i wychowania o stanie 
przygotowań organów prowadzących 
do objęcia obowiązkiem szkolnym 
dzieci sześcioletnich wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 





Druki nr 1825 i 
1897 
54.  Rozpatrzenie poselskiego wniosku o 
zarządzenie ogólnopolskiego 
referendum w sprawie zniesienia 
obowiązku szkolnego sześciolatków 





Druk nr 2022 
55.  Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy 
Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy 





Druk nr 2181 
56. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
świadczeniach rodzinnych (agenda 




Druk nr 1766 
57. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
świadczeniach rodzinnych (agenda 




Druk nr 1767 
58. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu 
ustawy o ustaleniu i wypłacie 





Druk nr 2252 
59. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 





Druki nr 2254, 
2257 i 2257-A 
60. Przedstawione przez Radę Ministrów 
sprawozdanie z wykonania ustawy z 
dnia 26 października 1982 r. o 
wychowaniu w trzeźwości i 
przeciwdziałaniu alkoholizmowi w 
okresie 1 stycznia - 31 grudnia 2010 r. 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 




Druki nr 1998 i 
2105 
61. Przedstawione przez Radę Ministrów 
sprawozdanie z realizacji "Krajowego 
programu przeciwdziałania przemocy 
w rodzinie" za okres od 1 stycznia 
2012 r. do 31 grudnia 2012 r. wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 





Druki nr 1950 i 
2148 
62. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o uchwale 





Druki nr 2307 i 
2326 
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ustawy o świadczeniach rodzinnych 
(agenda point #17). 
63. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o edukacji 





Druki nr 1298 i 
1974 
64. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie przedstawionego przez 
Radę Ministrów sprawozdania z 
realizacji "Krajowego programu 
przeciwdziałania przemocy w 
rodzinie" za okres od 1 stycznia 2012 






Druki nr 1950 i 
2148 
65.  Informacja o działalności rzecznika 
praw dziecka za rok 2013 oraz uwagi 
o stanie przestrzegania praw dziecka 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Edukacji, Nauki i Młodzieży oraz 
Komisji Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 





Druki nr 2300 i 
2451 
66. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wspieraniu rodziny i systemie pieczy 
zastępczej oraz niektórych innych 





Druki nr 2532, 
2532-A, 2630 i 
2630-A 
67. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 





Druki nr 2681 i 
2722 
ratyfikacji Konwencji Rady Europy o 
ochronie dzieci przed seksualnym 
wykorzystywaniem i niegodziwym 
traktowaniem w celach seksualnych, 
sporządzonej w Lanzarote w dniu 25 
października 2007 r. (agenda point 
#12). 
68. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 
rządowym projekcie ustawy o 
ratyfikacji Konwencji Rady Europy o 
zapobieganiu i zwalczaniu przemocy 
wobec kobiet i przemocy domowej, 
sporządzonej w Stambule dnia 11 





Druki nr 2515 i 
2701 
69. Sprawozdanie Komisji Zdrowia o 
uchwale Senatu w sprawie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o świadczeniach 
opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze 
środków publicznych oraz niektórych 





Druki nr 2765 i 
2785 
70. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
emeryturach i rentach z Funduszu 
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych oraz 






Druki nr 2782, 
2820 i 2820-A 
71. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 




Druk nr 2832 
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ubezpieczenia społecznego w razie 
choroby i macierzyństwa oraz 
niektórych innych ustaw (agenda 
point #5). 
72. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu 
ustawy o Karcie Dużej Rodziny 





Druk nr 2923 
73. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu 
zagrożeniom przestępczością na tle 
seksualnym i o zmianie niektórych 




Druk nr 2859 
74. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej o rządowym projekcie 
ustawy o Karcie Dużej Rodziny 




Druki nr 2923 i 
2958 
75. Przedstawiony przez prezesa Rady 
Ministrów dokument: Informacja 
Rady Ministrów o realizacji w roku 
2013 ustawy z dnia 9 czerwca 2011 r. 
o wspieraniu rodziny i systemie 
pieczy zastępczej wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 





Druki nr 2713 i 
2802 
76. Informacja rządu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej o działaniach 
podejmowanych w 2013 r. na rzecz 





Druki nr 2611 i 
2937 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 1 
sierpnia 1997 r. Karta Praw Osób 
Niepełnosprawnych wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny (agenda point 
#10). 
77. Sprawozdanie Rady Ministrów z 
realizacji ustawy z dnia 4 lutego 2011 
r. o opiece nad dziećmi w wieku do lat 
3 w latach 2011-2012 wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 






Druki nr 1843 i 
2127 
78. Sprawozdanie Rady Ministrów z 
realizacji ustawy z dnia 4 lutego 2011 
r. o opiece nad dziećmi w wieku do lat 
3 w 2013 r. wraz ze stanowiskiem 
Komisji Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 





Druki nr 2849 i 
3021 
79. Sprawozdanie ministra pracy i 
polityki społecznej z realizacji 
programu wieloletniego "Pomoc 
państwa w zakresie dożywiania" za 
okres styczeń 2010 r. - grudzień 2013 
r. wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 






Druki nr 2793 i 
2947 
80. Przedstawione przez Radę Ministrów 
sprawozdanie z realizacji "Krajowego 
programu przeciwdziałania przemocy 
w rodzinie" za okres od 1 stycznia 





Druki nr 2851i 
2993 
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stanowiskiem Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny (agenda point 
#34). 
81. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 
rządowym projekcie ustawy o 
ratyfikacji Konwencji Rady Europy o 
zapobieganiu i zwalczaniu przemocy 
wobec kobiet i przemocy domowej, 
sporządzonej w Stambule dnia 11 




Druki nr 2515, 
2701 i 2701-A 
82. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
emeryturach i rentach z Funduszu 





Druki nr 2651 i 
3175 
83. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu 
ustawy o leczeniu niepłodności 




Druk nr 3245 
84. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
pobieraniu, przechowywaniu i 
przeszczepianiu komórek, tkanek i 




Druk nr 608 
85. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o ochronie genomu 
ludzkiego i embrionu ludzkiego oraz 
zmianie niektórych innych ustaw 




Druk nr 1107 
86. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o świadomym 




Druk nr 1122 
87. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Zdrowia o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o uzgodnieniu płci 





Druki nr 1469 i 
3648 
88. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Zdrowia o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o 





Druki nr 3814 i 
386. 
89. Pierwsze czytanie obywatelskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu 
ludzkiego i warunkach 
dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży 
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Debates on the nation analysed in chapter 6: 
 










1. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projektu uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Václava Havla 





Druk nr 94 
2. Pierwsze czytanie przedstawionego 
przez Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej projektu ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o godle, barwach i hymnie 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o 
pieczęciach państwowych i ustawy o 





Druk nr 80 
3. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Karola Józefa 





Druki nr 87 i 
95 
4. Pierwsze czytanie obywatelskiego 
projektu ustawy o powrocie do 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej osób 
pochodzenia polskiego 
deportowanych i zesłanych przez 
władze Związku Socjalistycznych 






Druk nr 22 
5. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej o pilnym rządowym 
projekcie ustawy zmieniającej 
ustawę o zmianie ustawy o systemie 
oświaty oraz o zmianie niektórych 





Druki nr 102, 
113 i 113-A 
6. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o skutkach 
powierzania wykonywania pracy 
cudzoziemcom przebywającym 
wbrew przepisom na terytorium 






Druk nr 120 
7. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 70. rocznicy 






Druk nr 198 
8. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Zygmunta 
Krasińskiego w 200. rocznicę Jego 





Druki nr 149 i 
187 
9. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury 
Fizycznej, Sportu i Turystyki o 
przedstawionym przez Prezydenta 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o godle, 






Druki nr 80, 
191 i 191-A 
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Polskiej oraz o pieczęciach 
państwowych i ustawy o sporcie 
(agenda point #2). 
10. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
sytuacji w Republice Białoruś 






Druk nr 227 
11. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Spraw Wewnętrznych o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
cudzoziemcach oraz ustawy o 
promocji zatrudnienia i instytucjach 





Druki nr 206 i 
233 
12. Informacja prezesa Rady Ministrów 
na temat projektu wdrażanego przez 
Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej, 
ograniczającego wymiar godzin 
lekcji historii w szkołach 







13. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Jana 
Rybkowskiego w 100. rocznicę Jego 





Druki nr 184 i 
242 
14. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury 
Fizycznej, Sportu i Turystyki o 
uchwale Senatu w sprawie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o godle, barwach i 





Druki nr 273 i 
301 
oraz o pieczęciach państwowych 
oraz ustawy o sporcie (agenda point 
#14). 
15. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Spraw Wewnętrznych o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o cudzoziemcach oraz ustawy 
o promocji zatrudnienia i 






Druki nr 314 i 
339 
16. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o skutkach 
powierzania wykonywania pracy 
cudzoziemcom przebywającym 
wbrew przepisom na terytorium 






Druki nr 120 i 
357 
17. Pierwsze czytanie komisyjnego 
projektu uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia 18 kwietnia 
Narodowym Dniem Pacjenta w 





Druk nr 326 
18. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Spraw Wewnętrznych o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
dokumentach paszportowych 





Druki nr 320, 
394 i 394-A 
19. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 





Druk nr 437 
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budowy Centralnego Okręgu 
Przemysłowego (agenda point #28). 
20. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uchylenia rozporządzenia ministra 
edukacji narodowej z 23 grudnia 
2008 r. w sprawie podstawy 
programowej wychowania 
przedszkolnego oraz kształcenia 
ogólnego w poszczególnych typach 
szkół (Dz. U. z 2009 r. Nr 4, poz. 17) 
oraz rozporządzenia ministra 
edukacji narodowej w sprawie 
ramowych planów nauczania w 
szkołach publicznych z dnia 7 lutego 





Druki nr 284 i 
361 
21. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o skutkach 
powierzania wykonywania pracy 
cudzoziemcom przebywającym 
wbrew przepisom na terytorium 






Druki nr 445 i 
468 
22. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Andrzeja Frycza-
Modrzewskiego w związku z 440. 





Druki nr 300 i 
419 
23. Sprawozdanie ministra spraw 
wewnętrznych z realizacji w 2011 r. 
ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o 
nabywaniu nieruchomości przez 
cudzoziemców wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Administracji 






Druki nr 303 i 
358 
24. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury 
Fizycznej, Sportu i Turystyki o 
komisyjnym projekcie uchwały w 
sprawie nadania Stadionowi 
Narodowemu w Warszawie imienia 






Druki nr 488 i 
506 
25. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 90. 
rocznicy powrotu części Górnego 
Śląska do odradzającego się Państwa 





Druki nr 575 i 
578 
26. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o nadaniu nowej 
nazwy Politechnice Radomskiej im. 






Druki nr 495 i 
558 
27. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
hołdu wszystkim zamordowanym i 
represjonowanym na terenach 





Druk nr 687 
No country for losers? 
261 
Appendix I: List of parliamentary debates 
tzw. Operacji Polskiej w latach 1937-
1938 (agenda point # 19). 
28. Informacja prezesa Instytutu Pamięci 
Narodowej o działalności Instytutu 
Pamięci Narodowej - Komisji 
Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko 
Narodowi Polskiemu w okresie 1 
stycznia 2009 r. - 31 grudnia 2009 r. 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 





Druki nr 65 i 
173 
29. Informacja prezesa Instytutu Pamięci 
Narodowej o działalności Instytutu 
Pamięci Narodowej - Komisji 
Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko 
Narodowi Polskiemu w okresie 1 
stycznia 2010 r. - 31 grudnia 2010 r. 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 





Druki nr 66 i 
174 
30. Informacja prezesa Instytutu Pamięci 
Narodowej o działalności Instytutu 
Pamięci Narodowej - Komisji 
Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko 
Narodowi Polskiemu w okresie 1 
stycznia 2011 r. - 31 grudnia 2011 r. 
wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 





Druk nr 328 i 
415 
31. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o likwidacji 
Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej - 
Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko 






Druk nr 606 
32. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o uchyleniu dekretu 
o obszarach szczególnie ważnych dla 
obrony kraju oraz o zmianie ustawy 





Druk nr 663 
33. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Spraw Wewnętrznych o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
dokumentach paszportowych 





Druki nr 637 i 
709 
34. Informacja ministra sprawiedliwości 
na temat podejmowanych przez 
Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości oraz 
podmioty mu podległe i 
nadzorowane działań dotyczących 
zagwarantowania właściwych 
procedur postępowania ze zwłokami 
ofiar katastrofy smoleńskiej na 







35. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 90. rocznicy rozpoczęcia 
budowy portu morskiego w Gdyni 





Druk nr 746 
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36. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 20. rocznicy nawiązania 
stosunków dyplomatycznych między 
Rzecząpospolitą Polską i Republiką 





Druk nr 736 
37. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Spraw Wewnętrznych o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
dokumentach paszportowych 





Druki nr 637 i 
709 
38. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie informacji ministra 
sprawiedliwości na temat 
podejmowanych przez Ministerstwo 
Sprawiedliwości oraz podmioty mu 
podległe i nadzorowane działań 
dotyczących zagwarantowania 
właściwych procedur postępowania 
ze zwłokami ofiar katastrofy 
smoleńskiej na terenie Federacji 






39. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Zofii i Stefana 





Druk nr 800 
40. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w związku z 70. 
rocznicą powstania Narodowych Sił 





Druki nr 743 i 
820 
41. Sprawozdanie Komisji Zdrowia o 
komisyjnym projekcie uchwały w 
sprawie ustanowienia 18 kwietnia 
Narodowym Dniem Pacjenta w 





Druki nr 326 i 
798 
42. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2013 Rokiem 
Pamięci o Powstaniu Styczniowym 





Druki nr 593 i 
821 
43. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 70. rocznicy powstania 
Rady Pomocy Żydom "Żegota" 





Druki nr 907 i 
912 
44. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 70. rocznicy wysiedleń z 





Druk nr 915 
45. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia setnej rocznicy urodzin 





Druki nr 824 i 
842 
46. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o 
przedstawionym przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekcie uchwały w sprawie 




Druki nr 869 i 
898 
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Osób Niepełnosprawnych (agenda 
point #17). 
47. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2013 Rokiem Jana 




Druki nr 865 i 
899 
48. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2013 Rokiem 





Druki nr 867 i 
901 
49. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w związku z 
90. rocznicą zamordowania 
prezydenta Gabriela Narutowicza 




Druk nr 956 
50. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2013 Rokiem 






Druki nr 868 i 
902 
51. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2013 Rokiem 






Druki nr 868 i 
902 
52. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w 150. 
rocznicę wybuchu Powstania 




Druk nr 1022 
53. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia powstania Teatru 






Druk nr 1055 
54. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o przedstawionym przez 
Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
przebudowie i modernizacji 
technicznej oraz finansowaniu Sił 
Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 





Druki nr 780 i 
1021 
55. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o Korpusie 
Weteranów Walk o Niepodległość 





Druk nr 1099 
56. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o: 
1) poselskim projekcie uchwały w 
związku ze 120. rocznicą powstania 
Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej, 
2) poselskim projekcie uchwały w 
120. rocznicę powstania Polskiej 
Partii Socjalistycznej 




Druki nr 994, 
995 i 1074 
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57. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w 70. 
rocznicę wybuchu Powstania w 






Druk nr 1266 
58. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 140. rocznicy urodzin 






Druki nr 1227 i 
1260 
59. Przedstawione przez Radę Języka 
Polskiego "Sprawozdanie ze stanu 
ochrony języka polskiego w latach 
2010-2011" wraz ze stanowiskiem 
Komisji Kultury i Środków Przekazu 





Druk nr 1083 i 
1211 
60. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Grzegorza 
Przemyka - ofiary stanu wojennego 






druk nr 1372). 
61. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia dnia 4 czerwca Dniem 
Wolności i Praw Obywatelskich 





Druki nr 1281, 
1320 i 1320-A 
62. Sprawozdanie ministra spraw 
wewnętrznych z realizacji w 2012 r. 
ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o 
nabywaniu nieruchomości przez 
cudzoziemców wraz ze 
stanowiskiem Komisji Spraw 





Druki nr 1255 i 
1314 
63. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o rządowym projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o urzędzie 
Ministra Obrony Narodowej oraz 






Druki nr 1236, 
1453 i 1453-A 
64. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
kombatantach oraz niektórych 
osobach będących ofiarami represji 
wojennych i okresu powojennego 
oraz niektórych innych ustaw 





Druk nr 1417 
65. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Aleksandra 
Fredry w 220. rocznicę urodzin 





Druki nr 1359 i 
1399 
66. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie sprawozdania ministra 
spraw wewnętrznych z realizacji w 
2012 r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 
r. o nabywaniu nieruchomości przez 





Druki nr 1255 i 
1314 
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67. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskich 
projektach uchwał w sprawie: 
1) ustanowienia Dnia Pamięci i 
Męczeństwa Kresowian, 
2) ustanowienia 11 lipca Dniem 
Pamięci Męczeństwa Kresowian, 
3) ustanowienia dnia 11 lipca Dniem 
Pamięci Męczeństwa Kresowian, 
4) ludobójstwa dokonanego przez 
OUN - UPA na ludności polskiej 
Kresów Wschodnich w latach 1939-
1947, 
5) uczczenia 70. rocznicy tragedii 
ludności polskiej na Kresach 
Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej 





Druki nr 327, 
470, 536, 
1295, 1333, 
1415 i 1415-A 
68. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci ofiar mordu 
profesorów uczelni lwowskich w 





Druki nr 1385, 
1479 i 1479-A 
69. Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw 
Wewnętrznych o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
dokumentach paszportowych 





Druki nr 1510 i 
1560 
70. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o cudzoziemcach 





Druk nr 1526 
71. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w 70 rocznicę 
buntu więźniów w niemieckim, 







72. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o rządowym projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o służbie 
wojskowej żołnierzy zawodowych 
oraz o zmianie niektórych innych 





Druki nr 1278 i 
1673 
73. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia dnia 20 września 
Ogólnopolskim Dniem 




Druki nr 1663 i 
1695 
74. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 330 rocznicy Bitwy 




Druki nr 1132 i 
1697 
75. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o rządowym projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o służbie 
wojskowej żołnierzy zawodowych 
oraz o zmianie niektórych innych 




Druki nr 1278 i 
1673 
76. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 





Druki nr 1446 i 
1694 
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ustanowienia 17 września Dniem 
Sybiraka (agenda point #28). 
77. Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw 
Zagranicznych o poselskim projekcie 
uchwały w sprawie wyrażenia 
solidarności z prześladowanymi 
wspólnotami chrześcijańskimi w 





Druki nr 1702 i 
1776 
78. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o uchwale Senatu w 
sprawie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
służbie wojskowej żołnierzy 
zawodowych oraz niektórych innych 





Druki nr 1790 i 
1810 
79. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 1150. rocznicy misji 
świętych Cyryla i Metodego wśród 





Druki nr 1447 i 
1802 
80. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 200 rocznicy śmierci 
księcia Józefa Poniatowskiego 





Druki nr 1768 i 
1803 
81. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia sierżanta Józefa 





Druki nr 1613 i 
1809 
ostatniego żołnierza 
antykomunistycznego podziemia w 
50 rocznicę śmierci (agenda point 
#18). 
82. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o przyznaniu 
świadczenia pieniężnego i renty 
inwalidzkiej przysługującym 
sybirakom - kombatantom 
przebywającym w latach 1939-1956 
na przymusowym zesłaniu lub 
deportacji w byłym Związku 
Socjalistycznych Republik 





Druk nr 1657 
83. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w 65. rocznicę 
śmierci Kardynała Augusta Hlonda 





Druki nr 1830 i 
1851 
84. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 70. rocznicy bitwy pod 





Druki nr 1839 i 
1852 
85. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Tadeusza 





Druk nr 1879 
86. Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw 
Wewnętrznych o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o cudzoziemcach 





Druki nr 1526, 
1853 i 1853-A 
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87. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w 65. rocznicę 
śmierci Kardynała Augusta Hlonda 





Druki nr 1830 i 
1851 
88. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 70. rocznicy bitwy pod 





Druki nr 1839 i 
1852 
89. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 95. 
rocznicy powstania rządu Ignacego 





Druki nr 1880 i 
1891 
90. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały Sejmu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w sprawie 





Druk nr 1954 
91. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2014 Rokiem 




Druki nr 1784 i 
1922 
92. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2014 Rokiem Jana 




Druki nr 1872 i 
1924 
93. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2014 Rokiem św. 




Druki nr 1873, 
1923 i 1923-A 
94. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 95. rocznicy 
przyznania Polkom praw 




Druk nr 1969 
95. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Włodzimierza 
Przerwy-Tetmajera w 90. rocznicę 





Druki nr 1947 i 
1971 
96. Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw 
Wewnętrznych o uchwale Senatu w 
sprawie ustawy o cudzoziemcach 





Druki 1982 i 
1995 
97. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 32. rocznicy 
wprowadzenia stanu wojennego 




Druk nr 2008 
98. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w 95. 
rocznicę wybuchu Powstania 




Druk nr 2011 
99. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej oraz Komisji Polityki 





Druki nr 677, 
1099, 1417 i 
1997 
No country for losers? 
275 
Appendix I: List of parliamentary debates 
1) senackim projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o kombatantach oraz 
niektórych osobach będących 
ofiarami represji wojennych i okresu 
powojennego, 
2) poselskim projekcie ustawy o 
Korpusie Weteranów Walk o 
Niepodległość Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, 
3) rządowym projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o kombatantach oraz 
niektórych osobach będących 
ofiarami represji wojennych i okresu 
powojennego oraz niektórych innych 
ustaw (agenda point #2). 
100. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
powszechnym obowiązku obrony 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz 
zmianie ustawy o uposażeniu 
żołnierzy niezawodowych oraz 






Druk nr 1992 
101. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej - 
Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko 
Narodowi Polskiemu oraz ustawy 





Druk nr 1958 
102. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Wincentego 
Witosa w 140. rocznicę jego urodzin 





Druk nr 2062 
103. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej oraz Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o: 
1) senackim projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o kombatantach oraz 
niektórych osobach będących 
ofiarami represji wojennych i okresu 
powojennego, 
2) poselskim projekcie ustawy o 
Korpusie Weteranów Walk o 
Niepodległość Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, 
3) rządowym projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o kombatantach oraz 
niektórych osobach będących 
ofiarami represji wojennych i okresu 
powojennego oraz niektórych innych 





Druki nr 677, 
1099, 1417, 
1997 i 1997-A 
104. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 






Druk nr 2083 
105. Informacja prezesa Rady Ministrów 
w sprawie sytuacji na Ukrainie 
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106. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia pułkownika Ryszarda 





Druki nr 2066 i 
2099 
107. Pierwsze czytanie senackiego 
projektu ustawy o działaczach 
opozycji antykomunistycznej oraz 
osobach represjonowanych z 






Druk nr 2137 
108. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Macieja Rataja w 






Druk nr 2166 
109. Informacja prezesa Rady Ministrów 
w sprawie aktualnej sytuacji na 





110. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 





Druk nr 2187 
111. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
15. rocznicy członkostwa Polski w 





Druk nr 2204 
112. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 





Druki nr 2126 i 
2160 
uczczenia 25. rocznicy obrad 
Okrągłego Stołu (agenda point #9). 
113. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o rządowym projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
powszechnym obowiązku obrony 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz 
zmianie ustawy o uposażeniu 
żołnierzy niezawodowych oraz 






Druki nr 1992 i 
2158 
114. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej oraz Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o kombatantach oraz 
niektórych osobach będących 
ofiarami represji wojennych i okresu 
powojennego oraz niektórych innych 





Druki nr 2173 i 
2212 
115. Pierwsze czytanie senackiego 
projektu ustawy o działaczach 
opozycji antykomunistycznej oraz 
osobach represjonowanych z 






Druk nr 2137 
116. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Jacka Kuronia 





Druk nr 2225 
117. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 




Druk nr 2260 
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sześćsetlecie nawiązania polsko-
tureckich stosunków 
dyplomatycznych (agenda point #1). 
118. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
zaopatrzeniu emerytalnym żołnierzy 
zawodowych oraz ich rodzin oraz 
ustawy o zaopatrzeniu emerytalnym 
funkcjonariuszy Policji, Agencji 
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 
Agencji Wywiadu, Służby 
Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego, Służby 
Wywiadu Wojskowego, Centralnego 
Biura Antykorupcyjnego, Straży 
Granicznej, Biura Ochrony Rządu, 
Państwowej Straży Pożarnej i Służby 





Druki nr 2049 i 
2237 
119. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia setnej rocznicy śmierci 





Druki nr 2108 i 
2222 
120. Sprawozdanie Komisji Mniejszości 
Narodowych i Etnicznych o 
poselskim projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o mniejszościach 
narodowych i etnicznych oraz o 





Druki nr 2223 i 
2291 
działach administracji rządowej 
(agenda point #5). 
121. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 10. rocznicy śmierci Jacka 





Druki nr 2253 i 
2279 
122. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o uchwale Senatu w 
sprawie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
powszechnym obowiązku obrony 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz 






Druki nr 2308 i 
2332 
123. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży oraz Komisji 
Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki 
Regionalnej o uchwale Senatu w 
sprawie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
systemie oświaty oraz ustawy o 





Druki nr 2309 i 
2312 
124. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia papieża bł. Jana Pawła II 






Druki nr 2321 i 
2329 
125. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 650-lecia Uniwersytetu 





Druk nr 2373 
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126. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej oraz Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
zasadach użycia lub pobytu Sił 
Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 






Druki nr 2170 i 
2358 
127. Sprawozdanie Komisji Mniejszości 
Narodowych i Etnicznych o uchwale 
Senatu w sprawie ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o mniejszościach 
narodowych i etnicznych oraz o 
języku regionalnym oraz ustawy o 
działach administracji rządowej 





Druki nr 2402 i 
2437 
128. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 70. rocznicy 
zwycięskiej bitwy o Monte Cassino 





Druki nr 2376 i 
2408 
129. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
Radzie Ochrony Pamięci Walk i 





Druki nr 1492, 
1517 i 1517-A 
130. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o statusie Weterana 
Opozycji Antykomunistycznej i 





Druk nr 2342 
Antykomunistycznej wobec 
dyktatury komunistycznej PRL w 
latach 1956-1989 oraz o zmianie 
niektórych innych ustaw (agenda 
point #20). 
131. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej oraz Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
zasadach użycia lub pobytu Sił 
Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 






Druki nr 2170 i 
2358 
132. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 150. rocznicy urodzin 
oraz 75. rocznicy śmierci Romana 





Druki nr 2084 i 
2582 
133. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 150. rocznicy śmierci 






Druki nr 2547 i 
2628 
134. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci ofiar Obławy 
Augustowskiej z lipca 1945 roku 





Druki nr 2513 i 
2626 
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135. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
oddania hołdu bohaterom polskiej 






Druki nr 2546 i 
2627 
136. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia 70. rocznicy Powstania 
Wileńskiego - operacji "Ostra 





Druki nr 2548 i 
2629 
137. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w 70. rocznicę 
wybuchu Powstania Warszawskiego 





Druki nr 2623 i 
2635 
138. Pierwsze czytanie przedstawionego 
przez Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej projektu ustawy o zmianie 
ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku 
obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
oraz niektórych innych ustaw 





Druk nr 2609 
139. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Augusta 
Cieszkowskiego w 200. rocznicę 





Druki nr 2712 i 
2717 
140. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w 25. 
rocznicę powołania Rządu premiera 






Druk nr 2733 
141. Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw 
Zagranicznych o poselskim projekcie 
uchwały w sprawie ludobójstwa 
dokonywanego na chrześcijanach, 
jazydach, Kurdach oraz innych 
mniejszościach religijnych i 
etnicznych przez organizację 
terrorystyczną tzw. Islamskie 
Państwo (ISIS) na obszarze 






Druki nr 2696 i 
2721 
142. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Ustawodawczej o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zniesieniu 9 maja 
jako Narodowego Święta 






Druki nr 2533 i 
2704 
143. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci ofiar masowej 
zbrodni dokonanej na Pomorzu 
Gdańskim w latach 1939-1940 





Druk nr 2762 
144. Pierwsze czytanie obywatelskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
mniejszościach narodowych i 





Druk nr 2699 
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regionalnym, a także niektórych 
innych ustaw (agenda point #12). 
145. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Cyfryzacji o senackim projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o orderach 





Druki nr 2543, 
2727 i 2727-A 
146. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 30. 
rocznicy śmierci ks. Jerzego 





Druki nr 2788 i 
2789 
147. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia 70. rocznicy przybycia 
do Nowej Zelandii polskich dzieci i 





Druk nr 2806 
148. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
30. rocznicy śmierci 
błogosławionego księdza Jerzego 





Druk nr 2810 
149. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Społecznej i Rodziny oraz Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka o 
komisyjnym projekcie uchwały w 
sprawie ustanowienia dnia 20 
listopada Ogólnopolskim Dniem 





Druki nr 2813 i 
2871 
150. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 





Druki nr 2862 i 
2912 
uczczenia 75. rocznicy wysiedleń 
ludności cywilnej z Gdyni przez 
okupanta niemieckiego i oddania 
hołdu ich ofiarom (agenda point 
#28). 
151. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2015 Rokiem Jana 




Druki nr 1861 i 
2931 
152. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskich 
projektach uchwał w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2015 Rokiem Jana 




Druki nr 2747, 
2817 i 2932 
153. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2015 Rokiem 
Polskiego Teatru Publicznego 




Druki nr 2897 i 
2933 
154. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
uczczenia pamięci Stanisława 
Dygata w związku z 100. rocznicą 




Druki nr 2950 i 
2956 
155. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Ustawodawczej o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o zniesieniu 9 maja 





Druki nr 2533, 
2704 i 2704-A 
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Zwycięstwa i Wolności (agenda 
point #15). 
156. Sprawozdanie Komisji Polityki 
Senioralnej o komisyjnym projekcie 
uchwały w sprawie upamiętnienia 
profesor Haliny Szwarc w związku z 
40. rocznicą powstania pierwszego w 
Polsce Uniwersytetu Trzeciego 




Druki nr 3050 i 
3082 
157. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o komisyjnym 
projekcie uchwały w 70. rocznicę 
Tragedii Górnośląskiej 1945 roku 





druki nr 3327 i 
3372 
158. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
upamiętnienia Marszałka Józefa 
Piłsudskiego w 80. rocznicę śmierci 





Druki nr 3364 i 
3373 
159. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony 
na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej oraz niektórych innych 





Druk nr 3433 
160. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskich 
projektach uchwał w sprawie: 
- uczczenia ofiar przewrotu 





Druki nr 3379, 
3414 i 3416 
- uczczenia pamięci ofiar zamachu 
majowego 1926 r. (agenda point 
#36). 
161. Poselski projekt uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia dnia 14 czerwca 
Narodowym Dniem Pamięci Ofiar 
Niemieckich Nazistowskich Obozów 
Koncentracyjnych i Obozów Zagłady 





Druk nr 3498 
162. Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw 
Wewnętrznych o rządowym 
projekcie ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony 
na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej oraz niektórych innych 




druki nr 3433, 
3607 i 3607-
A). 
163. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie ustawy o ustanowieniu 
Dnia Pamięci Ofiar Obławy 
Augustowskiej z lipca 1945 roku 




Druki nr 3294 i 
3531 
164. Sprawozdanie Komisji Obrony 
Narodowej o poselskim projekcie 
uchwały w sprawie upamiętnienia 
lotników polskich walczących w 






Druki nr 3480 i 
3617 
165. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w 155. 
rocznicę urodzin Ignacego Jana 





Druk nr 3895 
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166. Informacja prezesa Rady Ministrów 
na temat kryzysu migracyjnego w 
Europie i jego reperkusji dla Polski 





167. Sprawozdanie Komisji Administracji 
i Cyfryzacji oraz Komisji 
Mniejszości Narodowych i 
Etnicznych o poselskim projekcie 
ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
mniejszościach narodowych i 
etnicznych oraz o języku 
regionalnym oraz niektórych innych 





Druki nr 3545, 
3767 i 3767-A 
168. Przedstawiony przez Prezydium 
Sejmu projekt uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia dnia 2 października 
Dniem Pamięci o Cywilnej Ludności 






Druk nr 3938 















1. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
wdrożeniu niektórych przepisów 
Unii Europejskiej w zakresie 
równego traktowania oraz niektórych 





Druk nr 1051 
2. Sprawozdanie Komisji Zdrowia o 
poselskim projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o zawodach 






druki nr 1354 i 
1544). 
3. Głosowanie nad wnioskiem o 
odrzucenie informacji minister 
edukacji narodowej na temat 
skutków wynikających ze zmiany 
ustawy z dnia 7 września 1991 r. o 
systemie oświaty, dokonanej ustawą 
z dnia 13 czerwca 2013 r., w zakresie 
przeprowadzania zajęć dodatkowych 
na terenie przedszkoli, 
niejednoznaczności rozstrzygnięć 
legislacyjnych powodujących 
niepokój i protesty rodziców dzieci 
uczęszczających do publicznych 
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4. Pierwsze czytanie rządowego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy 
Kodeks karny oraz niektórych innych 





druk nr 2016). 
5. Sprawozdanie Komisji Edukacji, 
Nauki i Młodzieży o pilnym 
rządowym projekcie ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o systemie oświaty 





Druki nr 2075, 
2141 i 2141-A 
6. Przedstawione przez Radę Ministrów 
sprawozdanie z realizacji 
"Krajowego programu 
przeciwdziałania przemocy w 
rodzinie" za okres od 1 stycznia 2012 
r. do 31 grudnia 2012 r. (druk nr 
1950) wraz ze stanowiskiem Komisji 
Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny 




Druk nr 2148 
7. Pierwsze czytanie pilnego 
rządowego projektu ustawy o 
zmianie ustawy o systemie oświaty 
oraz niektórych innych ustaw 





Druk nr 2315 
8. Pierwsze czytanie poselskiego 
projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy 
Kodeks pracy oraz niektórych innych 





Druk nr 1948 
9. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 





Druki nr 2515 i 
2701 
  
ratyfikacji Konwencji Rady Europy o 
zapobieganiu i zwalczaniu przemocy 
wobec kobiet i przemocy domowej, 
sporządzonej w Stambule dnia 11 
maja 2011 r. (agenda point #13). 
10. Sprawozdanie Komisji Kultury i 
Środków Przekazu o poselskim 
projekcie uchwały w sprawie 
ustanowienia roku 2015 Rokiem Jana 




Druki nr 1861 i 
2931 
11. Sprawozdanie Komisji 
Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka 
oraz Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o 
rządowym projekcie ustawy o 
ratyfikacji Konwencji Rady Europy o 
zapobieganiu i zwalczaniu przemocy 
wobec kobiet i przemocy domowej, 
sporządzonej w Stambule dnia 11 




Druki nr 2515, 
2701 i 2701-A 




Acker, J. (1992) Gendered Institutions: From Sex Roles to Gendered Institutions. 
Contemporary Sociology, 21(5): 565–69. 
Ackerly, B.A., Stern, M. & True, J. (2006) Feminist methodologies for International 
Relations. In Ackerly, B.A., Stern, M. & True, J. (eds.) Feminist Methodologies 
for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-16. 
Anderson, L.S. (2006) European Union gender regulations in the East: the Czech and 
Polish accession process. East European Politics and Society, 20(1), pp. 101-
125. 
Avdeyeva, O. (2009) Enlarging the Club: When Do States Enforce Gender Equality 
Laws? Comparative European Politics, 7(1), pp. 158-177.  
Avdeyeva, O. (2010) States’ Compliance with International Requirements: Gender 
Equality in EU Enlargement Countries. Political Research Quarterly, 63(1), 
pp. 203-217. 
Avdeyeva, O. (2015) Defending Women's Rights in Europe: Gender Equality and EU 
Enlargement, Albany: SUNY Press.  
Azari, J.R. & Smith, J.K. (2012) Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established 
Democracies. Perspectives on Politics, 10(1), pp. 37-55. 
Bacchi, C. (1999) Women, Policy and Politics. The Construction of Policy Problems, 
London: Sage Publications.  
Bacchi, C. (2000) Policy as Discourse: What does it mean? Where does it get us? 
Discourse: Studies in the cultural practices of education, 27(1), pp. 45–57.  
Bacchi, C. (2005) Discourse, Discourse Everywhere: Subject “Agency” in Feminist 
Discourse Methodology. NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender 
Research, 13(3), pp. 198-209. 
Bakker, I. & Silvey, R. (eds.) (2008) Beyond States and Markets: The Challenges of 
Social Reproduction, London: Routledge. 
Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, I. (2010) [1991] Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, 
London: Verso.  
Barrett, J.B. & Buckley, C. (2009) Gender and Perceived Control in the Russian 
Federation. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(1), pp. 29–49. 
Bauman, Z. (2010) Living on Borrowed Time: Conversations with Citlali Rovirosa-
Madrazo, Cambridge: Polity. 
Beckwith, K. (2007) Mapping Strategic Engagements: Women’s Movements and the 
State. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 9(3), pp. 312-338. 
Beckwith, K. (2014) Gender, class, and the structure of intersectionality: working-
class women and the Pittston Coal strike. Politics, Groups, and Identities, 2(1), 
pp. 17-34. 
Beckwith, K., Burns, N., Hawkesworth, M., Htun, M., Adams, J. & Orloff, A.S. (2005) 
The Concept of Gender: Research. Politics & Gender, 1(1), pp. 127–182. 
Bedford, K. & Rai, S.M. (2010) Feminists Theorize International Political Economy. 
Signs, 36(1), pp. 1-18. 
Beveridge, F. (2012) ‘Going soft'? Analysing the contribution of soft and hard 
measures in EU gender law and policy. In Lombardo, E. & Forest, M. (eds.) 
The Europeanisation of gender equality policies. A discursive-sociological 
approach, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 28–48. 
Bielasiak, J. (2010) The paradox of Solidarity's legacy: contested values in Poland's 
transitional politics. Nationalities Papers, 38(1), pp. 41-58. 
Bjarnegård, E. (2013) Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment. 
Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Blaikie, N. (2000) Designing Social Research, Malden: Polity Press. 
Blommaert, J. & Bulcaen, C. (2000) Critical Discourse Analysis. Annual Reviews 
Publishers, 29, pp. 447-466. 
Bobako, M. (2005) Powrót kobiet do historii – niedokończony projekt. Krytyka 
Polityczna, 7/8, pp. 256-265 
Bobako, M. (2010) Demokracja wobec różnicy. Multikulturalizm i feminizm w 
perspektywie polityki uznania, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie. 
Bobako, M. (2011) Konstruowanie odmienności klasowej jako urasawianie. 
Przypadek polski po 1989 roku, Biblioteka Online Think Tanku 
Feministycznego, Available at: 
http://www.ekologiasztuka.pl/think.tank.feministyczny/articles.php?article_id
=555 (accessed January 2017). 
Böll Foundation (ed.) (2015) Anti-Gender Movements on the Rise? Strategizing for 
Gender Equality in Central and Eastern Europe, Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
Publication Series on Democracy Vol. 38. 
Bourdieu, P. (1993) The Field of Cultural Production, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Bratton, K.A. (2005) Critical mass theory revisited: the behavior and success of token 
women in state legislatures. Politics & Gender, 1(1): 97–125.  
No country for losers? 
295 
Bibliography 
Bretherton, C. (2001) Gender Mainstreaming and EU Enlargement: Swimming 
Against the Tide? Journal of European Public Policy, 8, pp. 60-81.  
Bridger, S. (1999) Enterprise and Survival. Moscow Women and Market Mythologies. 
In Bridger, S. (ed.) Women and Political Change. Perspectives from East-
Central Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 75-90. 
Bridger, S., Kay, R. & Pinnick, K. (1996) No More Heroines? Russia, Women and the 
Market, London: Routledge.  
Brustier, G. (2015) France. In Kovats, E. & Põim, M. (eds.) Gender as symbolic glue 
- The position and role of conservative and far right parties in the anti-gender 
mobilizations in Europe, FEPS in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, pp. 19-39. 
Bryson, V. (1992) Feminist Political Theory, Basingstoke: MacMillan. 
Bucholtz, M. (1999) Bad examples: transgression and progress in language and gender 
studies. In Bucholtz, M., Liang, A.C. & Sutton, L.A. (eds.) Reinventing 
identities the gendered self in discourse, Studies in Language and Gender, New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–26. 
Bucholtz, M. (2001) Reflexivity and Critique in Discourse Analysis. Critique of 
Anthropology, 21(2), pp. 165-183. 
Bunce, V. (1994) Should Transitologists Be Grounded? Slavic Review, 54(1), pp. 111-
127.  
Bunce, V. (2003) Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the 
Postcommunist Experience. World Politics, 22(1), pp. 167-192. 
Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: 
Routledge. 
Bystydzienski, J. (1999) The Effects of the Economic and Political Transition on 
Women and Families in Poland. In Bridger, S. (ed.) Women and Political 
Change. Perspectives from East-Central Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, pp. 91-109. 
CBOS (2011) Opinie o prawnej dopuszczalności i regulacji aborcji, Available at: 
www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2011/K_102_11.PDF (accessed November 
2016).  
CBOS (2013) Stosunek do praw gejów i lesbijek oraz związków partnerskich, 
Available at: http://www.cbos.pl/PL/home/home.php (accessed January 2017).  
Celis, K., Kantola, J., Waylen, G. & Weldon, L.S. (2013) Introduction: Gender and 
Politics: A Gendered World, a Gendered Discipline. In Waylen, G., Celis, K., 
Kantola, J. & Weldon, L.S. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Gender and 
Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2-26. 
Cerami, A. & Vanhuysse, P. (2009) Post-communist welfare pathways: theorizing 
social policy transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Chappell, L. (2002) Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in 
Australia and Canada, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.  
Chappell, L. (2006a) Comparing Political Institutions: Revealing the Gendered “Logic 
of Appropriateness”. Politics & Gender, 2(3), pp. 249–235. 
Chappell, L. (2006b) Contesting Women’s Rights: Charting the Emergence of a 
Transnational Conservative Patriarchal Network. Global Society, 20, pp. 491-
519. 
Chappell, L. & Waylen, G. (2013) Gender and the Hidden Life of Institutions. Public 
Administration, 91(3), pp. 1-17. 
Charkiewicz, E. (2006) Feminizm, transformacja, władza, Referat na konferencję 
ALTEGLOBALIZM. DOKĄD ZMIERZAMY? Fundacja Lorga, Młodzi 
Socjaliści i Fundacja im Róży Luksemburg, 26 June, Warszawa, Poland. 
Charkiewicz, E. (2008) Czy Matka Polka może być uboga? Krótki przegląd debat o 
płci, klasie i rasie. Recyling Idei, 11, pp. 62-68. 
Charkiewicz, E. (2012) Gender mainstreaming donikąd. Analiza dokumentów i 
programów bezzwrotnych dotacji UE 2007-2011. Referat na konferencji 
NEWW i Fundacji Róży Luksemburg „Pieniądze też mają płeć”, 17 May, 
Gdańsk, Poland. 
Chełstowska, A., Druciarek, M., Kucharczyk, J. & Niżyńska, A. (2013) Relacje 
Państwo–Kościół w III RP, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych. 
Childs, S. (2004) New Labour's Women MPs: Women Representing Women. London, 
New York: Routledge. 
Childs, S. & Krook, M.L. (2006) Gender and Politics: The State of the Art. Politics, 
26 (1), pp. 18–28. 
Childs, S. & Krook, M.L. (2008) Critical mass theory and women's political 
representation. Political Studies, 56(3), pp. 725–736.  
Childs, S. & Webb, P. (2012) Sex, Gender and the Conservative Party: From Iron 
Lady to Kitten Heels, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chimiak, G. (2003) Bulgarian and Polish Women in the Public Sphere. International 
Feminist Journal of Politics, 5(1), pp. 3–27. 
No country for losers? 
297 
Bibliography 
Chouliaraki, L. & Fairclough, N. (1999) Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking 
Critical Discourse Analysis, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Cohn, C. (1993) War, wimps, and women: talking gender and thinking war. In Cooke, 
M. & Woollacott, A. (eds.) Gendering War Talk, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.  
Collier, D., Mahoney, J. & Seawright, J. (2004) Claiming Too Much: Warnings About 
Selection Bias. In Brady, H.E. & Collier, D. (eds.) Rethinking Social Inquiry: 
Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 85-
102. 
Collins, P.H. (1998) It’s All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation. 
Hypatia, 13(3), pp. 62-82. 
Connell, R. W. (1995) Masculinities, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. 
Connell, R. W. (1998) Masculinities and Globalization. Men and Masculinities, 1(1), 
pp. 3-23. 
Connell, R.W. (2006) Glass Ceilings or Gendered Institutions? Mapping the Gender 
Regimes of Public Sector Worksites. Public Administration Review, 66(6), pp. 
837–849. 
Connell, R.W. & Messerschmidt, J.W. (2005) Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the 
Concept. Gender and Society, 19(6), pp. 829-859. 
Connell, R.W. & Wood, J. (2005) Globalization and Business Masculinities. Men and 
Masculinities, 7(4), pp. 347–364. 
Corrin, C. (1999) Gender and identity in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 15(1), pp. 1-6. 
Czerwińska, A., Łapniewska, Z. & Piotrowska, J. (eds.) (2010) Kobiety na „zielonej 
wyspie”. Kryzys w Polsce z perspektywy gender, Warszawa: Fundacja 
Feminoteka, Fundacja H. Bölla, Przedstawicielstwo w Polsce. 
Dąbrowska, M. (2004) Whose Interests Do They Defend? Problems of the Polish 
Feminist Movement. In Frunză, M. & Văcărescu, T. (eds.) Gender and the 
(Post) ‘East’/’West’ Divide, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Limes, pp. 111-124. 
Dąbrowska, M. (2009) European vs. national in Polish gender equality debates and 
policy documents. QUING Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies, Deliverable 
No. 47/49. 
Dahlerup, D. & Freidenvall, L. (2005) Quotas as a “Fast Track” to Equal 
Representation for Women. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7(1), 
pp. 26–48. 
Daskalova, K. (2007) How should we name the ‘women-friendly’ actions of state 
socialism? Aspasia, 1, pp. 214–219. 
Dębski, M. (2010) Poland – A New Reality, Old Problems, Available at: 
www.socialwatch.eu/wcm/documents/Poland.pdf (accessed December 2016).  
Drozda, Ł. (2015) Lewactwo. Historia dyskursu o polskiej lewicy radykalnej, 
Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa. 
Duda, M. (2016) Dogmat płci. Polska wojna z gender, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Katedra. 
Duffy, D.M. (2000) Social Identity and its Influence on Women’s Roles in East-
Central Europe. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2(2), pp. 214–243. 
Dunin, K. (2002) Czego chcecie ode mnie, „Wysokie Obcasy”? Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Sic! 
Dunn, E. (2017) Prywatyzując Polskę. O bobofrutach, wielkim biznesie i 
restrukturyzacji pracy, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.  
Ďurinová, P. (2015) Slovakia. In Kovats, E. & Põim, M. (eds.) Gender as symbolic 
glue - The position and role of conservative and far right parties in the anti-
gender mobilizations in Europe, FEPS in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, pp. 104-125. 
Dzierzgowska, A. & Rutkowska, E. (2008) Ślepa na płeć, Edukacja równościowa po 
polsku. Raport krytyczny, Warszawa: Fundacja Feminoteka. 
Einhorn, B. (1993) Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women's 
Movements in East Central Europe, London: Verso. 
Einhorn, B. & Sever, C. (2003) Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern 
Europe. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5(2), pp. 163–190. 
Eisenstein, Z. (1993) Eastern European Male Democracies: a Problem of Unequal 
Equality. In Funk, N. & Mueller, M. (eds.) Gender Politics and Post-
Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 
New York: Routledge, pp. 303-317. 
Elson, D. (2013) Economic Crises from the 1980s to the 2010s: A Gender Analysis. 
In Rai, S. & Waylen, G. (eds.) New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy, 
Abingdon: Routledge, pp.189-212. 
Enloe, C. (1990) Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press.  
No country for losers? 
299 
Bibliography 
Episkopat (2013) List pasterski na Niedzielę Świętej Rodziny 2013 roku, Available at: 
http://episkopat.pl/list-pasterski-na-niedziele-swietej-rodziny-2013-roku/ 
(accessed November 2016). 
Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Fairclough, N. (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis. The critical study of language, 
London and New York: Longman.  
Fairclough, N. (2000) New Labour, New Language? London: Routledge.  
Fairclough, N. (2001) Language and Power, Harlow: Longman. 
Fairclough, N. (2003) Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research, 
London: Routledge.  
Falkner, G., Treib, O. & Holzleithner, E. (eds.) (2008) Compliance in the Enlarged 
European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters? Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Falleti, T.G. (2006) Theory-Guided Process Tracing in Comparative Politics: 
Something Old, Something New. APSA-CP: Newsletter of the American 
Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics, 
17(1), pp. 9-14. 
Faludi, S. (1991) Backlash: the undeclared war against American women, New York: 
Crown. 
Federici, S. (2004) Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive 
Accumulation, Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia. 
Federici, S. (2012) Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist 
Struggle, Brooklyn/Oakland: Common Notions/PM Press. 
Fidelis, M. (2015) Kobiety, komunizm i industrializacja w powojennej Polsce, 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo W.A.B. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 12(2), pp. 219-245. 
Fodor, E., Glass, C., Kawachi, J. & Popescu, L. (2002) Family Policies and Gender in 
Hungary, Poland and Romania. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 35, 
pp. 475-90. 
Footitt, H. (2002) Women, Europe and the New Languages of Politics, London, New 
York: Continuum. 
Forest, M. & Lombardo, E. (2012) The Europeanisation of gender equality policies: A 
discursive-sociological approach. In Lombardo, E. & Forest, M. (eds.) The 
Europeanisation of gender equality policies. A discursive-sociological 
approach, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 1–28. 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977, Great Britain: Harvester Press. 
Franceschet, S. (2011) Gendered Institutions and Women’s Substantive 
Representation: Female Legislators in Argentina and Chile. In Krook, M.L. & 
Mackay, F. (eds.) Gender, Politics and Institutions. Towards a Feminist 
Institutionalism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 58-78. 
Freidenvall, L. & Krook, M.L. (2011) Discursive Strategies for Institutional Reform: 
Gender Quotas in Sweden and France. In Krook, M.L. & Mackay, F. (eds.) 
Gender, Politics and Institutions. Towards a Feminist Institutionalism, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 42-57. 
Fukuyama, F. (1989) The End of History? The National Interest, Summer, pp. 3–18. 
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, New York: The Free Press. 
Funk, N. (1993) Introduction: Women and Post-Communism. In Funk, N. & Mueller, 
M. (eds.) Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, New York: Routledge, pp. 1-14. 
Funk, N. (2014) A very tangled knot: Official state socialist women’s organizations, 
women’s agency and feminism in Eastern European state socialism. European 
Journal of Women’s Studies, 21(4), pp. 344–360. 
Fuszara, M. (2005) Kobiety w polityce, Warszawa: wydawnictwo Trio.  
Fuszara, M. (2009) Kobiety w polityce dwudziestolecia (1989-2009). Raport: Kobiety 
dla Polski – Polska dla kobiet. 20 lat transformacji 1989-2009, Warszawa: 
Fundacja Feminoteka. 
Fuszara, M. (2010) Citizenship, Representation and Gender. Polish Sociological 
Review, 4(172), pp. 367-389. 
Fuszara, M. (ed.) (2013) Kobiety, wybory, polityka, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw 
Publicznych.  
Fuszara, M. & Zielińska, E. (2006) Women and the Law in Poland. Towards Active 
Citizenship. In Lukić, J., Regulska, J. & Zaviršek, D. (eds.) Women and 
Citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe, Bodwin: Aldershot, pp. 39-60. 
Fuszara, M., Grabowska, M., Mizielińska, J. & Regulska, J. (2009) Współpraca czy 
Konflikt, Unia Europejska, Państwo i kobiety, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa 
Akademickie i Profesjonalne. 
Gal, S. (1996) Feminism and Civil Society. Replika, Special Issue, pp. 75-82. 
No country for losers? 
301 
Bibliography 
Gal, S. & Kligman, G. (2000) The Politics of Gender After Socialism, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Gdula, M. (2008) Nie bójmy się konfliktu. In Polityczność. Przewodnik Krytyki 
Politycznej, pp. 5-14. 
George, A.L. & Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development, Boston, 
MA: MIT Press. 
George, A.L. & McKeown, T.J. (1985) Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision Making. Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, 2, pp. 
21-58. 
Gerber, A. (2008) Some things are not negotiable: Gender, sovereignty, and Poland's 
integration into the European Union. Advances in Gender Research, 12, pp. 79-
98. 
Gerber, A. (2010) The Letter versus the Spirit. Barriers to Meaningful Implementation 
of Gender Equality Policy in Poland. Women’s Studies International Forum, 
33, pp. 30-37. 
Gerber, A. (2011) Cultural Categories of Worth and Polish Gender Policy in the 
Context of EU Accession. Social Politics, 18 (4), pp. 490-514. 
Gerring, J. (2004) What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For, American Political 
Science Review, 98(2), pp. 341-354. 
Gilbert, N. & Mulkay, M. (1984) Opening Pandora's Box: A sociological analysis of 
scientists' discourse, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
GINI (2013) GINI Country Report Poland, Available at: 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/aia/ginicr/poland.html (accessed December 2016).  
Glass, C. & Fodor, E. (2007) From public to private maternalism? Gender and welfare 
in Poland and Hungary after 1989. Social Politics: International Studies in 
Gender, State & Society, 14(3), pp. 323-350.  
Golinowska, S. (2009) A Case Study of the European Welfare System Model in the 
Post-communist Countries—Poland. Polish Sociological Review, 166, pp. 273-
296. 
Gombrowicz, W. (1986) Dzienniki 1953-56, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Literackie. 
Grabowska, M. (2012) Bringing the Second World In. Conservative Revolution(s), 
Socialist Legacies, and Transnational Silences in the Trajectories of Polish 
Feminism. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 37(2), pp. 385-
411. 
Grabowska, M. (2014) Gender Equality in Poland after EU accession. Expectations 
and reality, Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 1-24. 
Grabowska, M. (2015) Cultural war or ‘Business as Usual’? Recent Instances, and the 
Historical Origins of a ‘Backlash’ Against Women’s Sexual Rights in Poland. 
In Anti-Gender Movements on the Rise? Strategizing for Gender Equality in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, pp. 54-64. 
Grabowska, M. (2016) Keynote lecture, AtGender Spring Conference “Spaces of 
Feminist Learning and Teaching: queering movements, translations and 
dynamics”, 22.04.2016, Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
Graff, A. (2003) Lost between the Waves? The Paradoxes of Feminist Chronology and 
Activism in Contemporary Poland. Journal of International Women's Studies, 
4(2), pp. 100-116. 
Graff, A. (2007) A Different Chronology. Reflections on Feminism in Contemporary 
Poland. In Gillis, S., Howie, G. & Munford, R. (eds.) Third Wave Feminism. A 
Critical Exploration. Expanded Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 
142-155. 
Graff, A. (2008a) The Land of Real Men and Real Women. Gender and EU Accession 
in Three Polish Weeklies. In Elliott, C. (ed.) Global Empowerment of Women: 
Responses to Globalization, Politicized Religions and Gender Violence, New 
York: Routledge, pp. 191-212. 
Graff, A. (2008b) Rykoszetem. Rzecz o płci, seksualności i narodzie, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo W.A.B. 
Graff, A. (2009) Gender and Nation, Here and Now: Reflections on the Gendered and 
Sexualized Aspects of Contemporary Polish Nationalism. In Oleksy, E.H. (ed.) 
Intimate Citizenships: Gender, Sexualities, Politics, London: Routledge Series 
in Gender and Society, pp. 133‐146. 
Graff, A. (2010) Magma, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej. 
Graff, A. (2011) [2001] Świat bez kobiet. Płeć w polskim życiu publicznym, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo W.A.B. 
Graff, A. (2014a) Nacjonalizm. In Opracowanie zbiorowe, Gender. Przewodnik 
Krytyki Politycznej, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, pp. 432-
439. 
Graff, A. (2014b) Report from the gender trenches: war against “genderism” in Poland. 
European Journal of Women’s Studies, 21(4), pp. 431-442. 
Graham, A. & Regulska, J. (2006) The Parameters of the Political: Does Meaning 
Matter for Participation in Public Life for Women in Poland and Ukraine. In 
Lukić, J., Regulska, J. & Zaviršek, D. (eds.) Women and Citizenship in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Bodwin: Aldershot, pp. 121-146. 
No country for losers? 
303 
Bibliography 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers. 
Gregor, A. & Grzebalska, W. (2016) Thoughts on the contested relationship between 
neoliberalism and feminism. In Kováts, E. (ed.) Solidarity in struggle: feminist 
perspectives on neoliberalism in East-Central Europe, Budapest, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, pp. 11-20. 
Grzebalska, W. (2015) Poland. In Kováts, E. & Põim, M. (eds.) Gender as symbolic 
glue: the position and role of conservative and far right parties in the anti-
gender mobilizations in Europe, Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Grzebalska, W. (2016) Why the War on ‘Gender ideology’ Matters – And Not Just to 
Feminists. Antigenderism and the Crisis of Neoliberal Democracy, Available 
at: http://visegradinsight.eu/why-the-war-on-gender-ideology-matters-and-
not-just-to-feminists/ (accessed January 2017).  
Grzebalska, W., Kováts, E. & Petö, A. (2017) Gender as symbolic glue: how ‘gender’ 
became an umbrella term for the rejection of the (neo)liberal order. Political 
Critique, Available at: http://politicalcritique.org/long-read/2017/gender-as-
symbolic-glue-how-gender-became-an-umbrella-term-for-the-rejection-of-
the-neoliberal-order/ (accessed January 2017). 
Grzebalska, W. & Soos, E.P. (2016) Conservatives vs. the "culture of death". How 
progressives handled the war on "gender", Belgium: Renner Institut, FEPS 
YAN study. 
Grzymala-Busse, A. & Innes, A. (2003) Great expectations: the EU and domestic 
political competition in east central Europe. East European Politics and 
Societies, 17(1), pp. 64-73. 
GUS (2003) Narodowy Spis Powszechny 2002 – wyniki, Available at: 
http://stat.gov.pl/spisy-powszechne/narodowe-spisy-powszechne/narodowy-
spis-powszechny-2002/ (accessed December 2016).  
GUS (2009) Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2009, Available at: 
http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-
statystyczne/rocznik-statystyczny-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-2009,2,4.html 
(accessed January 2017).  
GUS (2011) Wyniki Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2011, 
Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/spisy-powszechne/nsp-2011/nsp-2011-wyniki/ 
(accessed December 2016).  
GUS (2014) Kobiety i mężczyźni na rynku pracy 2014, Available at: 
http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/rynek-pracy/opracowania/kobiety-i-
mezczyzni-na-rynku-pracy-2014,1,5.html (accessed December 2016).  
GUS (2016) Kobiety i mężczyźni na rynku pracy 2016, Available at: 
http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/rynek-pracy/opracowania/kobiety-i-
mezczyzni-na-rynku-pracy-2016,1,6.html (accessed December 2016).  
Gwiazda, A. (2016) Democracy in Poland. Representation, participation, competition 
and accountability since 1989, London: Routledge.  
Hahn, C.M. (ed.) (2002) Postsocialism: ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia, 
London and New York: Routledge.  
Hall, P. (2003) Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics. In 
Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (eds.) Comparative Historical Analysis in 
the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 373-404. 
Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 
London: Routledge. 
Haraway, D. (1988) Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), pp. 575-599. 
Hardy, J. (2010) Nowy polski kapitalizm, Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i 
Prasa.  
Heinen, J. (1997) Public/Private: Gender - Social and Political Citizenship in Eastern 
Europe. Theory and Society, 26(4), pp. 577-597. 
Heinen, J. (2006) Clashes and Ordeals of Women’s Citizenship in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In Lukić, J., Regulska, J. & Zaviršek, D. (eds.) Women and Citizenship 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Bodwin: Aldershot, pp. 81-100. 
Heinen, J. & Wator, M. (2006) Child Care in Poland before, during, and after the 
Transition: Still a Women's Business. Social Politics, 13(2), pp. 189-216. 
Helmke, G. & Levitsky, S. (2004) Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A 
Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), pp. 725–740. 
Horsman, J. (1990) Something in My Mind Besides the Everyday: Women and 
Literacy. Toronto: Women’s Press. 
Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse, Buckingham: Oxford University Press. 
Hryciuk, R. & Korolczuk, E. (eds.) (2012) Pożegnanie z Matką Polką? Dyskursy, 
praktyki i reprezentacje macierzyństwa we współczesnej Polsce, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. 
Hryciuk, R. & Korolczuk, E. (2013) At the Intersection of Gender and Class: Social 
Mobilization around Mothers’ Rights in Poland. In Jacobsson, K. & 
Saxonberg, S. (eds.) Beyond NGO-isation. The Development of Social 
Movements in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Ashgate, pp. 49-70. 
No country for losers? 
305 
Bibliography 
Hryciuk, R. & Korolczuk, E. (2015) Niebezpieczne związki. Macierzyństwo, ojcostwo 
i polityka, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.  
Imre, A. (2014) Postcolonial Media Studies in Postsocialist Europe. boundary, 241(1), 
pp. 113-134. 
Imre, A. (2016) The Cosmopolitan Media Cultures of Europe. In Ponzanesi, S. & 
Colpani, G. (eds.) Postcolonial Transitions in Europe, Contexts, Practices and 
Politics, London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield International, pp. 315-
328. 
Isaac, J.C. (2017) Is there illiberal democracy? A problem with no semantic solution. 
Eurozine. Public Seminar, pp. 1-26. 
ISKK (2014) Kościół w Polsce, Available at: 
http://www.iskk.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=38&
Itemid=67 (accessed December 2016).  
Ivanič, R. (1998) Writing and Identity: The discoursal construction of identity in 
academic writing, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing. 
Janion, M. (1996) Kobiety i duch inności, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sic! 
Janion, M. (2000) Do Europy tak, ale razem z naszymi umarłymi, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Sic! 
Janion, M. (2006) Niesamowita Słowiańszczyzna: fantazmaty literatury, Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo Literackie. 
Jasiewicz, K. (2008) The Europeanization of Polish Democracy, Polish Sociological 
Review, 164(4), pp. 359–82. 
Jaworski, A. & Coupland, N. (eds.) (1999) The Discourse Reader, London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Jorgensen, M. & Phillips, L. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications. 
Judt, T. (2006) Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Books.  
Kang, A.J. (2015) Bargaining for Women’s Rights: Activism in an Aspiring Muslim 
Democracy, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Kantola, J. (2006) Feminists Theorize the State, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Karwatowska, M. & Szpyra-Kozłowska, J. (2014) Językowa niewidzialność kobiet, In 
Rudaś-Grodzka, M. et al. (eds.) Encyklopedia gender. Płeć w kulturze, 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Czarna Owca, pp. 211-218. 
Kathlene, L. (1995) Position Power versus Gender Power: Who Holds the Floor? In 
Duerst-Lahti, G. & Kelly, R.M. (eds.) Gender Power, Leadership and 
Governance, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 167-194. 
Kelly, R.M., Bayes, J.H, Hawkesworth, M. & Young, B. (eds.) (2001) Gender, 
Globalization, and Democratization, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Kenny, M. (2009) Gendering Institutions: The Political Recruitment of Women in 
Post-Devolution Scotland, Thesis (PhD), University of Edinburgh. 
Kenny, M. (2013) Gender and Political Recruitment. Theorizing Institutional Change, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kepel, G. (1993) Zemsta Boga, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej. 
Kicińska, M. (2009) Parlamentarna Grupa Kobiet – lobby kobiece w polskim 
parlamencie. Raport: Kobiety dla Polski – Polska dla kobiet. 20 lat 
transformacji 1989-2009, Warszawa: Fundacja Feminoteka. 




Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, United States: 
Henry Holt Company.  
Koobak, R. & Marling, R. (2014) The decolonial challenge: Framing post-socialist 
Central and Eastern Europe within transnational feminist studies. European 
Journal of Women’s Studies, 21(4), pp. 330-343. 
Korolczuk, E. (2013a) Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and the nationalistic 
discourse in contemporary Poland. Paper presented at the conference: 
Overcoming gender backlash: experiences of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, 
Georgia, Armenia and Poland, Kyiv, October 24-25 2013. 
Korolczuk, E. (2013b) Gendered Boundaries between the State, Family and Civil 
Society. The Case of Poland after 1989. In Nautz, J., Ginsborg, P. & Nijhuis, 
T. (eds.) The Golden Chain: Family, Civil Society and the State, New York: 
Berghahn Books, pp. 240-258. 
Korolczuk, E. (2015) “The War on Gender” from a Transnational Perspective – 
Lessons for Feminist Strategising. In Anti-Gender Movements on the Rise? 
Strategizing for Gender Equality in Central and Eastern Europe, Berlin: 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, pp. 43-53. 
Kováts, E. (ed.) (2016) Solidarity in struggle: feminist perspectives on neoliberalism 
in East-Central Europe, Budapest, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  
No country for losers? 
307 
Bibliography 
Kováts, E. (2017) The Emergence of Powerful Anti-Gender Movements in Europe and 
the Crisis of Liberal Democracy. In Köttig, M., Bitzan, R. & Petö, A. (eds.) 
Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, Springer, pp. 175-189. 
Kováts, E. & Põim, M. (eds.) (2015) Gender as symbolic glue: the position and role 
of conservative and far right parties in the anti-gender mobilizations in 
Europe, Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Kramer, A. (2009) The Polish Parliament and the Making of Politics through Abortion: 
Nation, Gender and Democracy in the 1996 Liberalization Amendment Debate. 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(1), pp. 81–101. 
Krasnodębski, Z. (2003) Demokracja peryferii, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Słowo/Obraz 
Terytoria. 
Krizsan, A. (2006) Ombudsmen and similar institutions for protection against racial 
and ethnic discrimination. In The European Centre for Minority Issues and The 
European Academy Bozen/Bolzano (ed.) European yearbook of minority 
issues, 4, 2004/5, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 163–185. 
Krizsan, A. (2009) From formal adoption to enforcement. Post-accession shifts in EU 
impact on Hungary in the equality policy field. In Schimmelfennig, F. & 
Trauner, F. (eds.) Post-accession compliance in the EU’s new member states, 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 2 (13), Available at: 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-022a.htm (accessed January 2017). 
Krizsan, A. (2012) Equality Architectures in Central and Eastern European Countries: 
A Framework for Analyzing Political Intersectionality in Europe. Social 
Politics, 19(4), pp. 539–571. 
Krizsan, A. (ed.) (2015) Mobilizing for Policy Change: Women's Movements in 
Central and Eastern European Domestic Violence Policy Struggles, Budapest: 
Central European University. 
Krizsan, A. & Lombardo, E. (2013) The quality of gender equality policies: A 
discursive approach. European Journal of Women's Studies, 20(1), pp. 77-92. 
Krizsan, A. & Papp, E. (2005) Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in Hungary. 
in Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. Monitoring Law and Practice in 
New Member States and Accession Countries of the European Union, OSI, 
Available at: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/articles_publications/ 
publications/equal_20050502 (accessed December 2016). 
Krizsan, A. & Popa, R. (2010) Europeanization in Making Policies against Domestic 
Violence in Central and Eastern Europe. Social Politics, 17(3), pp. 379–406. 
Krizsan, A., Skjeie H. & Squires, J. (2014) The changing nature of European equality 
regimes: explaining convergence and variation. Journal of International and 
Comparative Social Policy, 30(1), pp. 53-68. 
Krook, M.L. & Mackay F. (2011) Introduction: Gender, Politics, and Institutions. In 
Krook M.L. & Mackay, F. (eds.) Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a 
Feminist Institutionalism, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 
1-20. 
Krook, M.L. & Squires, J. (2006) Gender Quotas in British Politics: Multiple 
Approaches and Methods in Feminist Research. British Politics, 1(1), pp. 44-
66. 
Kronsell, A. (2006) Methods for studying silences: gender analysis in institutions of 
hegemonic masculinity. In Ackerly, B.A., Stern, M. & True, J. (eds.) Feminist 
Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 108-128. 
Kulawik, T. (2005) Wohlfahrtsstaaten und Geschlechterregime im internationalen 
Vergleich, Gender Politik Online, Available at: www.fu-
berlin.de/sites/gpo/...und...und...in.../kulawik.pdf (accessed January 2017). 
Kulawik, T. (2009) Staking the Frame of a Feminist Discursive Institutionalism. 
Politics & Gender, 5(2), pp. 262-271. 
Kulawik, T. (2011a) The Politics of Human Embryo Research in Poland, In Robbins, 
P. & Huzai, F. (eds.) Exploring Central and Eastern Europe’s 
Biotechnological Landscape: Transitioning the Life Sciences, Springer, pp. 55-
78. 
Kulawik, T. (2011b) Women's solidarity. The uprising of the Polish women's 
movement. Baltic Worlds, 4(4), pp. 14-17. 
Kulpa, R. & Mizielinska, J. (eds.) (2011) De-Centring Western Sexualities: Central 
and Eastern European Perspectives, Farnham: Ashgate. 
Kundera, M. (1984) The tragedy of Central Europe, New York Review of Books, 31(7), 
pp. 33-38. 
LaFont, S. (2001) One step forward, two steps back: women in the post-communist 
states. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 34, pp. 203–220. 
Larsen, N.B. (2009) Institutional nationalism and Orientalized Others in Parental 
Education. In Keskinen, S., Tuori, S., Irni, S. & Mulinari, D. (eds.) Complying 
with Colonialism. Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, pp. 225-240. 
Lazar, M.M. (2007) Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis: Articulating a Feminist 
Discourse Praxis. Critical Discourse Studies, 4(2), pp. 141-164. 
Leder, A. (2014) Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Krytyka Polityczna. 
No country for losers? 
309 
Bibliography 
Leiber, S. (2007) Transposition of EU social policy in Poland: are there different 
‘worlds of compliance’ in East and West? Journal of European Social Policy, 
17(4), pp. 349–360. 
Lieberman, R.C. (2002) Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political 
Change. American Political Science Review, 96(4), pp. 697-712. 
Lister, R. (2003) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Litosseliti, L. & Sunderland, J. (eds.) (2002) Gender identity and discourse analysis, 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.  
Lohmann, K. & Seibert, A. (eds.) (2003) Gender assessment of the impact of European 
Union accession on the status of women in the labour market in Central and 
Eastern Europe, National Study: Poland, Warsaw, Poland: Karat Coalition. 
Lombardo, E. & Forest, M. (2011) The Europeanization of gender equality policies: a 
discursive-sociological approach, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Lombardo, E., Meier, P. & Verloo, M. (eds.) (2009) The Discursive Politics of Gender 
Equality: Stretching, Bending and Policymaking, London: Routledge. 
Lombardo, E. & Verloo, M. (2009) Institutionalizing Intersectionality in the European 
Union? International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(4), pp. 478-495. 
Lovenduski, J. (2011) Foreword. In Krook, M.L. & Mackay, F. (eds.) Gender, Politics 
and Institutions. Towards a Feminist Institutionalism, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. vii-xi. 
Ludwig, G. & Wőhl, S. (2013), Gender mainstreaming jako strategia neoliberalizacji. 
Współczesne transformacje reżimów płci - ponowne przemyślenia z 
perspektywy foucaultowskiej, Biblioteka Online Think Tanku 
Feministycznego, Available at: 
http://www.ekologiasztuka.pl/think.tank.feministyczny/articles.php?article_id
=482 (accessed January 2017).  
Lustgarten, L. (1980) Legal control of racial discrimination, London: Macmillan 
Press. 
MacEwen, M. (ed.) (1997) Anti-discrimination law enforcement. A comparative 
perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Maciejewska, M. & Marszałek, M. (2013) Polska jako neoliberalna awangarda Unii 
Europejskiej? Krytyka polityki równości płci na tle polityk gospodarczych, 
Biblioteka Online Think Tanku Feministycznego, Available at: 
http://www.ekologiasztuka.pl/think.tank.feministyczny/articles.php?article_id
=500 (accessed January 2017).  
Mackay, F. (2004) Gender and Political Representation in the UK: The State of the 
Discipline. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6(1), pp. 99-
120. 
Mackay, F., Kenny, M. & Chappell, L. (2010) New Institutionalism Through a Gender 
Lens: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism. International Political Science 
Review, 31(5), pp. 573-558. 
Mackay, F., Monro, S. & Waylen, G. (2009) The Feminist Potential of Sociological 
Institutionalism. Politics & Gender, 5(2), pp. 253-262. 
Magyan-Vincze, E. (2006) Romanian Gender Regimes and Women’s Citizenship. In 
Lukić, J., Regulska, J. & Zaviršek, D. (eds.) Women and Citizenship in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Bodwin: Aldershot, pp. 21-38. 
Manners, I. (2002) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40(2), pp. 235–258. 
Markowski, R. (2001) Party system institutionalization in new democracies: Poland – 
a trend-setter with no followers. In Lewis, P.G. (ed.) Party development and 
democratic change in post-communist Europe: The first decade, London: 
Frank Cass, pp. 55-77. 
Matlak, M.M. (2016) Hobbesian Catholicism on the Rise in Poland? IWM Transit 
Online, Available at: http://www.iwm.at/transit/transit-online/hobbesian-
catholicism-on-the-rise-in-poland/ (accessed December 2016).   
Matynia, E. (1994) Women after Communism: A Bitter Freedom. Social Research, 
61(2), pp. 351-377. 
Mayer, T. (ed.) (2000) Gender Ironies of Nationalism, Sexing the Nation, London and 
New York: Routledge.  
McBride, D. & Mazur, A. (2010) The politics of state feminism. Innovation in 
comparative research, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Mcclintock, A. (1995) Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest, London and New York: Routledge. 
Meyer, A. G. (1985) Feminism, Socialism, and Nationalism in Eastern Europe. In 
Wolchik, S.L. & Meyer, A.G. (eds.) Women, State and Party in Eastern 
Europe, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 13-30.  
Mikulova, K. (2014) “Potemkin Europeanisation”? Dynamics of Party Competition in 
Poland and Hungary in 1998–2004. East European Politics and Societies and 
Cultures, 28(1), pp. 163-186. 
Moghadam, V. M. (ed.) (1994) Identity politics and women: cultural reassertions and 
feminisms in international perspective, Boulder, San Francisco; Oxford: 
Westview Press. 
No country for losers? 
311 
Bibliography 
Montgomery, K.A. (2003) Introduction. In Matland, R.E. & Montgomery, K.A. (eds.) 
Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Moran-Ellis, J., Alexander, V.D., Cronin, A., Dickinson, M., Fielding, J. & Thomas, 
H. (2004) Following a Thread – An Approach to Integrating Multi-method 
Data Sets, Paper given at ESRC Research Methods Programme, Methods 
Festival Conference, Oxford, July 2004.  
Moran-Ellis, J., Alexander, V.D., Cronin, A., Dickinson, M., Fielding, J., Sleney, J. & 
Thomas, H. (2006) Triangulation and Integration: processes, claims and 
implications. Qualitative Research, 6(1), pp. 45-60. 
Mostov, J. (2000) Sexing the nation/ desexing the body: politics of national identity in 
the former Yugoslava. In Mayer, T. (ed.) Gender Ironies of Nationalism, 
Sexing the Nation, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 89-112. 
Mrozik, A. (2012) Akuszerki transformacji. Kobiety, literatura i władza w Polsce po 
1989 roku, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IBL PAN. 
Mrozik, A. (2014) Gender studies w Polsce: perspektywy, ograniczenia, wyzwania. In 
Opracowanie zbiorowe, Gender. Przewodnik Krytyki Politycznej, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, pp. 180-199. 
Navickaite, R. (2016) Under the Western Gaze: Sexuality and Postsocialist 
‘Transition’ in East Europe. In Ponzanesi, S. & Colpani, G. (eds.) Postcolonial 
Transitions in Europe, Contexts, Practices and Politics, London, New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield International, pp. 119-132. 
Nicolaescu, M. (1996) Utopian Desires and Western Representations of Femininity. 
Replika, Special Issue, pp. 103-110. 
Nora, P. (1989) Between memory and history. Les lieux de mémoire. Representations, 
26, pp. 7-24. 
Opracowanie zbiorowe (2014) Gender. Przewodnik Krytyki Politycznej, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.  
Orla-Bukowska, A. (2006) New threads on an old loom. National memory and social 
identity in postwar and post-Communist Poland. In Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, 
W. & Fogu, C. (eds.) The politics of memory in postwar Europe, Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, pp. 177-210. 
Ost, D. (1991) Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics Opposition and Reform in 
Poland since 1968, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Ost, D. (2005) The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Outshoorn, J. & Kantola, J. (2007) Changing state feminism, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Pabijanek, K. (2013), The Role of the Catholic Church in Abortion Debates after 1989 
in Poland. In Manifold Angles of Gender: Looking through a Magnifying 
Glass”, Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, pp. 59-
63. 
Panizza, F. & Miorelli, R. (2013) Taking Discourse Seriously: Discursive 
Institutionalism and Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory. Political Studies, 
61(2), pp. 301-318. 
Pańków, I. & Post, B. (eds.) (2010) Kobiety u władzy? Spojrzenie z Sejmu, Warszawa: 
Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN. 
Papanek, H. (1994) The Ideal Woman and the Ideal Society: Control and Autonomy 
in the Construction of Identity. In Moghadam, V.M. (ed.) Identity politics and 
women: cultural reassertions and feminisms in international perspective, 
Boulder, San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 42-75. 
Pascall, G. & Kwak, A. (2005) Gender Regimes in Transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Bristol: Policy Press. 
Paternotte, D., van der Dussen, S. & Piette, V. (eds.) (2015) Habemus Gender! 
Déconstruction d’une riposte religieuse, Bruxelles: Sextant. 
Penn, S. (1994) The National Secret. Journal of Women’s History, 5(3), pp. 55-69. 
Penn, S. (2003) Podziemie kobiet, Warszawa: Rosner i wspólnicy. 
Penn, S. (2014) Sekret Solidarności, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo W.A.B. 
Perelman, M. (2012) Barbaric Sport: A Global Plague, London: Verso.  
Peterson, S.V. (1999) Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism. International 
Feminist Journal of Politics, 1(1), pp. 34-65. 
Peterson, S.V. (2005) How (the meaning of) gender matters in political economy. New 
Political Economy, 10(4), pp. 499-521. 
Pető, A. (2003) European Integration: Politics of Opportunity for Hungarian Women? 
European Integration Studies, 2(2), pp. 81–86. 
Pető, A. (2015) “Anti-gender” mobilisational discourse of conservative and far right 
parties as a challenge for progressive politics. In Kováts, E. & Põim, M. (eds.) 
Gender as symbolic glue: the position and role of conservative and far right 
parties in the anti-gender mobilizations in Europe, Budapest: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, pp. 126-131. 
Pierson, P. (2000) Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. 
American Political Science Review, 94(2), pp. 251-268. 
No country for losers? 
313 
Bibliography 
Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pierson, P. & Skocpol, T. (2002) Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political 
Science. In Katznelson, I. & Milner, H. (eds.) Political Science: The State of 
the Discipline, New York: Norton, pp. 693-721. 
Pietrzak, J. (2016) Smutki tropików. Współczesne kino Ameryki Łacińskiej jako kino 
polityczne, Warszawa: Książka i Prasa. 
Pine, F. (1996) Redefining Women's Work in Rural Poland. In Abrahams, R. (ed.) 
After Socialism: Land Reform and Social Change in Eastern Europe, Oxford: 
Berghahn, pp. 133-155. 
Pine, F. (1998) Dealing with fragmentation: the consequences of privatisation in rural 
central and southern Poland. In Pine, F. & Bridger, S. (eds.) Surviving Post-
socialism: local strategies and regional responses in post-socialist Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 106-123. 
Pine, F. (2002) Retreat to the household? Gendered domains in post-socialist Poland. 
In Hahn, C.M. (ed.) Postsocialism: ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia, 
London: Routledge. pp. 95-113. 
Pine, F. & Bridger, S. (eds.) (1998) Surviving Post-socialism: local strategies and 
regional responses in post-socialist Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Podgórska, J. & Kapecka, J. (2003) Cień Matki Polki. Polityka, 24.05.2003, pp. 92- 
95. 
Ponzanesi, S. & Colpani, G. (eds.) (2016) Postcolonial Transitions in Europe, 
Contexts, Practices and Politics, London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
International. 
Porter, B. (2000) When nationalism began to hate. Imagining modern politics in 
nineteenth century Poland, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Prado, C.G. (1995) Starting With Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Prizel, I. (1998) National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in 
Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Radaelli, C. (2000) Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism 
as a source of Legitimacy. Governance, 13(1), pp.25-44. 
Radaelli, C. (2003) The Europeanization of Public Policy. In Featherstone, K. & 
Radaelli, C. (eds.) The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp.  27-56. 
Radkiewicz, M. (2005) XY–tożsamość mężczyzny w polskich filmach fabularnych. 
In Durys, E. & Ostrowska, E. (eds.) Gender: Wizerunki Kobiet i Mężczyzn w 
Kulturze, Kraków: Rabid, pp. 259-268. 
Rai, S. & Waylen, G. (eds.) (2008) Global Governance, Feminist Perspectives, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Rai, S. & Waylen, G. (eds.) (2013) New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy, 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Ramazanoglu, C. & Holland, J. (2002) Feminist Methodology: Challenges and 
Choices, London: Sage. 
Randall, V. (2002) Feminism. In Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (eds.) Theory and Methods 
in Political Science, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 109–130. 
Reeser, T. W. (2010) Masculinities in Theory: An Introduction, Chichester Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Regulska, J. (1998) The new ‘other’ European woman. In Ferreira, V., Tavares, T. & 
Portugal, S. (eds.) Shifting bonds, shifting bounds: women, mobility and 
citizenship in Europe, Oeiras: Celta Editora. 
Regulska, J., Lukić, J. & Zaviršek, D. (2006) Introduction. In Lukić, J., Regulska, J. 
& Zaviršek, D. (eds.) Women and Citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Bodwin: Aldershot, pp. 1-20. 
Regulska, J. & Grabowska, M. (2008) Will it make a difference? EU enlargement and 
women’s public discourse in Poland. In Roth, S. (ed.) Gender Politics in the 
Expanding European Union, Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 137–154. 
Reinharz, S. (1992) Feminist Methods in Social Research, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rich, A. (1986) Blood Bread and Poetry, Selected Prose 1979–1985, New York: 
Norton and Co. 
Rose, N. & Novas, C. (2004) Biological citizenship. In Ong, A. & Collier, S.J. (eds.) 
Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological 
Problems, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 439-463. 
Ruchniewicz, K. (2007) Noch ist Polen nicht verloren. Das historische Denken der 
Polen, Münster: LIT Verlag. 
Rudaś-Grodzka, M., Nadana-Sokołowska, K., Mrozik, A., Szczuka, K., Czeczot, K., 
Smoleń, B., Nasiłowska, A., Serafin, E. M. & Wróbel, A. (eds.) (2014) 
Encyklopedia gender. Płeć w kulturze, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Czarna 
Owca. 
No country for losers? 
315 
Bibliography 
Rueschemeyer, M. & Wolchik, S.L. (eds.) (2009) Women in Power in Post-communist 
Parliaments, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Said, E. W. (1978) Orientalism, New York: Pantheon Books. 
Sarata, N. (2010) Polityka równościowa w kryzysie. In Kobiety na „zielonej wyspie”. 
Kryzys w Polsce z perspektywy gender, Warszawa: Fundacja Feminoteka, 
Fundacja H. Bölla, Przedstawicielstwo w Polsce, pp. 105-122. 
Saward, M. (2010) The Representative Claim, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Saxonberg, S. & Szelewa, D. (2007) The Continuing Legacy of the Communist 
Legacy? The development of family policies in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. Social Politics, 14(3), pp. 351-379. 
Schegloff, E. (1997) Whose text? Whose discourse? Discourse & Society, 8(2), pp. 
165-187. 
Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) (2005) The Europeanization of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Schmidt, V. A. (2008) Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas 
and Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, pp. 303–326. 
Scott, J. W. (1986) Gender: a useful category of historical analysis. American 
Historical Review, 91, pp. 1053-1075. 
Sierakowski, S. (2014) The Polish Church’s Gender Problem. The New York Times. 
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/opinion/sierakowski-the-
polish-churchs-gender-problem.html?_r=0 (accessed December 2016). 
Šiklová, J. (1993) Are Women in Central and Eastern Europe Conservative? In Funk, 
N. & Mueller, M. (eds.) Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections 
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, New York: Routledge, pp. 
74-83. 
Šiklová, J. (1998) Why We Resist Western-Style Feminism. Transitions, 5(1), pp. 30-
35. 
Sindbjerg Martinsen, D. (2007) The Europeanization of gender equality – who controls 
the scope of non-discrimination? Journal of European Public Policy, 14(4), pp. 
544-562. 
Sissenich, B. (2007) Building States without Society: European Union Enlargement 
and Social Policy Transfer to Poland and Hungary, Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books. 
Slavova, K. (2006) Looking at Western feminism through the double lens of Eastern 
Europe and the Third World. In Lukić, J., Regulska, J. & Zaviršek, D. (eds.) 
Women and Citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe, Bodwin: Aldershot, 
pp. 245–264. 
Sloat, A. (2004) Legislating for Equality: The Implementation of the EU Equality 
Acquis in Central and Eastern Europe. Jean Monnet Working Papers 8, pp. 1-
23. 
Słodkowska, I. & Dołbakowska, M. (2006) Wybory 2005: Partie i ich programy, 
Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN. 
Snyder, T. (2003) The reconstruction of nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 
1569-1999, New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
Sowa, J. (2011) Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną formą, 
Kraków: Universitas. 
Sowa, J. (2015) Inna Rzeczpospolita jest możliwa. Widma przeszłości, wizje 
przyszłości, Warszawa: Grupa Wydawnicza Foksal. 
Sperling, V. (2014) Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Spivak, G.C. (1999) A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Toward a History of a 
Vanishing Present. Cambridge University Press. 
Środa, M. (2009) Kobiety i władza, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo W.A.B. 
Squires, J. (1999) Re-thinking the Boundaries of Political Representation. In Walby, 
S. (ed.) New Agendas for Women, Macmillan Publishers Limited, pp. 169 - 
189. 
Squires, J. (2007) New politics of gender equality, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Stapleton, K. & Wilson, J. (2004) Gender, Nationality and Identity. A Discursive 
Study. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11(1), pp. 45–60. 
Steinmo, S. (2008) Historical Institutionalism. In Della Porta, D. & Keating, M. (eds.) 
Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118-138. 
Stetson, D.M. & Mazur, A. (eds.) (1995) Comparative state feminism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Strahan, R. (2007) Leading Representatives: The Agency of Leaders in the Politics of 
the US House, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Sunderland, J. & Litosseliti, L. (2002) Gender identity and discourse analysis: 
theoretical and empirical considerations. In Litosseliti, L. & Sunderland, J. 
(eds.) Gender identity and discourse analysis. Discourse approaches to 
No country for losers? 
317 
Bibliography 
politics, society, and culture, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, pp. 1-
39. 
Tarrow, S. (2004) Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide. In Brady, H.E. & 
Collier, D. (eds.) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 171-180. 
Thelen, K. (2003) How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical 
Analysis. In Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (eds.) Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
208-240. 
Thelen, K. (2004) How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in 
Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tickner, A.J. (2005) What is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to 
International Relations Methodological Questions. International Studies 
Quarterly, 49, pp. 1-21.  
Tickner, A. J. (2006) Feminism meets International Relations: some methodological 
issues. In Ackerly, B.A., Stern, M. & True, J. (eds.) Feminist Methodologies 
for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-
41. 
Titkow, A. (2007) Tożsamość polskich kobiet. Ciągłość, zmiana, konteksty, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. 
Tóth, O. (1993) No envy, no pity. In Funk, N. & Mueller, M. (eds.) Gender politics 
and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, New York: Routledge, pp. 213-223. 
Trakilovic, M. (2016) ‘The Other Within’: Challenging Borders from the European 
Periphery. In Ponzanesi, S. & Colpani, G. (eds.) Postcolonial Transitions in 
Europe, Contexts, Practices and Politics, London, New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield International, pp. 209-228. 
Tripp, A. M. (2006) Why So Slow? The Challenges of Gendering Comparative 
Politics. Politics & Gender, 2(3), pp. 249–263.  
True, J. (2010) The Political Economy of Violence Against Women: A Feminist 
International Relations Perspective. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 32(1), 
pp. 39-59. 
Turbine, V. (2012) Locating Women’s Human Rights in Post-Soviet Provincial 
Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(10), pp. 1847–1869. 
Turunen, J. (2015) Semiotics of Politics. Dialogicality of Parliamentary Talk, Thesis 
(PhD), Uppsala University.  
Tycner, M. (2016) Poland's right turn: inexplicable madness or rational response? 
Open Democracy, Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-
make-it/marta-tycner/polands-right-turn-inexplicable-madness-or-rational-
response (accessed December 2016).  
Van Dijk, T. (1993) Elite Discourse and Racism, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Van Dijk, T. (2008) Discourse and Power, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Verdery, K. (1996) What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Verdery, K. (2002) Whither postsocialism? In Hahn, C.M. (ed.) Postsocialism: ideals, 
ideologies and practices in Eurasia, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 
15-28. 
Verloo, M. (2001) Another Velvet Revolution? Gender Mainstreaming and the Politics 
of Implementation. IWM Working Paper 5, Vienna: IWM. 
Verloo, M. (2005) Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe. A Critical Frame 
Analysis Approach. The Greek Review of Social Research, 17(B), pp. 11-34. 
Verloo, M. & Lombardo, E. (2007) Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in 
Europe. Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach. In Verloo, M. (ed.) 
Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality. A critical frame analysis of gender 
policies in Europe, Central European University Press, pp. 21-50. 
Vuorela, U. (2009) Colonial Complicity: The 'Postcolonial' in a Nordic Context. In 
Keskinen, S., Tuori, S., Irni, S. & Mulinari, D. (eds.) Complying with 
Colonialism. Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, pp. 19-33. 
Walby, S. (1994) Methodological and theoretical issues in the comparative analysis of 
gender relations in Western Europe. Environment and Planning, A(26), pp. 
1339-1354. 
Walby, S. (1996a) Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’? In Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) 
Mapping the Nation, London: Verso, pp. 225-234. 
Walby, S. (1996b) Woman and Nation. In Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) Mapping the Nation, 
London: Verso, pp. 235-254. 
Walby, S. (2004) The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of 
Gender Regime. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & 
Society, Spring, pp. 4-29. 
Walby, S. (2005) Gender, nation and other polities. In Tolz, V. & Booth, S. (eds.) 
Nation and gender in contemporary Europe, Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, pp. 10-23. 
No country for losers? 
319 
Bibliography 
Warat, M. (2014) Development of Gender Equality Policies in Poland. A review of 
success and limitations. Polish-Norwegian Research Programme operated by 
the National Centre for Research and Development under the Norwegian 
Financial Mechanism 2009-2014 in the frame of Project Contract No Pol-
Nor/200641/63/2013. 
Watson, N. & Lindenberg, U. (eds.) (2002) Monitoring the EU accession process: 
Equal opportunities for women and men, Budapest, Hungary: Open Society 
Institute. 
Watson, P. (1993a) Eastern Europe’s Silent Revolution: Gender. Sociology, 27(3), pp. 
471-487. 
Watson, P. (1993b) The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern Europe. New Left Review, I 
(198), pp. 71-82. 
Watson, P. (1997) (Anti)feminism after Communism. In Oakley, A. & Mitchell, J. 
(eds.) Who’s Afraid of Feminism? London: Hamish Hamilton, pp. 144-167. 
Watson, P. (2000a) Re-thinking Transition: Globalism, Gender and Class. 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2(2), pp. 185-213. 
Watson, P. (2000b) Theorizing Feminism in Postcommunism. In Bull, A., Diamond, 
H. & Marsh, R. (eds.) Feminisms and Women’s Movements in Contemporary 
Europe, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, pp. 100-117. 
Waylen, G. (2007) Engendering transitions. Women’s Mobilization, Institutions, and 
Gender Outcomes, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Waylen, G., Celis, K., Kantola, J. & Weldon, L.S. (2013) The Oxford Handbook of 
Gender and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Waylen, G. & Rai, S.M. (2013) New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy, Taylor 
and Francis. 
Weiner, E. (2009) Eastern Houses, Western Bricks? (Re)Constructing Gender 
Sensibilities in the European Union’s Eastward Enlargement. Social Politics, 
16 (3), pp. 303-326. 
Weldon, L. S. (2006a) The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of 
Gender. Politics & Gender, 2(3), pp. 235–248. 
Weldon, L. S. (2006b) Inclusion and understanding: a collective methodology for 
feminist International Relations. In Ackerly, B.A., Stern, M. & True, J. (eds.) 
Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 62-88. 
Widdowson, H. (1995) Discourse Analysis: A Critical View. Language and 
Literature, 4(3), pp. 157-172.  
Widdowson, H. (1996) Reply to Fairclough: Discourse and Interpretation: Conjectures 
and Refutations. Language and Literature, 5(1), pp. 57-69. 
Wielgosz, P. (2005) 25 Years of Solidarity – From Workers Revolution to Capitalism, 
Available at: http://www.naomiklein.org/shock-
doctrine/resources/part4/chapter9 (accessed January 2017).  
Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logica-Philosophicus, London: Kegan Paul. 
Wodak, R. (ed.) (1989) Language, Power and Ideology, Amsterdam: Benjamins 
Publishing. 
Wodak, R. (2009) The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wöhrer, V. (2004) Border Crossers. Gender Discourses Between ‘East' and ‘West'. In 
Frunză, M. & Văcărescu, T. (eds.) Gender and the (Post) ‘East’/’West’ Divide, 
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Limes, pp. 61-79. 
Wolchik, S. L. (1985) Women in Pre-Communist Period. Introduction. In Wolchik, 
S.L. & Meyer, A.G. (eds.) Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe, 
Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 47-50. 
Wolff, L. (1994) Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of 
the Enlightenment, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Yanow, D., Schwartz-Shea, P. & Freitas, M.J. (2008) Case Study Research in Political 
Science. In Mills, A.J., Durepos, G. & Wiebe, E. (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Case 
Study Research, London: Sage Publications. 
Young, I. M. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (1998) Gender and Nation, London: Sage Publications. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2001) Nationalism, Feminism and Gender Relations. In Guibernau, 
M. & Hutchinson, J. (eds.) Understanding Nationalism, Oxford: Polity Press, 
pp. 120-141. 
Yuval-Davis, N. & Anthias, F. (eds.) (1989) Woman-Nation-State, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Zielińska, K. (2010) Challenging the Nation. Polish Women’s Quest for Democracy 
and Justice. In Gora, M. & Mach, Z. (eds.) Collective Identity and Democracy. 
The Impact of EU Enlargement. ARENA Report 4/10, pp. 89-126. 
Zarycki, T. (2004) Uses of Russia: the role of Russia in the modern Polish national 
identity. East European Politics and Societies, 18(4), pp. 595-627. 
No country for losers? 
321 
Bibliography 
Zbyszewska, A. (2013) The European union working time directive: securing 
minimum standards, with gendered consequences. Women's Studies 
International Forum, 39, pp. 30-41. 
Zubrzycki, G. (2010) History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish 
Mythology. Qualitative Sociology, 34(1), pp. 21–57. 
Zvinkliene, A. (1999) Neo-Conservatism in Family Ideology in Lithuania. Between 
the West and the former USSR. In Bridger, S. (ed.) Women and Political 
Change. Perspectives from East-Central Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, pp. 135-150. 
 
